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An Exploratory Framework for India’s relationship with ‘New Nepal’ January 16, 2009 Nihar R. Nayak 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: P. Stobdan
Discussants: Ashok Mehta and Sangeeta Thapliyal

The paper, An Exploratory Framework for India’s Relationship with New Nepal, was presented by Dr. Nihar Nayak. Professor P. Stobdan was the Chair. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta and Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal were the external discussants; and Dr Smruti Pattanaik and Dr. Pushpita Das were the internal discussants.

The paper brought out the complexities associated with the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on July 31, 1950. It identified some key elements which should be incorporated to make the Treaty more acceptable to both sides. At the outset, the presentation briefly focused on the important Articles of the Treaty, highlighting that the key objective of the agreement was to promote peace and friendship between the two states. Mutual politico-economic, socio-cultural linkages and security requirements were underlined as common concerns. Highlighting the element of reciprocity, the paper argued that one key element of the treaty was that it offered economic opportunities in India for Nepalese nationals against Nepalese assurances that India’s security concerns would be respected. The external political environment in the form of the shadow of the Cold War was one of the overwhelming factors shaping concerns and perceptions on both sides. Chinese adventurism in Tibet and apprehensions over Communist influence in Nepal were some of the factors that drove the two countries towards a settlement of issues.

Dr. Nayak argued that over the years, the treaty has emerged as a nationalistic issue and is considered a major constraint on Nepal’s independent foreign policy. In fact, during his official visit to India in 2008, the Nepalese Premier emphasized that there should be a “clear revision” of the treaty. Highlighting the Nepalese and Indian perspectives, the paper brought out the key irritants associated with the treaty. While Nepal was overwhelmingly concerned with issues relating to security and the unilateral imposition of restrictions on the free movement of people across the border; India was conversely concerned with the number of Nepali immigrants and the presence of ISI in Nepal, who could be working in tandem with Chinese intelligence.

Dr. Nihar Nayak pointed out that despite irritants and opposition from both sides, especially Nepal, the treaty has not been abrogated by either side, an issue which he considered curiously serious, because Clause 10 provides for abrogation as a viable option. The paper also highlighted the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. On trade, Dr. Nayak argued that India is Nepal’s largest trading partner. Seventy per cent of total Nepalese trade is with India. Also, bilateral trade and investments have greatly improved between the two countries. India’s share in Nepal’s total trade made a quantum jump form 26 per cent in 1996-97 to almost 41 per cent in 2000-01. In fact amongst the SAARC countries, India’s trade growth has been the fastest with Nepal and total trade stands at half a billion dollars accounting for around 25 per cent of total India-SAARC trade. However, hydro-projects, transit and employment benefits to Nepalese migrants in India are possible areas of cooperation between the two countries. Notwithstanding the mutual benefits, the relationship between the two countries remains strained. New Nepal, Dr. Nayak argued, provides an opportunity towards strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries. He suggested that the treaty needs adjustment, review and updating, keeping in view changing security and economic realities. Both governments, he emphasized, also need to agree not to allow the use of their respective territories for activities harmful to the national security interests of the other. Also, both countries should not enter into any kind of military alliance with third countries.

Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta argued that the concept of New Nepal is questionable, as it is an ongoing process. He pointed out that the fact that there was no earlier call for abrogation of the treaty was incorrect as the call for change had come from Manmohan Adhikari. He noted that the main problem with the 1950 treaty was that all provisions of the treaty were in breach in themselves and none of them were operational. He also pointed out that one of the main problems with the 1950 treaty was that the implications of the treaty had not been studied in detail, engendering parochial politics for vested interests. Gen. Mehta underlined the importance of identifying new concerns in Nepal, pointing out that Nepal and Pakistan were two factors which ought to be taken into account while discussing India-Nepal relations.

Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal noted that the paper needs to revisit the underlying context of its title. She argued that it was important to identify the groups and political actors in Nepal opposed to the treaty. She also noted that Nepal’s fears need to be taken into account and consequent ramifications for the treaty. It was also important to discuss what kind of a relationship India wanted with Nepal.

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik pointed out that the issue of abrogation is directly linked with political posturing. The 1950 treaty needed to be seen in the context of identity politics. She pointed out that domestic politics in Nepal was primarily responsible for the failure of the 1950 treaty and that there was a need to bring out the Indian perspective on the treaty more clearly. Dr Pushpita Das pointed out that it was important to argue why India should opt for a revision of the treaty.

