Israel’s Policy towards the West Bank since the 7 October 2023 attack

Summary

Despite international pressure preventing formal changes to the West Bank’s legal status, the Israeli government has pursued settlement expansion, outpost legalisation, administrative restructuring and legislative initiatives to transform the territorial and political status quo. These measures, driven by historical and religious claims, seek to prevent Palestinian statehood and advance the Greater Israel vision.

Since taking office on 29 December 2022, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu government, backed by the far-right Religious Zionism-Otzma Yehudit bloc, comprising 14 seats, has intensified settlement expansion, administrative control and security operations in the occupied West Bank. These developments have further accelerated after Hamas’ attack in southern Israel on 7 October 2023. This brief evaluates Israel’s policy towards the West Bank under the Netanyahu government, particularly since the 7 October attack, by examining settlement projects and institutional measures alongside the ideological and security considerations shaping government priorities. The brief further explores settler violence and its implications, assesses Israel’s security approach in the West Bank and the evolving dynamics with the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Settlement Issue

Settlements refer to Jewish communities established in territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 Arab–Israeli war that are not under Israeli sovereignty. Although Israeli communities previously existed in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip until 1982 and 2005, respectively, recognised settlements, unauthorised outposts and farms are currently concentrated in the occupied West Bank. Since coming to power in December 2022, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu-led government, supported by Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionist party and Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit Party, has accelerated settlements and outposts across the West Bank.

Between 1967 and 2022, Israel established and legalised 127 settlements in the West Bank. Netanyahu government has scaled up this process, approving 103 additional settlements alongside around 259 new outposts, including 186 farms undergoing various stages of legalisation, between 2023 and early September 2026. The government has reportedly allocated around US$ 6.6 billion for settlement development and infrastructure and advanced plans for 63,311 housing units in 2025, i.e., 27,941 housing units in the West Bank and 35,370 housing units in East Jerusalem.[1] While Area C remains the principal locus of settlement expansion, activity has increasingly extended into Areas A and B, blurring the administrative demarcation lines.[2] The Israel Defense Force (IDF) through seizure orders also continues to appropriate land in Area A for military infrastructure, separation barrier, while requisitioning Palestinian homes for surveillance, interrogation and settlement connectivity.[3]

Religious-Nationalist and Security-centric Priorities

A significant segment of Israel’s settler movement views the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria, as part of the historic Israelite kingdom and considers Jewish settlement a religious entitlement. This religious-nationalist ideology underpinning the vision of a Greater Israel has shaped government policy, with far-right factions mobilising a disciplined electoral bloc, lobbying key ministers, and securing influential bureaucratic positions.[4]

The settlement movement, emboldened by greater political leverage and a fragmented opposition, has operated within the post-7 October security environment to transform Israeli policy beyond conflict management and reconfigure the status quo in the West Bank.[5] The broad approach envisages establishing facts on the ground, subduing Palestinian national aspirations, providing residency with partial political rights, incentivising emigration and laying the groundwork for extending Israeli sovereignty over 82 per cent of the West Bank.[6]

From Israel’s security perspective, settlements serve as a protective belt, consolidating territorial control, increasing the Jewish population, establishing spatial presence and enhancing security through infrastructure, military deployments, roads and checkpoints. Consistent with its approach in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and during the conflicts with Iran, Israel’s West Bank policy is guided by the concept of absolute security reinforced after the 7 October 2023 attack, prioritising proactive neutralisation of long-term and short-term threats, operational freedom and sustained security control, rendering restraint or political accommodation a strategic risk.[7]

Although most Israelis do not want to live in the West Bank or view settlements as vital to religious fulfilment, public opinion remains divided over their security value. While 40 per cent believe continued settlement-building helps Israel’s security, 35 per cent consider it harmful.[8] By intertwining the security logic with territorial and religious-nationalist considerations, Israel is undertaking a broad political-ideological transformation leading to administrative and legal restructuring.

