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| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Myanmar’s Relations with Bangladesh since 1988 | May 15, 2009 | Udai Bhanu Singh | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Ranjit Gupta During the 1980s, when Myanmar was the largest opium producer in the world, the basic goal behind Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral relationship was to cooperate in anti-drugs cooperation. But, over the years, the relationship started facing a lot of complications with the emergence of issues like maritime border demarcation, Rohingya refugees and drug trafficking. As far as economic aspect of Myanmar-Bangladesh relationship is concerned, the signing of the border trade agreement of May 1994 legalizing the informal border trade between the two states; the inauguration of Teknaf-Maungdaw trade in September 1995; Bangladeshi trade delegation’s visit to Myanmar in 1998; Sr. Gen Than Shwe’s visit to Bangladesh in December 2002 and consequent agreement between the parties to cooperate in road and water transportation; can be pointed out as significant developments. However, on strategic issues, a lot remains to be done. The very fact that Myanmar-Bangladesh border offers a safe haven to terrorist organizations in the region makes it necessary for both countries to cooperate in counter insurgency activities. But ironically, not much has been initiated by either side in this respect. The refugee problem in Myanmar is another significant aspect which needs to be addressed adequately by both Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to a recent estimate, even today, around 19,200 remain in Bangladesh. Smuggling of arms and ammunitions is considered another area in which both Myanmar and Bangladesh need to cooperate. Factors like recovering of arms and ammunition of the insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Organization (ARSO) by the Bangladeshi Army and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) in September 2005 and the recovering of a large amount of heavy weapons from the Naikhangchari sub-district in Bangladesh in the last eleven months clearly indicate lack of cooperation between Myanmar and Bangladesh in tackling smuggling issue. Despite lack of cooperation on certain strategic issues, both Myanmar and Bangladesh have been trying to improve bilateral ties through certain regional and sub-regional forums, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC), the ARF, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum (BCIM). Over the years, besides Rohingya and smuggling, issues like land border demarcation and maritime order demarcation have emerged as two major areas of friction. Tensions have arisen particularly over Myanmar’s planned construction of a 40 kilometre fence along the border, ostensibly to check cross-border smuggling. Recently in October 2008, a standoff between Myanmar and Bangladesh occurred when Myanmar not only permitted a South Korean ship to explore natural gas in the disputed area between the two countries, but also sent its naval vessel. Claims and counterclaims of the two neighbours in the Bay of Bengal continue to occur regularly. It is quite interesting to note that in case of Myanmar-Bangladesh relations, the demographic factor plays quite a different role. Over the years, while flow of refugees from Bangladesh has been a source of trouble for its neighbours, in case of its relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh is the affected party. The burden of refugees seems to be particularly high in case of Bangladesh due to its poor economic condition and limited resources. In addition, there are constant assessments that some of the refugees may be associated with terror groups. For India, both Bangladesh and Myanmar have their own special significance from geopolitical as well as strategic points of view. On the Indian side, terrorism prone states like Arunachal, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram shares border with Myanmar. The problem of insurgency and economic underdevelopment in this region cannot be addressed adequately without India’s cooperation with Myanmar on these issues. Indo-Myanmar relationship is also significant due to India’s emphasis on Look East policy. Growing Myanmar-China relations may affect India’s interest in the region until and unless we too start improving our relations with Myanmar. Besides, an amicable relationship with resource rich Myanmar will also help India to improve its energy security in the long run. However, it remains undeniably true that the success of New Delhi’s policy toward Myanmar would be incomplete if its objectives with regard to Bangladesh were undermined. Whether to tackle the growing insurgency problem in the region or to deal with rise of China, India needs to have a region wide comprehensive policy, including positive policies toward its immediate neighbours. Important points raised in the discussion:
Prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
South East Asia and Oceania | Bangladesh, Myanmar-Bangladesh Relations, Myanmar | |||