Some of the points raised during the discussion were:

  • The issue of remittances going to Nepal was important.
  • Issue of perceptional factors regarding the image of Nepali workers in India should be considered. Also, identification cards and certificates need to be issued to Nepali migrants in India.
  • It was important to outline the status of Indian business interests in Nepal.
  • Domestic concerns are far more important to Maoists in Nepal than the 1950 treaty.
  • The 1950 treaty could offer a broader framework for a better Indo-Nepal bilateral relationship.

Prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

South Asia India-Nepal Relations, Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nepal
Interaction with a Delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of Swedish Parliament January 12, 2009 Round Table

A delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament visited IDSA on January 12, 2009. Ms. Carina Hägg of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden led the delegation. The focus of the interactive session was regional security in South Asia. Dr. Arvind Gupta, the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at the institute, chaired the interactive session. Members of the South Asia cluster at IDSA as well as the members of the other clusters participated in the discussion.

Dr. Arvind Gupta gave an overview of the political and economic situation in the South Asia region including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives. He said that while there is democratic change in the region and the environment for regional cooperation was good, the recent terror attacks in Mumbai represent a setback for India- Pakistan relations and regional peace. He noted that Pakistan was in a denial-mode about the Mumbai attacks. Islamabad’s reluctance to come to terms with the fact that Pakistan’s soil was being used for terrorist attacks was not helping matters. In India there was deep anguish and despair about Pakistan’s denial and its diversionary tactics. The Indian government has acted with great restraint and relied on diplomacy. The international community must appreciate the gravity of the terror threat emanating from Pakistan and take effective steps curb to it.

Captain Alok Bansal, Research Fellow at IDSA, gave a brief overview of the security situation in Pakistan. He indicated that the Pakistan government’s control over its territory was rather tenuous. Besides the economic crisis, the state was beset with a resurgence of ethnic aspirations and various ethnic groups are seeking a greater share of Pakistan’s economic resources. However, the gravest threat to Pakistan is the progressive Talibanisation of its North-Western territories. Taliban had established firm control over North and South Waziristan and Orakzai agency and they are active in Mohmand agency. Large parts of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) including Swat valley had come under the influence of the Taliban. Talibanisation has also led to sectarianism. Sectarian violence has become endemic to Kurram agency and parts of NWFP. Currently Pakistani forces are not undertaking any operations against the Taliban. They are instead pursuing isolated and limited action in Mohmand and Khyber agencies. In the past six months major operations have only been confined to Bajaur agency and Swat valley.

The Swedish delegation raised a number of issues during the interaction. They wanted to know about Sino-Indian relations, India’s role in UN peacekeeping missions, and the security implications of climate change. Suitable briefings were given to the visitors on these issues. It was emphasized that although India faces a number of security challenges, India’s approach in dealing with these problems was rooted in its democratic and multi-cultural ethos. The visiting delegation was also briefed on various issues relating to Sino-Indian relations. They were informed that though Sino-Indian engagement increased considerably in recent years such as in trade, tourism and students’ exchange programme, but there are still unresolved issues like the border dispute and Tibetan refugees. The capability and future aspirations of the Chinese Navy, its manoeuvrings in the Indian Ocean, bases in neighbouring countries of India and the strategic implications of its naval expansion for the region were also discussed.

Prepared by Alok Mukhopadhyay, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Nuclear and Arms Control
Tibet: Connectivity, Capabilities and Consequences January 09, 2009 P. Stobdan 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: Arvind Gupta
Discussants: Ravi Sawhney and Rahul K Bhonsle

Since 1951, China had fueled massive economic investment in Tibet. In recent decades, infrastructure assumed the salience in China’s Tibet strategy, especially under its ‘Go West’ policy, launched by Jiang Zemin in 2000. The stated goal was to usher Tibet into an era of modernity and prosperity. The policy gained more urgent priority since 2003 when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao showed greater commitment to make Tibet a part of China’s economic miracle. The 1,100 kilometer railway to Lhasa that cost $4.2 billion has symbolized China’s success in Tibet. Even the Indian Defence Minister Mr. A K Antony accepted the fact that there was no comparison of such development on the Indian side, when he visited a forward location in December 2007.

In 2007, China’s State Council had approved 180 projects for Tibet that would cost over 770 billion yuan ($10.2) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Reports suggest that more than 77 percent projects have already commenced. According to the Tibet Autonomous Regional Development and Reform Commission, over 200 billion Yuan were spent during the year 2008.

