Events

The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses organised a round table interaction with Bolat Nurgaliev, Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on February 27, 2009. During his visit he deliberated upon important issues like the current status of the SCO, role of observer states and the question of the SCO’s expansion, economic cooperation within the framework of the organisation, and its current strategy for cooperation in the energy sector. He also dwelt on the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and its negative effect on neighbouring states. The limitations and problems faced by the SCO were also highlighted by the Secretary General.

The Secretary General said that the Afghanistan issue has continued to be on the agenda of SCO meetings. Member countries have been keen to help Afghanistan because peace and stability there is in their interest. However, any physical involvement by the SCO in Afghanistan has not been contemplated so far. He informed that the SCO will shortly be organising a conference on Afghanistan in Russia as discussed in the previous SCO summit meeting. The conference would aim to assess the seriousness of the problem in Afghanistan with focus on terrorism and drug trafficking and to analyse the possible options to address the aforesaid issues. Senior government officials would be participating in this conference. India will be one of the participating countries.

During the discussion, it was articulated that Afghanistan has been the play ground for India, Persia and Central Asia, where these powers have sought to establish control. Today, Pakistan wants to dominate Afghanistan. However, it was only India which can establish strong economic linkages with Afghanistan because of its economic potential. It was pointed out that trading with India will bring about economic prosperity to Afghanistan. Therefore, it is important for India and Pakistan to work together to bring stability in Afghanistan.

On cooperation between the SCO and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) he said that both organisations have a working engagement. While the CSTO is mainly a military political bloc, SCO is an organisation addressing security and economic cooperation among member states. What CSTO lacks is the Chinese component. He also ruled out the possibility of the SCO turning into a military bloc.

In response to a question on energy competition in the Eurasian region and SCO’s role in this sector, he said that some member states have energy resources while others are transit countries for the supply of these resources. Therefore, energy cooperation remains an important issue for SCO member countries. However, progress in the area of setting up an energy club has not achieved much success. There is a difference of opinion on the issue of how to cooperate with each other within the SCO framework. While some members want the creation of an energy club, others emphasise on formulating an SCO energy strategy. Some others are of the opinion that before formulating a regional energy strategy it would be important to formulate a national energy strategy. He said that as heads of States want to focus on the energy issue there is a possibility that in the long run SCO will be able to formulate a common energy strategy acceptable to all member states.

On the speculation about the possibility of SCO+3, the Secretary General said that under the current situation this was not possible. So far the United States has been watching the activities of the SCO from a distance but has not approached it officially for any kind of engagement. As for Japan, it was not keen to be in SCO. There is a Japan-Central Asia Dialogue under which it cooperates with Central Asian countries. This was, in fact, a response to SCO activities.

On the issue of expansion, he said that currently the SCO remains an open organisation. But at the same time it is undergoing a process where the criteria of including new members is being formulated. However, on the issue of observer status to new countries, their numbers would not be allowed to exceed that of full member states. He said that during the forthcoming June summit of SCO, some rules for the role of observer countries will be adopted.

On India’s role in the SCO, he said that the SCO expects India to play an important role in establishing peace and security in this region. He said that India has expressed desire to participate in political, economic and security arena but not officially applied for a full membership to the SCO. He said that Turkey has shown some interest to be involved in specific projects with the SCO.

Economic cooperation within the SCO framework has been the focus of member countries. Several steps have been taken up in this direction. During the Dushanbe Summit meeting an MOU on partnership relations between the Interbank Association of the SCO and Eurasian Development Bank was signed. In this context member countries have come to the stage of selecting major projects which need to be undertaken in the region. Most countries have been interested in infrastructure projects like building of roads and tunnels. It was pointed out that the SCO was close to creating a development fund. In this context it was highlighted that legal rules need to be created for any kind of financial cooperation.

Highlighting the limitations and problems of the SCO, the Secretary General said that there was a need to perfect the organisational structure and continue to build political trust among member states. It was noted that some times a gap between decision making and actual implementation of projects taken up by the SCO delays the whole process. Often priority placed on national interest by individual member states creates a problem for any forward movement of the organisation. He stated that the current financial crisis will have some impact on various economic projects taken up by member countries of the SCO.

