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Interaction with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) March 01, 2023 Round Table

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised an interaction with a three-member delegation from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) led by Ambassador Thomas Greminger, Director, GCSP on 1 March 2023. The interaction was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA. Senior scholars, research analysts, and interns of the institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

The manifold implications of the Russia-Ukraine conflict have questioned the nature of European security and its tenets. With no resolution in sight, the human, economic and political costs are mounting. A roadmap for reconstructing peace and security in Europe can be through Confidence Building Measures, subregional arms control, and a dialogue on the principles of European security.

Detailed Report

Amb. Chinoy began the interaction by introducing the delegation to the various research facets and training modules of MP-IDSA. In his remarks, Amb. Chinoy stated that the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been felt beyond the borders of Europe, where geo-security has taken precedence over geo-economics. The conflict has resulted in the questioning of the nature of European security. He highlighted overlapping loyalties and complex interdependencies in a globalised world, wherein, India shares cordial relationships with both Russia and the United States, as does Germany with China. He emphasised the importance of ending the conflict and stated that India is well-positioned to mediate a resolution.

Amb. Greminger introduced the audience to the functioning of GCSP and the dialogue space it offers. He stated that the current status of the war in Ukraine can be comprehended in four phases, starting with the Battle for Kyiv, followed by the Battle for Donbas, a successful counter-offensive in Kharkiv and Kherson, and finally, the war of attrition.

Amb. Greminger presented five possible scenarios. First, the highly likely continuation of the ongoing high-intensity warfare. Second, a continuing low-intensity conflict. Third, an escalation through military means in the South, destruction of strategic civilian infrastructure, cyber attacks, and, although unlikely, the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, an unlikely scenario could be conflict termination through a one-sided victory. Finally, a favourable scenario could be a negotiated conflict resolution that covers territorial issues in Crimea and Donbas, war crimes, and reparations.

Amb. Greminger discussed the implications of the conflict and emphasised that it has had a significant impact on peace in Europe. He first highlighted the human costs of the conflict, including eight million refugees, 90,000 civilian casualties, as well as skyrocketing inflation and acute food insecurity. Secondly, he drew attention to the critical damage to civilian infrastructure. Thirdly, he discussed the economic consequences, including energy insecurity and trade disruptions. Finally, he focused on the political consequences of the conflict, stating that the world is moving towards a "Cold War 2.0" where deterrence will dominate the landscape of European security. He also observed that security will continue to be focused on territorial defence, resulting in high defence budgets. Amb. Greminger emphasised the changing nature of cooperation on other agendas, including transnational issues and dealing with complex geographies.

He presented a roadmap for reconstructing peace and security in Europe. First, he stressed the need for the Russian Federation to respect international law and territorial sovereignty. Second, he suggested that trust can be rebuilt through Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). Third, the United States’ negotiated response to Russia should include military risk reduction and subregional arms control. The fourth step should involve a dialogue on the principles of European security itself. This should be followed by a review of the status of "bridge" countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova) that share geographical proximity with Russia, as well as the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in those countries. Lastly, he emphasised the importance of considering the future role of Russia in the European security order. He concluded that peace and stability in Europe can only be achieved through cooperation with Russia, not without it.

Discussion

Amb. Chinoy emphasised that it is highly improbable that any of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) could completely overpower one another. He specifically noted that the collapse of Russia in this context is nearly impossible. He further discussed the current period of great uncertainty due to the suspension of the New START Treaty. According to him, if neither side is willing to make concessions, it will only lead to an escalation of the conflict and a one-sided victory will become even less likely. Amb. Chinoy concurred with Amb. Greminger that peaceful negotiation is the most viable option. However, he pointed out that conditional negotiation is not possible. He emphasised that territorial control is an essential aspect of the negotiation, and the illegal occupation of Indian territories by Pakistan and China provides a common ground for discussion.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) highlighted that of the likely scenarios presented by the speaker, only one discusses the end of the conflict. He also discussed the role of external support to Ukraine.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy raised a query on the future of European commitment to Ukraine.

Mr. Om Prakash Das inquired about the characteristics of ‘Cold War 2.0.’

Dr. Jason Wahlang raised a query about Europe’s reactions to China’s Peace Plan for Ukraine.

Amb. Chinoy discussed the pre-conditions for Russia and Ukraine to negotiate the end of war and the possibilities of who would lead the Ukrainian front for negotiation.

The discussion ended with a Vote of Thanks by Amb. Chinoy.

Report was prepared by Ms. Richa Kumaria, Intern, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA.

Fellows Seminar on Indian and Chinese Approaches to United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa March 20, 2023 Fellows' Seminar

Dr. Rajeesh Kumar, Associate Fellow, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA presented his paper on “Indian and Chinese Approaches to United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa” at the MP-IDSA Fellows’ Seminar on 20 March, 2023, at 1430hrs in MP-IDSA Auditorium. The Seminar was chaired by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, (Retd.) former DGMO & First Force Cdr. and Head of Mission of UNPROFOR (former Yugoslavia), and former Director, United Service Institution of India. The external discussants for the Paper were Ambassador T.S. Tirumurti, Former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, New York and Professor Yeshi Choeden, CIPOD, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The internal discussants included Major General (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, Ms. Ruchita Beri, Senior Research Associate & Centre Coordinator, ALACUN Centre, and Colonel (Dr.) D.P.K Pillay (Retd.), Research Fellow, Non-Traditional Security Centre. The Seminar was attended by all MP-IDSA scholars and interns.

Executive Summary

In his paper presentation, Dr. Rajeesh Kumar compared and contrasted Indian and Chinese involvements in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) highlighting their troop deployment and rationale for participation, their involvement in UNPKOs in Africa and, the Indian and Chinese voting responses on United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) related to UNPK Missions in Africa. He concluded by presenting the findings of his paper followed by policy suggestions. According to the external and internal discussants, the paper was timely, good and well-researched on an important topic. They suggested that the paper could verify and update the data presented, distinctly bring out comparisons of Indian and Chinese involvement in UNPKOs, include historical contexts and add additional dimensions such features of India’s UNPKOs in Africa, additional motivations underlying India’s UNPK efforts in Africa among others. The discussants discussed every policy recommendation in the paper in great detail.

Detailed Report

Lt. Gen. General Satish Nambiar PVSM, AVSM, VrC, (Retd.) (former DGMO & First Force Commander and Head of Mission of UNPROFOR (former Yugoslavia), and former Director, United Service Institution of India) chaired the MP-IDSA Fellows’ Seminar. Introducing the panel, he invited Dr. Rajeesh to present his paper on “Indian and Chinese Approaches to United Nations Peacekeeping (UNPK) in Africa”. In his presentation, Dr. Rajeesh Kumar (Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA) compared and contrasted the Indian and Chinese involvements in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) highlighting their troop deployment and rationale for participation, their involvement in UNPKOs in Africa and, the Indian and Chinese voting responses on United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) related to UNPK Missions in Africa. He concluded by presenting the findings of his paper followed by policy suggestions. Detailing the limitations of his study, Dr. Rajeesh spoke on the huge disparities in availability of data especially on China’s troop deployment and insufficient official documents on the latest peacekeeping details of China.

In the first part of his presentation, Dr. Rajeesh explained the evolution of the Indian and Chinese approaches to UNPKOs. India is the largest troop contributor, has proactively participated in 75% of the UNPKOs globally since 1964, provided critical leadership roles, sustained the largest peacekeeping fatalities (177 peacekeepers) and has adopted a principled approach emphasising on the United Nations (UN) Charter principles such as sovereignty, consent of parties and impartiality. He stated that a primary characteristic of India’s approach is its peacebuilding activities and engagement with local communities. On the other hand, China had initially opposed all activities pertaining to peacekeeping including resolutions since it perceived UNPKO as a tool of superpowers to intervene in global south countries. The Speaker explained that China’s involvement in the UNPKO took a drastic shift in the 1980’s, it’s today the second largest contributor to UNPK budget, ranks tenth in troop contributing countries (TCCs), largest among the permanent five (P5), has adopted a principled approach emphasising UN Charter principles and has a selective approach since it uses peacekeeping as a tool to wield influence.

The second part of Dr. Rajeesh’s presentation focused on Indian and Chinese involvement in the UNPKOs in Africa highlighting their troop contribution, rationale for participation and criticisms. Providing an overview and trajectory of UNPKOs in Africa, he mentioned that the continent has hosted nearly 47% of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the world. India has participated in 22 missions in Africa, suffered most casualties (123 deaths) and consistently contributed at least more than 5,000 troops in all missions. The Speaker assessed that India’s participation in Operation Congo is a specimen of India’s robust PKO contribution, its involvement in Somalia illustrated the fundamentals of India’s peacekeeping in Africa, Sierra Leone validated India’s stellar contribution, deployment of an all women unit in Liberia and role in South Sudan exemplified the fundamental characteristics of UNPKO in Africa among many others. However, he added that India’s peacekeeping in Africa is not free of criticism and alluded to the lack of language proficiency, accusations of sexual abuse and inadequate training to face challenges in the African context. On the other hand, China has participated in 17 UNPKOs in Africa, recently become proactive in its participation and its important missions include Congo, Liberia, Sudan and South Sudan. He stated that Chinese involvement has been criticized for lack of transparency, failure to uphold human rights standards in peacekeeping, resource extraction, use of PKO forces for its security interest in Africa and support for authoritarian regimes. Discussing the rationale for both countries, the Speaker assessed that while India contributes troops as a display of its solidarity with developing countries, to strengthen bilateral ties, and due to its aspiration for the high table among other factors; China’s involvement is due to its growing ambitions, security and economic interests, to safeguard  Chinese infrastructure constructions, showcase  its military capabilities and building of a positive reputation in Africa.

