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India's Foreign Policy: Coping with the Changing World by Prof Muchkund Dubey November 26, 2012 1530-1730 hrs Book Discussion Forum

Venue: Room no 005, IDSA

Panelists:
1. Dr Arvind Gupta, DG, IDSA
2. Amb Sheel Kant Sharma
3. Amb Yoginder Kumar
4. Prof. Sujit Dutta, Jamia Millia University
5. Dr Smruti S Pattanaik, Research Fellow, IDSA

Impact of Local State Politics on Indo- Bangladesh Relations December 21, 2012 Anand Kumar 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chairperson: Ambassador I P Khosla
Discussants: Shri K Srinivasan, Shri Anil Kamboj and Dr Joyeeta Bhattacharjee

South Asia
Equilibrium in Higher Defence Organisation: Lessons for the Future December 14, 2012 Rajneesh Singh 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chairperson: Dr. Manoj K Joshi
Discussant: Shri Amit Cowshish and Maj General B K Sharma (Retd)

Defence Economics & Industry
Effectiveness of Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements December 07, 2012 Mahendra Prasad Fellows' Seminar

Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd)
External Discussants: Lt Col Sanjay Pande, Lt Col VS Raghuvanshi and Col OP Singh
Internal Discussant: Col Venu Gopal

Major Highlights of the Paper:

This is second paper of a research project entitled “Synergising QA for Speedy Defence Procurement and Ensuring Quality.” The first paper studied various aspects of quality assurance (QA) in army procurements, from a point of view of efficiency. The current paper critically analyses the effectiveness of the QA in Army procurements and looks at the ways in which the failure data collected from the defects reported on newly acquired equipment during their warranty period can be used to strengthen the Quality of QA.

The difficult and inhospitable terrains (from Thar to Siachen, the variation in temperature is more than 100 degrees) in which the Indian Army has to operate warrants that the soldier and equipment both have to be rugged enough to bear this variation in terrain and climate. One such instance of terrain difficulty was the high failure rates of INSAS (Indian Small Arms System) at Kargil, where the rifle encountered some reliability problems in the very cold climate. The paper therefore stresses the imperative that the equipment in the hands of soldiers must be of superb quality and ought to have a high in-built reliability, in addition to being rugged. The QA of the equipment must therefore be focused to ensure these aspects.

Delving on the effectiveness or lack thereof of QA, the paper says that an effective QA of equipment will ensure that the equipments perform their intended function under given operating conditions, repeatedly, with the optimum maintenance when operated in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. Effective QA in turn ensures that there are no or negligible complaints against the product that has been quality-assured. An ineffective QA on the other hand is evident from the numerous complaints of product failure, especially during its warranty period and for reasons attributable to the design, material and production process, once the product is put into service.

The basic argument in the paper is that the well established system of defect reporting, which happens to be the most important feedback from the user, is not being fully exploited to trace back the causes that lead to occurrence of defects in field. A detailed analysis of the contemporary defect reporting practice and what ails it has been carried out. Some of the major findings of the study are:

  • Though the time lines for defect reporting and investigation are clearly laid down, they are seldom followed. Investigation and closure of many defects takes more than six months and in quite a few cases more than a year. Keeping defective equipment for such long duration without preservation causes further deterioration and also deprives the user of the services of that equipment.
  • The user feels maximum pinch if only one number of that type of equipment is authorised to them on which the defect report is initiated. For instance, if only one generating set is authorised to a minor unit deployed in an operational area, and that remains unavailable to them for want of a defect investigation for a year, the unit is condemned to live without electricity for that duration, unless it borrows one from some other unit.
  • Many times the officers commanding workshops are under tremendous pressure to improve equipment availability, which discourages them from reporting certain defects, and instead carry out repairs of the defective equipment and put them back into service. Thus many defects go unreported, leading to a distortion in the feedback data on QA through defect reporting.
  • In case of equipment not being under warranty period, there is a tendency to avoid defect reporting.
  • Multiplicity of agencies involved in the QA process makes coordination difficult, leading to poor QA at times.
  • QA of products offered by Ordnance Factories and Defence Public Sector Undertakings need a complete revamp.