| Coastal Security Arrangement in Maharashtra: An Assessment | May 15, 2009 | Pushpita Das | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Rajaram Panda The paper discusses the overall coastal security arrangement in Maharashtra. The first part of the paper deals with the evolution of the coastal security mechanism in the state. Section two evaluates the deficiencies, inadequacies and shortcomings in this mechanism. An assessment of the security measures that were announced by the central and state governments in response to the Mumbai attack is also highlighted in the paper. The paper argues that awareness about the vulnerability of the country’s coasts first arose in the wake of the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts, when it was established that the explosives used were smuggled in through the coast at Raigad in Maharashtra. This led to the launch of ‘Operation Swan’ with the aim of preventing the landing of contraband and infiltration along the Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts. Further attention to coastal security was given after the Kargil Review Committee’s recommendations for a comprehensive reform of the security set-up. It came in the form of a Task Force on Border Management, with coastal security being a part and parcel of it. The Task Force recommended, inter alia, the setting up of a specialised marine police in the form of coastal police stations, augmentation of the strength of the Coast Guard in terms of personnel and material, the formation of fishermen watch groups, and the establishment of an apex body for management of maritime affairs. On the recommendation of the Task Force, the central government launched the Coastal Security Scheme in 2005-06. A three-layered patrolling system is operational to secure the Maharashtra coast. At the outermost layer, the Indian Navy patrols the high seas and carries out aerial reconnaissance with ship-based aircraft. The intermediate layer comprising of the Exclusive Economic Zone (between 12 and 200 nautical miles) is patrolled by the Coast Guard. And the territorial waters are patrolled by joint coastal patrolling teams comprising personnel drawn from the Customs, the State Police and, till 2006 from the Indian Navy. 26/11 happened in spite of this multi-layered coastal security mechanism. Lack of ‘actionable’ intelligence has been widely attributed as the main reason for this failure. But there are certain inherent inadequacies in the coastal security mechanism, making it incapable of preventing infiltration through the coast. These deficiencies are:
To address these issues, the paper put forward some policy recommendations to the Maharashtra government. Some of these are:
Further, the central government needs to clearly spell out areas of jurisdiction of different agencies engaged in coastal security and ensure coordination among all agencies by establishing a central command system. Issues Raised in the Discussion: Prepared by M. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | India, Mumbai attack, Maharashtra, Coastal Security | ||
| Trends in Thinking about Warfare | May 08, 2009 | P. K. Gautam | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: M. S Chowdhury “Trends in thinking about warfare” presented at the IDSA Fellow Seminar on 08 May, 2009 at IDSA New Delhi by Col. PK Gautam( Retd) was well received and critically reviewed by external discussant and internal peer discussants. The proceedings were chaired by Brigadier MS Chowdhuri, VSM ( Retd) Chief Instructor United Service Institute (USI) of India. External discussants were Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle, SM (Retired), author and analyst, and Dr Chandar Sundaram from the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research, USI of India. Internal discussant were Wg Cdr Ajey Lele and S. Rajsimman. The paper identifies the following areas as unexplored or absent from Indian strategic community. The paper further argues that absence of these factors from Indian discourse may have its repercussion at both the level of research and policy making.
The protracted nature of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan compels one to think about the nature and character of war. While the nature of war continues to be enduring, the character has changed to that of a counterinsurgency campaign. The paper recommends strategic thinkers concerned with the military “use of force” in resolving “inter-state” and “intra-state” be sensitive to the available literature on the subject which debates whether modern war fighting capabilities enabled by hi-tech weaponry based on science and technology have ensured “victory”. The paper argues the importance for certain constructivist approaches to help research in this area. It begins its argument by stating that military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon have overemphasized modern military operations while ignoring other factors that may eventually decide the result of operations. The paper also stresses the “way of fighting” and highlights the “Maratha way” to underline this point.