In the next section of his presentation, Dr. Rajeesh briefly discussed the voting responses of India and China on UNSCR related to UNPKOs in the timeframe of 1991-92, 2011-12 and 2012-22. Stating the voting responses in each year to the UNPKOs, the Speaker summarised that the voting patterns displayed the proactive and aggressive approach of both countries. Dr. Rajeesh concluded his presentation with the key highlights of his findings and offered a few policy suggestions. Identifying the similarities of Indian and Chinese approaches, he pointed out their shared common interests in promoting peace and stability in Africa, support for regional development activity as emerging powers and demonstration of their growing influence and leadership. He discussed that India and China differ in their motivations for participation in UNPKOs in Africa, approaches to engaging with local community, and in their voting patterns. Dr. Rajeesh suggested that local language constraints of Indian peacekeepers could be improved; specialized training could be increased; and use of modern technologies in African UPKOs can be promoted.

Ambassador T.S. Tirumurti (Former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, New York) complimented Dr. Rajeesh for a timely paper on an important topic detailed in an analytical manner and researched well, bringing out important points. He shared some of his observations such as - besides India’s world renowned professionalism and contribution to shaping UNPK policies, India has left a stamp on every peacekeeping activity including peacebuilding, recognising importance of technology in peacekeeping and strengthening the regime to prevent impunity attacks against peacekeepers. He expressed agreement with the presenter’s opinion that India views UN as a critical element of its global vision for peaceful coexistence and PKOs help shape a country’s image positively as a responsible international actor. Stating that most conflicts in Africa are rooted in colonial struggle, Ambassador Tirumurti underlined that India’s participation in UNPKOs in Africa is an expression of its solidarity with developing countries. Underscoring the importance of historical dimensions with multiple examples, he assessed that India’s focus on UNPKOs in the African continent came as a natural extension of the close defence links established since 1950s. This makes India different from China and altruism must not be forgotten in the world of realpolitik.

Commending the author’s perspectives on the evolution of Indian and Chinese peacekeeping, Ambassador Tirumurti shed light on some points of convergences and divergences between the two such as – on risks taken, India has professionally evaluated risks cautiously and deployed its peacekeeping troops in high risk theatres unlike China which is hesitant; on military strategic capabilities, while India has less reserve capability and a long logistic link from India to Africa, China has the largest standby force for peacekeeping with 8,000 troops and its logistics base in Djibouti is an advantage which is pertinent as the distance and time for decision making costs India a few deployment opportunities; on mandates, while both the countries are concerned about the increasingly robust mandates, India views it as a means to address issues  with the national defence forces while China sees it as an attempt to erode host state authority; both countries pushback against pressures from the West; on senior leadership, India has contributed leadership at all levels since the beginning unlike China; on engagement with local communities, while India is known for building good engagement, China is criticized for the lack of it.

Agreeing with the author’s observation that India has a more principled approach of neutrality to UNPK, Ambassador Tirumurti sounded a note of caution to the author on certain aspects stating that – the sources criticising training of Indian peacekeepers must be verified for their credibility; re-consider correlation drawn between China’s peacekeeping deployments and its economic interests with inclusion of substantive data and statistics to explain the nexus; criticisms on Chinese support for authoritarian regimes must be justified with valid examples; important to compare only those UNSCRs votes where both countries expressed views on the mandate of UNPKOs since abstentions are often related to non-peacekeeping factors; and policy point four given by the author must be re-checked as one must not confuse India’s economic interests with its peacekeeping interests. Additionally, Ambassador Tirumurti offered valuable suggestions for enhancing the paper such as – China’s financial contribution to UNPK could be explained with a chart and comparison with P5 to understand how China uses its financial clout to bring about changes in some UNPK appointments; comparison of how diversified the UNPK pledges of China are vis-à-vis India’s pledges; highlight India’s contributions such as Unite Aware Initiative; closely examine gender mix in Indian and Chinese troops and finally, enhancing women deployment in Indian peacekeeping troops could be included in the policy recommendations. The discussant concluded by acknowledging the author for bringing out a valuable paper.

The next external discussant, Professor Yeshi Choeden (CIPOD, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University) began by appreciating the author’s worthy attempt to study the topic. She conveyed that peacekeeping is the most visible form to exist on the international stage and focus on the African continent of 54 countries is valid since India and China as emerging countries require support. One way to establish relations is by participating in the UNPKOs. Professor Choeden provided inputs on how to improve the paper further. At the outset, she expressed her concern that the while the paper has a parallel discussion on India and China in UNPKOs, the policy recommendation only focused on India which raises a query on the utility of comparing with China. She suggested that policy suggestions could perhaps include some lessons to learn from China such as its efficient publicity of its peacekeeping involvement. Policy recommendations in the paper must emerge out of the comparison discussed in the paper and even the title could include the word ‘comparison’. Mentioning that the paper highlights China’s budget contribution, she cautioned that budget contribution cannot be compared with troop contribution since budget contribution is a legal obligation unlike troop contribution. Additionally, while India has a reputation of paying consistently on time, it could be researched whether China also pays the full amount in time and since China’s budget contribution is discussed, India’s budget contribution must also be included.

Professor Choeden opined that India’s standby forces commitment must be included similar to how China’s is discussed and, recommendations could emerge from this comparison. She stressed on the importance of comparing not just uniformed personnel but also the contribution of non-uniformed personnel such as police personnel and experts. She underlined that gender must be discussed in greater detail since it’s an important topic at the UN. Professor Choeden candidly expressed her views elucidating that Indian peacekeepers are known as ‘initial peace builders’ because of their involvement in humanitarian assistance to local communities unlike China and, that China’s contribution until recently was limited and specialized in logistical support which is not risky while India’s UNPK contribution includes all aspects. Reflecting on India’s contribution in mainstreaming gender in UNPKOs, she recommended that the policy inputs must highlight the need to repeat the deployment of an Indian women police unit similar to Liberia. She also pointed out the need to update some of the data mentioned in the paper. Professor Choeden concluded by commending the author’s good attempt and stressing on the need for added research before its publication.

The first internal discussant, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) (Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA) began with appreciating the paper. He shared his insights on the TCC data. For instance, the paper states that China is the highest TCC among the P5, however, the total troop contribution of the P5 is half of India’s troop contribution. He opined that the paper must distinctly note that although China ranks 10th in TCC, it is 10th by a very large margin from India. Another interesting facet in the TCC data, according to Maj. Gen. Bakshi, is that only one NATO country features in the top 30 TCCs, i.e. Italy ranked 24th. In this context, the Speaker underscored the importance of the location of troops and the type of troops contributed by the countries. Informing the audience about his own field experiences with regard to troops deployed in UNPKOs, he pointed out that the paper had mismatching figures in the tables and remarked on the need to re-check and update the data. Noting that the paper does not list the names of the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), military advisors and force commanders in the section on India’s leadership contribution to UNPKOs, he underscored that India’s military advisors in UNPKOs, the names of SRSGs and Deputy SRSGs need to be mentioned and, India’s helicopter deployments including type of troops must be included.

Maj. Gen. Bakshi emphasised that China’s initial contribution was only in logistical support which is a well secured area with no risks and zero contact with hostiles; unlike India which has its troops deployed in all arenas. He proposed that the paper would benefit to compare and contrast India and China’s UNPK involvement in the same missions in Africa. Recognising that peacekeepers and police officials are important in an UNPKO, he elucidated on the significance of teamsites and the critical role played by unarmed military observers. Vouching that the success of a mission depends on how teamsites function, Maj. Gen. Bakshi conveyed that while unarmed military observers are the eyes, ears and smile of the UN; the peacekeepers are the hidden teeth. He highlighted that Indian peacekeepers besides being praised for professionalism, a friendly approach and reliability in crises, are well known for complete impartiality, highly ethical approaches and innovative ways of handling issues. Reflecting further on this, Maj. Gen. Bakshi shared some personal anecdotes.

The Speaker opined that language skills may not be as important for troops who would anyway have the support of interpreters and since most African countries are Anglophone. Asserting that Indian peacekeepers having inadequate training is not a substantive statement, he said that “Peacekeeping is not a Soldier’s job, but only a Soldier can do it”. Maj. Gen. Bakshi suggested that the huge training footprint of India’s Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) could be included. Expressing agreement with the recommendation on technology in peacekeeping, he reflected on the restrictions caused by budget. He concluded by commenting on the need to reconsider the issue of addressing economic interests mentioned by the author in policy recommendations.

Col. (Dr.) D.P.K Pillay (Retd.) (Research Fellow, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA) congratulated Dr. Rajeesh for bringing out a timely paper on a topic that has limited material available. Reflecting on the importance of the historical context and influence of India’s role as founding member of the League of Nations and the UN, Col. Pillay detailed an overview of India’s neutral assistance and troop contribution to the war in Korea headed by Lt.  Gen. K S Thimmaya, its troop contribution during the Suez Canal crisis and participation in Yugoslavia. Discussing India’s refusal to participate in the UN Missions in Timor-Leste and others based on its principled approach, he suggested that these dimensions could also be mentioned in the paper. Noting that China never participated in UN Missions initially, he reflected on the reasons that led China to eventually involve itself in UNPKOs such as its approach of “cannot rip them, join them” and the impact of the war in Korea. He pointed out that China does not contribute to UNPKO budget out of charity.

Mentioning examples of Chinese activities in Sudan, Mali and Congo, Col. Pillay underlined that China’s UNPK deployment and resource allocation must be elaborated in detail in the paper. He asserted that humanitarian cause does not drive China’s agenda and it is instead a low cost PR exercise. He assessed that India has failed to capitalise on its UNPK efforts despite having contributed much more than China, qualitatively and quantitatively. On policy suggestions, he opined that language skills training was not feasible and rather, unessential.  Stating that ‘India was earlier what Africa is today’ and African nations like Mozambique aspire to be like India, he discussed the various fields that India could offer insights to Africa including college construction in conflict-prone zones, healthcare and others. Expressing that the paper is good, he suggested that strands driving both the countries participation in UNPKO and the differences could be built coherently in the paper.