To improve effectiveness of QA in Army procurements, the paper makes following important recommendations:

  • DGQA must constantly strive to improve the quality or effectiveness of the QA it does on the equipment procured, by making corrections in their QA tools on the basis of dual input i.e. feedback from the field Army in the form of Defect Reports (DRs), as well as from expert judgement.
  • The Officers and staff of DGQA undergoing various courses at Defence Institute of Quality assurance (DIQA) can be given projects on individual cases as part of their course curriculum.
  • It is imperative to maintain a database of DRs at AsHSP or technical directorates in a suitable form and regularly update them.
  • It is necessary that the users (field Army) report the defects meticulously.

The paper concludes by saying that in order to ensure that for the Indian Army to perform its operational tasks efficiently and effectively, it is necessary that only high quality and reliable equipment and weapon system are provisioned. QA organisation responsible for ensuring quality and reliability of these equipment and weapon systems therefore needs to be empowered by the Department of Defence Production. The organisation too, needs to empower itself internally by continuously improving its ability and upgrading its skills. Creation of a Quality Assurance Information System (QAIS) based on the suggested model, wherein feedback from users is analysed to identify the root cause of the problems and their application to relevant activity of QA, coupled with expert judgement in the form of internal and external audit of the quality of QA, would prevent stagnation of these activities and result in a dynamically improving and evolving effectiveness of the organisation, which is highly desirable at the moment.

Major Points of discussion and Suggestions to the Author:

  • There is involvement of multiple agencies in the QA process from DRDO to DGQA. Synergisation of efforts therefore becomes necessary in order to achieve desired results.
  • Quality starts from raw material stage, whereas the quality check commences at a much advanced stage of weapon development. This gap sometimes leads to poor quality weapons getting quality clearance.
  • The failure or defect reporting system has its own problems, which results in less number of defect reports. Online filling of DRs should be permitted to expedite the reporting process. Moreover, instead of waiting for the equipment to break down, advance defects report can be sent based on the performance monitoring of the weapon. It should be ensured that DRs are not confined to manufacturing defect alone; rather it should also incorporate defects arising out of poor maintenance.
  • Sampling procedure of DGQA and QA of items developed by DRDO can be looked into to suggest measures to plug the gaps in the system.
  • The real test of the equipment is not in its survivability during the warranty period, but through the life-cycle of the weapon, as there is less likelihood of the weapon developing problem in its early years.
  • It is not possible to check at design stage weapons that are produces abroad, because DGQA cannot afford to place its staff for the entire duration of designing, which is usually very long.
  • A comparative study of QA process in some advanced countries should be undertaken to learn the best practices in QA.
  • There are 16 functions of DGQA in its Charter of duties. But there is a question mark whether the DGQA is adequately staffed to perform these duties.

Report prepared by Amit Kumar, RA, IDSA

Round Table Discussion on Post Leadership Transition Analyses in China November 20, 2012 Round Table

IDSA organised a Round Table Discussion on the subject of Post Leadership Transition Analyses in China on 20 November. Amb (retd) TCA Rangachari chaired this discussion. Prof. Madhu Bhalla, Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, Maj Gen SL Narsimhan, Cdr KK Agnihotri and Brig Mandip Singh presented their views on the leadership transition. A large number of scholars from inside and outside IDSA attended this discussion.

Major Highlights of the Presentations:

