Technology is a key driver of air power. Technology asymmetry has shown decisive results in the history of air warfare. It is evident in any war that US air power has been employed post World War II. It also leads to a belief that the air power capability of a nation is a direct reflection of its industrial and technological base. Therefore, the result of an air war is perceived to be more of a depiction of technical and industrial superiority than anything else. However, this article argues that such advantages do not seal the fate.

Air power has played a critical role in counter-insurgency and irregular warfare across the world. India’s own rich experience is full of documented
roles of air power in such campaigns. This article documents the unique experience of Indian air power in ‘robust’ peacekeeping under the

With the announcement of the proposed theaterisation of the existing structure of the armed forces, there have been numerous exchanges of ideas, formal and informal discourses, official and unofficial exchange of views and perspectives in recent months. During such exchanges, a standpoint of equating the Air Force of a nation with the Artillery has emerged and it requires to be put in a proper perspective. Indian military history has unfortunately not highlighted the lethality and importance of air power, which is the root cause for incorrect understanding of air power.

The only unfettered use of air power in India’s wars was in 1971, and it produced disproportionate and decisive outcomes. IAF’s air strategy, the extent of its role in contributing to the failure of Pakistan’s strategy in the west, and the vast range of operations carried out towards the surface war on both fronts simultaneously, are relatively unknown.