Internal discussant Ms. Ruchita Beri (Senior Research Associate & Centre Coordinator, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA) began her remarks by stating the importance of the topic. She expressed concern that the paper has missed discussing the security situation in the African continent. Stating that the continent is not a monolith and has 54 countries, she noted that UNPK in Africa is challenging since peacekeepers face a tough and complex security climate. She analysed that further to the reasons discussed by the author for India’s rationale for participation in UNPKOs in Africa, a key motivation was keeping peace, a clear foremost objective in India-Africa cooperation. Quoting Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech which underscored the commitment of India and Africa towards peace, she stressed that India’s UNPK interests in Africa are driven by its genuine desire of peace commitment & solidarity with people of Africa. Mentioning the ten guiding principles of India-Africa engagement, she emphasised on principle seven that states India’s support to UN in advancing peace in the African continent. Sharing that there are several statements by the Government of India (GOI) on this issue, she suggested that this could be incorporated into the paper.

Taking cognizance that India’s peacekeeping in Africa is exemplary as drawn out in the paper, Ms. Beri shed light on other important features of India’s peacekeeping in Africa such as promoting gender equality, reflecting solidarity and enhancing bilateral cooperation. She added that examples could be provided to substantiate how India’s UNPK effort has helped in promoting relations. Ms. Beri shared her observations on the policy recommendations provided by the author. On language skills, she highlighted that Africa has multiple languages and brought out the issue of limited language training facilities available in India to provide such training. On Indian peacekeepers not receiving adequate training, she underlined that the sources of such criticism, whether African or western, must be verified especially since India is at the forefront of training African peacekeepers and peacekeepers from abroad. She suggested that the perception of African countries about India as a security partner in terms of its role in UNPKOs could also be explored in the paper.

Next, Ms. Beri shared her observations on China’s involvement in UNPKOs in Africa stating that writings by Chinese scholars could be referred to which highlight China’s great power ambition as a rationale for its UNPK involvement. She shed light on factors driving China’s Africa policy such as contestation of Taiwan. She mentioned that reports of incidents indicating that China has tested its weapons through UNPK could also be included in the paper. Ms. Beri concluded by quoting Nelson Mandela’s “dream of an Africa which is in peace with itself” and conveyed that India is trying to help its African counterparts achieve this dream.

In the Q/A session, Ambassador Tirumurti underscored that language skills of peacekeepers is not a common sense issue on which a conclusion could be made but rather, it is important to consider what the UN requires. Stating that the UN mandates language proficiency as one of its criteria in UNPKOs, he asserted that the author’s policy suggestion is credible. Additionally, on the gender ratio of troops, he added that India must fulfill the percentage mandated by UN. Further, explaining that countries do not invest in conflict areas which is where peacekeeping forces are deployed, he stressed on the need to exercise caution before linking economic interest with peacekeeping and underlined the importance of data for such a connection. The UN Mission in Mali was also briefly discussed in the Q/A session.

Next, Dr. Kumar shared his remarks on the comments and inputs received. He acknowledged the discussants for their valid inputs adding that he would incorporate the same.

In the final leg of the seminar, the Chair Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar candidly shared his insights and observations on the theme of the paper. He suggested reframing the paper title and argued that India does not necessarily gain from the Chinese experience. He substantiated his observation by sharing insights from his own experience as a UN First Force Commander who spearheaded military personnel from 34 countries. He asserted with multiple explanations that since India has been engaged in UNPKOs much longer than the Chinese, China could learn from India’s experience. In his remarks, Lt. Gen. Nambiar outlined the various significant contributions of CUNPK and suggested that these could be incorporated into the paper.  Assessing that India has participated in every UN Mission in Africa, he contended that the Chinese were not able to match India’s intense contribution and commitment to UNPK. He advised that the paper could address these issues as well. He emphasized the importance of data being correct and suggested that since the first Military Advisor at UN was an Indian, this could be included in the paper.

According to Lt. Gen. Nambiar, the focus of the paper ought to be what the Chinese can learn from India. On the issue of India’s aspiration for permanent membership in the UNSC, he remarked that it would never come about unless all P5 agree and all representing countries get together. He argued that the focus of India’s effort for reconstitution of the UNSC must be to ensure inclusion of one of the 54 countries from the African continent and one from among the 27 countries in South America. In his opinion, as far as India is concerned, other countries would fight our case provided India gets its economic act together along with strong bilateral relations. He also shed light on the hypocrisy of western nations who occupy top leadership positions in the UN Mission rather than deploying troops on ground; efforts to securitise climate change and the issue of funding. In his concluding points, Lt. Gen. Nambiar remarked that the Indian Peacekeeper has a tremendous record and the onus lies on everyone to ensure that this reputation is not sullied.

The Fellows’ Seminar concluded with brief remarks by Ms. Beri stating the importance of presenting a researcher’s viewpoints, significance of constructive criticism to improve the paper and note of acknowledgment to the external discussants.

Key Takeaways on the Paper

  • An important, worthy and timely paper on a significant theme.
  • India has adopted a principled approach emphasising on the United Nations (UN) Charter principles such as sovereignty, consent of parties and impartiality. On the other hand, China has adopted a principled (emphasising UN Charter principles) but selective approach (since it uses peacekeeping as a tool to wield influence).
  • While India contributes troops as a display of its solidarity with developing countries, to strengthen bilateral ties, its aspiration for a high table among other factors; China’s involvement is due to its growing ambitions, security and economic interests, to safeguard Chinese infrastructure constructions, to showcase its military capabilities and building of a positive reputation in Africa.
  • The similarities of Indian and Chinese approaches include their shared common interests in promoting peace and stability in Africa, support for regional development activity as emerging powers and demonstration of their growing influence and leadership. On the other hand, India and China differ in their motivations for participation in UNPKOs in Africa, approaches to engaging with local community, and in their voting patterns.
  • The paper suggested that local language constraints of Indian peacekeepers could be improved; specialized training could be increased; and use of modern technologies in African UPKOs can be promoted.

Inputs by External Discussants

  • Historical dimensions portraying India’s UNPK efforts in Africa as a natural extension of the close defence links established since 1950s, India’s tryst with UNPKOs and sacrifice of Indian peacekeepers could be included.
  • Sources criticising training of Indian peacekeepers must be verified for their credibility.
  • Correlation drawn between China’s peacekeeping deployments and its economic interests must be substantiated with data and statistics to explain the nexus.
  • Criticisms on Chinese support for authoritarian regimes must be justified with valid examples.
  • It is important to compare only those UNSCRs votes where both countries expressed views on the mandate of UNPKOs since abstentions are often related to non-peacekeeping factors.
  • China’s financial contribution to UNPK could be explained with a chart and comparison with P5 to understand how China uses its financial clout to bring about changes in some UNPK appointments.
  • The need to repeat and enhance women’s deployment in Indian peacekeeping troops could be included in the policy recommendations.
  • Policy recommendations in the paper must emerge out of the comparison discussed in the paper.
  • Since India has been engaged in UNPKOs much longer than the Chinese, perhaps the focus of the paper ought to be on what China could learn from India’s experience.
  • The efforts of CUNPK and its significant contributions could be incorporated.

Inputs by Internal Discussants

  • India’s military advisors in UNPKOs, the names of SRSGs and Deputy SRSGs, India’s helicopter deployments including type of troops and the critical role played by unarmed military observers must be included.
  • The paper would benefit to compare and contrast India and China’s UNPK involvement in the same missions in Africa.
  • The huge training footprint of India’s CUNPK could be included.
  • The issue of addressing economic interests mentioned in the policy recommendations must be reconsidered.
  • The historical context and influence of India’s role as founding member of the League of Nations and the UN could be discussed in the paper.
  • China’s UNPK deployment and resource allocation must be elaborated in detail in the paper.
  • The paper has missed discussing the security situation in the African continent.
  • Other key motivations for India’s UNPK efforts in Africa as brought out by GOI statements, and other important features of India’s peacekeeping in Africa could be included.
  • Examples could be provided to substantiate how India’s UNPK effort has helped in promoting bilateral relations.
  • The perception of African countries on India as a security partner in terms of role in UNPKOs could also be explored in the paper.
  • Writings by Chinese scholars on China’s UNPKO participation could be referred.
Monday Morning Presentation on Cultivating and Sustaining Subject Matter Experts in the Indian Army March 20, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Col. Guriqbal Singh GillResearch Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on Cultivating and Sustaining Subject Matter Experts in the Indian Army” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 20 March 2023. The session was chaired by Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.), Research Fellow. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance. 

Executive Summary

The need for specialists in armed forces was first felt at the turn of the century. However, the current organisational matrix in the armies world over may not be conducive to fostering specialists. This includes issues like lack of talent identification, limited opportunities for specialists based on talents identifed, an overemphasis on operational domain, a lack of a talent management information system, a lack of a more versatile approach to differentiation and promotion of officers and a lack of growth opportunities for specialists. The speaker undertook an environmental scan of the best talent management practices in armies worldwide. He proposed recommendations based on the scan and his experience in the Army. 

Detailed Report

Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.) opened the session by emphasising that the debates around specialisation are relevant not only to the Army but to various fields such as the corporate sector, civil services and sports. The debates revolve around training people in a niche area of expertise instead of generalised training that may be utilised in different positions but consequently will be less intricate. Col Chaddha then handed over the stage to the speaker  Colonel G.S. Gill. 

The speaker stated that the cultivation of subject matter experts has become prominent only in the last two decades for armies of different nations. Drivers include resource constraints, changing nature of jobs that require specific skills, and the changing nature of security threats. 

The speaker defined subject matter experts as individuals with a deep understanding of a particular job, process, department, function, technology, machine, material or type of equipment. They have existed in all three services of the Armed Forces, in different measures, with the Air Force and Navy having a higher proportion of experts. The Indian Army utilises experts in procurement, equipment management, indigenisation, and technical development. Expertise will increasingly be utilised in domains like cyber warfare and space, the new niche domains. The Indian Army needs many more subject matter experts, especially in top echelons of the force. 

