K. Subrahmanyam

You are here

  • Share
  • Tweet
  • Email
  • Whatsapp
  • Linkedin
  • Print
  • K. Subrahmanyam was Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses from 1969 to 1975 and from 1980 to 1987.

    Vote of Thanks at the National Seminar on Defence Acquisition

    Today, we are facing a serious challenge in trying to cope up with a rising China and in that effort we have very many disadvantages. The Chinese have a developed infrastructure on their side which we have failed to develop on our side. The Chinese have a much higher GDP, have a better developed, modernized military, and perhaps higher level of technology. Under these circumstances we have got to look for factors in our favour in the international situation which we could exploit in order to cope up with the Chinese challenge. Yes, there are.

    January 2010

    Outlook for the Seventies: Strategic and Technological

    So far the Chinese have carried out ten nuclear tests which include one underground test, one test of a nuclear-tipped missile and three thermo-nuclear tests. In other words, the Chinese are on a comprehensive weapons programme, which will give them thermo-nuclear warheads from the megaton range down to small yield nuclear weapons of a few kiloton range and even fractional kiloton range. They are now engaged in improving the compactness of their warheads.

    September 2009

    Nehru's Concept of Indian Defence

    No aspect of Jawaharlal Nehru's policies and leadership came under as severe an attack as those on defence. Unfortunately till this day no scholastic appraisal of the policy he pursued in regard to national security is available and it is a great pity that the Government has not encouraged such a study. We have had a host of publications by foreigners, retired Indian Army officers, retired civil servants, journalists, academicians and politicians which are generally critical of Jawaharlal Nehru's defence policy. The bias in these works is all too obvious. Shri B.N.

    November 2008

    Partnership in a Balance of Power System

    The popular perception in India is that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of one of the two Superpowers, the bipolar international system has become unipolar. The United States is now assumed to be an unchallenged sole Superpower. Consequently, it is felt in some quarters that the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 is a case of US recruiting India as one of its allies for possible future containment of China. Such a perception nurtures suspicion about the US and its motivation about its attempts to befriend India.

    October 2005

    Arms and Politics

    Before and during World War II, India was one of the many territorial commands of the British imperial defence system. When India became independent, the country was totally reliant on Britain for its armaments for the three services. There was some left over equipment of the US armed forces from the World War II period – Dakota aircraft, some Sherman tanks and transport vehicles.

    January 2005

    Narasimha Rao and the Bomb

    In the background of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s obituary tribute to P.V. Narasimha Rao acknowledging the latter as the true father of Shakti nuclear test of May 11, 1998, let me recall Rao’s role in the development of the Indian nuclear deterrent as narrated by him. This is important in order to understand the correct historical perspective about very important decisions of the past; in this case, Rao’s account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office.

    October 2004

    Pages

    Top