On October 14, 2008, Chinese military engineers and workers began digging a tunnel in Tibet’s Galung La Mountain in Nyingchi Prefecture to build the most difficult highway to China’s last road-less Medog County that borders Arunachal Pradesh. China’s state media prominently highlighted the significance of the 141 km long road connecting Medog with Tibet’s main East-West highway. The project will be completed by 2010.

The great concern for India is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), also known as the ‘Great Western Line’. The project is worth China’s $60 billion that aims to divert more than 40 billion cubic meters of water annually from China’s longest river, the Yangtze, and its tributaries through a tunnel under the Yellow River to northern China. The initial phase is expected to be ready by 2010. But a section of the route has already been used for meeting the water requirements during the Beijing Olympics. The initial two routes of the project will take water from the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze basin through the Yellow River to Beijing, Tianjin, and other booming cities in the north. The third route plans to divert waters from Tibet’s Yalong, Dadu and Jinsha rivers to the northern plains. The Brahmaputra project forms the second phase of the third route. The project was envisaged on the assumption that by 2030 the Yangtze basin will not have sufficient water for transfer to the north. The major concern here is: why is China going ahead with the SNWTP if there is inadequate water available for rerouting?

The project’s aim is to divert the Tsangpo at the Shoumatan Point (the ‘Big U-turn’) for constructing the world’s largest hydroelectric plant at the knick-zone to generate 40,000 Megawatts of electricity, and for diverting 200 billion cubic meters of water annually to the arid north. The project will involve enormous engineering complexity on the scale of the Tibet railway system and the Three Gorges dam. Media reports also suggest China’s proposal to use nuclear explosives to blast a 15 kilometer tunnel at the U-turn.

The great challenge for India regarding the project is that India has no water sharing treaty with China. China has rarely bothered to share information prior to flood situations. As a result India often becomes vulnerable to environmental threats. Also, there is no record of China consulting the lower riparian states before undertaking construction of dams upstream.

As the economies of India and China grow, both are going to compete not only for oil and gas but also for water resources. One can conclude that China as the upstream state would treat water as a strategic commodity.

Points raised during the Discussion

  • China is unwilling to discuss the issue with India at the bilateral level.
  • There is a need to discuss water diversion by China at the United Nations and the issue also needs to be brought before the International Court of Justice.
  • The potential impact on India of China blocking the Brahmaputra river needs to be examined.

Prepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN Tibet, India-China Relations, China
Spreading Tentacles of Left-Wing Extremism: Are we Failing in Police Training: A case study of Chhattisgarh January 09, 2009 Om Shankar Jha 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: Ved Marwah
Discussants: G. D. Bakshi and K. M. Madhusudhanan

Various case studies of Naxalite-related incidents have revealed that one of the prime reasons for recurring security forces casualties has been the inadequacy in training imparted to them. While the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) have well developed integral infrastructure and resources for training, the police forces in most of the States are generally lagging behind. Police forces are generally capacity-deficient to fight the Naxalites effectively and need to be transformed into a combat-oriented force in Naxal-affected States. However, police training has been less than satisfactory. An adequate and efficient police training system, infrastructure and resources are required to be built up in the States to meet current training requirements.

The vital question is whether the present police training facilities, resources and infrastructure available in the States are adequate to train personnel, including new recruits, within a short span of time. This paper attempts to assess the present police training system, infrastructure and resources in Naxal-affected States, discusses the role of the Central Government in general, and examines Chhattisgarh in particular. The paper also identifies corrective measures and makes relevant policy recommendations.

Law and order being a state subject, the primary responsibility of building police training system, infrastructure and resources lies with State governments. However, the Central Government has been rendering support to States in the formulation of training policy, research, improving law enforcement, standardisation and modernisation through exchange of knowledge, coordination and budgetary allocation. The Centre as part of the Seventh Plan has recently taken the initiative and decided to set up 20 Counter insurgency and Anti-Terrorism training Centres in Bihar, Jharkhand, Assam, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Also adequate funds have been allocated to Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) in the 7th plan for development of the police training system throughout the country. Modernisation of police forces has not brought about any visible improvement in the police training system so far in most of the States. A few States like Andhra Pradesh have however taken the lead.

Presently, a huge gap exists between requirements and availability of police training infrastructure and resources in most of the States. Select numbers of police personnel are being trained in Army and CPMF training establishments. However, these establishments have their own commitments and cannot afford to regularly train State police personnel unless their infrastructure and resources are enhanced.

