The Pokhran test carried out by the Indian Atomic Energy Commission on 18 May 1974, by and large, evoked predictable reactions. Those countries that had come to accept the conventional wisdom on the issue of nuclear proliferation expressed regrets ranging from mild to profound. Some Third World countries expressed satisfaction but Pakistan reacted very strongly.
It is necessary to have a detached and realistic assessment of the military situation in Bangla Desh. During the last one week, our press reports were over-optimistic and these reports need careful reassessment now.
This is a personal recollection of the author on the evolution of the Indian nuclear policy and developments leading to the Shakti tests. Since it draws solely upon the author’s memory there could be errors and discrepancies in the account. This has been written in an effort to present a coherent and comprehensive account of the Indian nuclear policy, since, in the absence of an authoritative official document, there are considerable dissensions and misperceptions in the country.
Members of Parliament, press correspondents, interested University men and the attentive newspaper reading public in India, all agree that not enough information is available in easily assimilable form to enable a meaningful debate on matters pertaining to national security. It is one of the strange ironies of the situation that in spite of this criticism being voiced for well over a decade, and the country having gone through two major wars and a border skirmish, there has been no effort to study the reasons underlying this state of affairs, and to suggest concrete remedial steps.
Neville Maxwell's book, India's China War (Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1970) has already been subjected to extensive comments by a number of senior journalists in this country. By and large, the comments are not commendatory and one correspondent reflected the official view that it had woven a string of half-truths and misrepresentations around a preconceived conclusion. It is natural for an ordinary Indian to be indignant over the book.
The former defence minister Shri Yeshwantrao Chavan led a delegation to the United States in May 1964 to discuss American support for the Indian Defence Five-Year Plan. The delegation included among others, the then defence secretary Shri P.V.R. Rao. Both Shri Chavan and Shri Rao were very impressed by the quantitative and analytical approach adopted by the US Defense Department and on their return, initiated discussions in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to explore the possibility of setting up a ‘think tank’ on the lines of the RAND Corporation.
There is general agreement among those concerned with international relations and strategy that for the next fifteen years Asia is more likely to be an area of tension and conflict involving major powers than any other part of the world, now that detente has stabilised the situation in Europe. There is further agreement that China and growing nationalism among the Asian societies will be the foci around which tension and conflict are likely to build up.