  • The 18th Party Congress report suggests that the CPC’s internal dynamics are still in an evolutionary stage.
  • Hu’s report as the outgoing General Secretary is not a statement of the collective will of the Party but indicative of the internal debates on matters of policy which are ongoing within the Party.
  • Debates on “Scientific Outlook on Development” indicate fissures within the Party.
  • Use of theory is only to the extent that it helps construct the economic model when there is in fact none in reality.
  • Financial crisis has been seen as a systemic crisis of capitalism; there is a view that the liberal economic policy adopted since 1978 needs a correction.
  • Another point of debate is between further reforms versus deepening welfare policies. Reforms cannot be held back. There is also greater confidence in the state’s capacity to deal with these issues based on the increased capacity.
  • The reports of the 18th Party Congress were generally more silent on strategic issues, compared to the 16th and 17th Party Congresses which brought clear strategic direction on the table. The 18th Party Congress focussed on four major points but nothing was substantially different from the previous reports.
  • Firstly, it mentioned that China is facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges, the former mainly economic and the latter territorial and strategic.
  • Secondly, it mentioned that China’s “core interests” shall be protected while reminding that the Chinese have recently expanded the definition of “core interests”.
  • Thirdly, the reports specifically mentions about the potential of soft power.
  • Lastly, they also mention that China would take steps in its military modernisation commensurate to its international standing.
  • Regarding change and continuity it was opined that according to Chinese tradition, at least two to three years would pass before any bold change is initiated.
  • China and US will continue to ‘shadow box’ will one another.
  • The new political alignment suggests concern over provinces that were doing better in the days of growth; new issues of labour, social unrest and corruption are biggest challenges for the party and economy. As a corollary, mid-west and west will continue to see slow and tardy progress.
  • Political reform was 6th on the priority of agenda’s in the 16th Party Congress while it was on the top of 18th Party Congress priorities. China’s politics is unlikely to take a liberal-democratic shape but there will be a general consensus on broadening the mandate of the Party by making it more representative. However, it will continue to be a ‘top-down’ institution.
  • The 18th Party Congress constitution calls for the need for democracy to be visible. It proposes ‘deliberative democracy’ and not ‘liberal democracy’ and a greater voice of the people at the grassroot/village level.
  • Party’s legitimacy is dependent on the will of the people and corrective measures are likely to the extent of ensuring legitimacy.
  • Another anxiety is to do with the gap between decision-making and implementation and it has to do with the quality of the cadre at lower levels which is diluted after the Three Represents formulation; party membership has become a career securing tool. At the same time, the princeling-party nexus is hurting the image of the party.
  • China’s economy has escaped the logic of the Party in many areas. Endemic corruption is almost ‘acceptable’ and there is a feeling in some quarters that this was used as an excuse to weed out Bo Xilai, who posed an ideological challenge to the consensus.
  • It was felt that the PLA Army was probably made to give away more space to its counterparts i.e. Navy and Air Force and the new leadership structure reflects a trend towards more professionalism than the earlier focus on political ideology. Tenures for Commanders of PLAN, PLAAF and SAC tend to be longer ensuring continuity.
  • It was noted that the new CMC leadership lacked anyone with command experience from the Chengdu MAC, perhaps indicating that the military issues relating to India have taken a back seat in Chinese strategic thinking, for the present. However, this needs to be seen in the larger prism of the area being responsible for operations in TAR which remains a “core interest”.
  • Gen Ma Xiaotian, who has recently returned from a trip to India, may be roped in for strategic thinking on India related issues in China and PLA.
  • The transition has resulted in new Commanders in four out of China’s seven MACs. This lends credibility to the fact that professional and operational experience is rewarded.
  • According to the General Secretary’s report, the 253 km long Lhasa-Xigatse rail line is likely to be completed next year and work would begin on the recently announced 435 km long Lhasa-Nyingchi rail project. This is part of the proposed 1900 km long Sichuan-Lhasa rail link project.
  • The vacant post of the third Vice Chairman of the CMC would most probably be filled by the incumbent Vice President of the state sometime in March 2013.
  • China’s overall maritime capacity will increase as economy and trade’s dependence on maritime resources grows. Maritime expansion, including that of the PLA-N is linked with the great power ambitions.
  • There is increasing domain knowledge specialisation to expand maritime capacity; it can be seen in expansion of various kinds of shipbuilding capacities both in commercial and warship construction. This growing capacity and will manifested in assertive action recently in the maritime disputes in South and East China Seas.

Other Points of Discussion

  • Hu Jintao’s lineage will continue through the protégés in CMC and Politburo.
  • Factional lines are not clear but overlap to a large extent. Factions have strategic unity but tactical differences.
  • There is a general consensus on how to preserve the status quo and party’s supremacy.
  • Going by some of the selections that did not happen it is clear that the party does not like individual style leadership but prefers consensus. This will lead to further institutionalization of the Chinese politics.
  • Fear of chaos and problems associated with representative democracy create fears about liberal democracy.
  • Tibet is viewed as a developmental challenge and not as a ethnic-religious-cultural issue.
  • Xi is reform oriented and known as ‘Mr Do it’. He visited India in 1991 as Fujian Party boss. There is strong view that India-China trade will get a fillip with Xi at the helm.
  • Xi’s association with the Tibet Work Forum meetings as Chair since early this year suggests that he is likely to be deeply involved in Tibet issues.
  • Li Keqiang is in charge of the 12th Five Year Plan implementation the ‘Western Development’ strategy.

