Nuclear science and technology have impinged upon global politics and security studies for decades. The IDSA has focused on the study of the political and strategic facets of nuclear science and technology since its inception and is known for providing a different perspective on global nuclear issues. The Institute has been in the forefront of shaping the debate on key nuclear issues in India and in the world at large.
The Center for Nuclear and Arms Control is dedicated to advance research on strategic nuclear issues. The Centre is engaged in projects that seek to provide answers to relevant policy questions relating to global nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and anti-proliferation, nuclear energy, global nuclear governance, regional nuclear dynamics, Arms Trade Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, among others. Through its outreach activities, the Centre has disseminated its research output in the strategic studies and policy communities effectively
|Director General||Senior Research Associate||Associate Fellow||Associate Fellow||Associate Fellow|
May 23, 2013
India’s admission to the NSG has, as on the previous times when the India-US Nuclear Deal and the NSG exemption of 2008 were under discussion, caused many of those opposed to the Indian nuclear programme to come out with various policy suggestions on how to get India to agree on additional conditionalities. In addition there is a move by many to use the Indian admission for membership as a means to legitimize the illegitimate nuclear commerce between China and Pakistan. All these are predicated on the assumption that India is desperate to join the NSG. India should reject any move by the nonproliferation lobby to devise a criterion-based admission procedure.
May 15, 2013
Kenneth Waltz hailed as the ‘King of thought’ was a towering thinker in the field of IR. His two most important works, Man, The State, and War (1959) and Theory of International Politics (1979), provided a framework within which emerged the principal debate in IR.
India's relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime deteriorated sharply after its 1974 underground nuclear test which, according to India, was a peaceful nuclear explosion, but which was n
May 1, 2013
In the aftermath of recent North Korean actions and threats, there has been in recent times some open debates and discussions about the prospects of South Korea “going nuclear” i.e. developing its own nuclear weapons. This brief argues that short of abrogating all its bilateral and multilateral treaties and obligations with heavy costs, the prospects of it doing so in the short/medium term are not that easy and may not be cost effective.
April 18, 2013
There is a lot of inaccuracy and assumption in reporting Chasma 3 nuclear cooperation between China-Pakistan. It is not conceivable in engineering terms as to how a 300 MWe Chasma 3 can be transformed into a 1,000 MWe project.
April 8, 2013
By abstaining from voting on the global arms trade treaty, India has exposed the treaty’s loopholes in not addressing concerns about illegal transfer of arms to terrorist organisations, insurgents groups and other non-state actors.
March 8, 2013
Nuclear force development is at present an attractive means for Pakistan to attract international political and financial assistance, while salving the paranoias of its security establishment. Improvement in the state-society relationship could reduce the domestic appeal of endless nuclear expansion as other, more sustainable, resources become available to the state for building economic growth and security.
February 22, 2013
The second Chinese BMD test has a message for India: propel the development of long-range (exo-atmospheric) interception capabilities to mitigate the possibility of further asymmetry on strategic forces.
February 20, 2013
Although PNEs were surrounded by ambiguity of intent from the very onset, retroactive measures after May 1974 have ensured that an underground nuclear test could be ‘peaceful’ only when conducted by or with the assistance of the superpowers.