The speaker noted that talent management is critical for developing subject matter expertise in the Army. Talent management is having the appropriate amount of individuals, with the appropriate skill sets and levels of motivation, at the appropriate location and time. Critical factors to talent management for the Indian Army are developing talent, retaining talent and secession planning. In order to develop talent, talent needs to be identified, and mechanisms are needed for the same. Successive deployments in their specific fields can then develop the individual s talent and expertise. The Indian Army needs to develop mechanisms to retain talent as it often misses out doing the same by not deploying individuals in the fields they have expertise in. The Army also needs to provide a vision for domain experts in terms of policy. 

According to the speaker, the US Armed Forces lead the world in efficient talent management practices, which includes a talent management information system test bed which was followed by the Joint Officer Management (JOM) program, a career long program dedicated to developing experts for joint force structures. The UK launched its own talent management program, the Unified Carrier Management program, one year before the US in 2021. The program was created to enhance the military s capacity to retain and train soldiers in specialised positions and is currently also in the testing phase. The UK s program like the US system is also based on a career management information system; the Indian Armed Forces currently lack a similar system. Surprisingly, the oldest talent management system belongs to the Singapore Army, which has different entry, rank and pay structures for domain experts.

The speaker noted that historically, the Indian Army manages its officers to increase their ability to compete for promotions and leadership. This strategy fosters a command-centric, operationally-driven culture. Non-operational postings are avoided despite the fact that they can help one get the specialised knowledge necessary for most senior officer positions, the bulk of which are non-operational. Hence, the organisational culture in the Army maybe detrimental to specialisation. 

The training methodology also inhibits the nurturing of specialists. This is so because most courses are designed to prepare an officer for command, as a platoon commander or as a company commander. There do exist certain courses that are designed to impart specific domain knowledge like information warfare or financial planning. Unfortunately, officers are often not utilised in the specific domains they receive training in. 

First and foremost, the speaker recommended the setting up of a policy framework with respect to the creation and continuation of subject matter experts. This needs to be followed by the setting up of an elaborate talent management information system. The speaker further stated that the career path for non-operational specialists needs to be widened to make it a lucrative choice. Lastly, there is a need for a differentiation methodology that is conducive to specialisation. Currently, we have a differentiation methodology of bimodal distribution produced by comparing all officers to a command-centric or operational yardstick only by means of the Annual Confidential Report System. The excessive emphasis on promotion needs to be reduced in selection boards for the promotion of officers and a methodology focusing on each officer's individual growth, qualifications and best employment matching their talents is required.

The moderator, Col. Chaddha then opened the floor for questions and remarks. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, contributed to the discussion. He noted that the need for specialisation is also extremely relevant to the Indian Civil Services, apart from the Army. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) and scholars of the Institute contributed to the discussion. Col. Vivek Chadha concluded the session.

Report prepared by Mr. Aayush Maniktalia, Intern, Defence Economics & Industry Centre, MP-IDSA.

Military Affairs Indian Army
Monday Morning Meeting on “Coastal Security Construct: The Indian Way” February 13, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Comdt. M. Srivastava, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA, spoke on ”Coastal Security Construct: The Indian Way” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 13 February 2023. Capt Anurag Bisen, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA, was the moderator. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, the Deputy Director-General, MP-IDSA, and scholars attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The Mumbai blasts in 1993 and the 26/11 attacks of 2008 shaped India's coastal security contours. The emergence of coastal security construct dates back to 1990 in the aftermath of IPKF’s withdrawal from Sri Lanka with the commencement of Operation Tasha. Subsequently, post 26/11, Phases one and two of the Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) were initiated to strengthen the coastal security mechanism. Phase three is envisaged to be underway soon. However, India needs those involved in coastal security to constantly train, equip, exercise, and keep reinventing the wheel and incorporate the lessons learnt.

Detailed Report

Capt. Anurag Bisen set the stage by introducing the audience to coastal security with some facts. India has 7,516.6 kilometres of coastline running through nine states and four union territories. The territorial waters of India are 1,55,889 square kilometres, and the exclusive economic zone is 20,30,490 square kilometres, nearly 60% of the land area. There are over 3,000 coastal villages and 1,382 island territories, with more than 120 million people involved in fishing activities who use nearly half a million boats. India shares its maritime boundary with the same number of countries with which it shares land boundaries. 90% of India’s trade by volume and 70% by value is conducted through the coast. Moreover, 70% of energy requirements are also met through the coast.

The Government of India raised the Indian Coast Guard on the recommendations of the K.F. Rustamji Committee. It started with two frigates and five patrol boats. Today, the Indian Coast Guard is the fourth largest in the world. Capt. Bisen said that the most significant terrorist attacks India has faced have come from the sea, demonstrating the importance of coastal security. The Indian Navy proposed setting up a Maritime Security Advisory Board in 2005. The National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) was set up in 2009 under the cabinet secretary in light of the 26/11 attacks. The Group of Ministers (GoM) report in 2001 recommended setting up a maritime security committee at the apex level, which the Government finally established in 2022 as a National Maritime Security Coordinator (NMSC). Capt. Bisen finally remarked that neither maritime nor coastal security mechanisms had reached finalisation, and an impregnable maritime border remains a work in progress. He then introduced Comdt. M. Srivastava and requested him to make his presentation.

Comdt. M. Srivastava began by observing that two events which shaped India's coastal security contours are the Mumbai blasts in 1993 and the 26/11 attacks of 2008. In both cases, the sea route was used, as Capt. Bisen mentioned earlier.

India’s Maritime Stakes

Comdt. M. Srivastava started by highlighting India’s maritime stakes. About 26 crore of India’s population lives within 50 km of the coastline, which also has numerous vital areas and points. Shipping is still the world’s most efficient and economical means of transportation. India has twelve major ports and around 200 non-major ports. The major ports handled a cargo of nearly 530 Million Tonnes during April-December 2021, a jump of nearly 11% from 2020 during the same period. The non-major ports also saw a considerable increase in traffic from 2017 to 2021. India’s maritime agenda was first published in 2011, emphasising port capacity enhancement, developing port infrastructure, promoting coastal shipping, etc. Presently, India seeks a maritime-led economic growth through its maritime vision-2030, which is set to bring an investment of Rs. 3 lakh crore and create twenty lakh jobs. India is also proto-testing offshore wind energy farms with a target of 30 GW from offshore wind energy by 2030. It has kick-started its deep sea mission for rare earth elements in the Central Indian Ocean Basin. Policies such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), Sagarmala and Project Mausam align with a maritime-led development. India’s economic growth is intricately intertwined with the seas, so its focus on a blue economy is inescapable.

However, Comdt. M. Srivastava opined that in the contemporary era of global political and economic interdependence, the sea routes are increasingly facing safety and security concerns as they are vulnerable to maritime terrorism, piracy, illegal activities, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, smuggling of arms and ammunitions and natural disasters such as sea-level rise and cyclones.

Maritime Terrorism

There is a growing nexus between maritime crime and terrorism. The sea’s vast expanse, its unregulatory nature, blurred jurisdiction and stealth nature makes it a preferred medium for  terrorists. There are frequent seizures of arms, drugs and narcotics consignments at sea, which indicates a disturbing trend. The nexus between drug traffickers, terror organisations and their financing is dangerous. The definition of maritime terrorism as per the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and offences in the maritime domain as laid in the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation or SUA convention 1988 (amended 2005) were highlighted.

India’s Coastal Security Construct

The emergence of coastal security can be traced back to 1990, post the de-induction of IPKF from Sri Lanka, a low-intensity maritime operation (LIMO), Operation Tasha, commenced in Palk Bay. It was the first coastal security mechanism construct involving multiple agencies, including state police and administration. This multi-layered concept of patrolling laid the foundations for coastal security in India. Subsequently, in 1993 the Mumbai blasts happened, for which the RDX was smuggled through the sea route. Operation Swan was initiated in September 1993 to prevent the transit of arms and ammunition along the coasts of Gujarat and Maharashtra, but there were challenges in terms of workforce, resources and intelligence inputs etc. Post Kargil conflict in 1999, the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) made recommendations to improve border management. A GoM was formed, which had a dedicated task force for border management. Its report came out in 2001 and is known as the GoM report 2001. Intelligence efforts also gained momentum to enhance coastal security by establishing a Multi-Agency Centre (MAC). The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) was also implemented to enhance port security. The Department of Border Management was formed under the MHA in 2004. The Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS) approved the first phase of the CSS. The CSS was based on the perspective plans made by the coastal states and Union Territories, which was implemented in 2005 for five years. The scheme consisted of setting up coastal police stations, outposts, checkposts, etc. However, while this was underway, the 26/11 attacks again exposed the vulnerability of the Indian coastline and compelled India to revamp its coastal security mechanisms. Various duties were assigned to the Indian Navy and Coast Guard, and a strong need for electronic surveillance was also felt. Phase one of the Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN) project was implemented from 2011 onwards, and 46 coastal surveillance radar and electro-optic sensors were established. The currently underway CSN phase two includes the installation of 38 additional radar stations with eight mobile surveillance systems. These will be integrated with vessel traffic management wsystems (VTMS) of the Gulfs of Kutch and Khambat. Once in place, this will lead to 109 surveillance radars along the coastline, i.e. one radar per 74 km. The CSN provides real-time surface surveillance up to 25 nautical miles, and post-CSN phase two, a near gap-free electronic surveillance, is envisaged. The Directorate General of Lighthouses and Lightships (DGLL) also established a National Automatic Identification System (AIS) chain by installing AIS sensors and associated equipment at 87 existing lighthouses. The DG shipping also implemented a Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system in 2009 in accordance with IMO regulations. The National Command Control Communication and Intelligence (NC3I) network correlates the data received from both Naval and Coast Guard nodes and disseminates the information to the networked stations. The CSS phase two was implemented from 2011 onwards, emphasising the strengthening of marine police. The NCSMCS was constituted in 2009 under the Cabinet Secretary for apex-level coordination. Similarly, the Steering Committee for Review of Coastal Security (SCRCS) under the Secretary, Border Management in MHA was constituted in 2013. The state and district-level committees in coastal states and UTs to monitor, manage and steer coastal security issues have been constituted post the coastal security review meeting held in 2016. The Marine Police training at the National Academy of Coastal Policing (NACP) was established at Okha in 2018. The Indian Navy, Coast Guard and BSF form the core of this academy. Further, the newly approved National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) project is likely to facilitate seamless synergy and coordination amongst the stakeholders.

