Asymmetric Air Power: Employing Guerrilla Warfare Principles in Air Warfare

Technology is a key driver of air power. Technology asymmetry has shown decisive results in the history of air warfare. It is evident in any war that US air power has been employed post World War II. It also leads to a belief that the air power capability of a nation is a direct reflection of its industrial and technological base. Therefore, the result of an air war is perceived to be more of a depiction of technical and industrial superiority than anything else. However, this article argues that such advantages do not seal the fate. It looks at guerrilla warfare strategies to overcome technological and industrial asymmetry. Guerrilla warfare is a strategy wherein a weak adversary can inflict disproportionate losses against a stronger adversary using minimal resources. This article examines the principles employed by the guerrillas and explores possible ways of adapting those to mainstream employment by the regular air forces. At present, the use of guerrilla warfare in air power is limited to tactical employment of the principles of ‘agility and mobility’. This article expands to examine all four basic guerrilla warfare principles as espoused by Mao Zedong and explores possible applications in the employment of air power. By this, it attempts to offer viable military options (air power) to a nation against an adversary that is several times superior in terms of economy, industry and technology.