Chhattisgarh State police personnel lack adequate training to effectively fight the Naxalites. The police training infrastructure and resources in this State are not commensurate with ground requirements. Also, the lack of coordination between CPMF and state police forces is evident given the absence of an operational ethos and gap in training.

Chhattisgarh inherited a depleted police force and infrastructure when it was formed in the year 2001. A large number of reluctant officers and men from Madhya Pradesh were allotted Chhattisgarh State. Besides, many personnel, trained in instructional duties, managed to remain in Madhya Pradesh. The state inherited the worst Naxalite-hit areas, and the Chhattisgarh Police, at its inception, was capacity deficient. Given the state’s limited infrastructure, it also suffers from deficiency in training. Finances are a major constraint faced by the State police and are far below what is necessary to meet the requirements of manpower, mobility, infrastructure, communication, land, residential accommodation, etc.

The state police has identified some key areas and steps are being taken to improve police training. These include: commando training; intelligence training; basic induction training; specialist training; improvement of training infrastructure and facilities; joint training with CPMF; joint/collective training with CPMF; and redressing resource deficiency. Also, the State has taken an initiative to establish a Counter Insurgency and Jungle warfare Training College which can train 3,600 police personnel each year. With limited training infrastructure, Chattisgarh will take at least 10 years to train its entire police manpower in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare.

A positive environment and culture is lacking in the police set up in most of the States. Posting to a training institution is considered as punishment. Also there is little interest in undergoing training. There is no motivation and incentive for the trainers. Hence police forces lack good quality of instructors. Training is also not strictly linked with promotion. Training is therefore a neglected activity in the police. Excess commitment of police personnel is another reason for training to be neglected.

Holistic development of the training system is required in the police set-up. The essence of police human resource development lies in training, and it cannot be neglected any longer. There is an urgent need to prioritise training at all levels including special pilot projects like dedicated allocation of budget for development of training infrastructure and resources to States. The Army and the CPMF have a large number of well-trained instructors whose services can be utilised in the police training academies of naxal-affected States.

The paper’s recommendations were:

  • Prioritising police training at all levels especially in Naxalism- affected States.
  • Addressing budgetary constraints.
  • Addressing manpower and leadership problems.
  • Development of instructional staff.
  • Developing training infrastructure.
  • Developing a healthy training culture.
  • Improving operational understanding between State Police Forces and CPMF through joint training and inducting CPMF instructors and leadership in armed police battalions and police training institutions. Also utilisation of retired army personnel and officers in police training can be explored.

Points raised during the Discussion:

  • The menace of Left Wing Extremism constitutes a considerable security threat for India’s internal peace and development.
  • Left Wing Extremism has socioeconomic roots.
  • Left Wing Extremism is a heartland insurgency; so the government relies on police and paramilitary forces.
  • The Andhra Pradesh model of tackling Left Wing Extremism has worked, and should be replicated elsewhere with adequate modifications to suit local conditions.
  • Left-wing extremism ultimately requires a political solution.
  • Police leadership have to change their attitude especially towards training, which needs to be prioritised.
  • The Army’s short-service officers may be reemployed for police training.
  • Army/paramilitary forces personnel may be deputed to the training Institutes and armed police battalions of States affected by Left Wing Extremism.
  • Human rights must be included in the police training curricula.

Prepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Terrorism & Internal Security Left-Wing Extremism, Naxal, Maoist, Chhattisgarh
India’s Economic Engagement of Africa: Partnering Africa January 02, 2009 Ruchita Beri 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: Arvind Gupta
Discussants: Dilip Lahiri and Shipra Tripathi

Historically, the principal tenet of India’s policy towards Africa has been support for the struggle for decolonization and racial discrimination in South Africa. Economic engagement between India and Africa is increasing like never before though it is not new. During the colonial period, India played a significant role in terms of supplying personnel for middle level services such as duka. At present the scale and swiftness of India’s economic engagement with Africa is expanding. This has been facilitated by the changing African outlook in recent years. On the political side there has been an end in sight for some of the debilitating conflicts that have ravaged the continent. At the same time there is a move by Africans to take charge of their own destiny. For its part, the Indian government laid out its broad economic cooperation frame work during the India-Africa Forum Summit in April 2008. This conference gained significance because of an attempt to forge a closer partnership between India and African countries and address the common goals and challenges they face. An important element of India’s approach towards Africa is the growing presence of the private sector in African countries.