Observations by Discussants Brig Bhonsle recommended more references to Indian literature. He mentioned that the US has now achieved asymmetry in Iraq. Counter insurgency is always difficult in foreign lands and he recalled the Indian experience in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. As regards 4GW, he traced its origins to 1980s through the work of William Lind and others. Foreign literature he agreed was mostly about marketing products. As regards civil- military relations, he mentioned that one has to introspect within the services and noted that the Chief of Defence Staff was stymied by the Air Force. Blame thus is shared by all in lack of synergy in system. Dr Sundaram desired greater focus and suggested the replacement of warfare with warfighting. He traced how the British who were familiar with “guilds” where the concept of class had originated improvised to cement the regimental system in India based on its society, which rather cemented the units. One new and challenging area of research over the century was via content analysis of the USI journal which needs to be done for further research by scholars. The journal has been published since 1870- being the oldest surviving journal on defence issues in India – it would give a good idea on ways of thinking on warfare in the Indian context. Observing a tendency not to look at history, he also explained how political scientists have got the better of the topic than historians in general.. It is evident that historic lessons have been ignored – such as those of Vietnam, or of Iraq. Societies can not be treated as water, but as cultures. On the Chinese sources, they need to be treated with caution as they have very strict censorship laws. He lamented that in Indian democracy, there is excessive delay to get hold of even non classified historic papers which is counter productive. It is time that official war histories of 1962, 1965 and 1971 are made public Wg Cdr Lele suggested that ways of warfare are contextual – theater based, or guerrilla war or present state of asymmetric warfare. He opined that there is nothing Western or Eastern as regards RMA. In shock and awe and effect based operations he mentioned that winning war is not enough, but winning the peace is important . Subject is not only military, but involves policy makers, think tanks and academia. He noted that nanotechnology will usher in fifth generation warfare and we need to prepare. Mr. S.Rajasimman exemplifies on this aspect by arguing that the paper captures this phenomenon at two important levels. These are at 1) operational level 2) doctrinal level. Conceptualization at these two levels differs. The paper for instance does not assume a clear distinction between the both. Both “Iraq War” and “Afghan War” have been claimed and argued to be unsuccessful. The paper argues that the “protracted-insurgency based operations” in Iraq and Afghan has proven that Shock and Awe lost its sting. Here distinction needs to be made how the concept of “shock and awe” functions at operational level and doctrinal level. Operational success need not necessarily mean doctrinal success. In other words the overwhelming fire power and high-tech weapon systems used may have been successful at the operational or tactical level by achieving the “military objectives” against “political-social objectives” as part of the next phase in the war. Discussion Comments by E mail: Disagreeing on some issue such as 4GW, US performance and high end warfare capability, Colonel Peter Garretson, USAF concluded that the paper also manifests what is the central debates in the US which is : What is the future of warfare, and what should be our organizational emphasis Right now the forces to reform in favor of irregular prevail in power and noise But they are strongly checked by the services and existing budget Other concerns of Col. Garretson were about long-range conventional missiles, and cruise missiles, which he thought will change high-end warfare. Trends which he thought need to be highlighted since World War II were: An increase in examination of the future, at least organizational, from individual theorists, to VonKarman's New Horizons, to AF2025... The increase in capability of airpower, and the counters by those who don't have it The de-civilization of warfare by the disadvantaged Namrata Goswami wrote : “that unlike what George Tanham or Ashley Tellis would have us believe, Indian military is rather good at attrition warfare, if you take its long drawn engagement in the North East and Jammu and Kashmir as a success story - then the rather valid question would arise: why are they still there? . Therefore, I beg to differ with you on this aspect. I strongly argue that the growing militant violence in the North East especially Assam and Manipur is sign enough about the failure of countering insurgency effectively with devastating effect on overall way of life in these areas. Just managing violence between the security forces and the militants while turning a blind eye to extortion networks, social violence, and political instability tells badly on our military's way of warfare, if there is any at all”. Comments by Participants Commander Ranjit Rai (Retd) wanted more emphasis on strategic thinking. Dr Arvind Gupta, from his experience noted that much more coordination and work is needed including original Indian work on the Indian way of warfare including text books. Dr Uttam Sinha felt the need to pull out military writings of Indian authors which must include culture, history and trend analysis. Brigadier SP Sinha ( Retd) explained from his 1965 war experience on EBO as to how raw troops who were initially paralysed by artillery fire, got used to or inoculated to it after few days of shelling. Lesson was effect based must be understood in context and for time period. It does not last permanently. . Concluding Remarks of Chairman Chair highlighted the following
