Fumio Kishida’s Legacy and Likely Prospects for Japan’s Next PM
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Arnab Dasgupta
Dr. Arnab Dasgupta is a Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. His areas of research includes India-Japan relations, Japanese domestic politics… Continue reading Fumio Kishida’s Legacy and Likely Prospects for Japan’s Next PM read more
Keywords: Japan
On 14 August 2024, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced in a surprise press conference that he would not be seeking re-election as the Secretary-General of the incumbent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), effectively putting a full stop on his two-year tenure as Prime Minister of the country.1 He did not introspect on his decision, simply stating that he intended his actions to convey to the Japanese people that the LDP has the capability to change in reaction to recent scandals that have rocked the Japanese political sphere. As the race heats up to elect Kishida’s successor, this commentary places in perspective his legacy since his election to the highest elected office in October 2021.
Kishida’s Achievements
Among his many signal accomplishments, Fumio Kishida can justly be regarded not only as a worthy inheritor of Shinzo Abe’s key policies, but also a versatile and canny politician with a keen eye for Japan’s broader national interests as the world is buffeted with new geopolitical cross-currents. At the time of his election, Kishida was widely regarded as a dove, a change of pace after the hardline conservative policies of Abe.2 However, he quickly proved commentators wrong, as he adroitly utilised his conciliatory image to push through the strongest reforms in the field of defence, security and foreign policy seen in decades.
From the outset of his premiership, Kishida enthusiastically joined with the Western world on several issues. He has supported Ukraine from the outset of the conflict with Russia, supplying massive amounts of aid, facilities and training to the war-torn country.3 On technological competition with China as well, Japan joined curbs placed by the United States of America on supplying advanced semiconductor manufacturing technology to Chinese companies. It has though done so begrudgingly, with specific exceptions carved out for the prodigious manufacturing capabilities Japanese companies have set up in China.4 Japan under Kishida has been far more enthusiastic about joining US-devised minilaterals such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the AUKUS military supply pact.
An arguably more impactful contribution made by Kishida in security policy is his adroit conflation of East Asian security dilemmas with the security interests of the rest of the Global North. By coining now-memetic phrases such as “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow”5 and “indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security”,6 Kishida has encouraged the equivalency of Russia’s actions in Europe with China’s territorial aggression in Asia. The fact that he has continued to use the phrase throughout his Western sojourns indicates his continued desire to have Europe and the US’ continued attention on Indo-Pacific affairs, especially where it concerns China.
At the same time, Kishida resolutely reframed Japan’s foreign policy doctrine by seeking to build bridges with the Global South.7 As one of the early movers in this area, Kishida gave due credit to India as the voice of the Global South. This is evident in his choice of venue—New Delhi—for his marquee speech in 2023 announcing a new Indo-Pacific doctrine. He placed India at the centre of that doctrine as Japan’s preferred partner and invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Kishida readily accepted the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) concept articulated by India at the G20 summit in New Delhi. Subsequently, Kishida has continued to raise issues of Food, Fuel, Fertiliser and Finance at forums dominated by the Global North such as the G7.
In defence, Kishida’s achievements are quite numerous, and cannot be dealt with here in their entirety due to limitations of space. He not only presided over the promulgation of the most aggressive defence and security strategies so far, but also committed himself quite publicly to the cause of raising defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP to build up the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF). Since 2022, he has also presided over thoroughgoing reforms of the JSDF’s command structure, encouraged its theaterisation and decentralisation and actively supported its efforts to formulate new island defence strategies.8
Turning to the domestic economy, Kishida has also done quite well. Inheriting a growing economy on the verge of breaking out of a 30-year-long deflationary spiral, Kishida chose not to rest on his government’s laurels. He took bold actions to convince corporate employers (a not-insignificant share of employers in Japan’s employment market) to raise wages by the highest percentage in decades, while working closely with the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates after decades of negative interest had worn away banks’ ability to lend.9 He also announced new ‘core policies’ (骨太方針, honebuto hōshin) to curb Japan’s precipitous depopulation and spur regional revitalisation (地域創生, chiiki sōsei) by ramping up public expenditure.