Additionally, measures such as issuing Identity biometric cards for fisherpeople, colour coding of boats and online registration for fishing vessels have been implemented nationally to strengthen the mechanism. Exercises such as Sagar Kavach, Sajak and Sea Vigil are conducted periodically. Post 26/11, community groups were also formed in various states. The Indian Coast Guard has also introduced community interaction which has now graduated to community integration programmes. Comdt. Srivastava said that the coastal communities are considered eyes and ears and are an integral part of a coastal security construct.

Challenges flagged and deliberated by Comdt. Srivastava were as follows:

  • Long inundated and porous coastline
  • Suitable identification and tracking devices for small fishing boats at sea.
  • Maritime boundary issues and disputes
  • The diverse topography of India’s coastline compounds the coastal security challenges.
  • Coastal security is also connected to external factors such as political turmoil, economic collapse, internal conflicts, illegal migration and climate change.
  • Those involved in fisheries related crime and crime associated with fisheries, piracy and armed robbery at sea can easily be lured into terrorist activities. 
  • Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) and floating armouries at sea pose serious security concerns.
  • Marine Police is still struggling with basic impediments, and its capabilities need to be strengthened further.
  • Security of minor ports and fish landing centres remains a grey area with a need for electronic surveillance.
  • There is also a need for more elaborate legal provisions and fisheries regulation.

Recommendations given by Comdt. Srivastava were as follows:

  • Analyse the gap areas and finalise a plan of action for implementing CSS phase three.
  • Coastal security exercises, joint training, tabletop exercises and workshops are to be conducted regularly.
  • Improvement in the existing infrastructure, jetties and assets for marine police.
  • Checkposts and CCTVs at fish landing sites should be placed for access control.
  • The institutionalisation of entry and exit reporting by Indian Dhows.
  • Monitoring of unauthorised settlements along the coastline.
  • Empower the fisheries department with an adequate workforce, sanctions, and legal provisions.
  • Empower Marine Police with interceptor boats, equipment and training.
  • Improvement of fisheries monitoring control and surveillance.
  • Countermeasures to underwater and ariel threats should be developed.
  • A mechanism for space-based monitoring needs to be developed.

Comdt. M. Srivastava concluded his presentation by saying that coastal security is a multi-agency construct, and efficient coordination amongst stakeholders is imperative. The recently constituted NMSC is part of the NSCS, which will provide momentum to coastal security initiatives. Coastal security has undergone a significant overhaul post-26/11, and presently excellent support from all stakeholders is experienced. However, those involved in this construct must train, equip and exercise continuously and keep reinventing the wheel to incorporate the lessons learnt.

Comments 

Capt. Bisen thanked Comdt. Srivastava for providing a comprehensive overview of the coastal security construct, activities of the Coast Guard, an assessment of the challenges faced and his recommendations for them. Given the Capt’s experience of coastal security with the NSCS, he provoked the discussion by asking if we needed reform at higher level of coastal security construct. He also asked if there shouldn’t be a single force for a single border as recommended by the GoM. He then requested the Deputy Director General for his comments, concluding that MP-IDSA could work on this given the available expertise.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) thanked the Comdt. for his presentation and Capt. Bisen  for his remarks. He began by saying that this subject requires at least a day’s or a two-hour seminar. He asserted that there is a clear need for recommendations on inter-agency cooperation. The questions he raised were as follows:

  • The NMSC is primarily an advisor to the NSA, so is it possible to knit all agencies together?
  • Are UAVs used for surveillance?
  • Why are we not seeing a large number of seizures by the state marine police forces if they are being improved?

To Capt. Bisen’s remarks, the Comdt. said that the Steering Committee discusses issues pertaining to coastal security with the stakeholders and initiates necessary steps to strengthen the coastal security mechanism. Further, the issues, and measures to strengthen the CS construct are deliberated at NCSMCS, which is the apex body and where all the concerned stakeholders are present. Therefore, the needed reforms at higher levels are in place and much so after the recent appointment of NMSC. He then assured that all the government agencies are working day and night in any given condition towards a robust coastal security mechanism. He further explained in detail about the inherent security challenges and differences between land and security at sea. At sea, there is a blurred jurisdiction, with a different set of rules, legal provisions and jurisdiction in various zones such as territorial water, contiguous zones and EEZ. He then explained the advantages and necessity of a multi-agency mechanism. He added that unlike the US after 9/11, which merged stakeholders to form the Department of Homeland Security, India rightly preferred to go ahead with a multi-layered system as India faces a set of challenges at sea which are quite different from the US or Europe.

Comdt. Srivastava agreed with Maj. Gen. Bakshi that this subject needs at least a one-day seminar. In response to the latter’s questions, he affirmed that the Indian Navy provides training for ICG personnel at Naval training establishments, and there is a seamless synergy between IN and ICG. He flagged that identification devices such as transponders for sub 20 mt. boats are also being developed. He stressed that, however, along with technology, there will always be a need for physical presence at sea. The physical presence of ships and aircraft has no substitute and is imperative. Their efforts, however, must be supplemented by the use of technology. He briefly explained the current maritime domain awareness system and touched upon space-based monitoring. He emphasised that a holistic analysis and review of existing CS construct can be undertaken to identify the gaps that could be addressed in the CSS phase three. The Comdt. stated that marine police must be trained and equipped to meet their potential. The academy at Okha will provide suitable training and enhance their capability and seagoing skills. Various states are also taking administrative steps for cadre management, which will improve their operational capabilities. 

Ms. Sultana raised questions about environmental security along the coast.The Comdt. responded by stating how the Coast Guard helps the fisherpeople during natural disasters and takes measures to curb marine pollution. He highlighted that ICG conducts coastal clean-up exercises, which are widely acknowledged. Studies on climate change and challenges due to sea level rise or increased frequency of cyclones or more intense storms are also underway by various agencies. The ICG emphasises the concern for the marine environment and oil pollution at sea and undertakes operations to protect marine species such as the endangered Olive Ridley turtle.

In response to the queries of Mr. Oak and Dr. Sanur Sharma on an indigenous navigation and monitoring system, Comdt. M. Srivastava briefly stated that measures are in place, and scientific organisations are working on enhancing our space-based monitoring and surveillance capacity and capabilities.

Capt. Bisen thanked Comdt. M. Srivastava, wished everyone an exciting week ahead and concluded the meeting.

Report was prepared by Mr. Nikhil Guvvadi, Intern, Counter-Terrorism Centre.

Non-Traditional Security
Talk by Shri Rakesh Asthana on Narco-Terrorism and Drug Trafficking February 10, 2023 Talk

The Internal Security Centre of MP-IDSA organised a talk on ‘Narco-Terrorism and Drug Trafficking’ by Shri Rakesh Asthana (IPS Retd.), former Commissioner of Delhi, on 10 February 2023. The other two discussants on the panel were Shri Jayant Mishra, Executive Council Member and Shri Shantanu Sinha, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. It was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, T20 Chair and Director General MP-IDSA, attended by Deputy Director-General MP-IDSA Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi and MP-IDSA scholars.

Executive Summary

Deltails about drug trafficking and abuse in India were discussed. The organised crime network’s linkages with terrorism are a significant threat to India’s National Security and this aspect was elaborated upon during the discussion. It was pointed out that the setting up of the National Narcotics Coordination mechanism (NCORD) in furthering the agenda of dealing with such organised terror with improved coordination will help address the threat.

Report

In his welcome remarks, Amb. Sujan Chinoy pointed out the growing menace of drug trafficking and its linkages with terrorism to India’s national security. Proximity to the Golden Triangle makes India vulnerable to the trafficking of narcotics and drugs manufactured there and to the reverse flow of precursor chemicals to these regions, especially Myanmar. The proceeds from sale of narcotics and drugs are then used to fund insurgencies and other illegal activities. He said a similar situation is there on the western border, where Afghanistan and Pakistan have become the epicentre of the drug trade. India has become not only a centre for transit but also a significant consumption centre over the years. Recently, it has been observed that those who promote terrorism in India from across the border are using the proceeds of such drug sales to finance terror activities. Drones are being used for drug trafficking from across the border. Punjab has become a significant problem, and many drugs come through the Attari border. The money generated through them finds its way into Kashmir for funding terrorism. There have been many seizures off the coast of Gujarat, and several arms and drug consignments have been seized in the island territory of Lakshwadeep. There seems to be an emerging nexus between the AfPak region and geographies as far south as Maldives and Sri Laka. Amb. Chinoy concluded his opening remarks by saying how the complex maritime environment threatens India’s coastal security and drug abuse is a social problem that even Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed in his Mann ki Baat.

Defining the Drug

Mr. Asthana started by explaining what a drug is and differentiating its various forms. There are two types of drugs, narcotic and psychotropic. Narcotic drugs can again be divided into two, plant-based and synthetic. Poppy, Cannabis and Coca are plant-based drugs. Poppy’s derivatives are Heroin, Morphine, Codeine and Oxycodone. Marijuana and Hashish are derived from Cannabis, and Cocaine is made out of the Coca plant. These are the three significant drugs which are used by people all over the world. Another emerging area is synthetic narcotic drugs such as Fentanyl, Methadone, Hydrocodone, etc., which are pharmaceutical drugs that are misused. Psychotropic substances affect the central nervous system. They are medicines that are misused to get high on them, ultimately resulting in a person's death. The third area is that of precursor chemicals used to manufacture synthetic opioids. Most of the precursor chemicals are of dual use. They have legitimate use cases in the pharmaceutical industry; the other use case is for manufacturing illegal psychotropic substances.