India does not have the financial capacity to match the grants in aid by China and the West to Africa. However, India recognizes the African countries’ focus on capacity building and human resources development. As a result, Africa today is the largest recipient of India’s technical cooperation programme. India’s growing synergy with Africa is quite visible in the recent trade trends. Bilateral trade has increased from US $967 million in 1990-91 to $25 billion in 2006-07. India has institutionalized its relationship with African countries by launching the India-Africa Forum in April 2008. During the summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a number of initiatives including a duty-free trade preference scheme for 34 African countries. India has also enhanced its relations with African countries in the energy sector. Currently around 24 per cent of India’s crude oil imports are sourced from Africa. Indian national oil companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (OVL) has invested in equity assets in African countries.

However, China’s booming investment in Africa has provoked a heated debate on the continent and around the world. One of the challenges that India faces is the penchant among the Western media and intellectual to mention in the same breath both the Indian model of engagement with Africa and the very different Chinese economic approach to Africa. African countries have acknowledged the growth of Indian economy and have expressed a desire to emulate the Indian model.

Points raised during the Discussion

  • The India-Africa economic engagement needs to be examined carefully with specific data.
  • There is a need to create a centre or an institution to study India-Africa engagement.
  • There is a need to check where India should be focused and to know what when and where Africans really want to engage us.
  • Private sector involvement in Africa is very important.
  • People to people contact should be enhanced.
  • Non-Alignment is important for maintaining good relations between India and Africa.
  • There isn’t much Indian scholarship on Africa and this needs to be rectified.
  • India’s engagement in Africa’s social domain must be looked into.
  • India should identify areas in which more positive relations with African countries can be developed such as health, medicine, etc.
  • India should understand the sensibility of Africans.
  • In terms of investment competition between India and China, Africa welcomes both of them.
  • African countries believe that their problems can be better understood by Asian countries than others.
  • There is a need to promulgate a new policy towards Africa along the lines of the ‘look east policy’.
  • There is no need to compare China’s influence in Africa with that of India.

Prepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN Africa, India-Africa Relations, Economic Relations
A Critical Evaluation of Andhra Pradesh’s Response to the Naxal Challenge December 19, 2008 P. V. Ramana 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: G. D Bakshi
Discussants: D. K. Karthikeyan and J. N. Roy

Andhra Pradesh has been dealing with the Naxalite challenge for a long time and the way in which it has dealt with this challenge has evolved over this time. The Union Government has been suggesting to other Naxal-affected States that they should adopt the Andhra Model in responding to the Naxalite challenge. The objective of this paper is to discern the constituents of what is popularly referred to as the Andhra Model – in other words Andhra Pradesh’s experience in addressing the Naxalite challenge.

In sum, what is popularly referred to as the Andhra Model comprises of Security Response, Political Response and Development Response.

Security Response: Some of the core elements of the Security Response are: Surrender and Rehabilitation, Intelligence-based Operations, Victim Reassurance Policy such as civilian rehabilitation, and police rehabilitation, and Development Works and Mass Mobilisation.

Political Response: There exists, now, a consensus among the major political formations in the State on the approach to dealing with the Naxalites. They understand that the challenge is, indeed, real and has to be addressed. It is this realisation that has manifested in a response which comprises three essential elements, viz. tough security response, development response, and conducting limited periods of peace process.

Development Response: Twice, development programmes have been launched in the State with the particular objective of bringing in rapid socio-economic development in Naxalite-affected areas. The first initiative was known as Remote Areas Development Programme; and the second is known as Remote and Interior Areas Development Programme. Other development programmes such as Jalayagnam and Indiramma were also initiated.

The political leadership was initially not sensitive enough to the impending Naxalite challenge. This changed and a consensus had emerged among the political formations by about 1996-97 that the rebels had to be taken headlong, in all possible ways. Thus, the political will and commitment displayed by the leadership played a significant role in crafting Andhra Pradesh’s response to the challenge posed by the Naxalites. The other affected States have with them the advantage of the experience of the Andhra Pradesh in dealing with the Naxalite issue. They would have to clearly recognise that the Andhra Pradesh model is much more than deploying the elite Greyhounds. It involves years of painstakingly building-up the fighting capabilities of the State police, their training, logistics and intelligence.

To sum up, it might not be appropriate to suggest a near total replication of the experiences of Andhra Pradesh in dealing with the rebels. At best, it could serve as a relevant reference point for the other Naxalite-affected States to craft their respective strategies.

