Dr. Abhishek K. Darbey, Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), made his presentation on “China’s Security Capabilities in the Domain of Cognitive Warfare” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 June 2026. Col. Nester Derrick D’Souza, Research Fellow at MP-IDSA, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director – General, MP-IDSA, and Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The Speaker primarily looked at China’s security in the cognitive domain that covered themes such as the concept of cognitive security, correlation of emerging technologies and cognitive security, methods and mechanism of cognitive security, significance of the cognitive security system, China’s cognitive security system involving legislative and technological tools etc. He explained that the cognitive security system, is a machine based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies primarily, natural language processing, machine learning, and generative AI. He noted that by means of these technologies the system can automatically access, store, and assess the data available on cyberspace enabling the system to understand the psychological patterns of individual or group or community to manipulate them according to the attacker’s set objectives. The Speaker discussed China’s institutional framework for cognitive domain security that includes the Ministry of State Security and concerned services of the People’s Liberation Army. He elaborated on legislative tools to secure cognitive security involving agencies such as Cyberspace Administration of China and various laws and regulations. The discussion explored the challenges cognitive warfare poses for democratic societies, and India’s preparedness against cognitive domain threats. 

Detailed Report

In his introductory remarks, the moderator observed that the character of warfare has undergone significant transformation with the rapid advancement of digital technologies. Modern conflicts are no longer confined to conventional military operations but increasingly involve competition in cyberspace, the information domain and the cognitive sphere. He noted that cognitive warfare seeks to influence the perceptions, beliefs, and decision-making processes of individuals and societies, thereby weakening an adversary’s political resolve without necessarily resorting to kinetic force. Against this backdrop, he introduced the presentation as an examination of China’s growing capabilities in the domain of cognitive warfare and its implications for contemporary security studies.

Dr. Abhishek K. Darbey began by explaining that China conceptualises cognitive security as the protection of the cognitive space of its population against internal and external attempts to manipulate public opinion, undermine ideological unity, or challenge the authority of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Unlike traditional military operations that focus on physical destruction, cognitive warfare targets human cognition by shaping narratives, influencing perceptions, and altering behaviour through sophisticated information operations. In China’s strategic thinking, safeguarding public cognition has become an essential component of national security.

Dr. Darbey emphasised that AI constitutes the technological foundation of China’s cognitive security architecture. AI, particularly machine learning, deep learning and generative AI, enables the collection, processing and analysis of enormous volumes of structured and unstructured data. These technologies assist in identifying misinformation, detecting hostile narratives, predicting cognitive threats, and generating tailored responses in real time. Machine learning models continuously improve through adaptive learning, enabling the system to respond more effectively to evolving information threats.

Dr. Darbey explained that China’s AI-enabled cognitive security system performs several interconnected functions. It rapidly detects content considered harmful to national interests, analyses patterns of information dissemination and supports automated decision-making regarding the removal or restriction of sensitive material. Human analysts work alongside AI systems, allowing faster identification of emerging threats while ensuring oversight over critical decisions. Such integration of artificial intelligence with cybersecurity has significantly strengthened China’s ability to regulate its domestic information environment.

The Speaker elaborated on two principal dimensions of China’s cognitive security framework. The first concerns cyber and data security, where AI supports threat detection, intelligence analysis, and protection of digital infrastructure. The second relates directly to the cognitive domain by preventing manipulation of public opinion, protecting ideological stability, and ensuring that citizens receive information consistent with state narratives. According to Dr. Darbey, China considers security in the cognitive domain as important as the other areas of national security.

Dr. Darbey explained the Institutional mechanisms supporting China’s cognitive security strategy. Among the Institutions, the Ministry of State Security (MoSS) is the principal agency responsible for security against cognitive domain attacks in China. Other agencies include the United Front Work Department, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Cyberspace Force, PLA Information Support Force, Cyberspace Administration of China etc. The MoSS protects the public and establishment from perceived foreign ideological subversion by aggressively tracking disinformation, algorithm manipulation, and deep-fake attacks. The United Front Work Department, an organ of the CPC, is given the task to create a positive narrative and perception about the Party and China across the world by means of their long-term associations with foreign political elites, academic institutions, and the Chinese diaspora.