Between 2023 and 2026, the Israeli government and Knesset enacted administrative and legislative measures to deepen control over the West Bank. Smotrich, as Finance Minister and an adjunct minister in the Defence Ministry, accelerated settlement planning approvals, eased funding, and retroactively legalised several unauthorised outposts.[9] In June 2024, planning and building procedures in Area C shifted from military-led civil administration to a new ‘Settlement Administration’, which resumed land-title registration, identified unauthorised Palestinian construction, and facilitated demolitions in designated reserves in Area B. Moreover, in August 2025, an E1 settlement project was approved between Jerusalem and the Ma’aleh Adumim settlement, potentially severing East Jerusalem from major Palestinian population centres and disconnecting northern and southern West Bank.[10]

In February 2026, the Israeli cabinet authorised immediate registration of Area C land as state-owned where Palestinian ownership could not be established; extended Israeli regulatory enforcement into Areas A and B over environmental, water and construction matters; transferred licensing authority over Hebron’s Jewish settlement from PA-linked municipality to Israeli control; and approved the repeal of Jordanian law restrictions on property transactions with foreigners, enabling Israeli and foreign Jewish citizens to purchase property in the West Bank directly.[11] Moreover, the Knesset passed resolutions opposing a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River in July 2024, called for Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank in July 2025, and approved a Sovereignty Bill extending Israeli law, administration and judicial process to settlements in October 2025.[12]

However, the approval of the 103 settlements adjacent to Palestinian population centres across Areas A and B, beyond established settlement blocs and defensive lines, reflects contradictions in Israel’s security logic. Israel’s security establishment has warned that protecting dispersed settlements, outposts, agricultural farms and access routes and checkpoints creates security vulnerabilities and imposes substantial operational costs. These demands can affect IDF’s readiness, necessitate repeated reserve mobilisation, divert troops from counter-terror efforts and border security and perpetuate long-term conflict dynamics.[13] To reduce the IDF’s operational burden and prioritise defence and counter-terrorism, Defence Minister Israel Katz’s August 2026 plan proposes transferring civilian law enforcement in the West Bank to the police under National Security Minister Ben-Gvir.  Critics fear this arrangement could help settlers establish outposts and farms with reduced military oversight.[14]

Additionally, despite the expansion of Israeli settlements and outposts in the West Bank, demographic trends raise questions about the strategic effectiveness and long-term sustainability. Shaul Arieli, head of the Tamrur-Politography research group, characterises approval of the 103 new settlements as largely bureaucratic, intended to facilitate future infrastructure rather than reflect substantial demographic demand. Although the settler population has increased from around 300,000 to around 500,000, growth stems primarily from natural increase rather than migration.

During the current government’s tenure, net migration has been negative, with more settlers leaving than moving in, and a substantial portion of housing units remain vacant, indicating that supply exceeds demand.[15] Moreover, the annual population growth rate in settlements has declined from 16 per cent in 1991 to 7.8 per cent in 2000, 5.2 per cent in 2002, 2.9 per cent in 2023 and 2.2 per cent in 2025. Notably, the settler population increased by around 12,000, reaching 529,450 in 2025.[16]

By the end of 2025, the Palestinian population reached approximately 5.56 million, including 3.43 million in the West Bank and 2.13 million in Gaza.[17] Palestinians are more evenly distributed across the West Bank, with a population density of 472 people per square km compared with 78 among Jewish residents. Settlers constitute around 15 per cent of the West Bank’s population, and their settlements are concentrated in blocs near the Green Line and Jordan Valley, while isolated outposts and farms remain dispersed across Palestinian-populated areas. The demographic and spatial realities impede the settlements’ capacity to establish effective territorial dominance, raising questions about the long-term security and economic burden of protecting a relatively concentrated but politically influential population. In this light, a two-state solution remains feasible, with a 4 per cent land swap allowing 80 per cent of large settlement blocs, west of the security barrier, to remain under Israeli sovereignty.[18] However, the current government has shown inadequate willingness to pursue a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians.

