Events

Chair: Prakash Singh
Discussants: G. D. Bakshi and Arun Sahgal

In her presentation titled ‘A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East’, Dr. Namrata Goswami projected the vision of a peaceful and prosperous North East India by 2015. Identifying terrorism, left-wing extremism and insurgencies as the three great internal security threats of India, she repeated Manmohan Singh’s earlier statement that growing insurgencies in the North East are caused by lack of development and externally funded terrorism. Dr. Goswami has utilized the scenario building method pioneered by Herman Kahn of RAND. She identifies the key factors/drivers which can be utilized to perceive and describe, if not predict, four future scenarios in the Northeast by 2015. Before explaining the four scenarios, Dr Goswami points out the advantages as well as disadvantages of the scenario building method. According to her, despite the fact that scenario-building is one of the most widely accepted method of bringing about some true sense of a possible future, the future based on such method still remains imagined and fictitious.

While explaining the future scenario of North East India on the basis of scenario building method, Dr. Goswami offers a list of positive and negative drivers which can either lead the region on the path of prosperity or can prove as impediments in its progress. On the positive side, she points to factors like the region’s richness in natural resources, cultural heritage, the growing number of youthful population, higher level of education, influence of local communities and music in life, governance, etc. Factors like backward condition of transportation and communication, perceived feelings of neglect by New Delhi, cultural differences, rising ethnic violence, negative political culture, militarization of political culture, rampant extortion network, economic backwardness, porous international border, etc., are pointed out as negative drivers.

On the basis of the above mentioned drivers, Dr. Goswami has put forward four possible scenarios of North East India by 2015. They are: Destination North East: A Touristic Paradise (a scenario based on tourism development); Island North East: Beware imagined ‘others’ (a scenario based on fear of domination and ethnic violence); Multi-Cultural North East: Liberal and Progressive (a scenario based on the success of democracy); Global North East: Looking ‘East’ with Hope (a scenario based on the success of India’s ‘Look East’ policy). Among the four, Dr. Goswami considers the first, third and the fourth scenarios as ‘ideal’ to improve the conflict ridden states of the Northeast.

Points raised during the discussion of the Paper:

• The paper should be based more on certain pattern based prediction rather than single event prediction.
• In scenario construction, more than eight possible scenarios should be taken up. After discarding some of those scenarios due to their consistent inconsistency, four to five scenarios should be finally taken up for scenario building.
• Instead of making the scenario building method so much RAND centric, the scenarios should be based on the method adopted by certain private companies.
• An explanation of the process of scenario building in the paper will be helpful.
• As a choice of tool for scenario building method, net assessment technique is ideal, as it helps crystallize the scenario.
• Along with internal factors, geo-political factors too should be taken into account. As part of the geo-political factors, Chinese arms supply to insurgent groups in the Northeast, growing security threat from HUJI, etc. should be incorporated.
• It is necessary to have an in depth study of growing Islamic fundamentalism as part of insurgency situation within Northeast.
• Since many of the positive drivers mentioned in the paper can be negative drivers in other contexts (e.g., governance), a clear stance on the matter is necessary.
• The status quo will probably persist for some time in the Northeast.
• As long as extortion in Northeast India continues, achieving the desirable goal of disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) will not be possible. As a result, trade and tourism, the two sectors which constitute a significant part of the paper, will suffer.
• Political resolutions, so far, have not been very successful in bringing down the insurgency problem in the North East region. Under the circumstance, if armed forces are pulled out from the region, insurgency will, once again, increase.
• Greater academic emphasis should be put on the strong historical linkages between the Northeast and the rest of India.
• Focus on factors like what exactly is the subject for whom the scenario is built; identification of key decisive factors; identification of drivers and their classification, will make the paper all the more interesting.
• Both actors as well as issues can be treated as drivers.
• As far as Northeast India is concerned, factors like scale of insurgency, cross border support for insurgency, cross border migration, transport and communication, state of economy, etc., can be treated as potential drivers.
• Local cottage industry, progress of Northeastern youths in sports and positive governance in Sikkim should be incorporated as positive drivers.
• Progressive change in politics, such as through bringing about changes in labour laws, opening for outside work force, enhancement of education, increase in resource base, etc., can be quite helpful in improving the situation of the Northeast.
• Indian government’s future approach to its so called ‘Look East policy’ will depend on factors like degree of economic and social integration through communication revolution and softening of borders, lack of infrastructural developments coupled with political and economic concerns.
• The possibility of a peaceful and prosperous Northeast within the short timeframe of five years is unrealistic. Instead, the timeframe should be extended to 2050.
• The possibility of enduring peace in the region will depend upon the insurgency situation. The level of insurgency has already reduced in the region. Influence of Naga insurgency, which used to be considered as mother of all other insurgencies in the Northeast is no longer evident. Insurgent groups seem to be still working in this region, particularly for monetary benefits rather than demand for autonomy.
• With good governance, backed by insistence on accountability, peace can be brought to Northeast region.

Prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Chair: V. K. Misra
Discussants: Amit Cowshish and Sujeet Samaddar

India’s security comes with a huge price tag. In 2009-10, the defence budget reached Rs. 1,41,703 crores, representing nearly one-seventh of total central government expenditure and 2.35 per cent of the gross domestic product. Such a huge financial outlay raises questions as to how funds are allocated and what outcomes are being achieved. Does the defence budget provide the answers?

The budgeting system, in the form of Defence Services Estimates (DSE), follows ‘line-item’ budgeting. Total resources are provided in six demands for grants (catering to both the revenue and capital expenditures of the Defence Services), which in turn are subdivided into various revenue and capital items such a ‘pay and allowances’, ‘stores’, ‘works’, ‘aircraft and aero engines’, ‘naval fleet’, ‘heavy and medium vehicles’, among others. So the budget in essence does not provide information on expenditure on various capabilities or programmes that the country is acquiring to meet its security threats. Neither does the budget reflect the physical progress of various programmes on which massive investment is incurred. In other words, the intended outcome of the budget vis-à-vis security threats or the defence policy cannot be deduced from the existing system of budgeting.

To move towards a visible and outcome-oriented budget, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) since 2005 has issued guidelines emphasizing the link between financial budgets and actual and targeted performance of outlays. The guidelines task the central Ministries/Departments to articulate, among others, a list of major programmes/schemes and the goals and policy framework guiding them. The main objective of the exercise is to “establish one-to-one correspondence between the (financial) budget … and Outcome Budget…” However, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), along with 30 Ministries/Departments has been ‘exempted’ from preparing outcome budget. The exempted Ministries/Departments are however ‘requested’ to prepare outcome budget for ‘internal use’ and voluntarily decide the extent to which the general public can have access to it.

In the above context, the MoD has taken the initiative of formulating Defence Services Estimates, Vol. II (DSE, Vol. II), and making it mandatory for some of its institutions to prepare the outcome budget. The DSE, Vol. II, which currently is meant for “internal use” falls short of the parameters laid down by the MoF for preparing the outcome budget. It merely expands the item- or head-wise allocations made in DSE and, in addition, provides “Budget holder-wise summary sheets.” In no way does it relate the financial outlays with the intended outcomes. The major problem with the institutions that prepare outcome budgets are that their ‘outcomes’ are organisation specific and have ‘weak linkage’ with the overall plan of the MoD.

Arvind Kadyan highlights a number of gaps plaguing the implementation of outcome budgeting in defence. Foremost is the lack of programme-orientation in defence budget. He argues that the identification of major programmes by “High Level Budget Holders and Top Level Budget Holders in Service Headquarters, responsible for planning of budget” would go a long way in preparing outcome budget. The programme orientation however needs suitable changes in classification of heads of expenditure, reflecting all the inputs that go into specific programmes or sub-programmes. Among others, he argues that increased use of information technology can facilitate real-time “information required for monitoring, evaluation” and for “decision-making purposes.” He suggests that considering the “extra work” that would be generated in the initial phase of the implementation of the outcome budget there is a need for a professional body with the necessary wherewithal to carry out the job.