Drug Trafficking and Abuse in India

Mr. Asthana highlighted the scale of drug abuse in India. A large number of the youth in India are into drug abuse. AIIMS, Delhi had conducted a detailed survey in 2019 concerning drug abuse in the country. The study's results revealed the extent of the problem in India, where 31 million users of Cannabis, 23 million users of opioids and 11.9 million users of pharmaceutical sedatives are addicts. 2.06% of the population is affected, the average of which is far greater than in Asia and the world. A presentation was made for the Prime Minister, where he advised using the terminology of Death Cresent and Death Triangle. The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) has started using this terminology since then. It was a valid point made by the Prime Minister, opined Mr. Asthana, as it has adversely affected the State of Punjab and the Northeast Region of India.

It is a lucrative trade for drug traffickers but a death knell for society, he said. An addict requires a 0.5-milligram dose per day, that is, 360 metric tons of opioids per year, for all the addicts in India which is one metric ton per day. They cost 2-3 crores per kilogram, which is Rs. 1,45,000 crore of business annually. Against which the seizure was only 2.4 metric tons of Heroin in 2019 which is hardly 7% of the whole. After the NCB and state police forces were sensitised to the results of this survey, seizures went up to 7.1 metric tons in 2021, which is 19.7%. It is only the tip of the iceberg, and much work towards enforcement is required urgently.

A Threat to India’s National Security

Drug trafficking is a borderless crime, and its extent makes it very difficult to control. Death Cresent and Triangle produce 98% of heroin and meth for the world, which is being pushed into India for consumption and transit to other parts like Western Europe, Australia and Africa. Cocaine is primarily produced in South American countries, and via Africa or the Gulf, it reaches India by air or sea. Methamphetamine made in Myanmar is transported through the sea route, contributing the most to the total US$ 8 billion of business done per annum worldwide. The trafficking routes in India are the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir and the trade route at Attari. Sea routes are through the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.

The area under cultivation for the Poppy plant in Afghanistan decreased from 2017 to 2018. However, the outflow of Opium based drugs has only increased since the Taliban took over the country as it is the most significant contributor to their revenue. In 2022, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard played an enormous role in seizing 2,009 kilograms of Heroin from the high seas. In the same year, 1,063 kilograms of heroin was seized from the land routes. There is also a new trend of using drones to drop off drugs across the border in the northwest.

The drug lords of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran work together to push heroin through the Arabian Sea. Acetic Anhydride manufactured in India is shipped illegally to Pakistan and Iran and is used in making Heroin. After the abrogation of article 370 in Kashmir and the subsequent strengthening of security along the border, it became tough for the drug traffickers in the northwest to smuggle drugs across the border, so they shifted to the maritime route. For the last four years, the NCB has worked closely with the Indian Navy and Coast Guard, whose coordination with the Coast Guards of Sri Lanka and Maldives resulted in many seizures at sea.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supports the drug lords in Pakistan, and the money generated through their activities is being used to fund terrorist activities in India. The Haji Saleem network uses terrorists in India to carry out their activities. Eight Indian assets of their network have been identified in a Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) investigation whose links go back to the ISI and other contacts in Sri Lanka and Australia. According to Mr. Asthana, such analyses help understand the magnitude of the problem at hand.

The Kasargod network is another example worth mentioning, as per Mr. Asthana. It is a vast network with contacts in Sri Lanka, Gulf and Pakistan. They traditionally produced Ganja and sold it in the rest of India and Sri Lanka. Gradually they moved into operating with other complex narcotics. Recently, their linkages within Lakshwadeep and Maldives have also been mapped out. They also previously worked with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The kingpin of this network, Mohsin K.P., is running the show from jail in Qatar.

Rebel-controlled Shan and Kachin provinces of Myanmar share their border with China. These rebels depend on China, and the Chinese chemical industry is very active in the regions across the border. Therefore, almost 90% of precursors are being supplied by the Chinese. This dynamic has significant implications for India’s internal security. They are using the money generated to fund insurgency in the northeast and left-wing extremism in India with the supply of weapons. The rebels of Shan and Kachin are thriving through this business with backing from the Chinese. This issue needs to be addressed with just as much tenacity as India takes care of the northwest border. More than 2,000 kilograms of heroin and meth were seized from Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, the most infamous variant being that of the Yaba tablets.

A new trend that has emerged during NCB’s investigation is that drug handlers from abroad are hiring local gangsters in India to carry out their activities. Drugs are being used to lure people to work for them. The NCB, National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the state police forces are all working in tandem to curb such instances. The druglords of Mexico are planning to set up a cocaine manufacturing facility in India because India is the largest manufacturer of Potassium Permanganate, which is used to treat the Coca paste for it become Cocaine.

Higher Organisation

The Ministry of Home Affairs devised a great proposal to create a four-tiered National Narcotics Coordination mechanism (NCORD). NCB is the nodal agency tasked with coordinating with various agencies against drug trafficking. The Home and Special Secretaries head the Apex and Executive Committees at the Central Government level. Chief Secretaries and District SPs head the state and district-level Committees. In addition, a Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) system is led by the DG NCB, which is supposed to ensure coordination in investigations and anti-trafficking operations.

In conclusion, Mr. Asthana affirmed that the Government of India is committed to fighting drug trafficking and abuse. Besides being a security threat it is also a social problem also that needs to be fought constructively on the demand side and operationally on the supply side.

Amb. Chinoy thanked Mr. Asthana for an ennumerative and informative briefing and remarked that it is a great challenge to the nation. He shared a brief anecdote from his time in Mexico, where the Americans contacted India as they discovered that drug precursors were coming from India, as mentioned by Mr. Asthana. Mr. Jayant Mishra was then invited for his comments.

Mr. Mishra began his remarks by praising Mr. Asthana for being the frontline warrior while NCB’s NCORD initiative took shape in his capacity as the DG. He made the following brief observations:

  • Drug trafficking is not a stand-alone threat but is interlaced with arms and human trafficking. Darknet markets are used for trafficking of drugs and precursors.
  • Wildlife and antique trafficking are also intertwined with drug trafficking.
  • There are a rising number of adolescent users, and the gender gap is reducing with psychotropic drug users compared to narcotic users.
  • Hard drug markets being created in the west cause concern regarding terror financing.
  • While new and emerging technologies are used to curb drug trafficking, drug traffickers use them to conduct thier business.

After Mr. Mishra concluded with his remarks, Amb. Chinoy made a mention about Kashmiri school girls consuming drugs and how Chinese fentanyl is destroying the American countryside. He then invited Mr Sinha to speak.

Mr. Sinha highlighted how Pakistan’s narco-terrorist designs against India constantly evolve and how they are reviving Khalistani militancy and pushing drugs and arms into India.

Amb. Chinoy thanked Mr. Asthana for bringing out the Khalistani element and its role in drug trafficking in the region and opened up the floor for a Q&A session.

Comments

Ms. Ruchita Beri asked if any Africans were involved in drug trafficking to India. Mr. Asthana highlighted that many Africans from Nigeria, Mozambique, South Africa, etc., are overstaying their visas in India and are involved with the smuggling of Cocaine and Heroin. He said it is a complex issue involving another country's citizens and must be dealt with diplomatically.

Comdt. Manoranjan raised the query whether closed pharmaceutical industries could be involved in drug trafficking. Mr. Asthana said that such factories in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat are engaged in these activities.

Mr. Khare asked about the employment status of high-precision vehicle scanners for detection near borderlands. Mr. Asthana said that they are being deployed in the northeast region.

Capt. Bisen asked if a regional cooperative mechanism for Indian Ocean littoral states can be conceived against drug trafficking. Mr. Asthana said that there is already a significant amount of international cooperation through the NCB, and there are mechanisms already in place for the same in BIMSTEC and SCO.

Comdt. Srivastava, Col. Chada and Capt. Bisen’s queries about whether amendments in laws regarding greater synergy between the plethora of agencies involved and focus on the terrorism side of narcotics is needed, Mr. Asthana reiterated that there is already excellent coordination between the NCB, Enforcement Directorate and NIA. He mentioned that a draft regarding amendments to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act is currently being discussed by the law commission. Additionally, the NCB is being stregthened with enhanced manpower and resources to effectively deal with the threat of drug trafficking in the country.

Report prepared by Mr. Nikhil Guvvadi, Intern, Counter Terrorism Centre, MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning on Capability Development Challenges in Indian Army February 27, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Col. Manish Rana, SM, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Capability Development Challenges in Indian Army” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 27 February 2023. The session was moderated by Col. Rajneesh Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Capability development which is defined as a continuous process involving various stakeholders such as military planners, policymakers, procurement agencies, and industry planners holds great significance in the military domain, particularly in the context of the Indian Army's proposed acquisition of a Closed Quarter Combat (CQB) Carbine. However, impediments in the planning process and long-drawn procurement processes hamper capability development. Further, the missing collaboration and coordination among various stakeholders leads to lack of environment management and trust amongst multiple stakeholders.

The case study of CQB Carbine highlights the delays and challenges faced in its procurement due to environmental factors like a decade of defence procurement scam overdose, changes in defence procurement systems, and stakeholders' conflicting priorities. In this context, it is imperative to highlight the importance of effective collaboration and coordination among stakeholders and trust-building to expedite capability development.

Detailed Report

Colonel Rajneesh, Research Fellow, opened the session by bringing out the issues related to capability development and the budget availability for procuring new equipment for the Armed Forces. He brought out the dilemma of reduction of manpower to optimise the budget vis a vis higher allocations to Armed Forces. He also suggested alternatives like changes in doctrine, recruitment and retention, modernisation and operational responsibilities. He then  handed over the floor to the speaker, Colonel Manish Rana, Research Fellow.