Major points raised during the discussion were:

  • Development funds are often diverted to the Naxalites. The political parties/ political leaderships too pay ‘protection money’ to the Naxalites.
  • Poor governance has led to increase in Naxalites subversive activities.
  • To counter Naxalite challenge, the root cause will have to be attended to. And, the state’s delivery mechanism has to be revamped. The state has to penetrate into remote tribal areas.
  • Talks with Naxalite should be initiated.
  • Andhra Pradesh’s experience in addressing the Naxalite challenge is a unique example, and is successful. It is important to understand the model by other Naxal -affected States.
  • Andhra Pradesh Model is successful because of the ‘accessibility’, and it evolved over a long period of time.
  • Andhra Pradesh Model, however, has failed to implement Land Reforms.

Prepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

Terrorism & Internal Security India, Left-Wing Extremism, Naxal, Maoist, Andhra Pradesh
His Excellency Mr. Lulzim Basha, the Foreign Minister of Albania December 18, 2008 Round Table

His Excellency Mr. Lulzim Basha, the Foreign Minister of Albania led a high-level delegation to the IDSA on December 18, 2008 for an interaction with scholars on Indo-Albanian relations and the priorities of Albanian foreign policy. Mr. Basha was in India for the first time as the Foreign Minister of Albania on the occasion of inaugurating the Albanian embassy in New Delhi. Dr. Arvind Gupta who holds the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA chaired the interactive session.

Welcoming H.E. Lulzim Basha, Dr. Gupta highlighted the historic importance of Albania in the context of regional pace and stability. He referred to the deep respect every Indian has for Mother Teresa. He said that though diplomatic relations between the two countries are at a nascent stage, the first-ever visit by an Albanian Foreign Minister would pave the way of a long-lasting relationship.

Mr. Basha, in his introductory remarks, gave a brief overview of Albanian foreign policy, its role in South East Europe and the future of Indo-Albanian relations. He described Albania as a small country, a recent democracy but with a long history. The primary objective of Albanian foreign policy is to integrate with NATO as well as the European Union. While Albania would gain NATO membership in April 2009, when the alliance is going to observe its 60th year of existence, the process of full membership of the EU is also underway. Given that NATO is extremely important for Albanian security, Mr. Basha stated that Albanian forces have already been posted in Afghanistan along with NATO forces. On the modernisation and reform process of the Albanian armed forces, he stated that Albania strives for light, expeditionary forces which can be posted in different global theatres of conflict like Afghanistan and Iraq. Interoperability of Albanian armed forces is therefore an important objective. However beyond interoperability, Albania also wants to collectively address global challenges like piracy, nuclear proliferation, safety of energy supply routes, cyber security and most importantly terrorism.

Expressing his sympathy and solidarity with the people of India in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 26th, Minister Basha underlined that both India and Albania face common challenges. On the issue of the independence of Kosovo, he stated that so far 53 nations have recognised Kosovo as an independent nation. The minister said that the instance of Kosovo is a unique one and cannot be equated with other regions. Albania supports the independence of Kosovo and wants to integrate the whole Balkan region into the Euro-Atlantic architecture.

On Indo-Albanian relations, the Minister affirmed that his visit is aimed at building a strategic component to the bilateral relationship. Though Albania wants increased trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) from India, it is also willing to build partnership with Indian academia, research institutions, think tanks and strategic community.

On nuclear proliferation, the Minister stated that Albania strongly supports the US position and it does not want more countries with nuclear aspirations. On Sino-Albanian relations, Mr. Basha said that this relationship has traditionally been very strong and economic relations are continuously being strengthened. Though Albania supports the One-China policy, it strongly believes in democracy, human rights and multi-party system. On Albanian membership of NATO, the Minister underscored that besides its military nature, the alliance also represents values like democracy, human rights, etc. Countries who want to be NATO members have to ensure that these values are protected. For Albania, membership of NATO is a win-win situation. About the possible threat of radicalisation of younger Muslims in the Western Balkans in general and in Albania in particular, the Minister assured that the Muslim community in the European region had so far not been influenced by any extraneous global movements and the Albanian experience had been very successful.

The Minister concluded that his delegation, which had representatives of Albanian trade and commerce, would be able to contribute to Indo-Albanian economic relations whose potential has so far remained unexploited.