Kadyan strongly argues that Outcome budgeting is quite possible for the defence establishment, contrary to some perceptions that outcome of defence expenditure is not measurable and even if measurable its documentation may not be in the interest of the country’s security. These issues can be tracked by what he terms “attitudinal change” of concerned authorities. He says that all the information may not be placed in the public domain, as clearly articulated by the MoF. He suggests that “introduction of outcome budget is likely to be seen by the Services as an attempt to introduce a new mechanism to control budget utilisation.”

For effective implementation of outcome budgeting in defence, Kadyan argues that the MoD needs to follow a ‘comprehensive approach’ covering the entire defence budget. He suggests that a tri-service institution like the College of Defence Managements (CDM), Hyderabad should ideally be entrusted with the task of developing “an overall structure” for the purpose of implementation. The ‘Budget Holders’ in the Service Headquarters (SHQs) are then required to identify outcomes against the outlays, and prepare the outcome budget, keeping in view the overall defence policy of India. While executing the outcome budget, the Programme/sub-programme Directors under the Budget Holder would need enhanced delegation of financial powers. Once the outcome budgets at the stage of Budget Holders are prepared, their consolidation could be done by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS). Further, an independent organisation needs to be created for monitoring and evaluation of various ongoing programmes.

Points raised in the discussion:

• The experience of civil ministries in outcome budgeting is insubstantial, and is of little use for mid-course correction.
• Outcome budgeting in defence in some countries like Australia is of “little help” to the services.
• Transparency in outcome budgeting needs to be viewed simultaneously with the security aspects.
• Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has immense potential for preparing outcome budget in defence.
• Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is increasingly being adopted by many counties.

Prepared by Laxman Kumar Behera, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Chair: G. Balachandran
Discussants: Shakti Sinha, K. C. Singh and Rahul Bhonsle

Afghanistan today appears to be teetering on the brink of failure and unending chaos. Despite the military endeavour by the United States (US) and its allies, under Operation Enduring Freedom for the last eight years, violence in 2008 increased by 40 per cent over 2007 and almost 543 percent over 2005. The Taliban-led insurgency has spread and according to an estimate almost 70 per cent of the country have become “no-go areas for security forces, government officials and aid workers” depicting a rapidly shrinking political and humanitarian space. In this context, the paper reviewed the past US counter-insurgency approaches in Afghanistan and analysed the possible impact of a new Afghan strategy. Given India’s interest in long-term stabilization of Afghanistan, this policy analysis is relevant in terms of preparing responses to the evolving scenario in that country. The central thesis of the paper was that the present initiatives in designing a new COIN (Counter Insurgency) approach for Afghanistan to usher in ‘change’ are inadequate to turn the tide.

US COIN Approach under Bush administration

The inability of the international community to stabilise Afghanistan is clearly an outcome of the inadequate and short sighted policies of George W. Bush, who embarked on the military campaign in Afghanistan with the objective of dislodging the Taliban and winning the war. The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan depicts that the US policy under President Bush of establishing security with a ‘light footprint’ and lack of focus on ‘nation-building’ has proved to be counter productive. Moreover, at a critical juncture of Afghan stabilization efforts, the already limited resources and manpower devoted to Afghanistan were shifted to Iraq. Despite the successful completion of the Bonn process and conducting successful presidential and parliamentary elections, the political structures and the Parliament in Afghanistan are wracked by disruptive forces.

Initiatives of the Obama administration: Break from the past
Will they work?

Obama’s promise of ‘change’ from the previous administration’s unilateral policies, his preference to replace blunt force with ‘diplomacy’ and ‘smart power’ is projected to have ramifications not only on Afghanistan but also for the entire South Asia.

(i) Establishing Security - The debate in the present administration on the need to establish security in Afghanistan has revolved around three policy options: (a) Troop Surge (b) Arming the tribal militia (c) Talks/Negotiations with the Taliban.

(ii) Diplomacy and ‘Smart Power’ approach - Obama has promised a change by ending the war on terror. One of the first Presidential actions after taking office was ordering the closure of the controversial detention centre at Guantanomo Bay. This has been viewed positively at home and abroad.