Moreover, the settlements are not economically self-sufficient, relying heavily on government subsidies, financial assistance and services from Israel. Finite local employment opportunities, fragmented communities, inadequate urban centres and long distances between settlements deter economic integration and social cohesion.[19] While settlement expansion could embolden Israel’s territorial and political leverage, it has not yet resolved the demographic constraints. The limited Jewish immigration into the West Bank has coincided with efforts by a section of settlers to establish farms and outposts close to Palestinian communities, provoking violence. These developments have raised concerns about pressure on Palestinian residents to relocate and the gradual consolidation of Israel’s territorial presence.[20] The subsequent section delves into settler violence and its implications for Israel’s West Bank policy.

Settler Violence

Beyond institutional tools, settler violence in the West Bank against Palestinians has steadily increased. The nature of violence includes assaults, road blockages, property damage, arson, water and electricity infrastructure sabotage and land seizures. Between January 2023 and August 2026, there have been around 6,199 settler violence incidents, displacing more than 6,500, killing at least 72 and injuring 5,728 Palestinians.[21] Following the 7 October 2023 attack, the frequency of violent acts surged to 381 incidents, averaging 30 per week, compared with 21 between 1 January and 6 October 2023. Between October and December 2023, settler violence killed at least 10 and displaced around 1,208 Palestinians.[22]

The armed settler-soldier hybrids involving actions by local first response team members and territorial defence soldiers have blurred civilian-military boundaries and fuelled institutional disputes between police and IDF over investigative responsibility.[23] Israeli security establishment has faced criticism for failing to adequately safeguard Palestinian communities amid police, IDF and Shin Bet’s enforcement gaps due to fear of political repercussions, permissive government rhetoric and tolerance for settler violence characterised by the cancellation of administrative detentions of Jewish extremists, lenient investigations and low prosecution and conviction rates.[24] Despite near-daily attacks, Netanyahu has downplayed settler violence as a marginal concern, attributing incidents to a few hundred youths.[25]

Israeli security officials have warned that escalating settler violence risks triggering a broader cycle of violence in the West Bank. A mass-casualty settler attack could provoke retaliatory attacks by Palestinians on settlements and outposts and cause an uptick in recruitment into armed groups. In response, Israel could intensify raids on Palestinian towns, villages and refugee camps, deploy more troops, conduct mass arrests and home demolitions, revoke work permits, seize additional territory and expand settlements. A security emergency before the elections could politically benefit Likud and far-right parties while deflecting scrutiny from the Netanyahu government’s failures surrounding the 7 October attack.[26]

The relatively subdued Palestinian response reflects Israeli deterrence, fear of Gaza-like destruction, forced displacement or restrictions on civilian life and disillusionment with the PA that prioritises political control and stability over purposeful action. Palestinians’ restrained collective response also stems from the systematic weakening of armed groups through the IDF’s military operations in coordination with the PA, including arrests, surveillance, funding restrictions and infrastructure damage, which have eroded their capacity to organise collective resistance against Israeli actions. For Palestinians, the lack of mobilisation does not signify acceptance of the status quo; rather, resistance has increasingly become a struggle for survival.

IDF’s Military Campaign

Between October 2022 and September 2023, political violence in the West Bank increased by 50 per cent compared with previous years, driven by rising settler violence, IDF operations, and the emergence of decentralised Palestinian armed groups such as Lion’s Den, Jenin Brigade, Nablus Brigade, Tulkarm Brigade, Tubas Brigade, Balata Brigade and Black Cave. These groups were locally organised with fluid membership and operated largely outside established political factions but reportedly received organisational support from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The said groups were involved in over 500 violent incidents, primarily resisting Israeli raids, arrests and incursions, while sporadically attacking Israeli soldiers and settlers. Their emergence reflected younger Palestinians’ growing frustration with Israeli occupation, settlement expansion, settler violence and the IDF’s security measures, particularly March 2022 Operation Break the Wave.[27]