Over all observations All policy recommendations pertaining to study of war, theory building, nature of force employment study, more focus on conduct of war rather than just IR, not getting over awed by foreign literature, doctrines based on combat experience need to retain cultural values and renew debate on civil military relations. It was generally opined that the paper in terms of its idea was important in itself and also as a guide to future research in this area. Future research could benefit from the discourse analysis that this paper has attempted to highlight. Prepared by S.Rajasimman, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Military Affairs | India, Strategic Thinking, Warfare, Fourth Generation War (4GW), Military Affairs | ||
| Low Intensity Conflict under Nuclear Conditions: Analysing the India-Pakistan Theatre | May 08, 2009 | A. Vinod Kumar | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
India and Pakistan were again on the verge of a military confrontation following revelation of Pakistan’s complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Pakistan reluctance to act against its perpetrators had forced India to plan punitive responses against terror camps, prompting Pakistan to project a capability to repulse an Indian attack. After weeks of underdone posturing, both realised the possibility of a stalemate and de-escalated the conflict. Such responses have been the template of the India-Pakistan dynamics, especially after the May 1998 nuclear tests. Of all characteristics, the most discernable element is what is perceived to be an asymmetric nuclear deterrence equation that seems skewed against India, restricting its pro-active responses. The paper reviewed a problematic element in the India-Pakistan strategic competition – the scope for low intensity conflict under nuclear conditions. It examined whether the execution of a protracted low-intensity conflict by Pakistan is a negation of the nuclear deterrence equation between the two countries, and the reasons why India has failed to suitably respond to this strategy. The concept of Low Intensity Conflict has constantly evolved along with the transformations in the nature of warfare. When quantified by intensity and nature of conflict, all confrontations remaining below the level of high- or mid-level conventional war could be classified as low-intensity conflicts. Generally, LIC is a genre embracing many types of sub-conventional and asymmetric warfare including insurgency, counter-insurgency, and even terrorism and counter-terrorism The chunk of debate on nuclear South Asia is centred on two issues: (a) has nuclear weapons caused instability, raising potential for escalation; (b) is it a stability-instability paradox, whereby Pakistan used the assumed stability at the nuclear level to create instability at the lower level. In this dialectical spectrum, both schools converge on the stability-instability paradox, which states that the stability created by nuclear weapons at the top would cause or facilitate instability at the sub or conventional levels. Pakistan seeks to deter at all levels – nuclear, conventional, sub-conventional and does not want India to share the same equation. It fears Indian pre-emptive attack against nuke capability. In this regard it has two objectives (i) gain parity against India’s conventional superiority (b) existential deterrence against India’s nuclear capability. Pakistan fears the asymmetry with India in force levels and believes space for conventional war exists, which India would exploit. India could crush insurgency at limited conventional levels and threaten second strike if Pakistan contemplates nuclear response. Linked with this thinking is the utility of nuclear weapons in achieving Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Kashmir. Pakistanis had always believed that its nuclear capability could neutralise the Indian conventional as well as nuclear forces while providing the umbrella to reopen the Kashmir issue. Through every opportunity of brinkmanship, Pakistan seeks to internationalise the Kashmir dispute, project it as a nuclear flashpoint and pressure India to initiate a dialogue. The Indo-Pakistan peace process could have in some ways validated this strategy. However, it had mixed results as India managed to repulse the insurgency through successful counter-insurgency, forcing Pakistan to push in foreign mercenaries to hype the theatre. The paper concluded with the assertion that Pakistan is an irrational actor. It is a hub of terrorism and proliferation and a theological nuclear weapon state primarily controlled by military. It exploits global paranoia to its advantage. However it is equally apprehensive about being bombed back to Stone Age. It realizes that tactical first-strike is unfeasible and would invite massive Indian retaliation. As for India’s limited responses, despite repeated breaches, India never expanded theatre and instead used economic and military might. Also, it never allowed space to internationalise Kashmir. India has yielded political gains through responsible behaviour. The moot question is- Has this approach been fruitful - political timidity and