(iii) Pakistan- Issue of Sanctuary- Obama has maintained that the future US efforts “must refocus” on “Afghanistan and Pakistan -- the central front in our war against Al Qaeda”. Sanctuaries on the Pakistan side of the Afghan-Pakistan border supply and train the assault on Afghanistan and the allied forces there. Moreover, the Pakistani Taliban, have expanded their sweep over a vast area of the country.

(iv) Pressure tactics on Karzai - Members of the Obama administration have provided enough indications of backing an alternative candidate in the upcoming Afghan national elections. The decision is just not based on the fact that Karzai was a choice of the Bush administration, but because of his inability to rein in rampant corruption, the flourishing drug trade, and the inability of his government to deliver basic services.

(v) Regional Strategy - The Obama administration has favoured a ‘comprehensive strategy’ that looks at the problem of Afghanistan regionally, and that goes even beyond Pakistan and India but in some way takes into consideration the interests of Russia, Iran, and even China.

The paper assessed that there is not much change with the ushering of the new administration and most likely it would be a continuation of earlier policy. There are no bench marks and timeline for the ‘Exit strategy’ either.

Policy options for India

India’s interests in Afghanistan are long term stability and building a ‘land bridge,’ mentoring-ANA, ANP, COIN grid and fostering Capacity building-community projects. Obama administration’s policy of ‘troop surge’ or ‘negotiating with the Taliban’ would be viewed with greater interest by Indian policy makers in the post 26/11 Mumbai scenario. Unless troop surge is accompanied by ‘civilian surge’ the Afghans would resent the foreign troop presence. India needs to emphasise on an Afghan-led process of long-term institution building both in the security and governance sectors. India could contribute to capacity building and training of personnel (Afghan Army and police) but needs to steer clear from any direct military involvement in that country. The post 26/11 scenario calls for a better regional strategy to address the threat emanating from non-state actors operating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

Issues raised in the discussion:

• There are two dimensions to the problem in Afghanistan- strategic depth and nation building. The situation is grim in that country but as far as nation building is concerned, Afghans would themselves have to work towards it as no outsider would do it.
• Militarism was dominant in George Bush’s policy and it was not a comprehensive approach.
• President Obama’s policy talks about a regional approach and India and China are important parts of this regional concept.
• The primary reason for the unpopularity of the government in Afghanistan is lack of social development activities.
• Very often despondency is the tone when we talk about Afghanistan. The strategy of winning hearts and minds needs to be pursued.
• Afghanistan has become a competing space for great powers. There is lack of understanding of local cultures and absence of a social code.
• NATO’s presence in Afghanistan is in body and not in soul. The member countries of NATO come with a set of caveats and therefore there is lack of fruitful coordination.
• As far as India’s role is concerned, the larger question is how India would fit within the NATO framework.
• India should in fact adopt a more forward looking and proactive posture. However, any decision by India to send troops to Afghanistan as part of a more proactive role should be properly assessed and its ramifications should be studied carefully.
• As Afghanistan is also a member of SAARC, India could offer it a larger bouquet of choices.
• Pakistan is both a part of the Afghanistan problem and a solution to the problem.
• Afghanistan needs to have a force which is sustainable in its own budget.
• Great nations and narrow minds do not work.
• Afghanistan problem cannot be solved in isolation and there is need for comprehensive engagement.
• The role of SCO in the context of Afghanistan should also be considered while studying this problem.
• The proposal regarding implementation of the Panchayati Raj system in Afghanistan may not be a feasible option.

The session was chaired by Dr. G. Balachandran. There were three external discussants: Shri K.C. Singh, Shri Shakti Sinha and Brigadier (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle. Dr. Rajiv Nayan and Captain Alok Bansal were the internal discussants.

