Two co-ordinated strikes on July 25 and 26, 2008 in Bengaluru and Ahmedabad killed 54 people and injured nearly 200. In the next few days, 28 bombs including two car bombs were found in Surat, which possibly did not explode due to faulty mechanism. This set of incidents seems to mark a new terrorist tactic – the targeting of important cities to cause significant casualties. Serial blasts of this kind began in India with the October 2005 co-ordinated strikes in New Delhi.

The low-intensity bombs that blew up in Ahmedabad and Bangalore have thrown light on the challenges before India’s intelligence agencies. Not only are the agencies unsure of who is behind the attack, the terrorists remain faceless. The obvious question to ask is: why has there been a spate of low-intensity bombings in small markets as opposed to say, the high-intensity bombing of a strategic location?

Nagaland has been up in flames for quite sometime now. For the past eight months or so, heavy inter-factional killings between the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah [NSCN (IM)], the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang [NSCN (K)], and the newly formed National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Unification [NSCN (U)], have been vitiating the atmosphere there. On July 9, clashes between the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (U) in Diphupar village led to the death of a few insurgents.

In many ways the story of Punjab is anomalous to the stylized facts of civil war literature. Empirical literature on civil wars points to a negative correlation between income and likelihood of conflict. There is also cross-country evidence to suggest that rough terrain contributes to greater possibility of violence. Both these facts did not hold in the case of Punjab. However, recent research on terrorism supports the view that terrorism is not correlated with poverty and lower education levels.

The central leadership of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is under pressure following the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by a section of its cadres. ULFA’s top leaders are likely to have a tough time ahead in keeping their outfit together. However, for the sake of peace and security of Assam, it is advisable for the Government of India to pursue the peace dialogue with a united ULFA rather than with a breakaway faction.

Insurgency movements in India’s northeast would appear to be even more intractable and beyond solution if not for the ongoing ceasefires and peace negotiations between the government and two dozen outfits in various states. Products of the efforts by community based organisations, official initiatives or the plain bankruptcy of ideas of the rebel outfits, such negotiations have been the harbinger of tranquillity in many areas of the region.

At a time when the India-China border dispute is hogging the limelight and causing unease in the Indian establishment, many festering inter-state border disputes in the Northeast that are sowing seeds of discord seem to elude the attention of policymakers at the Centre. The issue of inter-state border disputes came to the fore recently, when tensions erupted along the Assam-Meghalaya border following the Assam government’s attempt to lay a foundation stone for a primary health sub-centre at Langpih, a border village claimed by both Assam and Meghalaya.

At least nine co-ordinated blasts rocked Jaipur on May 13, 2008, killing more than 70 people and injuring 200. Subsequently, a little known Islamic militant group, Indian Mujahideen (henceforth IM), claimed responsibility for the attacks through an e-mail that contained threatening assertions. The authenticity of the mail has been confirmed by the Indian Intelligence Bureau. Since then, the security establishment in India has been trying to decipher the details of this organisation.

The Indian reaction to the terrorist attacks in Jaipur has so far been quite predictable. As usual the media has congratulated the citizens of Jaipur for ‘resilience’ and maintaining communal amity, while at the same time lambasting the security set-up in the state as well as in the centre including each and every security, intelligence and investigative agency and their working procedures, lack of coordination, absence of a central agency, etc. First of all, it has to be underscored that Jaipur was very important in the terror target book.