First and foremost, the speaker defined capability development as the process of acquiring and improving the Military's capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. It involves the identification of needs and developing strategies to meet them, ultimately resulting in the acquisition and development of new technologies, weapons systems and training programs. It was emphasised that capability development is a continuous process that can only be accomplished over a period of time. Colonel Rana observed that capability development involves a range of stakeholders, such as military planners, policymakers, procurement agencies and industry planners.

A glance at numerous write-ups on the subject suggests a shortage of funds, non-availability of indigenous capabilities, flaws in the planning process and long-drawn procurement processes are significant challenges to capability development in the Military domain. However, what needs to be more present in the academic research domain is the missing collaboration and coordination amongst various stakeholders leading to non-tangible issues of lack of environment management and trust amongst multiple stakeholders. While structurally and intent-wise, all these stakeholders are brought together to ensure the desired capability is acquired in the most efficient and time-bound manner, in practice, these stakeholders have different, at times conflicting, priorities. There needs to be effective collaboration and coordination among these stakeholders. Especially for the Armed Forces management, not used to an organisational culture based on negotiation and compromise, the environment for executing capability development becomes challenging.

The speaker highlighted his assessment of capacity building through a case study, the proposed acquisition of a Closed Quarter Combat (CQB) Carbine for the Indian Army. A CQB Carbine has an effective range of around 200 metres. It is lightweight, manoeuvrable and has a high rate of fire while having less recoil. These attributes make a CQB Carbine ideal for close combat, such as urban warfare and counterinsurgency operations in dense jungles. They would go a long way to enhance the Army's capabilities. Indian Army used World War II vintage 9 mm SMG for close-quarter battle needs until the early 2000s. Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) produced the weapon, and production stopped in the early 2000s as the same was declared obsolete.

The INSAS program started in the 80s, in which modern assault rifles, light machine guns and CQB Carbine were to be developed indigenously and inducted into the Indian Army. Colonel Manish noted that India used to manufacture WW II vintage CQB Carbines at its ordinance factories until it was declared obsolete in the 1990s. When the INSAS family of weapons were introduced, the Carbine was not found suitable, and the search for a better alternative took off.

Despite knowing in 2000 that INSAS Carbine was not suiting the bill, the Request for Proposal for a fresh weapon was only initiated in 2008. Eight to ten years to initiate a case for a personal weapon is by no standards acceptable. Furthermore, the case could not be progressed as the Services Qualitative Requirements worked out were found to be too ambitious. One needs to look at the environmental realities of that time to understand why such a simple thing took so much time to get initiated. Firstly, it is obvious that despite the INSAS Carbine being found unsuitable, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) would have tried its best to continue pushing for its induction as a lot of time and money would have been invested in the program. The go-ahead for a separate procurement would only have come after DRDO efforts to continue would have convincingly exhausted. Secondly, the time being talked of coincides with an era of defence procurement scam overdose. The memory of the Kargil coffin scam, Tehelka scam and Scorpene deal scam even today gives goosebumps to people involved in defence procurement, what to say the paralysis they would have brought into the system at that time. Thirdly, the decade of 2000 to 2010 also is remembered for large-scale changes in the Defence procurement system. The Defence Procurement Procedure manual was first introduced in 2002 and underwent numerous amendments in 2005, 2006 and 2008. It is evident that the decade lost in progressing procurement of CQB Carbine (2000- 2010) was indeed a challenging decade for defence procurements in general. Hence, more than anything else, what delayed the CQB Carbines' induction in this decade was attributable primarily to environmental factors.

In 2010, a fresh Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued for the weapon. Trials took place from 2011-14, but the case hit another wall when one of the two vendors competing for the project failed the trials due to a minor issue. Therefore only a single vendor remained. Owing to the scam hangover of the previous decade, the officials were unenthusiastic about progressing with it due to the scrutiny that it may have generated due to a single vendor, and the case was stopped. This highlights the resistance amongst stakeholders to manage environmental issues and the need for more trust.

In 2014, the honourable Defence Minister directed that considering the operational necessity of the weapon, the Defence Ministry would opt for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route from the US. Despite the Defence Minister himself taking a strong stand on the issue, the case did not progress. In 2018, a fast-track process was initiated. In this option, a weapon currently in use in another armed force can be inducted without extensive trials. Caracal, a UAE-based arms manufacturer, was chosen as the supplier, and the contract was planned to be signed in 2019, and weapons were to be delivered by 2020. However, it was again cancelled due to issues not being in the open domain, highlighting a lack of trust. One can presume that environmental factors again influenced the case. Two significant factors that could have affected the decision may be the coming of age of indigenous industry and DRDO. Indian industry, which had so far been more or less a silent spectator in the case, had started acquiring certain capabilities and, combined with the clarion call for Atmanirbhar Bharat by our Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, had got adequately vitalised to start raising the ante for indigenous procurement of CQB Carbine. DRDO also, after improving its earlier versions, started production of a Carbine, which had started getting inducted into paramilitary forces in some quantities. The speaker observed that the opacity in such procedures, as highlighted above, leads to the propagation of conspiracy theories which is not in the interest of establishment.

A fresh RFP has now been issued in 2022, and the chase for a CBQ Carbine continues, about four decades after the need for it was felt. The speaker highlighted that in capability development, more often than not, circumstances arise wherein the procurements get unduly delayed, and there seem to be no apparent reasons. As per him, the main challenge is managing environmental issues and building trust amongst various stakeholders to avoid such a situation. He highlighted that the issue, being intangible, finds little discussion in the academic field. In the end, he suggested using the Systems approach and study of Organisational Culture to avoid the recurrence of such issues in defence procurement to assist capability development.

Q&A Session

The floor was opened for questions and comments, wherein scholars from the Institute, including the Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), contributed to the discussion. He noted that the bureaucracy's insistence on following the book helps avoid misuse of authority but may delay the induction of critical capabilities in the Armed Forces. Colonel Rajneesh in his closing remarks highlighted the importance of both tangible and intangible aspects involved in the capability development process and thanked the speaker for an enlightening talk covering the complexities of procurement procedures.

Report prepared by Mr. Aayush Maniktalia, Intern, Defence Economics & Industry Centre, MP-IDSA.

Indian Army
Monday Morning Meeting on “Revival of Strategic Threats to India's Internal Security” March 07, 2023 1000 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Mr. Shantanu Sinha, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will speak on “Revival of Strategic Threats to India's Internal Security” at the Monday Morning Meeting which will be held on 13 March 2023 at 10 AM. The venue is Auditorium, Second Floor.

Dr. Adil Rasheed, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will be the moderator.

Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai, Research Analyst, will be the rapporteur.

21st Asian Security Conference: Towards Reformed Multilateralism in the Era of Indo-Pacific March 28, 2023 to March 29, 2023 Conference
Monday Morning Meeting on “India’s Continued Engagement with Afghanistan: Looking Ahead” March 06, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Vishal Chandra, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “India’s Continued Engagement with Afghanistan: Looking Forward” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 06 March 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Senior Fellow, and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General of MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), the Deputy Director General of MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Twenty years after being ousted from power by forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in 2021. Since taking office in 2021, the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan has been diplomatically isolated; not a single country has yet formally recognised their government. Violence against ethnic minorities, disrespect for women's rights, and violations of civil liberties are just a few of the problems that continue to mar the Taliban's regime in Afghanistan. Moreover, internal ethnic conflict and power struggles within the Taliban, ties to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and recurrent attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have harmed Afghanistan's security situation and put the Taliban under pressure in their own backyard. Thus the poor socioeconomic indicators as well as a worsening of security conditions point to a gloomy future. India, a vital supporter of Afghanistan's development and prosperity, has remained close to the country despite numerous challenges and has gained the respect of the Afghan people. New Delhi chose a people-centered approach meant to support the development and well-being of the ordinary Afghan citizen.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. Ashok K. Behuria offered a brief overview of how the Taliban had regrouped in rural Afghanistan and all along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, and had returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. Dr. Behuria added that the Taliban had faced multiple challenges since reclaiming control in 2021, including a crisis of legitimacy as well as economic and security issues. He emphasised that despite having to cope with numerous security and economic challenges, the Taliban were deftly handling the deteriorating economic situation and had made some progress in lowering the number of terrorist attacks and casualties in Afghanistan. He emphasized that despite regional and global obstacles, India should continue to support the people of Afghanistan.

Dr. Vishal Chandra began his presentation by highlighting the fact that since no government has recognised the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Taliban are working very hard to gain international legitimacy, and that other countries' were very circumspect in engaging the Taliban. The country is currently experiencing a severe humanitarian and security crisis following the Taliban taking back control of Kabul. There are 28.3 million people in need of humanitarian relief and support, 14.7 million of whom are in acute need. Among the 28.3 million people in need, 6.4 million women and 15.2 million children require immediate humanitarian help. Dr. Chandra observed that the number of persons in need has dramatically risen from 24.4 million in 2022 to 28.3 million in 2023. He pointed out that 75% of Afghanistan's total state spending was on aid and support from abroad, citing the UNDP 2022 study.

While humanitarian relief is trickling in, not quite to the satisfaction of the Taliban and the Afghan people, the country is also experiencing a serious security crisis and violent outbursts, which are being coordinated by the ISKP and other terrorist organisations. He stated that in addition to ISKP, there are other ultra-orthodox Taliban factions that either question the legitimacy of the current Taliban leadership or oppose some of its policy goals. He also informed the audience that ethnic groups that had earlier collaborated with the Taliban and coordinated operations against NATO forces (because they shared similar ideologies) were at the moment vying for control over resources, influence, and positions. However, he noted that despite the constant attacks against the Taliban regime and their patrons, the Taliban seemed to have prevented the situation from getting out of control; but it is uncertain how long Taliban will be able to maintain their control over diverse forces exercising their influence in Afghanistan. The failure of Taliban leaders to incorporate non-Pashto tribes in its administrative and policy establishment continued to be a significant obstacle for them, in addition to the ISKP threats, he said.