Prepared by Dr. Meena Singh Roy, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Chair: V.G Patankar
Discussants: Kalim Bahadur and Ajay D Behera

Pakistan’s self image, geographical location and history have influenced the country’s strategic thinking. In the initial years, Pakistan perceived itself to be a weak state and believed that India posed an existential threat to its security. However, Islamabad’s thinking evolved over a period of time through its experience in various wars with India, tension on the western borders, developments in communications, military doctrines, military technology and weapons systems. For instance, after its defeat in the 1971 war with India, Pakistan decided to develop nuclear weapons. Following the acquisition of a nuclear capability was acquired in 1987, nuclear deterrence became an important element of Pakistan’s strategic thinking. Similarly, Islamic jihad based on young recruits from Pakistan mosques and madrassas played an important role in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Drivers for Pakistan’s Strategic Outlook

Pakistan has suffered from a small state syndrome ever since its inception. It feels a strong sense of disadvantage vis-à-vis India. Being one-fourth its territory and one-eighth of its population, Pakistan feels pressured by being in the vicinity of a much larger Hindu dominated India.

Pakistan was conscious of the fact that any attack from its perceived adversaries, India to its East and Afghanistan/erstwhile Soviet Union in the West would leave it with very little strategic depth. This led Islamabad to adopt a strategy of “offensive defence” vis-à-vis India, and on the other hand to develop relations with Iran and make vigorous attempts to establish its influence in Afghanistan.

The 1893 Durand Line created by the British profoundly embittered the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact in 1947, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations because it laid claim to the Pashtun territories on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line. In 1949, a loya jirga (grand tribal assembly) convened by the Afghan government declared support for “Pushtunistan”. The jirga which affirmed the position of the Afghan government was not willing to accept the validity of agreements like the 1893 Durand Agreement, as it considered Pakistan a new state rather than a successor state to British India, and considered past treaties with the British pertaining to the status of the border as null and void. Afghanistan’s support for Pushtunistan found expression due to Pashtun nationalism, the pride stemming from Pashtun political domination of Afghanistan historically and the implicit vulnerability that characterizes Afghanistan’s landlocked geographic situation.

Pakistan’s inability to establish a stable democratic system in the early years of its independence resulted in the repeated intervention of the army. Given its interest in remaining the dominant power centre it has not tolerated interference by civilian governments in matters it considers sacrosanct.

Pakistan’s internal ethnic contradictions and the dominance of the Punjabis in the power structure resulted in the movement for secession in East Pakistan. At the time of independence, it was hoped that a “common faith” would help overcome any ethno-linguistic contradictions

The excessive importance given by the Pakistani leadership to the views of the Ulema resulted in the gradual ascendancy of religious extremists. The Ulema have had significant influence over the Pakistani leadership

Pakistan has always used its Islamic identity and therefore its links to Islamic countries as an important factor in promoting its strategic objectives. Right from the beginning Pakistan’s leadership adopted a pan-Islamic approach, became a member of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and later of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).

The strategic location of Pakistan during the Cold War led to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States which determined its strategic outlook for a substantial period of history. Regime survival, Pakistan’s traditional policy paradigm of seeking leadership in the Muslim world, securing national unity through Islam and obtaining Western economic and military assistance were some of the imperatives guiding Pakistan’s behaviour.

Elements of Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking

First, it would be pertinent to emphasize that Pakistan’s strategic thinking has been dominated by the Army because of the Army’s continuous role in government, whether direct or indirect.

Second, it was therefore natural that Pakistan’s strategic thinking should have been characterised by a highly aggressive posture towards India. A number of assumptions on the part of the Pakistani leadership led it to attack India in 1965. It was believed that after Nehru’s death the potential for disintegration of India was higher, and Lal Bahadur Shastri was considered to be a weak leader. The flawed concept of “The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West” remained the basis of Pakistan’s military strategy till the surrender at Dhaka in 1971. Pakistan’s aggressive attitude was also evident from its strategy to destabilise India through covert means as in the state support for Sikh separatists through the 1980s. Since the late 1980s Pakistan has actively sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of the highly trained mujahideen who had returned from the Afghan war. The Kargil operations in 1999 were launched by the Pakistan Army with the aim of acquiring territory at Kargil in a bid to force India to solve the Kashmir problem on terms favourable to Pakistan.