Before the 7 October 2023 attack, analysts predicted that the West Bank, which experienced deadly violence in 2022, rather than Gaza, would become the epicentre of renewed Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel focused on containing Palestinian armed groups through targeted military action and security cooperation with the PA, maintaining steady troop deployments and operational frequency in the West Bank. Following the 2023 Hamas attack, the scale of counter-terrorism operations intensified, involving refugee camp raids, expanded checkpoints and temporary closures that substantially disrupted the networks of West Bank-based armed groups.[28]

On 21 January 2025, the IDF launched Operation Iron Wall, complementing the PA’s Operation Protect the Homeland, which began on 5 December 2024. The IDF’s campaign targeted armed cells and sought to restore operational control in Jenin, Tulkarem and Nur Shams refugee camps, reportedly killing around 102 fighters, arresting 320, and displacing over 45,000 Palestinians. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz called the operation a shift in security strategy in the West Bank, signalling a more aggressive approach to target “Iran-backed terrorists”.[29]

According to the IDF, Palestinian attacks and Israeli fatalities in the West Bank have dropped. Reported Palestinian attacks fell from 847 in 2023 and 504 in 2024 to 57 in 2025, while Israeli fatalities stood at 35, 41 and 20 respectively. The number of Palestinians killed by the IDF also decreased from 504 in 2023 and 500 in 2024 to 240 in 2025. The proportion of Palestinians deaths during gunfights fell from 72 per cent in 2024 to 42 per cent in 2025.

Overall, firearm-related incidents declined by 86 per cent and Molotov cocktail incidents dropped by 17 per cent in 2025 compared to the previous year. The IDF seized 1,373 weapons in 2025, up from 1,095 in 2024, and confiscated NIS 17 million, or US$ 5.5 million, in alleged terror funds in 2025, compared with NIS 9.5 million, or US$ 3 million, the previous year.[30] The number of Palestinians entering Israel illegally also decreased from 12,406 to 8,636, while arrests of wanted Palestinians rose by over 25 per cent to approximately 3,500.[31]

In the long term, the IDF seeks to preserve a permanent presence, preserve operational freedom, control refugee camps’ entry points and conduct security operations to prevent renewed militant activity. It also envisages expanding Palestinian police deployments inside the camps to restore basic governance and facilitate conditions for eventual dismantling of refugee camps.[32]

Dynamics with Palestinian Authority

The far-right parties, after joining the Likud-led coalition, have supported measures to weaken the PA, including settlement expansion, outpost legalisation, economic and banking restrictions, curbs on construction and movement and changes affecting the administrative distinctions among Areas A, B and C. These measures risk fragmenting Palestinian communities into disconnected enclaves, complicating the prospects for a territorially contiguous Palestinian state and facilitating the extension of Israeli sovereignty over major settlement blocs and strategically significant areas.[33]

Finance Minister Smotrich has pursued policies that have placed additional pressure on the PA’s economic viability, including restrictions on Palestinian workers in Israel, withholding of tax and customs revenues since October 2023, sanctions against PA officials and delays in clearance revenue transfers since May 2025. These measures have reduced salary payments to 50–70 per cent, weakened essential public services and further eroded confidence in the PA’s governance capacity. For the Israeli far-right, the PA’s weakening could present an opportunity to accelerate its dismantling and consolidate Israel’s control over the West Bank.[34]

Prime Minister Netanyahu has historically denounced the 1993 Oslo Accords as incompatible with Israel’s right to security and the historic right of the Jewish people to the whole land of Israel. While providing lip service to prospects of a two-state solution,[35] Netanyahu has broadly opposed Palestinian statehood and contributed to the political divide between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the PA in the West Bank, thereby maintaining the diplomatic paralysis and deflecting international pressure to pursue the peace process.[36]