Despite these challenges, Dr. Chandra was of the opinion that the Taliban were trying their best to manage the economy by raising domestic taxes, particularly through customs duties, as well as through informal and conventional levies on mining, transportation, and agriculture, which have increased with a crackdown on corruption. Afghanistan also exports coal to Pakistan.  The Taliban have also made it clear that their government would pose no risks to India or other nations in the region, and they have promised that their territory would not be used as a base for terrorist attacks against other countries. Mr. Vishal emphasised that the Taliban's relationships with Al-Qaeda, the TTP, and other designated militant groups, however, remained intact, and it was unclear how they were planning to maintain such relationships while pursuing international legitimacy.

Given this, Mr. Chandra said it has posed a very interesting dilemma for India whether it could engage the people of Afghanistan without engaging the Taliban. He argued that because of India's centuries-old cultural and civilizational ties to Afghanistan, there is strong sympathy among Afghan civilians for India. This has, over the years, not only helped India to acquire the trust of Afghans cutting across ethnic lines but also to maintain its neutral position despite significant political and security upheavals over the years. India's present commitment, he emphasized, was primarily focused on infrastructure, humanitarian relief, and developmental aid.

According to Dr. Chandra, India has remained the largest regional contributor of aid for Afghanistan’s development and humanitarian assistance. Since 2001, India has adopted a multi-sectoral aid strategy that includes both large and small-scale projects and covers all regions of Afghanistan. Large-scale infrastructure projects include the construction of the Afghan Parliament, the 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram, and the construction and commissioning of the Salma Dam power plant in the province of Herat.

Dr. Chandra stated that India had also been the driving force behind numerous short-term community-based development initiatives that emphasised local ownership and management and covered agriculture, rural development, education, health, and vocational training, including the renovation of Kabul's Habibia School. These community-based initiatives have a clear, immediate effect on the daily lives of the people. For instance, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) sponsors a large number of yearly long-term university scholarships for Afghan students studying in India for undergraduate and graduate degrees. India similarly offers vocational training to Afghan women and youth. India also offers initiatives to improve capacity in the areas of agricultural research, healthcare, and rural development. Recently, India provided 40,000 of wheat and 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccine. India, therefore, has maintained its policy of "staying the humanitarian course" in Afghanistan after the Taliban seized control again in 2021.

Dr. Chandra concluded that India had gained knowledge and experience of working in Afghanistan's challenging political and security environment over the years. Notwithstanding practical difficulties, he pointed out that India had largely been successful in dealing with Afghanistan, regardless of the ideological leanings of Afghan regimes, with the exception of the first Taliban rule (1996-2001). In addition, he stated that India does not have any parochial foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and that because India has been more responsive and adaptable to local circumstances, it has been able to preserve both trust and people-to-people ties over time. In order to continue its aid and assistance initiatives in Afghanistan, he urged India to send a humanitarian envoy to Kabul.

Comments and Questions

The floor was opened for questions and comments. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), and scholars from the Institute contributed to the discussion. In his remarks, Ambassador Chinoy pointed out that the conflict in Ukraine has diverted attention from the Taliban, which has allowed them to consolidate their regime in Afghanistan. He stressed that there was still potential for an internal Taliban fault-line to blow up at some point, which might lead to further instability. He added that the alleged death of an ISKP commander of Kashmiri descent in Afghanistan was excellent news for India. India, he continued, must maintain its humanitarian aid efforts while keeping an eye on political and security developments in Afghanistan.

Report prepared by Dr. Mohd. Usman Bhatti, Research Assistant, MP-IDSA.

Talk by Ambassador Anil Wadhwa on "Future of India-Australia Economic Cooperation" February 28, 2023 Talk

A talk by Ambassador Anil Wadhwa, Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi, on “Future of India-Australia Economic Cooperation” was organised by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) on 28 February 2023 at 1100h in room number 005. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, who chaired the session, began the proceedings by briefly explaining the topic. He said that India-Australia relations were stunted for many years and revolved around cricket, commonwealth and curry. However, relations recently improved with India and Australia forging the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The development of the Indo-Pacific construct also brought the two countries closer. The New Education Policy was likely to draw Australian universities to India. There has been positive movement in economic relations between the two countries in light of the India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (INDAUS ECTA). Although there have been Indian investments in Australia, there exist some issues regarding the same. Commenting briefly about Australia-China relations, Ambassador Chinoy observed that there was a fractured view of the rise of Beijing in different parts of Australia, based on economic and security considerations. Setting an apt background for the speakern the Chair invited Ambassador Wadhwa to deliver the talk.

Ambassador Wadhwa started by talking about geopolitical events during and post-COVID-19 years. He spoke about aggressive Chinese actions vis-à-vis Australia in the aftermath of the Australian demand for an enquiry into the origins of COVID-19. Canberra felt let down due to the Chinese ban on Australian imports. Shipments of coal kept waiting at the ports. The big businesses involved in China felt the need to diversify to reduce dependency on Beijing. Through all these years, India-Australia relations were improving. The two countries elevated their ties to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020. Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised Australia that India would be involved in that country’s economy. The speaker mentioned a report titled ‘An India Economic Strategy to 2035’ by Mr. Peter Varghese that focused on ten economic sectors and was limited to ten states of India. He informed the audience that the reciprocal report titled ‘Australia Economic Strategy’ (AES) authored by the speaker looked at 12 economic sectors of Australia, including futuristic areas and was not restricted to any of the provinces in that country. Further, he spoke about the Australia-India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA), signed in April 2022 and that entered into force in December 2022.

The author of the AES spoke enthusiastically about the growing Indian diaspora in Australia. He stated that the diaspora was hard-working and controlled several boardrooms in Australia. They could act as a bridge between the two countries. Further, he highlighted the high-level exchange of visits from the two sides, including the PMs and ministers. Ambassador Wadhwa pointed out a number of bilateral initiatives that have been kicked off between the two countries. It included an Australia-India Centre of Excellence for Critical and Emerging Technology Policy; a diaspora mapping report titled “Australia’s Indian Diaspora: A National Asset - Mapping the Community’s Reach into the Australia-India Economic Relationship” Critical Minerals Investment Partnership; Future Skills Initiative; Green Steel Partnership; New and Renewable Energy Partnership; and a vast number of collaborations in diverse fields such as e-mobility, rare earth material, strategic reserve funds, science, green partnership, and infrastructure forum, among others. On the military front, he mentioned mutual logistics agreement and the four-country Malabar naval exercise as examples of substantial engagement.

Talking about INDAUS ECTA, the speaker enlightened the audience about the benefits of the deal, which gives duty-free access to goods from each country to the other. Indian companies have benefitted by investing in Australian coal. The pact has made the movement of students easier. Also, service providers such as Yoga teachers and chefs have benefitted. He said that the Albanese Government increased the quota for trained manpower. There was ample opportunity in fields of nursing, carpentry, masonry, and perimeter security, among others. Progress has been made in the research collaboration. The Mechanism for the Mutual Recognition of Qualifications has increased employability. Ambassador Wadhwa stated that Australia has immense Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) export potential that might replace countries from West Asia for India’s energy needs. By 2035, India will likely become one of Australia’s important export markets, and Australian investments in India will also likely see an uptick. The speaker said the country had kept aside billions of dollars for the commercial mining of critical minerals and the space industry, among others.

Further, Ambassador Wadhwa spoke about the Australian University campuses being set up in India. He said such universities are essential from the perspective of the Indian market. The speaker explained that the ECTA neutralised some of the disadvantages of not being part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). He said that Australia was a small market. Therefore, there was a limit to the trade. Commodities such as minerals would be very important in the future, since the country contains some of the essential critical minerals. Australia has substantial pension funds of trillions of dollars, and India’s Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme was attracting Australian investment. Regarding the Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (AI-CECA), the speaker said that it could be a bench setter for other Free Trade Agreements India is negotiating with other nations. However, the Australian dairy industry has been kept out of the negotiations. Indian agriculture has much to learn from Australia regarding the use of technology to manage agriculture efficiently.

Ambassador Wadhwa listed a number of areas of bilateral cooperation mentioned in the AES that included commodities (critical minerals like lithium, mine safety, manufacturing of mining equipment); LNG exports; construction of warships, support ships, corvettes; textile and textile design; groundwater management solutions and recycling of water; Education (training the trainers programme); space technology; collaboration in e-learning; grid technology (remotely controlled grid stabilisation); healthcare; farm and dairy production (food processing units); fintech (cloud and other technology); tourism; infrastructure development; and automobile spare components.

Following the talk, the Chair observed that India-Australia relations had come a long way in the last decade. There existed synergies with India. However, China has made exceptional inroads in Australia. There are vast numbers of Chinese students. China is buying land parcels in the country. But after trade tensions with Beijing, Australia was trying to diversify relations. Ambassador Chinoy agreed with the speaker that India had an opportunity in the automobile, Information Technology, Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises, and defence sectors. The Chair also saw the opportunity for bilateral cooperation in third countries, especially the Pacific Islands. He opined that the ECTA was a good initiative for the two countries. However, he also flagged the irritants in the relationship, such as the problem of illegal immigration and attacks by Khalistani supporters on temples.

In the ensuing question and answer session, Ambassador Wadhwa said there was distrust regarding Indian companies in Australia in the past. But now, Indian companies get contracts for various projects. Regarding Uranium export, the speaker said that India does not require uranium from Australia, and the Non-proliferation Treaty is an emotive issue in Canberra. Australia has limited capacity to go beyond Sri Lanka and participate in African affairs. Chinese media has a strong influence on media and academia. India should learn sports stadium management from Australia. The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) pact was designed to counter China in the Pacific.

Report was prepared by Mr. Niranjan Oak, Reasearch Analyst, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre.

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