Kishida’s Achilles heel
How, then, did Kishida’s downfall come about? The short answer is missteps in the political sphere. The organisational rot exposed by the Unification Church scandal10 (where LDP members were found to have almost-incestous ties with members of the notorious cult organisation) and the even-bigger kickback scandal11 (where LDP parliamentarians were found to be exploiting loopholes in election funding laws to amass ‘donations’ from corporate sponsors) led him to peremptorily decide to fire several of his cabinet members and announce the dissolution of factions. The impact of this move can best be summed up by quoting Reginald Bevins, Postmaster-General during Harold Macmillan’s government in Britain in the 1960s:
This was making enemies on a grand scale, enemies of those dismissed, enemies of their friends in Parliament, and shattering confidence in the Party at large. […] Of one thing I was convinced: no…Prime Minister could behave like that and survive.12
Indeed, the combined effects of the Unification Church and kickback scandals has led to a mood among voters of punishing the LDP electorally. The results of several recent local and gubernatorial elections, where LDP candidates have been soundly trounced by Opposition-backed politicians, betray the depth of this rage. This series of debacles in turn has emboldened a rebellion within the LDP, with first-time parliamentarians (joined by more senior members) unaffiliated with any factions calling on Kishida to step back from the race to lead the LDP in September.13 Kishida’s press conference announcement can be read as his admission of defeat before his peers.
What Happens Next?
There are two likely scenarios facing Japan now. The first option is that Kishida, while stepping down as party leader, continues as Prime Minister till the end of his term next year. This is most unlikely, though not unheard of. The second, much more plausible scenario is that Kishida will resign as Prime Minister simultaneously with the election of a new party leader in September, handing over the reins to his successor. In either case, an election is in the offing. The new General Secretary emerging from the internal hustings is extremely likely to call snap elections immediately after their appointment, as it is the tradition in Japan for a new leadership to seek popular legitimacy after the changeover is complete.
Already, one can begin to see a host of contenders for the throne emerging from within the party ranks. Former Defence Minister (and perpetual prime ministerial hopeful) Shigeru Ishiba has expressed strong interest in running, and polls conducted by most news media in Japan points to his victory as the likeliest. The current Minister for Digital Transformation Taro Kono, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa and Minister for Economic Security Sanae Takaichi have emerged as likely challengers.
Takaichi’s candidature though is dented by her loyalty towards the late Shinzo Abe and his faction, which many within the LDP—and nearly all voters without—hold responsible for the scandals plaguing the party. Others, such as formerly-ousted Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato and his successor Yoshimasa Hayashi, have also expressed a desire to run. Current projections by prominent commentators indicate that between 14 and 20 candidates may be in the fray for the party’s top position.14
It is the outcome of the national election that is far from certain, however. A recent poll has found that 78 per cent of respondents did not see trust in the LDP improving after the election. Further, in a unique twist of events, the leading opposition party, as well as the LDP’s coalition partner, will also be undergoing a leadership contest in September. If even one charismatic leader emerges from the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) or the Kōmeitō in the coming weeks to mount an adequately persuasive challenge to the LDP, voters could very well choose to repose their trust in them, heralding the second time in the 21st century when the LDP will have to relinquish power.
Conclusion
New Delhi must ensure that candidates such as Shigeru Ishiba from the LDP and Yukio Edano and Kenta Izumi from the CDP are apprised of India’s interests regarding Japan’s continued focus on the Indo-Pacific and the Global South. The candidates’ stances on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and the Quad will be keenly watched. The next leader of the LDP, as well as of the CDP, may not be as accommodative of US interests or as tough on China as Kishida and his predecessors. Indeed, they may well choose constructive engagement with it, as happened in 2008–2011 when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), predecessor of the CDP, took power away from the LDP. Given this situation, India must also be prepared to recalibrate its position on Japan’s commitment to FOIP or the Quad, if need be.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.