Prepared by Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Nuclear and Arms Control
Intelligence orientation course for DIA/ Service HQ officers December 15, 2008 to December 19, 2008 Training Capsules
China in Asia: Strategic Goals & Emerging Patterns in its Periphery Policy December 12, 2008 Sujit Dutta 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: V. P. Dutt
Discussants: Madhu Bhalla and G. V. C. Naidu

The paper broadly argued that the extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy is generating political and economic waves across Asia. The peaceful rise and integration of China into the international system necessitates that it pursues a long-term peace strategy that does not fundamentally clash with the interests of the major Asian powers. The pursuit of an aggressive nationalist course would not only be highly destabilizing but would also seriously jeopardize the economic and security prospects for Asia. However, China’s pursuit of a peace strategy is domestically challenged – by segments of its military and Party that are steeped in old style nationalism and seek territorial gains against India, Japan and Southeast Asia; unify Taiwan and utilize its growing influence to manage the influence of the major powers – US, India, Japan and Russia. The tensions at the heart of China’s foreign policy and strategic establishment over both national goals and appropriate strategy has nor been resolved. Biding time indicates a tactical adjustment while the statement of harmony and peaceful rise underlines a long term peace strategy. Both domestic and external political realignments are to be expected in such a political context. India’s strategic environment and role in emerging Asia would be significantly shaped by what happens in China and what politics it pursues towards Asia’s regions.

Major points raised during the discussion were:

  • The things which categorize China’s regional policy are driven by its security concerns.
  • The ideology of nationalism may lead to sub-nationalism and can be problematic.
  • There is a modern dimension to the periphery engagement pursued by China.
  • China is only trying to re-evolve its earlier periphery policy. What one needs to do is look at history if it can tell us where China will go.
  • The current debate within the community of Chinese historians as to what are the real boundaries has relevance to the question of Tibet as well as India.
  • China’s rise came about at a time when the Cold war was declining.
  • There has been a relative decline in the influence of the United States and Japan in South East Asia. Today China is the largest aid provider to Myanmar and Laos and the second largest to Vietnam.
  • In South East Asia no country wants to appear to be antagonistic to China.
  • China has to learn to deal with the emergence of India as an East Asian power.
  • North Korea and Pakistan may appear to be a liability for China in the long run.
  • One cannot draw a pattern in the Chinese regional understanding.
  • There needs to be more focus on issues of military technology and military modernization of China.
  • China’s focus remains hard power.
  • China’s behaviour is guided by its nationalist goals and it makes no compromises.
  • China is gradually moving away form multilateralism to regionalism.
  • China has always projected its economic power and has not been seen to be making any compromises.
  • China’s main strategic rival is the United States even today and its major focus is the quest for resources.
  • There has been an increase in the Chinese presence in South Asia and also an increase in the efforts made by China to exclude India from the East Asian region.
  • China has gained from the decline of the USSR and will definitely take advantage of the decline of the United States.
  • A number of scenarios were proposed that could have been included in the paper as future predictions.
  • China’s thinking on the periphery needs to be looked at in detail.
  • Can the idea of periphery be discussed as an extended neighbourhood?
  • It needs to be highlighted that China has made compromises with Myanmar, Russia and Japan on the territorial issues.
  • China does not have an Asia policy and a loss of territory is considered as a loss of prestige.

Prepared by Gunjan Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

East Asia China's South Asia Policy, China-Asia Relations, China
Exploring India – Kazakhstan Transport Linkages December 11, 2008 1030 to 1300 hrs Round Table

A Roundtable was held on December 11, 2008 against the backdrop of increasing demand for transport connectivity between India and Central Asia. Among the many points discussed the following stand out as important.

  • Economic growth in the Asian region and emerging opportunities for interregional trade are creating a demand for viable transport connectivity, land-linking arrangements, and important transit services.
  • Due to geographical and geopolitical attributes, India and Central Asia are confronted with a range of constraints that have hitherto inhabited a full realization of two-way trade and commerce. The problems of distance were substantially compounded by the instability factor in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The situation was unlikely to change in the near and medium term.
  • The discussion focused on the importance of restoring the ancient Silk Route that traditionally linked Central Asia and India through China’s Xinjiang province, while it also emphasized on the need for developing the North-South Corridor or road connectivity through Iran and Afghanistan.
  • It was realized that any viable future long-distance transport grids, including energy pipelines from resource rich Siberia and Central Asia to India were not possible without them transiting through Western China. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) becomes the hub for any mode of transportation to be developed in the future.
  • Participants underscored the point that China and Central Asian countries have facilitated various transit transport systems to overcome their interregional trade problems. A web of transport connectivity has been developed by XUAR, which has 16 Class A ports and 11 Class B ports connecting with eight countries.
  • According to experts, different variants of transport connectivity are realistically attainable while adopting a schematic approach. Among the several inchoate thoughts, the route that directly followed an alignment in a north-south direction along the existing railway lines and roads in Kazakhstan, Western China and India included: Almaty, Korgas, Yinning, Kuqa, Aksu, Kashgar, Yarkand, Yecheng (along the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway No. 219) Mazar, Shahidulla, Sumxi, Derub, Resum, Shiquanhe, Gar, Kailash, Burang, Lepu-lekh. The total distance would be less than 3,000 kilometres. Importantly, the route under consideration already existed and it is only a matter of cross-border connectivity.
  • A linkage through Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir is arguably the shortest, but China’s sensitivity to any engagement in Jammu & Kashmir may rule out the option.
    From India’s perspective while considering the topographical factor, Lipu-Lekh Pass in Uttarakhand (opened for border trade with China since 1992) is considered a feasible entry point. Refurbishing of the road connecting to Shipkila in Himachal Pradesh and Lipu-Lekh in Uttarakhand are already in progress under the Special Accelerated Road Development Project (SARDP).