Report prepared by Avinash Godbole, Research Assistant and Bijoy Das, Research Associate, IDSA.

East Asia
Joint Workshop by IDSA and PIC on "Energy and Environment Dilemma: Way Ahead for India" November 27, 2012 1000 hrs Workshop

Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor), IDSA
Organisers: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Pune International Center (PIC)

Non-Traditional Security
IDSA-PRIO Workshop on Global Governance and Resource Use: The Case of the Arctic November 19, 2012 Bilateral

Venue: IDSA, New Delhi

The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) hosted the roundtable on “Governance and Resource Use: The Case of the Arctic” on November 19, 2012 at the IDSA campus. The day-long conference comprised of two sessions, each with 4 speakers. Dr. Arvind Gupta, DG IDSA and Dr. Åshild Kolås, Research Professor, PRIO gave the inaugural speech.

Session 1

The opening session focused on the Arctic. Leiv Lunde, Fridtjof Nansens Institutt, Norway highlighted the reasons why the Arctic is attracting global interest. Reasons cited were several including growing economic interest because of climate change, immense resource potential, new emerging transport routes (like the Northern Sea Route) and gradually strengthening governance mechanisms. He also pointed out that the Arctic region is currently faced with low international tension. In addition he also discussed the role of Russia as a major player. Concern was expressed by him over the poor infrastructure along the Russian Arctic coast. In conclusion, he recommended that India join the Arctic Council as an observer, while at the same time investing political energy in other institutions. Rune Rafaelsen, Secreatry General of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes pointed out that the influence of people living in the Arctic and that the governance of the regions’ resources cannot be underestimated. He recommended that a new Secretariat be built for managing the Arctic resources. Captain (N) Gunnar Heløe, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, delineated that the High North will be Norway’s most important strategic priority area in the years to come. Dr Rafaelsen and Captain Heløe both pointed out that the delimitation line as per the Norwegian-Russian agreement (signed and ratified in July 2011) was the result of 40 years of negotiation.

In a quick response to the India’s position, Amit Narang, Deputy Secretary, United Nations Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India emphasised that the Arctic is of global rather than regional interest and India has been actively engaged in the region. He stated that India had submitted its application to Sweden for Observer Status in the Arctic Council on November 6, 2012. Cdr Sarabjeet Parmar, IDSA posed the question, viz. whether the governance of the Arctic was really settled, since the agreement between Russia and Norway on Svalbard was only a bilateral one. In his view, Russia would rely increasingly on fossil fuels from the High North which is why it had been strengthening its cooperation with Norway. He also brought out the issue of conflicting continental shelf claims and the possibility of conflict arising due to sovereignty issues arising from the claims. The difference in opinion between the US and Canada on the issue of international waters and internal waters was highlighted as an example. Discussing the standing of the Arctic Council he brought China into the discussion. He pointed out that China’s application for a permanent status as an observer in the Arctic Council had been rejected in 2012 by Norway but reiterated that the Council should view the applications for membership from non-Arctic nations in a more holistic way. H.P. Rajan, former Director, Office of Legal Affairs, UN, and former Adviser to the Dpt of Ocean Development, GoI, provided technical insights about the Law of the Sea. All Arctic States with the exception of the US are parties to it and all Arctic countries including the US agree that the legal regime contained in the UNCLOS applies to the Arctic as well. With Arctic meltdown, while new shipping routes will open up, the rights of States for various types of passage (innocent, transit, archipelagic or free passage) are already set out in UNCLOS; what needs to be worked out are the practical modalities, which could mostly be bilateral, but needs to be applied uniformly to other States also. As for resources, the landmass underneath Arctic is almost entirely the continental margins of 5 Arctic States, namely, Russia, Norway, Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and the US. Of these, Russia and Norway have already made their submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and received recommendations for delineation of the outer limits. Canada and Denmark are expected to make their submissions in 2013.

Discussion

Olav Schram Stokke, Research Professor, FNI, remarked that the Arctic Council is not dealing with sovereignty and security, but is rather coordinating fact-finding, capacity advancement, and serving as an information clearing house on priorities of decision-makers. This, according to him, is a good reason for non-Arctic states to become observers in the Arctic Council. Captain Heløe flagged China’s interest in Greenland. The Arctic Council according to him is limited since it does not take into account security issues. Astri Suhrke while referring to a recent article by Oran Young made the point that pursuing Observer status should not be the primary goal but this should be a springboard for a broader multilateral cooperation platform. In response to Suhrke’s comment, Rafaelsen argued that the Arctic Council at least provided a platform to people living in the region.