Third, such aggressive behaviour was also reflected in Pakistan’s dealings with Afghanistan. Concepts like strategic depth provided legitimacy for military expansionism into Afghanistan, initially by giving support to the anti-Soviet Mujahideen, and later by training and supporting the Taliban

Fourth, Pakistan’s strategists have followed a doctrine of “offensive defence” given Pakistan’s size, location, and terrain along its eastern border with India. In times of crisis, Pakistan has not hesitated to be the first to resort to use of force to gain initial advantage.

Fifth, though Pakistan’s belief in jihad as a weapon to achieve political goals is well known, it is interesting to note that in the late 1970's, efforts were made to interpret the Holy Quran and its relevance to war. The Quranic concept of Jihad seems to be the basis of Islamic strategic doctrine.

Sixth, Pakistan has relied extensively on irregulars to help it achieve its military objectives.

Seventh, Pakistan believed that it would be able to snatch Kashmir from India and “inflict a thousand wounds” on India, destabilise it or weaken it, through subconventional warfare. Taking advantage of its nuclear capability acquired in 1987, Pakistan started implementing its plan of achieving strategic goals first in Kashmir and then in the rest of India through a low-intensity conflict or proxy war.

Eight, nuclear weapons constitute the most important and advanced element in Pakistan’s strategic thinking. The essential logic of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is Indo-centric. Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapons capability in 1987, as has been admitted by General Mirza Aslam Beg himself.

It can be concluded that, Pakistan can claim only partial success in achieving its strategic objectives. Even recently, western leaders like David Miliband and Richard Holbrooke have been harping on Kashmir resolution as a pre-condition for peace in the region. Again, by relying on non-state jihadi organisations to fulfil their strategic objectives against India, and by reinforcing the Taliban to carry out Pakistan’s goals against Afghanistan, Pakistan has legitimised these terrorist groups to such an extent that they have become a threat to Pakistan’s own existence.

Some of the issues raised in the discussion were:

• When Pakistan was formed as an independent state, there was no understanding of security problems that it would face. As the country was divided into two wings separated by a 1000 miles of landmass, the factors shaping strategic thinking were potentially lacking since the outset.
• The 1947 Kashmir operation planned by Pakistan was not a part of its strategy. In fact this was the first time the word Jihad was used by the Pakistani establishment to give a symbolic connotation to the Kashmir issue.
• The paper seems to be episodically analytical and needs some form of conceptualization and framework of explanation. The derivatives and meaning of strategy and strategic thinking need to be elucidated.
• There is a need to focus on the nation building process in Pakistan, before outlining components of its strategic thinking. The fact that Pakistan is not a homogenous entity has to be reckoned with. The domestic aspect and the questions related to survivability of the state has to be underlined in order arrive at a comprehensive picture.
• There is a need to underline the strategic objectives in Pakistan. In this context it is important to comprehend Pakistani understanding of India.
• The paper needs to focus on 1971 as the turning point as there was a perceptible shift of Pakistan’s strategy.
• Given the economic dependence of Pakistan on the United States and the I.M.F, is it feasible to discuss the possibility of independent strategic thinking in Pakistan.

The seminar was chaired by Lt Gen (Retd.) V.G Patankar. External discussants were Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Dr Ajay. D. Behera. Internal discussants were Dr. Smruti Pattanaik and Col. Ali Ahmed.

Prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Chair: Hari Prasad
Discussants: Arun Sahgal and Manpreet Sethi

Strategic doctrine is taken here to be implemented by a combine of war fighting land, air, naval and joint doctrines in conjunction with nuclear doctrine. While with respect to China, India has a doctrine of ‘dissuasive deterrence’, it is contended in this paper that with respect to Pakistan it has moved from a deterrent doctrine to a more proactive and offensive doctrine that potentially countenances compellence. This paper looks at India’s strategic doctrine with respect to Pakistan. The hypothesis of this paper is that there has been a movement in India’s war fighting doctrine from deterrence to also countenance compellence. The paper attempts to assess this by first establishing the nature of the change and then analyzing its implications with respect to Indian grand strategy, prospective political aims in conflict and likely effectiveness. The proposed direction of change forms its concluding recommendations.

