S. S. Parmar replies: The 572 islands of the Andaman and Nicobar chain running in a north south direction of around 780 km long places this eastern most “Outpost” of India close to the South East Asian nations on Chinas’ radar scan.
Although we have an integrated command based at Port Blair and a number of Naval, Air Force and Coast Guard bases, the assets (in this regards I refer to ships and aircraft) presently, are not sufficient to place the vast sea area and islands under surveillance. A number of the Islands are uninhabited and offer a safe haven for elements inimical to the security of India.
As and when the required numbers of assets are available there would be the requirement of placing them at places that offer logistics support that would require the requisite infrastructure to be constructed. More importantly these places or bases would require to be in close proximity of navigable choke points so that the time required to reach the area would be the shortest.
There are two points to be kept in mind. Firstly, aircraft given the speed and potent reach are always considered an omni present threat. The nations adjoining the area would question our intentions. We may reason and give the rationale of anti piracy and anti smuggling but it may not go down well with them. Secondly infrastructure to support these assets would require to be constructed. There would be a requirement to duplicate and maybe triplicate similar infrastructure given the extent of the Island chain. This would be a costly affair.
Clarifying India’s Strategic Doctrine
Non-articulation of India's strategic doctrine lends it to be interpreted and perceived variously. India's security establishment need not be defensive about its strategic doctrine but boldly take on critics in the strategic community. Besides, its articulation would help provide direction to the military in their formulation of military doctrine, planning and acquisitions.