In his chairpersons’ remarks, Arvind Gupta asserted that two different views about the importance of the Arctic Council had emerged; one that it is an important institution, the other that it is not. He noted that in the case of the Arctic, the resource commons only begin outside the 200-mile economic zone of all coastal states, which constitutes a very limited area.

Session 2

The Chairperson Kristian Berg Harpviken, PRIO introduced the 2nd session by stating that the expectation of new hydrocarbon findings in the Arctic is important to at least three of the priority areas highlighted at Rio+20, namely energy, oceans and disaster readiness. He added that global governance issues, especially sustainability and access to resources, will strongly define the future and will create differing views. Mukul Sanwal, ORF emphasised that what is happening in the Arctic has implications on the rest of world and vice-versa. He claimed that the Arctic moderates circulation systems of oceans and atmosphere changes. He suggested that the United Nations should have a role to play; UNEP should formulate an ecological assessment and collaboration around, and review of models and their critical components. P K Gautam, IDSA expressed concern over issues of governance of the Arctic. He hoped that India would soon get observer status and would contribute to enhancing understanding among states with respect to the Arctic. Shebonti Ray Dadwal, IDSA, highlighted the limitations of energy governance organisations such International Energy Agency, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, UNEP and UNFCCC. Countries like India, she urged, should have representation in governance institutions. In addition, she recommended that there is need for all organisations to get involved in governance issues and not just the governments. Lydia Powell, ORF primarily discussed the issues and challenges of energy availability and governance in India.

Dr Harpviken in his chairperson’s remarks summed up the discussion by saying that change in the Arctic is more rapid than anyone had expected. At the same time the willingness and ability to exploit resources seemed to be less than expected. Changes elsewhere had driven changes in the Arctic rather than vice versa. He concluded that the Arctic may not be as special as people often presumed, which was brought out by the debate. He agreed that despite a consensus not being established, a lot had been learned about the positions and views.

(Report prepared by Madhavi Marwah, Intern, IDSA)

Welcome speech by Dr. Arvind Gupta, DG, IDSA

Talk by Defence Minister of Singapore, Dr Ng Eng Hen on ‘Security Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Landscape’ November 20, 2012 Other

Remarks by Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore

Security Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Landscape

Director General, IDSA, Dr Arvind Gupta
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen

It is a pleasure to be here in New Delhi, and to speak at your august institution, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Let me begin by thanking Dr Gupta and the IDSA for this opportunity to address all of you today. What I think could be useful to discuss is our perspectives and hopefully, collectively, come to some sensible steps in which India and Singapore can jointly move together to try to shape a more conducive environment.

Next month, New Delhi will host the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit to mark 20 years of ASEAN-India dialogue partnership and the 10th anniversary of the ASEAN-India Summit-level partnership. Before I came to India, I met your High Commissioner in Singapore and he updated me on the two flagship events to commemorate these milestones. First, there will be an ASEAN-India car rally from Yogyakarta in Indonesia, to New Delhi that would traverse through eight ASEAN countries. This event seems quite exciting and the car aficionados amongst you might still be able to sign up for this car rally. Second, there is also an expedition by the Indian Navy sail training ship INS Sudarshini that set sail from India in mid-September and is now mid-way through a journey that would see it call at nine ASEAN countries in all. These two events reflect and symbolise the strengthening of ties between the Governments as well as the peoples of India and ASEAN.

You will remember that in 1991, India embarked on its "Look East" policy. Yet, if you think about it, the engagements, the movement of people, the exchange of merchandise and ideas between India and ASEAN in the east are as old as the history of maritime trade itself. The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting had gathered in Phnom Penh in the middle of this year and we also had a formal retreat a few days ago in Siem Reap in Cambodia, where Secretary Panetta met with us informally as well. Obviously, when you go to Siem Reap, you have to visit Angkor Wat. The visit to Angkor Wat was a reminder of the Indian influence in Southeast Asia. I think the late King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia said it well when dedicating a boulevard in Phnom Penh to India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. And if I can quote him: "In fact, it was about 2,000 years ago that the first navigators, Indian merchants and Brahmins, brought to our ancestors their Gods, their techniques, their organization." The monuments at Angkor Wat, Borobudur, Preah Vihear, Prambanan, and Po Klong Garai are living reminders of the Indian influence in Southeast Asia. Thailand's International Airport is named Suvarnabhumi, Sanskrit for "Land of Gold", which was what ancient Indians called today's Peninsular Southeast Asia. Indeed, Thailand's Buddhist kings claim spiritual descent from India's legendary God-king Rama.