However, the PA’s loss of security control and ensuing governance vacuum would compel Israel to assume responsibility for public services and law and order.[37] Netanyahu has resisted the PA’s complete collapse, recognising that its short-term ideological benefits would entail substantial long-term costs. At the same time, Netanyahu’s focus on political survival has allowed Smotrich and Ben-Gvir to assume greater control over the West Bank. It has narrowed his ability to offer concessions to the PA.[38]

The PA leadership, seeking to prevent a major escalation in the West Bank that could influence Israel’s electoral dynamics, has responded primarily through diplomatic and legal advocacy.[39] President Mahmoud Abbas has condemned settlement expansion, settler violence and proposals for Palestinian displacement as a systematic effort to undermine the two-state solution. However, the PA’s capacity is constrained by a financial crisis, Israeli restrictions and constricted security control across the West Bank. Unlike Hamas and other armed factions, which justify armed resistance and endorse individual attacks against occupation and settlement expansion, the PA has resorted to internationalising the settlement issue, preserving a diplomatic pathway to statehood and maintaining security coordination with Israel.[40]

Conclusion

The Netanyahu government’s West Bank policy reflects the convergence of security objectives, religious-nationalist ideology and territorial ambitions, reinforced by the political influence of far-right coalition partners. Despite international pressure preventing formal changes to the West Bank’s legal status, the Israeli government has pursued settlement expansion, outpost legalisation, administrative restructuring and legislative initiatives to transform the territorial and political status quo. These have been done to facilitate direct Israeli management, permanent governing infrastructure, strengthen Israeli presence at religious and historical sites and build institutionalised civilian management frameworks untied to the military-led administration.

These measures, driven by historical and religious claims, seek to prevent Palestinian statehood and advance the Greater Israel vision. The settlement project, however, faces significant demographic and economic constraints that hinder comprehensive territorial dominance. Therefore, a certain section of settlers employs violence to facilitate Palestinian displacement and establish Israeli presence across strategically important areas.

Settlement expansion, settler violence and intensified military operations have increased the IDF’s operational burden amid manpower shortages, limited reserve forces and competition demands on other fronts. Israel’s current approach risks Palestinian displacement, casualties and retaliatory attacks, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of instability and militarisation. Although Palestinian responses to settler violence and raids remain largely subdued due to Israeli deterrence, fears of Gaza-like destruction, displacement and restrictions, sustained pressure could re-ignite unrest. Moreover, the Netanyahu government’s efforts to restrict the PA’s governance capabilities, revenues and economic activity could lead Israel to assume greater administrative and security responsibilities in the West Bank.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

[1] The 103 settlements include 48 legalised outpost, 24 expansions or splits from existing settlements and 31 new settlements. See Matan Golan, “103 Nails on the Map: How Israel’s Government is Burying the Two-State Solution”, Haaretz, 30 June 2026; “The Middle East, Including the Palestinian Question: Quarterly Open Debate”, United Nations Security Council, 27 July 2026; “2025 Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, Including East Jerusalem”, European Union, 6 July 2026.

[2] Under the 1993 Oslo Accords framework, the West Bank was divided into three areas. Area A (18 per cent) is under Palestinian civil and security control; Area B (22 per cent) is under Palestinian civil administration with Israel retaining security control; and Area C (60 per cent) remains under full Israeli civil and security control. Since 2022, around 30 outposts have emerged in Area B and one in Area A. “Israeli Settlements in the West Bank”, Middle East Institute, 9 June 2026.

[3] Nasser Khdour, “Settler Violence in the West Bank Hits Record Levels As Farming Outposts Expand”, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 30 September 2026.

[4] Matan Golan, “Backed by the Government and Army, Israeli Settlers Gain a Foothold in West Bank’s Area B”, Haaretz, 30 August 2026.

[5] Shira Efron, “Israel is Quietly Annexing the West Bank”, Foreign Affairs, 12 February 2026.