From a defensive and reactive mindset of the earlier years that gave rise to criticism that India lacks a strategic culture, change in a compressed time period has been witnessed of late. These changes in nuclear and conventional doctrines are contrary to the logical expectation of the Nuclear Age necessitating deterrent doctrines. India is the status quo and stronger power in the regional India-Pakistan dyad. This should have logically led to a deterrent doctrine with a defensive bias, since India, not seeking any territorial gains at the expense of others, could be expected to be more interested in preserving its interests and position. This has not been entirely borne out and instead India has apparently acquired a more offensive strategic doctrine in relation to its western front.

At the structural level, the strategic cul de sac forced on India by Pakistan’s continuing proxy war is a reason for this change. Pakistan’s venturesome strategy has been attributed to the advent of the Nuclear Age dating to the covert acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan by the late eighties. In order to get Pakistan to forego its doctrine of sub conventional provocation, deterrence has its limitations. Instead, compellence, going beyond the coercive diplomacy of the Operation Parakram kind, may be necessary.

India’s straitened defence budgets through the nineties - brought on by liberalization – lead to a drawdown of the conventional deterrent. The ‘stability-instability paradox’ made its appearance with Pakistan choosing to engage India at the sub-conventional level. Stability at the upper nuclear and conventional level, led to instability at the sub conventional level. This climaxed in Pakistani incursion across the Line of Control in Kargil in 1999. It has been posited that there is space for conventional operations between sub conventional and nuclear war. India has therefore moved towards an offensive doctrine that can be characterized as one of ‘compellence’, when the land, sea, air and joint doctrines are taken conjointly with nuclear doctrine.

The prognosis of future Limited War is that it would be short duration, high intensity and from a ‘cold start’. It is expected that international pressures and need to limit costs would entail a short duration. To offset international pressures in the crisis management stage and for getting enemy defence under prepared, a ‘cold start’ has been deemed necessary. This would enable India to make military gains through surprise, by undercutting the mobilization differential that was earlier in favour of Pakistan.

India’s land warfare doctrine is essentially to create the conditions of launch of the major offensive by the strike corps. A salient ‘fire break’ between the pivot corps offensives in the first phase and the following strike corps deep offensives in the next phase can be discerned, even though these offensive operations are likely to be in a seamless sequence, not lending itself to breakdown in ‘phases’. This ‘fire break’ constitutes the crucial decision point in which India’s strategic, political and diplomatic might needs to be combined with the impending application of military force to ensure Pakistan complies with Indian aims. The launch of the strike corps would be equivalent of a failure of grand strategy for it would bring the nuclear factor unmistakably into the reckoning. Since offensive operations would have to reckon with the nuclear reaction threshold of Pakistan, a nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation comes under question. There is a case for move of nuclear doctrine to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation.

There is need for maximizing synergy between the politico-diplomatic and military prongs of strategy to coincide with the ‘firebreak’ between launch of pivot and strike corps offensives. To keep these a seamless continuum is to unleash a ‘doomsday machine’. Launch of strike corps offensives, unless it is as a counter offensive to Pakistani corps offensives as part of their ‘offensive defence’ doctrine, would be to enter an uncertain strategic realm. Therefore, a public shift from ‘massive’ punitive retaliation to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation is in order at the nuclear level. At the conventional level must be taken into cognizance the ‘firebreak’ between the offensives of the pivot and strike corps as the key exit point with war termination pressures being maximized by an orchestration of Indian war grand strategy to culminate at this juncture, if not prior to launch of cold start forces.

The following points were raised during the discussion:

• It is difficult to make a sharp distinction between compellence and deterrence as the former is subsumed in the latter.
• India’s doctrine is not an offensive one, but is reactive and therefore lends itself to deterrence as against compellence.
• Better integration and jointness among the services is required to achieve war aims in future wars.

Prepared by by Dr. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Chair: Arvind Gupta
Discussants: Bhaskar Roy and Sanjay Bharadwaj

“Terror Financing in Bangladesh” by Dr. Anand Kumar outlined key factors that contribute to terror financing in Bangladesh. Dr. Kumar’s primary argument was that sustenance and maintenance of terror organizations is often built on the edifice of a strong financial base and that terror cannot make much headway without finance.

The author at the outset drew attention to the issue of state accountability in dealing with terrorism as terrorist activities often emanated from domestic territorial space. He emphasized that intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and imposition of new financial controls were important levers to curb the functioning of terrorist groups. In this context, he argued that the Government of Bangladesh has made only half hearted attempts to contain terrorist activities in its soil.

