Dr. Abhishek Yadav, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Turkish Defence Exports: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 6 July 2026. Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA, moderated the meeting. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the discussion.

Executive Summary

The Speaker examined the rise of Türkiye as a major arms exporter by tracing the evolution of its defence industry from import dependence to indigenous production, analysing its export figures and destinations, and assessing the drivers of its success alongside its structural vulnerabilities. Dr. Yadav highlighted the implications for India arising from Türkiye’s deepening defence cooperation with Pakistan and its growing strategic footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

Detailed Report

Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv, the moderator, laid out the context by tracing the widening geography of Turkish defence exports. As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Türkiye exported defence items to 55 countries during 2016 to 2025, up from 24 in the previous decade, 12 during 1996 to 2005, and only one country, Pakistan, during 1986 to 1995. As per Türkiye’s Secretariat of Defence Industries (SSB), the value of its defence and aerospace exports in 2025 stood at over US$ 10 billion, against a turnover of about US$ 20 billion. Five Turkish companies figured in the Defense News Top 100 Defence Companies for 2025 (Aselsan, TUSAŞ, Roketsan, ASFAT and MKE), as against two Indian companies (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Bharat Electronics Limited). Pakistan accounted for 14 per cent of Turkish defence exports over 2016-25, as per SIPRI figures. He then invited Dr. Abhishek Yadav to present his assessment.

Dr. Abhishek Yadav structured his presentation in three sections covering the evolution of the Turkish defence industry, its export figures and destinations, and a critical assessment with implications for India. Citing SIPRI’s March 2026 Report, he noted that Türkiye now ranks among the world’s top 11 arms suppliers, its share of global arms exports having risen from 0.9 per cent during 2016 to 2020 to 1.8 per cent during 2021 to 2025, the second-highest growth rate after Italy. He brought up the 1964 letter from US President Lyndon B. Johnson, which stated that American-supplied equipment could not be used for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus, and the US arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus operation, episodes that set in motion a sustained policy of indigenisation.

The Speaker described a transformation unfolding across five decades: direct procurement before 1990, co-production during the 1990s, partial design capability between 2000 and 2010, full indigenous design between 2010 and 2020, and the current decade to achieve complete localisation. The ecosystem now comprises over 4,000 companies and more than one lakh direct employees.

Dr. Yadav attributed this growth to seven structural reforms, including the restructuring of the procurement agency SSM into the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) under President Erdoğan, the National Technology Initiative of 2017 linking TÜBİTAK (the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye), the State agency responsible for funding and conducting scientific and defence-related research, with universities and industry, a domestic supply chain for armour materials, radars and rocket propellants, and substantial investment in space and satellite technology through the Türksat and Göktürk programmes. Türkiye’s defence localisation rate rose from about 20 per cent in 2002 to 80 per cent at present, and in 2025 alone the SSB organised 485 international activities across 94 countries.

According to Dr. Yadav, Turkish defence and aerospace exports grew from about US$ 1.95 billion in 2016 to over US$ 10 billion in 2025, roughly doubling every two years after 2021. Pakistan is currently Türkiye’s largest arms export market with 16 per cent of the total, followed by the UAE at 12 per cent and Ukraine at 8.4 per cent.

Dr. Yadav then turned to a region-wise breakdown of these exports. In Europe, Ukraine has received Bayraktar TB2 drones and has MILGEM-class vessels on order. Spain signed an agreement in 2025 for Hürjet trainers; Poland became the first NATO and EU country to operate the TB2; and Romania took delivery of a Hisar-class vessel in June 2026, Türkiye’s first warship export to a NATO and EU member state. Major customers in Africa include Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia and Libya. In West Asia, the UAE has procured Turkish systems for over two decades, Qatar has bought patrol boats and hundreds of armoured vehicles, and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in July 2023 for Akıncı drones with technology transfer and licence production. Ankara has also given armoured vehicles as military aid to post-Assad Syria. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia signed a contract in July 2025 for 48 fifth-generation KAAN fighters alongside earlier purchases of light tanks and drones, Malaysia has received many infantry vehicles of Turkish design, and the Philippines has taken attack helicopters and Cirit missiles.

The Speaker stated that closest to India’s concerns in South Asia, Pakistan maintains an extensive and expanding defence relationship with Türkiye encompassing Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones, targeting pods and MILGEM-based Babur class frigates, two of them under licenced production at Pakistan’s shipyard. Bangladesh has received armoured personnel carriers, guided bombs, rocket launchers, TB2 drones and howitzers, and the Maldives has received armoured vehicles, TB2 drones and a patrol boat. Türkiye thus maintains meaningful defence relationships with three of India’s neighbours.

The Speaker attributed Türkiye’s success against established suppliers to six factors: combat proven systems; willingness to offer technology transfer, co-production and localisation; a pragmatic export policy with fewer end user restrictions; conformity with NATO standards; rapid delivery timelines; and flexible financing terms. Dr. Yadav then set out the vulnerabilities. Critical platforms still rely on foreign engines, which exposes exports to licensing restrictions imposed by engine supplier nations, while imported semiconductors, sensors and precision electronics create supply chain risks. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions and tensions over the S-400 acquisition from Russia affect Western technology approvals, and Turkish lira volatility raises production costs.

Dr. Yadav also noted that President Erdoğan, during the 2023 Election, presented the indigenous defence industry as a symbol of strategic autonomy, national prestige and domestic political messaging. For India, he identified three implications. First, Türkiye’s defence cooperation with Islamabad is strengthening Pakistan’s military capability and industrial base, a dynamic visible during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, when Türkiye stood with Pakistan in condemning India’s military operations, while Indian authorities found evidence of usage of Turkish Songar and YIHA drones by Pakistan. Second, Bangladesh’s new government has signalled Ankara’s growing importance to Dhaka, with Foreign Minister Dr. Khalilur Rahman choosing Türkiye for his first major bilateral visit in March 2026, ahead of his April visit to India. Third, Türkiye is combining arms exports with training, flexible financing and industrial partnerships to expand its footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral, where India seeks to maintain influence.

Q&A Session

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, observed that Türkiye’s journey from procurement to co-production, partial design and finally indigenous design mirrors India’s own aspirations, and that much of its recent success was built on the wars of the past decade, with the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict that brought the Bayraktar drones to prominence. Noting that Türkiye wears many hats as a member of both the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), he suggested studying whether this dual identity has enabled or inhibited its defence exports. Amb. Chinoy also asked the Speaker to explore how Türkiye’s flexible export policy would sit with the European Union’s Readiness 2030 agenda of integrated procurement, supply chains and research.

The Director General remarked that the threat from Turkish weapons in the region should be viewed in context, as they are no more insidious than Chinese or American ones, since the contradiction between India and Türkiye is not a fundamental bilateral one; the deeper concern lies in Ankara’s aspirations of leadership in the Islamic world and the overall support it extends to Pakistan. Amb. Chinoy suggested that the theme of India-Türkiye cooperation should also be explored.

Other participants also raised questions regarding the strategic dependence created by the sale of complete system of systems, the risks and absorption limits of technology transfer to Saudi Arabia, the public-private split in production and exports, and the role of TÜBİTAK and state funding in research and startups. Questions were also raised regarding sanctions navigation, Türkiye’s outreach to the Maldives, capacity building with Bangladesh, and Türkiye’s prioritisation of Pakistan in its defence supplies. Dr. Yadav provided comprehensive responses to all comments and questions raised during the session.

The Report has been prepared by Mr. Aquib Mohd. Khan, Intern, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.