On the positive side, the experts cited, inter alia, the following points:

  • The proposed route involved only one country (China) as a land-link between India and Central Asia, as compared to the longer western routes traversing through Iran and Afghanistan.
  • The proposed route was seasonal, but its reactivation had a symbolic significance, essentially for reviving the traditional Silk Route that was vibrant until 1947.
    Importantly, the route passed through relatively stable Xinjiang as compared to the turbulent areas of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Central Asia. Additionally, India is not viewed as a factor of instability and therefore posed no threat to Xinjiang in terms of religion or ideology.
  • Significant trade volumes existed for markets in India, China, and Central Asia. India-Kazakhstan trade value has increased to US $370 million this year. Kazakhstan’s annual trade with Western China was over $10 billion.
  • If implemented, the route will cut down transportation costs of food/fuel supplied to India’s forward areas. Similarly, it would reduce the delivered costs of imports in Western China. Besides, China could earn considerable revenue from transit fees. Conceivably, arrangements for swap deals with China could also be worked out.
  • The above route was viewed as an important counterpoise for Pakistan’s plan for an 800 kilometre long railway from Gawadar to Kashgar.
  • Additionally, India was to gain an alternative access to the transcontinental transport corridors Western Europe - Western China being developed by Eurasian countries under various facilitation agreements.
  • Any resulting gains and prosperity could only trigger major development actions in the pockets of discontentment i.e. Tibet, Xinjiang, Kashmir.

On the negative side, participants expressed the following apprehensions:

  • The feasibility of the above route in terms of geopolitics, especially China’s willingness to co-operate, was viewed as a major factor. The issue of territorial disputes between India and China as a factor was also discussed at length
  • .

  • Notably, the Kazakh Ambassador welcomed the proposed route and had agreed to take up the matter with the Chinese authorities on a priority basis. The Ambassador also indicated Kazakhstan’s willingness to exercise its leverages vis-à-vis China should it become necessary.

Recommendation and Action Plan

  • The proposed route could possibly be the shortest as economically feasible and steps should be taken to materialize it.
  • A regional rather than a country-specific linkage approach should be adopted to enhance the viability. Russia and other Central Asian states must be involved in the co-operation efforts.
  • Participants also embellished the idea of widening its scope to include strategic commodities such as oil, gas, uranium, and minerals to enhance the volume movements. But, to start with, the route should only be opened for transit trade.
  • Lipu-Lekh and Shipkila border trade should be upgraded to transit trade, apart from improving the infrastructure.
  • Kazakhstan should consider taking up the matter with the Chinese government.
  • Kazakhstan, China, and India should consider using existing facilitation agreements for transit transport at the multilateral, bilateral, trilateral, and sub-regional levels.
  • The proposal could be perused within the Shanghai Organization Cooperation (SCO) framework, as well as under the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) mechanism. Several inter-governmental agreements on the Asian Highway Network already exist under the UN-ESCAP programme.
  • India, China and Central Asian republics should develop a sub-regional framework agreement designed to facilitate cross-border transit trade along the measures adopted by ASEAN, Greater Mekong Sub-region, TRACECA, ECO, BIMSTEC, and others.
  • The existing Kazakhstan-India Joint Working Group on Transport should be activated to include the above proposal so that exploration process and implementation could be initiated early.
  • The participants strongly recommended that a trilateral (India, Kazakhstan, China) joint study group be set up urgently for undertaking a feasibility study.

Prepared by Professor P. Stobdan, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN India–Kazakhstan Relations

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