The responses to the arguments that I forwarded in my initial essay, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’, have introduced interesting dimensions to this debate. While most of the respondents have agreed with my proposition that it is premature to think about China's entry into the South Asian regionalist project and that it would introduce complex challenges that would be difficult to manage, they disagree with some of the reasons that I have cited.

The 'Cheonan' incident has prodded and expedited the strategic comeback of the US in East Asia. The US offer to mediate the territorial disputes over islands and seabed minerals in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2010 has provoked harsh criticism from the Chinese. This US diplomatic move appears to be a premeditated one to substantially diminish the influence of China in the region, to re-secure its own strategic forward military presence and to signal that it is not yet time for China to acquire absolute control over this critical waterway.

Over the past few years there has been a move by some of the member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to induct China into the regional organisation. China, in turn, has indicated its desire to join. Since other extra-regional states were also keen to be involved, SAARC has opened its doors since 2007 for out-of region states through a new arrangement.

Experts are still searching for a settled answer to the causes and aftermath of the violent unrest between the Han and Uyghurs in China's Xinjiang province that erupted on July 5, 2009. The long-simmering resentment of the native Uyghurs against the Han-dominated groups coupled with the deepening economic crisis is believed to have been the major reason for the ethnic riots. The questions being asked now are: Was it a crisis of ethnicity or economy? Why did the crisis manifest itself this way? And was the crisis a prelude to China's terrorism problem?