[6] Udi Dekel and Tammy Caner, “A Conceptual Shift in the West Bank: Absolute Security, Decisive Outcome, and the Application of Sovereignty”, The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Insight No. 2129, 23 April 2026; “The Entire Land is Ours: Ben Gvir Escalates Calls For Annexation of West Bank”, Middle East Eye, 3 October 2026.

[7] Shira Efron, “Israel is Quietly Annexing the West Bank”, no. 5.

[8] Laura Silver and Maria Smerkovich, “Settlements and Violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem”, Pew Research Center, 20 June 2024.

[9] Jeremy Sharon, “Netanyahu Hands Smotrich Full Authority to Expand Existing Settlements”, The Times of Israel, 18 June 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “Drawing Annexation Claims, IDF Hands Many West Bank Powers to Civilian Ally of Smotrich”, The Times of Israel, 23 June 2024.

[10] “Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan”, United Nations, 25 September 2025.

[11] “Cabinet Repeals Jordanian Land Laws in Judea and Samaria”, Jerusalem News Syndicate, 8 February 2026; Nava Freiberg, “Security Cabinet Okays Deepened Israeli Control of West Bank; Hamas Urges ‘Escalation’”, The Times of Israel, 8 February 2026.

[12] “Knesset Plenum Votes in Favor of Declaration Stating That Parliament Opposes The Establishment of a Palestinian State”, Knesset, 18 July 2024; Eliav Breuer, “Knesset Approves Declaratory Measure to Apply Israeli Sovereignty to West Bank”, The Jerusalem Post, 23 July 2025; Keshet Neev, “Knesset Approves Bill to Apply Israeli Sovereignty in the West Bank”, The Jerusalem Post, 22 October 2025.

[13]  Yoana Gonen, “Israeli Settlers are Running a Security Ponzi Scheme”, Haaretz, 28 July 2026.

[14] Yaniv Kubovich, “IDF Sources Say West Bank Policing Plan Meant to Let Settlers Build Freely”, Haaretz, 23 August 2026.

[15]  Since early 2025, the negative migration trend observed in 2024 continued, with 343 more Israelis leaving the West Bank than arriving. About 235 relocated to Israel proper and 108 emigrated abroad. See Shaul Arieli, “Demographic Trends in the Israeli Population in the West Bank – First Quarter 2025”, X, 27 April 2025; Matan Golan, “103 Nails on the Map: How Israel’s Government is Burying the Two-State Solution”, no. 1.

[16] “West Bank Settlements”, Israel Policy Forum, 2026; “Factsheet – Israeli Settlements”, MIFTAH, 13 February 2004.

[17] “A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025”, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 31 December 2025.

[18] Matan Golan, “103 Nails on the Map: How Israel’s Government is Burying the Two-State Solution”, no. 1.

[19] Around 60 per cent of employed settlers work in Israel, while local employment opportunities in West Bank’s agriculture and industry remain minimal. “West Bank Settlements”, no. 16.

[20] Shani Cohen, “Why Israeli Settlements will Never be a Success Story”, Haaretz, 15 August 2026.

[21] The 72 deaths include 19 by Israeli forces, 36 by settlers and 17 by Israeli forces or settlers. See “West Bank – The Impact of Settler Attacks, January 2023 – August 2026”, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 23 September 2026.

[22] “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel”, UNOCHA, 4 January 2024; “2023 ‘Most Violent’ Year For West Bank Settler Attacks, Watchdog Says”, The Times of Israel, 1 January 2024.

[23] “No Justice, More Violence: How Israel’s Impunity Fuels the West Bank”, Haaretz, 2 August 2026.

[24] According to Israel Police data, investigations into Israeli settler violence incidents against Palestinians rose 560 per cent from 139 cases in 2019 to 779 in 2025. However, only 6.6 per cent of the cases resulted in indictments. See Udi Dekel and Tammy Caner, “A Conceptual Shift in the West Bank: Absolute Security, Decisive Outcome, and the Application of Sovereignty”, no. 6; Matan Golan and Josh Breiner, “Israeli Settlers Call Them ‘Hikes.’ Palestinians Keep Ending Up Dead”, Haaretz, 23 August 2026.