Singapore too has retained our Sanskrit name, "Lion Town" derived from the Sanskrit words simha and pura. Despite being a Chinese majority country, the Indian influence in Singapore is strong and as many of you who had visited Singapore will be quick to realise, this Indian influence has been melded indivisibly to create the unique Singapore of today. When you come to Singapore, the numerous street names, the culture, the food, the festivities, reflect an Indian heritage that is part and parcel of our multicultural and multiracial nation.

India's engagement with ASEAN and its influence on what makes ASEAN what it is today is a historical fact. Inevitably the question would be asked, what of the future - what role does India see for itself in the Asia Pacific region in the 21st Century, the Asian Century?

Changing dynamics in the Asia Pacific region

The growth of Asia certainly looks promising, based on current trends. India's long-term outlook remains bright, driven by strong economic fundamentals - large domestic savings and investments matched by strong domestic demand and a stable of World-class companies. In contrast to Europe, India has a young population, with half of its population currently under the age of 25. The demographic dividends will be reaped in the future. Just one metric to illustrate this - India's workforce will grow to 1 billion in 2030, from 780 million in 2010, and could potentially add two percentage points per annum to India's GDP growth for the next two decades, just based on the input of manpower on India's economy alone. China is currently reaping that demographic dividend, though this will tail off because China's population is ageing. Singapore had previously reaped that same demographic dividend because we had the baby boomers born in the 1950s, though now we are ageing as well. Some project India’s economy at US$5 trillion in 2030, quadruple what it is today.

China's economy is estimated to grow to US$16.5 trillion by 2030. By then, ASEAN is projected to have a population of 740 million people, by and large still young, and a combined GDP of US$3.2 trillion, roughly double what India is today. By then, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia will account for half of the world's population, with a growing middle class that will drive global demand for goods and services. Asia's economies are expected to account for more than 40 per cent of global output by 2030.

I think the numbers, the projections, the fundamentals are certainly very promising for Asia. But I think all of us here are realists and also students of history and history reminds us that projections are not always accurate predictions or pre-ordained certainties. Risks exist and history is replete with examples of "might have beens" as promising countries stumbled due to a variety of reasons. The recent escalation of tensions due to territorial disputes within the South China and East China Sea reminds us that miscalculations can set many countries on a downward trajectory. I give you one example of an incident which occurred between Japan and China as a result of the dispute in the East China Sea. In the wake of protests and boycotts, Japanese businesses shut hundreds of stores and factories in China and flights between two countries were cut. Sales of Japanese cars in China dropped by 60% in October, on a year-on-year basis, while visits by Chinese tourists to Japan dropped by a third. Just as a result of this one incident.

Stakeholder countries in Asia would therefore do well to work hard to ensure that virtuous conditions that we have today are maintained so that we can continue to cooperate and grow. We need to examine this complex dynamic and to understand how we can maintain these virtuous conditions. And I think the most critical relationship for the Asia-Pacific, or if you like, the Indo-Pacific, is the US-China relationship. How the US and China deal with one another will impact us all. All of us recognise that strategic rivalry will exist between a resident and a rising power. But beyond this, both sides have declared their intent on expanding cooperation. As I told you, we met Secretary Panetta in Siem Reap a few days ago, and he said in that meeting that the US Department of Defence pledged to step up strategic dialogue and build better relations with China. It is clear that much work remains to be done for US-China ties to achieve a more productive, less contentious footing.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula, transnational threats arising from terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemics and natural disasters are other concerns that none of us can choose to ignore. Nor can these concerns be solved by any one country, no matter how well resourced.

Building regional consensus and practical cooperation

To respond to these challenges effectively and to secure our futures, we need a cooperative and inclusive framework that allows stakeholders first and foremost to develop relationships based on trust and goodwill. As your Defence Minister A K Antony noted at the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, "a spirit of consensus needs to be fostered on issues that have common resonance" to member countries. There can be no greater issue of common resonance than our shared peace and prosperity.