reluctance to use military power? India believes in the scope for Limited War under Nuclear Conditions. Pakistan found space for LIC without hitting Indian threshold and Pakistan’s first-use posture restricted Indian response. Finally, these options will materialise only if the Indian political leadership mandates the security establishment to execute such radical responses to the three-decade old proxy war, which has cost thousands of lives and destruction of national resources. There is need for political will and audacity to exploit the turbulence in Pakistan and signal to Pakistan the futility and failure of its LIC strategy. Pakistan should be reminded of the fact that its survival should not be at the cost of promoting subversion and instability in South Asia. This would also mean a change of mindsets in Indian security establishment and the willingness to transcend traditional security approaches to explore radical solutions to this perennial security challenge. The important points raised during the discussion were
The session was chaired by Air Marshall (retd) Vinod Patney. The two external discussants were Brig Arun Sahgal and Maroof Raza. Prepared by Priyanka Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | India, Mumbai attack, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Nuclear Weapons, India-Pakistan Relations, Pakistan | ||
| Can Renewables Enhance Energy Security? | May 01, 2009 | Shebonti Ray Dadwal | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: B S Malik Though the case for incorporating renewable energy into national energy policies has been around for decades, the growing debate on climate change has enhanced the profile and brought the issue of renewable energy to the forefront as a means of tackling global warming. However, more than climate change issues, it is energy security and the access to and control of fossil fuel sources that are the main drivers of the West’s policy. Given the critical place energy holds for economic growth, retaining their positions in the global economic order is a major factor for the traditional powers, particularly in the event of a scramble for non-renewable energy resources taking place. While it is true that the current global financial crisis and economic recession have seen the demand for energy falling substantially across the world, it is generally believed that once the recession is over and demand picks up the price of oil and gas could once again become prohibitive. There are several reasons why this may occur, including production cuts by OPEC, but mainly due to depleting reserves from mature oil and gas fields. According to the US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, 80 out of 84 oil and gas exporting countries have reached a point where their field reserves have reached a plateau and production is decreasing. Hence, the Europeans took the lead in raising the issue of climate change as the most crucial national security issue, with the European Commission publishing what is termed as the “2020 by 2020” package, which includes proposals for not only reducing the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20 per cent by 2020, but also to ensure that 20 per cent of their energy is obtained from renewable energy resources. With Barack Obama’s election to the US Presidency, it is generally believed that the climate change issue has received a fillip. However, the US’ underlying concern is clearly about the country’s reliance, indeed, growing dependence, on imported energy resources. As President Obama stated in his presidential memorandum on January 26, 2009, “America’s dependence on oil is one of the most serious threats that our nation has faced.” Yet when one looks at the future plans for energy in the US as well as other developed countries, it is interesting to note that all of them are based on fossil fuels, as well as nuclear power, with renewable energy comprising only a small proportion of the energy mix. Despite the hype about renewable energy, developed countries will continue to rely on fossil fuels. It is a fact that major international oil companies such as BP, Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil are freezing their research and investments in renewable energy, while continuing to invest in the petroleum sector, including carbon-intensive energy sources like tar sands and natural gas from shale. As the momentum for the negotiations on working out a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 picks up, countries like India and China are coming under increasing pressure from the rich countries to commit to binding emissions cuts. Some of the developed countries are also raising the bogey of employing “retaliatory mechanisms” through the WTO forum against China and India if they don’t adhere to binding emission cuts. However, though India is not giving in to such pressures and has adopted the position that since it is the developed countries that are responsible for most of the current levels of carbon emissions they should make the requisite technology and funding available for mitigating emissions, it is taking necessary action by putting in place projects that will allow it to further improve its energy efficiency and decrease the rate of emission increase. There is no doubt that renewable energy resources are required to deal with climate change and global warming. However, to increase the share of renewables in national energy mixes, particularly in the poor and developing countries, cooperative methods will have to be employed, not threats and trade-related pressures. Moreover, the developed countries have to acknowledge the responsibility for the current increase in emission levels and take steps to mitigate the same. Yet, the rich countries demand that developing countries take measures to accept binding cuts on emissions by cutting down on their fossil fuel consumption and employ renewable energy systems that are either inaccessible or too capital intensive for most poor countries to adopt without funding. However, the developed countries are not agreeable to technology transfers or adequate funding required to deploy such technology. Points in the Discussion:
Prepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Non-Traditional Security | Climate Change, Financial Crisis, Renewable Energy, Energy Security | ||
| Accomodation with Militants in Swat: Implications For Regional Security | April 24, 2009 | Alok Bansal | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: C Uday Bhaskar In 1947 Swat was a princely state that was ruled by Miangul Abdul Haq Jehanzeb, the Wali of Swat, who was a progressive ruler and built a number of educational institutions, hospitals, roads and infrastructure. The state acceded to Pakistan in 1947, but retained its identity till 1969, when Wali relinquished power and the state of Swat was merged with the province of NWFP as the Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA). Until 1969 the Wali of Swat exercised absolute authority, and even after the merger continued to be the ruler in an honorary capacity till 1987. With the merger of the state in 1969, there was some tumult as many of the employees of the state were forcibly retired and there were large-scale protests, leading to confusion and anarchy. Swat became a haven for lawlessness and uncertainty. All the developmental projects were mired in red tape and there was all round deterioration. The public discontent was used by the religious fundamentalists to further their cause. Sufi Mohammad Khan, who was earlier a member of Jamaat-e-Islami, founded TNSM after leaving Jamaat-e-Islami in 1992, with the aim of establishing an Islamic order. In the ensuing clash with security forces Sufi Mohammad and 20 of his senior followers were arrested. But the provincial government of NWFP led by Sherpao for some strange reason withdrew the charges. After the US missile attack on Afghanistan in August 1998, TNSM threatened to attack American property and abduct American citizens unless USA apologised to the Islamic world for the missile attack. Many of his followers died in the misadventure and he was arrested on his return to Pakistan. In October 2007, after a few altercations with the security forces, his followers virtually took over the entire Swat Valley. As Sufi Mohammad began showing a willingness to negotiate a settlement, Fazalullah distanced himself from his erstwhile mentor. When Sufi Mohammad negotiated the deal with the government, the hard-line faction led by Fazalullah refused to abide by it. Subsequent to the US attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements from Afghanistan fled to the inaccessible and mountainous regions of the FATA. Initially Pakistani forces largely avoided interfering with them, intending to use them in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal. However, this policy had to change under sustained US pressure and the Pakistani troops were forced to enter South Waziristan Agency in FATA and directed the local Taliban to surrender foreign militants. The aim was to create a distinction between the local Taliban and al Qaeda led foreign militants. Despite the failure of peace deals in South Waziristan, the Pakistani government subsequently attempted the same policy of accommodation with the militants in North Waziristan. Islamabad accordingly signed another peace deal with the militants, with Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s assistance, called the Miramshah Agreement on September 5, 2006. But like previous such attempts in South Waziristan it failed to bring peace. In the run up to the February 2008 elections, the caretaker provincial government of NWFP, in a desperate bid to buy peace, had proposed implementation of Shariat regulations in the entire Malakand Division comprising seven districts, Dir Upper, Dir Lower, Swat, Shangla, Buner, Malakand and Chitral in the NWFP. The proposal intended to take away from people, their right to submit a writ in the High Court and the Supreme Court, instead a Shariat court at the division level was to be set up as the final arbiter of justice. This deal was followed by another deal on May 21, 2008 with Maulana Fazalullah. In the peace deal signed with Fazalullah, the militants agreed that they would accept and honour the writ of the federal and provincial government and would not malign the religion of other citizens. However, the deal was unilaterally discarded just a few weeks later under directives from TTP chief, Baitullah Mehsud who was unhappy with the ongoing military operations in Waziristan. As a result, Swat was a fierce battleground by the end of 2008 and by January 2009, the militants were controlling most of Swat valley. Soon the ANP government in NWFP realised that the army was not able to overcome the Taliban led by Fazlullah and the Taliban rather than being defeated, had consolidated their grip on Swat. It accordingly signed a fresh peace deal with Sufi Mohammad on February 16, 2009. As part of the deal, Shariat laws have been enforced in seven districts of Malakand Division and Kohistan district of Hazara