[25] “PM Blames ‘Small Number’ of West Bank Rioters as Mass Settler Attack Draws Wide Condemnation”, The Times of Israel, 29 September 2026.

[26] Amos Harel, “The West Bank is Primed to Explode. Israel’s Government Sees It As Opportunity”, Haaretz, 24 July 2026; Nagham Zbeedat, “After a Settler Attack, Palestinians in the West Bank Await Their Punishment”, Haaretz, 29 July 2026.

[27] Between March 2022 and September 2023, the IDF carried out more than 2,000 raids leading to around 210 deaths. See Ameneh Mehvar and Nasser Khdour, “The Resurgence of Armed Groups in the West Bank and Their Connections to Gaza”, ACLED, 14 December 2023.

[28] Jaser AbuMousa, “The Strategic Cost of Palestinian Powerlessness”, Middle East Institute, 27 July 2026.

[29] Mariam Barghouti, “Gaza Redux: With Operation ‘Iron Wall’, Israel Brings Carnage to the West Bank”, The New Arab, 26 February 2025; Yoav Zitun, “Tanks Withdrawn, Troops Sent Back to Gaza: Jenin Refugee Camp is Quiet and Terror Free”, Ynet News, 8 May 2025; “UNRWA: A Lifeline for the Displaced Families in the Northern West Bank”, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 7 April 2025.

[30] Yonah Jeremy Bob, “IDF: West Bank Terror Attacks and Israeli Deaths Dropped Sharply in 2025”, The Jerusalem Post, 19 January 2026; Yaniv Kubovich, “IDF Says Palestinian Terror in West Bank Down by 78% Amid Increase in Cooperation With Palestinian Authority”, Haaretz, 19 January 2026.

[31] Joe Truzman, “IDF Reports Significant Drop in West Bank Terrorism in 2025”, The Long War Journal, 19 January 2026.

[32] Neomi Neumann, “While Other Countries Push For a Palestinian State, Israel is Increasing Its West Bank Presence”, Washington Institute, 6 June 2025; Amir Bohbot, “Inside Operation Iron Wall: How The IDF is Reshaping the West Bank”, The Jerusalem Post, 6 July 2025.

[33] “October 7: Before and After”, Israel Policy Forum, 2026.

[34] Udi Dekel and Tammy Caner, “A Conceptual Shift in the West Bank: Absolute Security, Decisive Outcome, and the Application of Sovereignty”, no. 6.

[35] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address on 14 June 2009 at Bar-Ilan University acknowledged the possibility of Palestinian statehood under stringent conditions including demilitarisation, IDF control over airspace and borders including Jordan Valley, retention of major settlement blocs, rejection of East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital and right to return. “Address by PM Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2009; “Benjamin Netanyahu: Putting ‘An End to the Oslo Accords’ & the Two-State Solution”, Institute for Middle East Understanding, 22 July 2024.

[36] Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy was based on preserving Hamas’ governance and military capabilities; carrying out limited assaults to restore deterrence and facilitating the group’s financial well-being through Qatar to sustain disunity with the Fatah-led PA. See Adam Raz, “A Brief History of the Netanyahu-Hamas Alliance”, Haaretz, 20 October, 2023; Lahav Harkov, “Netanyahu: Money to Hamas Part of Strategy to Keep Palestinians Divided”, The Jerusalem Post, 12 March 2019.

[37] Gershon Baskin, “Trump can Stop the Next War in the West Bank, But He Must Act Now”, Haaretz, 24 August 2026.

[38] Shira Efron, “Israel is Quietly Annexing the West Bank”, no. 5.

[39] David Rosenberg, “It’s Not Just Violence: Israel is Crushing the Palestinian Economy Too”, Haaretz, 20 August 2026.

[40] Jaser AbuMousa, “The Strategic Cost of Palestinian Powerlessness”, no. 28.