To realise these common aspirations, we have begun to build platforms that forge an open and inclusive regional security architecture. In the past decade, ASEAN established the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and the ADMM-Plus in 2010. Let me elaborate a little on the ADMM-Plus because it is important in the security context. The ADMM-Plus brings together all the key regional stakeholders. The ADMM member states had carefully deliberated on the structure and size of ADMM-Plus, we didn't want it too big such that it was unwieldy, or too small such that it was exclusive. So we decided that it would be a 10 plus eight configuration, with 10 ASEAN countries and eight "Plus" countries - Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the US. These platforms, the East Asia Summit, the ADMM, the ADMM-Plus, together with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC, allow us to address the host of economic, cultural and security challenges and opportunities, promote dialogue, and trust and confidence among its members, and initiate responses to deal with regional challenges. For example, the Shangri-La Dialogue is a forum where countries can come together for constructive dialogue to reach that "spirit of consensus".

The ADMM-Plus has also another unique feature - that of military to military relations. That is something that the security agencies have over and above dialogue where militaries can exercise and cooperate with one another to build confidence and understanding. I am happy to report that we have made good progress in instituting practical cooperation between the ADMM-Plus militaries in areas of common security interest: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), maritime security, military medicine, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping operations. Experts' Working Groups, or EWGs, have been established in each of these areas to conduct exercises, dialogues, table-top exercises, full troop exercises. These exercises can be large and very complex but they are also very instructive and productive in building that military-to-military confidence. Next year, Brunei will host a ADMM-Plus HADR / Military Medicine full troop exercise that will bring together the 18 ADMM-Plus militaries off the coast of Brunei. I think it will be a wonderful exercise, a very ambitious one, with full asset involvement, troops on the ground and will also involve both US and China in the same exercise. India has also pledged to contribute a very substantial contingent and I would like to congratulate India for playing that role.

Singapore believes that India can and should play a major role in these various fora to promote peace, stability and progress for the region. India is a rising power. India signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 and committed itself to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia. India already participates closely in the EAS, the ARF, the ADMM-Plus and the Shangri-La Dialogue. India's perspectives and leadership would add to the balance of interests in the region.

India's greater engagement of Southeast Asia, as it has done in the past through meaningful multilateral engagement and a strong web of bilateral relationships, would also serve India's strategic and economic interests in the future. ASEAN and India became dialogue partners 20 years ago and the results of this engagement are clear. Since this engagement as dialogue partners, trade and investment between ASEAN and India prospered and increased about 20 times. From 2010 to 2011 alone, ASEAN-India bilateral trade increased by 43% from US$52 billion to US$75 billion.

Singapore-India Bilateral Relations

Ties between Singapore and India today are excellent on all fronts, from trade to culture to education and defence. In 2005, both countries signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), India's first-ever Free Trade Agreement. Trade between India and Singapore last year stood at US$28.5 billion, more than double what it was five years ago, and triple what it was when the CECA was signed. Singapore looks forward to the conclusion of the second review and update of CECA.

The people-to-people ties between India and Singapore are also better than ever. Many Indian nationals live and work in Singapore, including large numbers of IIT and IIM alumni. Some of you may also remember the International Indian Film Academy Awards Weekend. We were very happy that the Indian Film Academy chose Singapore as the site for their awards because it not only added to our GDP, but also because Singapore has a lot of Bollywood fans and they had a good time just stargazing at the many beautiful and handsome actresses and actors.

Our defence ties have also strengthened, especially after the signing of the Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2003. We now have an annual Defence Policy Dialogue chaired by the Permanent Secretaries. Ministers frequently exchange visits and Minister Antony spoke at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this year.

The Air Force and Army Bilateral Agreements were first signed in 2007 and 2008, respectively. As I speak, the Singapore and Indian Armies are conducting bilateral artillery training in Devlali, which we call Exercise Agni Warrior. I have personally visited our bilateral exercise in Devlali before and it is a very good exercise, held at very good training grounds. Both our air forces are also conducting Joint Military Training in West Bengal. Our navies have also held training exercises for a long time since 1994.

I think that these extensive and regular interactions between our countries prove that the bilateral partnership exists, while the fora for cooperation exists in a multilateral setting. The architecture is there but it needs to be strengthened.

