Within the first year of Xi Jinping’s elevation to the presidency, China has moved further ahead on its path to achieving primacy in the world. In the last week of November 2013, Beijing imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the conflicted Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, much to the consternation of its feuding neighbours such as Japan and South Korea. Their howls of protest found expression in the US attempt to challenge China to promulgate what it has done in deed.

South Korean president Park Geun-hye visited India in January 2014 after India and South Korea marked 40 years of diplomatic relations the previous year.1 These developments symbolise a burgeoning relationship between two of Asia’s leading economies and democracies. However, they have added significance as Asia undergoes a shift in the strategic balance of power.

In the last decade, the dynamics of inter-state relations in the Asia Pacific have changed rapidly, largely due to the rise of China. Competition rather than cooperation has become the order of the day. In the East and South China Seas, freedom of navigation, competitive claims over maritime boundaries and air space security are experiencing an evolution of new brinkmanship between the US, an established super power, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), an emerging super power, unfolding new challenges for the other potential regional players including India.

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, the chairman of the United Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN) (Maoist), visited India on April 27–30, 2013, shortly after he had returned from a week-long visit to China. During his visits to China and India, Prachanda proposed trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China. Although he assured India that this trilateral cooperation would be founded on the bilateral relations that Nepal already shares with India, he clearly did not elaborate on the nature of this trilateral cooperation and the issues that need to be discussed within this framework.