The presentation focused on three aspects: the Beneficiary Groups and Institutions involved in terrorism; the sources of terror finance in Bangladesh; and, the responses of the Bangladesh Government and international institutions. Finally, the paper briefly touched upon the policy relevance of the findings.

Main Beneficiary Groups and Institutions

Dr. Kumar argued that the main beneficiaries of terror finance in Bangladesh have been Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). Both organizations have maintained links with Islamic groups like Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Alhikma, Harkat ul Jihad etc. Money is used for recruitment and training purposes. Funding is also being channelled to build a large number of mosques and madarsas, which are playing an instrumental role in radicalizing society at the district and village levels.

Sources of Terror Financing

Some sources listed as potential feeders for financing terrorist activities, as argued by Dr. Kumar, were Islamic NGOs, Saudi charities, individuals, money laundering, fake currency, drugs and underworld. Dr. Kumar asserted that post 9/11, Islamic NGOs have increasingly become important in the fight against terrorism. In order to support the argument, he cited the steps taken by United States to halt the flow of funds to terrorist organizations through Executive Order 13224 and related elements of the USA Patriot act. He argued that as oversight mechanisms were absent, no financial scrutiny of the Islamic charities is undertaken, which further complicates the problem of tackling terror financing. The Saudi Government’s patronage of charities such as International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was also brought to attention. He cited the example of Al Haramain, a Riyadh based Muslim Charity, which was opened in Cox Bazar in 1992 to help Rohingya refugees but continued to operate in Bangladesh uninterrupted despite it being banned by the United Sates and Saudi Arabia. The connection between Al Haramain and terrorism was revealed in 2002, when linkages were made between Al Haramain and its suspected links to terror funding and trafficking of women and children under the garb of providing Islamic education. As far as individual support is concerned, links to Bin Laden were cited. Dr. Kumar argued that funds were flowing into Bangladesh in the form of Hundi through Jessore, Chittagong and Dhaka. He added that Bangladesh in recent years has also become a major source of fake currency. Fake currency was being printed in Chapai Nawabgunj and then being dumped into India. The nexus between drugs and terror finance also became evident when in 2005, the National board of Revenue found that business companies in Bangladesh were smuggling heroine to U.K. and that profits accrued form trafficking in narcotics often went for funding Islamist groups.

Responses of Bangladesh Government and International Institutions

Policy to tackle terror financing was expedited after the series of bomb blasts in 2005. The BNP enacted the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation (Amendment Act, 2004). However, political motivations have often been an impediment for sustained political action and an overt emphasis on NGOs let the real culprits go scot-free. The enactment of Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 also proved ineffective as it was full of operational loopholes. Similarly the dismal record of Bangladeshi Banks in checking terror finance was also brought to attention. The author argued that Bangladeshi banks have received approximately 236 suspicious transitions since the MLPA was enacted in 2002, but till date there has been no progress on the issue due to procedural problems.

The author further argued that pressure from the United States has proved ineffective in triggering a behavioural change within Bangladesh. However, he also noted the renewed interest of the United Nations in dealing with the problem of terror financing in Bangladesh since 2001. In 2005, Government of Bangladesh became a party to the UN International Convention for the suppression for the financing of terrorism. The Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering is another key forum where Bangladesh is engaging to get transparency into the system of terror finance.

The author concluded by stating that the issue of terror finance was a daunting challenge facing the government and political will needed to be strengthened in order to tackle the issue in a holistic manner.

Some of the points raised during the discussion were:

• One should be careful of classifying all charities as sources for terror finance. Classification of Madarsas is also needed.
• Domestic, regional and international issues responsible for terror financing should also be analysed.
• Causes of terrorism are generally found in the lack of development in Bangladesh, which is perhaps becoming an important catalyst for recruiting people.
• One needs to revisit pre 1971 years of undivided Pakistan to seek linkages between Pakistan and terrorism in Bangladesh. ISI links to terror financing should also be explored.
• Sources on linkages between terror financing and their sources should be more diversified.

The seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta, LBSC Chair, IDSA. Mr. Bhaskar Roy and Prof. Sanjay Bharadwaj were the external discussants; and Dr. Uttam Sinha and Capt. Alok Bansal were internal discussants

Prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.