Prepared by Dr. Priyanka Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses organised a round table interaction with Bolat Nurgaliev, Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on February 27, 2009. During his visit he deliberated upon important issues like the current status of the SCO, role of observer states and the question of the SCO’s expansion, economic cooperation within the framework of the organisation, and its current strategy for cooperation in the energy sector. He also dwelt on the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and its negative effect on neighbouring states. The limitations and problems faced by the SCO were also highlighted by the Secretary General.

The Secretary General said that the Afghanistan issue has continued to be on the agenda of SCO meetings. Member countries have been keen to help Afghanistan because peace and stability there is in their interest. However, any physical involvement by the SCO in Afghanistan has not been contemplated so far. He informed that the SCO will shortly be organising a conference on Afghanistan in Russia as discussed in the previous SCO summit meeting. The conference would aim to assess the seriousness of the problem in Afghanistan with focus on terrorism and drug trafficking and to analyse the possible options to address the aforesaid issues. Senior government officials would be participating in this conference. India will be one of the participating countries.

During the discussion, it was articulated that Afghanistan has been the play ground for India, Persia and Central Asia, where these powers have sought to establish control. Today, Pakistan wants to dominate Afghanistan. However, it was only India which can establish strong economic linkages with Afghanistan because of its economic potential. It was pointed out that trading with India will bring about economic prosperity to Afghanistan. Therefore, it is important for India and Pakistan to work together to bring stability in Afghanistan.

On cooperation between the SCO and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) he said that both organisations have a working engagement. While the CSTO is mainly a military political bloc, SCO is an organisation addressing security and economic cooperation among member states. What CSTO lacks is the Chinese component. He also ruled out the possibility of the SCO turning into a military bloc.

In response to a question on energy competition in the Eurasian region and SCO’s role in this sector, he said that some member states have energy resources while others are transit countries for the supply of these resources. Therefore, energy cooperation remains an important issue for SCO member countries. However, progress in the area of setting up an energy club has not achieved much success. There is a difference of opinion on the issue of how to cooperate with each other within the SCO framework. While some members want the creation of an energy club, others emphasise on formulating an SCO energy strategy. Some others are of the opinion that before formulating a regional energy strategy it would be important to formulate a national energy strategy. He said that as heads of States want to focus on the energy issue there is a possibility that in the long run SCO will be able to formulate a common energy strategy acceptable to all member states.

On the speculation about the possibility of SCO+3, the Secretary General said that under the current situation this was not possible. So far the United States has been watching the activities of the SCO from a distance but has not approached it officially for any kind of engagement. As for Japan, it was not keen to be in SCO. There is a Japan-Central Asia Dialogue under which it cooperates with Central Asian countries. This was, in fact, a response to SCO activities.

On the issue of expansion, he said that currently the SCO remains an open organisation. But at the same time it is undergoing a process where the criteria of including new members is being formulated. However, on the issue of observer status to new countries, their numbers would not be allowed to exceed that of full member states. He said that during the forthcoming June summit of SCO, some rules for the role of observer countries will be adopted.

On India’s role in the SCO, he said that the SCO expects India to play an important role in establishing peace and security in this region. He said that India has expressed desire to participate in political, economic and security arena but not officially applied for a full membership to the SCO. He said that Turkey has shown some interest to be involved in specific projects with the SCO.

Economic cooperation within the SCO framework has been the focus of member countries. Several steps have been taken up in this direction. During the Dushanbe Summit meeting an MOU on partnership relations between the Interbank Association of the SCO and Eurasian Development Bank was signed. In this context member countries have come to the stage of selecting major projects which need to be undertaken in the region. Most countries have been interested in infrastructure projects like building of roads and tunnels. It was pointed out that the SCO was close to creating a development fund. In this context it was highlighted that legal rules need to be created for any kind of financial cooperation.

Highlighting the limitations and problems of the SCO, the Secretary General said that there was a need to perfect the organisational structure and continue to build political trust among member states. It was noted that some times a gap between decision making and actual implementation of projects taken up by the SCO delays the whole process. Often priority placed on national interest by individual member states creates a problem for any forward movement of the organisation. He stated that the current financial crisis will have some impact on various economic projects taken up by member countries of the SCO.

Prepared by Dr. Meena Singh Roy, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.