At first glance, ‘Non-Lethal’ and ‘armed forces’ do not seem to go along, considering that the primary role of the military is to preserve national interests and safeguard territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of India against external threats. However, changes in the security dynamics have embroiled the Indian Army more and more in the secondary task of providing assistance to government agencies to cope with internal threats as part of ‘Aid to Civil Authority’ when requisitioned for the purpose.
Elections in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, be they for the state legislature or Parliament, have become the symbol around which the contest for legitimacy between the separatists and mainstream political leadership takes place. The recently concluded election for six Parliamentary constituencies was no exception. In the five-phase elections that were held in the state in April-May 2009, 2,022 election rallies were held.
Terrorism is at the forefront of international politics and is a major crisis of our age. Not found in pre-modern times, this phenomenon finds its root in ideological movements and not in religion. While referring to different forms of terrorism several scholars have suggested nihilism in modern times as the source of the problem. They view nihilism as a decline in values, or in other words, a tendency of ‘devaluing all values’.
The two global trends of multipolarity (rising powers) and non-polarity (failing states) are strongly present in the South Asian geopolitical context. India's competitive-cooperative relationship with China is clearly part of the multipolar trend of rising powers throughout the world, while India's long, antagonistic history with Pakistan is increasingly witness to a weakening and radicalized Pakistani state. In this mixed strategic environment, Indian nuclear weapons are neither a global bane nor a coercive form of power for compelling a lopsided agreement with Pakistan on Kashmir.
Despite the instant denial issued by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) of its involvement in the November 26 Mumbai terrorist attacks, it is clear that the attacks were the latest manifestation of the terrorist grouping's engorged war – the extension of Jihad much beyond its traditional hunting ground of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) to the Indian heartland. Abdullah Ghaznavi, speaking on behalf of the Lashkar, told TV channels in the early hours of November 27: ‘LeT condemns such acts and we have no link with those responsible for such acts’.
A decade after the Kargil conflict and over seven years after the major Indian military mobilization along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, both countries were yet again on the verge of a military confrontation following the revelation of Pakistan's complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Islamabad's recalcitrance in taking action against groups responsible for this attack forced New Delhi to plan punitive responses against terror camps within Pakistan, prompting the latter to mobilize troops and project a capability to repulse an Indian attack.
The Case for Employing Non-Lethal Weapons
At first glance, ‘Non-Lethal’ and ‘armed forces’ do not seem to go along, considering that the primary role of the military is to preserve national interests and safeguard territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of India against external threats. However, changes in the security dynamics have embroiled the Indian Army more and more in the secondary task of providing assistance to government agencies to cope with internal threats as part of ‘Aid to Civil Authority’ when requisitioned for the purpose.