It is unclear at present how the proposal by China and Pakistan for an Aspirational (Ethical) Code under the BTWC will be taken forward through to the 9th Review Conference of the Convention in 2022. However, some difficult questions will have to be addressed for this process to be successful in producing a code that can then be implemented in more detailed codes of conduct and codes of practice in national and professional settings after the Review Conference.

Today, there is an urgent need for reconciling the benefits that are likely to be accrued from the continuous advancement of the life sciences with the potential risks arising from the availability, accessibility, and affordability of the knowledge, tools, and technologies necessary for conducting scientific work. Within the context of the BTWC, biological security education and awareness are considered essential to strengthening the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

The recent BWC Review Conference faced various challenges emanating from a range of developments that took place during the last five years, alongside with lingering issues already existing for a long period of time. The related contents and interfaces are here presented and assessed briefly.

As countries were preparing for the 8th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in November 2016, the BTWC Implementation Support Unit organised four regional workshops, including one in New Delhi, as part of a European Union-sponsored programme supporting the convention. While the BTWC has seen little progress in terms of new legally binding commitments, verification or setting up an international implementation organisation, the workshops revealed that on the regional and local levels states parties are active in ensuring that the treaty commitments are being respected. This account discusses the main trends in treaty development and issues states parties face that emerged during the workshops.

The recently concluded Eighth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) held in Geneva reached a disappointing outcome as the participant states failed to adopt any meaningful programme of work for the next inter-sessional period, 2017-2021. The failure of the conference is clearly a missed opportunity in terms of reinforcing the norm against the use and spread of bio-weapons.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction usually referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), or Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production of an entire category of weapons, entering into force in 1975. The Eighth BWC Review Conference was recently held at Geneva from November 7-25, 2016, Unfortunately, it appears to have flattened for the lack of consensus among the member-states until the next conference in 2021.

In April 2016 the Preparatory Committee meeting for the Eighth Review Conference was concluded. This will be followed by another meeting in August 2016. Two major points were discussed during the April meeting, the issue of science and technology and effective inter-sessional process.

The States Parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are preparing for the Eighth Review Conference in November. Their focus remains on institutional capacity and exchange of views and information, rather than on possible specific compliance concerns. Consultations and proposals are reviewed. Treaty norms and appropriate capacity must be maintained.

Reports of Anthrax threat to Pakistani officials raises important questions regarding its spread in South Asia. It also exposesPakistan’s vulnerabilities to bioterrorism and calls for urgent attention at appropriate levels.