The sense of insecurity created by a regionally preponderant and militarily powerful India is the central catalytic factor that influences the dynamics of Pakistan’s regional security perception. The military-militant nexus in Pakistan, built around army’s misguided obsession with India, pursues strategic priorities in the name of protecting its national interests in Kashmir and Kabul. Sadly, both the Kashmir and Afghan policies of the military have started hurting Pakistan - internally and externally - more than India.
The ISI was set up in 1948, shortly after the first war with India, to strengthen sharing of intelligence between the army, navy and air force. It was headed first by Maj Gen R. Cawthorne, one of the last British officers to leave Pakistan. He continued at the helm of ISI till 1956. Thereafter, for almost three years, it remained headless as Pakistan faced constitutional turmoil leading finally to Ayub Khan’s first martial law take-over. Ayub appointed Brig Riaz Hussain as ISI chief and he continued up to 1966.
The ISI threat assessment may be received with great enthusiasm in Western capitals and policy circles, but for observers from the subcontinent it is neither ‘fundamental’ nor a ‘shift’.
While the US may continue to keep its contacts with the Pakistani army and its political leadership and strengthen its presence in Pakistan, can it contain the tide of Islamic radicalism prospering within Pakistan?
Cold Start is a good doctrine from India’s point of view, but one that could adversely impact strategic stability given since Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is premised on countering Indian conventional military superiority with a nuclear shield.
That the ISI patron is now becoming the victim of jehadi terrorism does not bode well for Pakistan, which now has to recast the agency’s role and organizational ethos to contain the Taliban.
Much as the text of Obama’s new ‘Af-Pak’ plan echoes India’s traditional concerns, it may turn out to be contrary to India’s interest with unseen implications in the longer term. Obama’s outlined strategy has been described as a ‘bold bid’ ‘bottom-up’ ‘comprehensive’ ‘pragmatic’ and even a ‘game changer’ approach.
Although insurgency in several areas of the North-East region of India has declined, external manipulation and support to insurgency in Assam, the most populous State in the region, continues to be a problem.
Three States in the region, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Sikkim, are mostly unaffected by insurgency, while there has been substantial decline in insurgency in Tripura and Meghalaya. Thus, insurgencies in the region are largely confined to Assam, Manipur and Nagaland.
The deadly terrorist attack in Mumbai is set to derail India-Pakistan bilateral relations. With all the evidence pointing towards Pakistan, it has become difficult to advocate that India must go ahead with the composite dialogue. The Indian government is understandably frustrated with Pakistan’s reluctance and/or inability to act against radical groups within its territory. In spite of repeated Pakistani assurances, radical groups are still operating openly in Pakistan, raising funds for jihad, and imparting armed training to jihadists.
Neither ‘fundamental’ nor a ‘shift’
The ISI threat assessment may be received with great enthusiasm in Western capitals and policy circles, but for observers from the subcontinent it is neither ‘fundamental’ nor a ‘shift’.