Division. The deal purports to abolish all “un-Islamic” laws and halt all operations by the security forces, as well as sets time limits for various trials, a maximum of six months for civil cases and four months for criminal cases. It also proposes setting up a divisional Shariat court or Darul Quza, which will be the final arbiter of all cases from the region. It would remove the need for local cases to be appealed through the normal court system followed in the rest of Pakistan. Many in the government perceive the peace deal as a split between the Baitullah Mehsud led TTP based in Waziristan and the Swat Taliban led by Fazalullah, but neither of the two has given any indication of a rift. On the other hand the deal saw consolidation of Taliban forces in Waziristan, as immediately after the deal, three Taliban commanders in South and North Waziristan including two who were perceived to be pro-government, joined hands. Although the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was formally promulgated in the region only after the Presidential ascent on April 13, 2009, the Qazi courts had started functioning in Swat Valley from March 17, 2009. The supporters of the deal say that the laws being implemented are a relatively mild form of Shariat, and meant to erode popular support for the militants demand for expeditious Islamic justice. Under the proposed law, qazi (religious judge), will sit in the court, along with a regular judge, to ensure that the judgments conform to Islamic teachings. The deal draws its support not only from the ANP led provincial government but also from the army, which sees it as a face saving device after it failed to evict Taliban from this region. The opponents of the deal believe that it will facilitate a parallel legal system and lead to a demand by the Taliban to impose a harsher version of Shariat and for its implementation in other parts of Pakistan as well. The US has also criticised the deal as it believes this deal only provides time and space for the militants to rearm, as well as give up secular traditions for Islamic law. Issues Raised in the Discussion
Prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
South Asia | Swat, Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan, Terrorism, Taliban, South Asia | ||
| Climate Change and Foreign Policy: The UK Approach | April 24, 2009 | Uttam Kumar Sinha | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: R Rajagopalan Climate change has the potential to create conditions for changing foreign policy in a globalised world. It dares to test whether the established tenets of foreign policy are still valid. Climate change has entered the realm of negotiations. National action plans, globally binding commitments, leadership and historical responsibilities are determining countries positions and defining their foreign policy agenda. However, the mainstreaming of climate change in foreign policy due to domestic and international imperatives reflects a shift in strategic thinking. It creates possibilities for the international community to look for solutions and bring together varied policy initiatives and differing positions. UK’s foreign policy has clearly adorned a green drape whether in helping create cross-cutting coalitions or strengthening institutions. The objective is to balance trade with climate change and climate change with development thereby enhancing its competitive position in the global economy. Climate change equally bolsters the image of Britain to take on a challenging role as it has on such critical issues like terrorism, nuclear proliferation and reducing global poverty. The UK has accepted and committed to the Kyoto Protocol and correspondingly reoriented its energy policies. Under the Kyoto Protocol, it is committed to reducing emission of six greenhouse gases by 12.5 per cent below 1990 levels and within the period of 2008-2012. However, what makes it interesting is the self-imposed pledge to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 20 per cent by 2012 UK’s approach vis-à-vis the EU is not divergent but seeks to act ‘beyond the defined’ framework. Such an approach towards a low carbon economy outlines a broad outlook towards the EU and inclines towards the ‘practical’ rather than ‘integrationist’. The EU catch figure of ‘2020 by 2020’ suggesting a 20 per cent reduction in emission targets as well as an increase of renewable energy by 20 per cent by the year 2020 as been greatly determined by UK’s own initiatives. Today, climate change is a dominant theme in the UK’s foreign policy, particularly under the current government. Current British policy has been founded on some farsighted thinking and initiated by Margaret Thatcher. In fact, there are three striking aspects that one can draw from the speech and as the article argues remains a guide to framing current UK policies on climate change. The first is the importance of research or knowledge capability. The second feature of climate change relates to the interplay between people and policies and the approach needed. The third pillar is effective environmental diplomacy and strengthening international regimes. Under foreign secretary Margaret Beckett, the UK, which held the presidency of the UN Security Council for the month of April 2007, was instrumental in bringing, for the first time, the issue of climate change to the UNSC in April 2007. In 2006, the G8 held one of the most interesting summits, with participation from emerging economies and agreed to hold a Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Change. Thus