Within the military establishment, the People’s Liberation Army has integrated cognitive warfare into its doctrine of “intelligentised warfare”. The PLA Cyberspace Force and the PLA Information Support Force are two specialised services of the PLA set up in 2024 for cyber and information domains warfare, which are key components of Cognitive Warfare. Network Information System is the key system built under PLA Information Support Force to store and secure data by means of AI-based applications.

The Speaker noted the central role of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) in regulating China’s digital ecosystem. The CAC administers and regulates all internet platforms in China, and its key tasks include: checking and maintaining a clean and healthy cyberspace ecosystem, and regulating all AI algorithms and machine learning models etc. The CAC conducts ‘Operation Qinglang’, a campaign to clear all anti-China/anti-government content from their cyberspace thereby preventing their citizens from exposure to such content. These measures, according to the speaker, illustrate China’s comprehensive approach to managing both technological infrastructure and public discourse.

The Speaker discussed the legal framework underpinning China’s cognitive security strategy. Laws such as the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, and Personal Information Protection Law regulate data governance, information flows, and cybersecurity practices. Additional regulations governing generative AI services, deep synthesis technologies, and AI-generated content require developers to ensure that training data and AI applications remain consistent with state regulations. Together, these legal instruments provide an institutional basis for China’s broader objective of protecting cognitive security.

Dr. Darbey observed that China’s approach combines technological capability with ideological governance. Domestically, the State exercises extensive control over cyberspace by restricting access to undesirable information, maintaining strict narrative management, and promoting ideological unity. Dr. Darbey argued that China’s ability to regulate its digital environment has enabled it to respond rapidly to misinformation campaigns and minimise the influence of anti-state narratives within the country.

Dr. Darbey noted certain limitations in China’s cognitive warfare capabilities in foreign social cognition. China has been building and improving its cognitive security system to safeguard and regulate the cognition of its population against malicious disinformation and influence operations. However, it lacks dominant platforms in digital space to influence the international population in their favour. Consequently, Beijing continues to rely on its mass-media, foreign missions, United Front Work Department to carry out its influence operations in foreign lands to promote favourable narratives globally.

In his concluding remarks, the Speaker highlighted that China has developed a strong security system and resilience against cognitive attacks waged on its domestic population. By controlling the flow of information, the Government of People’s Republic of China can maintain a pro-regime perception among its domestic population. However, it has great limitations to do so outside of China, because it cannot control the flow of information in other countries’ cyberspaces. Nevertheless, the country has built effective mechanisms to counter-anti-China narrative which is already propagated in foreign lands.

Q&A Session

The interactive discussion focused on several conceptual, technological, and strategic dimensions of cognitive warfare.

The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, reflected on the evolution of China’s methods of narrative control since the Mao-era. Whereas the earlier campaigns relied on political mobilisation of the masses by the Party cadres, now with AI-based technologies these campaigns are easier, faster and more intense. He noted that democratic societies face more complex challenges of security in balancing freedom of expression with the need to safeguard national security against hostile information operations. He emphasised that India must strengthen its technological capabilities while preserving democratic openness.

Participants questioned whether algorithmic censorship could reliably distinguish between legitimate criticism and threats to national security, particularly in democratic societies where freedom of expression remains a fundamental value. Concerns were also raised regarding the ethical implications of allowing AI systems to influence decisions affecting public discourse.

Responding to these observations, Dr. Darbey agreed that AI has significantly enhanced the State’s capacity to regulate information compared with earlier methods of narrative control. He also acknowledged the importance of examining India’s preparedness in this domain and noted that understanding cognitive warfare requires continuous engagement with evolving digital ecosystems and social media platforms.

On the question of China’s lessons on cognitive domain capabilities drawn from the Russia-Ukraine War and 2026 Iran War, Dr. Darbey emphasised that this is probably the first time in war with substantial practice of cognitive domain operations, and not only China, but militaries around the world are drawing lessons on cognitive domain operations from the ongoing wars. He argued that large-scale use of emerging technologies such as AI-based technologies has led to massive malicious disinformation and misinformation campaigns through digital platforms that has influenced the social cognition in shaping perceptions about the wars.

The discussion also examined the broader implications for India’s digital security and the importance of developing indigenous technological capabilities to enhance national resilience against cognitive domain operations. The Speaker suggested building indigenous infrastructures in digital domains such as social media platforms, digital communication apps, search engines, and robust infrastructures in cyber and information domains for the future inteligentized warfare.

The Report has been prepared by Mr. Pushpendra Singh, Intern, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.