Conclusion

President Pranab Mukherjee said, when he was External Affairs Minister in 2007: "India is not just a motor of regional growth, it can equally be the bulwark of regional security." As a close friend of India, Singapore agrees with President Mukherjee and welcomes greater Indian engagement with the region. Singapore looks forwards to working with India to forge peace and prosperity for Asia.

I look forward to an exchange of views in terms of your perspectives of how Singapore and India can work together in this important venture. Thank you very much.

Transcript of Question and Answer Session of Defence Minister of Singapore, Dr Ng Eng Hen' s Talk on ‘Security Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Landscape’

Military Affairs
Managing India's Nuclear Forces by Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara November 08, 2012 1530 hrs Book Discussion Forum

Venue: Room 005, IDSA

Nuclear and Arms Control
Interaction of IDSA scholars with media delegation from 18 IOR-ARC member countries October 29, 2012 Other

A media delegation from the 18 member countries of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) visited IDSA to interact with the Director-General, Dr. Arvind Gupta and other IDSA experts on issues pertaining to India’s role in the IOR-ARC.

Dr. Gupta briefed the delegation on the IDSA’s mission and its research agenda. He also gave the delegation an overview of India’s Foreign Policy which is based on the following tenets – strategic autonomy in foreign policy-making, economic reforms and opening up of markets in the early 1990s and lastly, the changing security environment where India has to deal with both traditional and non-traditional security threats. As far as the Indian Ocean region is concerned, Dr. Gupta stressed that in addition to being a re-discovery of India’s oceanic past, the region is important for its security, peace and development. Of late, there has been an increased interest in the region, especially on issues such as maritime security, diaspora and climate change. India, for its part, is trying to find its way and is making its contribution to deal with these issues. In the process, it is trying to arrive at a holistic response.

The delegation raised numerous questions on issues related to Indian Ocean region. The overarching subject was maritime security and piracy. On the Strait of Malacca, it was stated that the strait is very much a part of India’s security perimeter and there is a need to be more proactive and have joint patrols in the strait. Although currently there are no joint patrols, talks are on to have them in the future. On the question of whether India can be expected to help Mauritius manage its maritime security and address piracy, it was said that at the moment, it depends on the request made by the host country. However, India is exploring the option of building facilities in Seychelles and Mauritius. With regard to India’s take on the ‘string of pearls’ and dual usage of ports, it was stated though peaceful port visits is a non-issue, usage of ports during heightened conflict must be based on the laws of neutrality. On the question of whether India feels encircled by China, the response was that China was not a major concern for India but would be so only during heightened conflict. As far as the American presence in the region is concerned, it is likely to continue to remain in the region and is also essential for the security architecture of the region. The Asian countries have not yet considered a role in the region without the American presence. The IOR-ARC has not yet evolved enough to deal with hard-core security issues that still remain out of its purview. The Association is constrained by limitations such as insufficient budget capacities, lack of institutional and national capabilities to tackle security issues. However, if they can overcome these challenges, then perhaps the dependency on extra-regional powers can be omitted.

On the issue of trying pirates legally, it was noted that Malaysia has set a precedent and other countries that don’t have legislations on piracy should follow suit. India is in the process of getting a bill on piracy passed. Another issue that was raised was regarding the decrease in piracy on the eastern coast of Africa while it is increasing on the western coast. It was observed that there is no direct co-relation between the two and that piracy on the West coast is not a new phenomenon. As far as Chinese ‘economic incursions’ into Africa is concerned, there is no reason why India has to compete with China in the continent; African countries welcome both the Asian giants and there is space for both their markets. India’s ties with Africa date back to the ancient times and in the recent years, it has become more institutionalised with engagement taking place on three levels – bilateral, regional and continental.

There were also questions on other issues such as the mediating role that India could play between Iran and the West. It was pointed out that at the moment there is no appetite for meditation. But if both the parties agree, then India would be open to mediation. Similarly, India will also not mediate between Israel and Iran unless it is requested to do so. As far as the dispute between India and Bangladesh over maritime boundary is concerned, it was opined that it would serve the interests of both the parties to wait for the verdict from the International Tribunal. On the inclusion of Somalia and Pakistan in the IOR-ARC, the future possibility of their membership was not excluded. With regard to India-Yemen cooperation, it was said that the two countries share good bilateral relations and the Indian government is open to deepening trade and economic relations.

Report prepared by Keerthi Sampath Kumar, Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN

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