helping create an alternative path from formal negotiations at the UN to discuss new ideas, identify common ground and practical actions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The defining feature was to bring the G5 to the table and develop a way for cooperation; a strategy that is not imposed, but develops through consultation and dialogue. This will remain a critical guidepost to the north-south divide on the issue of climate change. In the UK, global warming and climate change have been prominent in public debates and greatly impacted policy making. The integrated approach has also been consistently backed by the leadership. For both Blair and Brown, climate change has been a priority issue. Whenever the UK has assumed a leadership role in the case of G8, or in the EU or in the Security Council, it has effectively raised the debate on climate change and gave it a forward momentum. Points in the Discussion
Prepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Non-Traditional Security | Climate Change, United Kingdom, Foreign Policy, European Union | ||
| Military Robots | April 17, 2009 | Ajey Lele | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Vinod Patney The paper argued that the futuristic battlefield is going to depend substantially on deployment of standoff weapons and virtual technology. Robotic technology is likely to play a major role. Presently, military robots are essentially used as UAVs or for landmine and explosive search. A few developed armies are using them for counter terrorism purposes. However, robots are not autonomous entities with positron brains. Their performance still depends on human control. Robotic animals could be of use to states like India which depend on mules for supporting their mountain divisions. The mules with the Indian army have significant utility for carrying logistic supplies to higher mountain ridges. Robots could help in this regard and over a period of time if found useful could replace animals. Robots have a great future because militaries are interested in utilizing them beyond their existing role as aerial drones or explosive identification/disposal devices. The growth of technology in this arena also shows promise for future development. The juxtaposition of Artificial Intelligence and robotic technology makes the future more exciting from a military point of view. By incorporating new synchronization and control methods and increasing levels of automation, military robots are expected to reduce the burden and risk for future warriors. Developments in cognitive technologies which essentially deal with man machine interaction are likely to develop the science of robotics further. Increasing militarization of robotics technology is expected to be a reality tomorrow. Naturally, the Defence Industry is expected to invest much more in this field in the coming years. As it happens with any other form of military technology, counter technologies are expected to be developed. Few forward looking thinkers/businessmen are already toying with the idea of finding ways to defend against enemy robots. According to a few unconfirmed reports efforts are underway to develop weaponry against robotic creatures. It is premature to comment on these developments with conviction but it may be possible that states could develop high energy microwave device or jamming devices to block the march of robotic armies. In the years to come as robots are going to become more autonomous the issue of morality is likely to emerge in a big way. This is because questions may arise as to who should be held morally responsible for actions taken by an autonomous robot for actions such as killing a human. Logically, armies should restrain themselves from giving this authority to autonomous robots. Isaac Asimov’s view holds the key. He noted the philosophical relationship between human and robot and the limitations of machines should be clearly explored. Asimov’s laws of robotics should not be allowed to fail. Air Marshal (Retd.)Vinod Patney chaired the seminar. The external discussants were Brig. Rahul Bhosle and Mr. R.K. Pruthi. Col. Ali Ahmed was the internal discussant. The major points made in the ensuing discussion were:
Prepared by Gunjan Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
North America & Strategic Technologies | Defence Industry, Counter-Terrorism, Robots, Military Affairs, Defence Technology | ||
| Training module on “defence and security issues’ for IFS probationers | April 06, 2009 to April 17, 2009 | Training Capsules | |||||||
| IDSA-ICRIER Joint International Seminar on Economic Co-operation for Security and Development in South Asia | March 16, 2007 to March 17, 2007 | Conference |
ProgrammeFriday, March 16, 20070900 Registration 0930-1030 Inaugural Session
1030 Tea 1100-1330 Session I: Changing Context of Regionalism in South AsiaChair: Shri M.K. Rasgotra, Chairman, National Security Advisory Board
Discussant: Dr. Ashok Behuria, Research Fellow, IDSA 1330-1430 Lunch 1430-1700 Session II: Infrastructure Development & Economic Co-operationChair: Shri Sunil Kant Munjal, Chairman, Hero Corporate Service Ltd., and former President, CII
Discussant: Ms. Nisha Taneja, Senior Fellow ICRIER Saturday, March 17, 20071000-1230 Session III: Regional Security Chair: Shri N.N. Vohra
Discussant: Cdr. Alok Bansal, Research Fellow, IDSA 1230-1330 Lunch 1330-1600 Session IV: South Asia : The Way AheadChair: Dr. Rajiv Kumar
1600-1700 Valedictory SessionChair: Prof. S.D. Muni
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South Asia |