The debates surrounding jointness and theatre commands reflect broader tensions within India’s military command structure that exist between legacy service-based command structures and operational requirements of modern warfare. As the nation transitioned into independence, India’s military command-and-control systems were primarily developed with a geographic or service-centric focus. This model was sufficient for past generations’ security challenges; however, current realities of multi-domain operations, the need for rapid decision-making and the possibility of simultaneous threats across various theatres have stretched these models to their limits. The post-Kargil reforms represented an important conceptual shift towards recognising weaknesses in inter-service coordination and integrated planning. They established the foundation upon which subsequent initiatives would be built to enhance India’s joint operational effectiveness. The article posits that jointness has progressed from being an idealistic concept to a practical necessity due to the increasing overlap between the land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains. Additionally, establishing theatre commands is often viewed as a potential solution to the issue of jointness, but this represents a structural solution and does not guarantee the desired outcomes. Experiences from both the United States and China illustrate that structural reorganisation of a military organisation does not necessarily equate to enhanced jointness. In fact, it can create new types of friction among different organisations if not supported by a common doctrine, mutual institutional trust and well-defined command relationships. In addition to the complexities inherent in creating theatre commands in India, there are also several unresolved issues associated with civilian–military relations, including bureaucratic oversight, identity and professionalism issues, promotion structures and the central control of air assets as national resources. Each of these issues contributes to institutional ambivalence and resistance to the adoption of theaterisation as the preferred form of jointness. The article concludes that hasty or incomplete theaterisation could potentially disrupt operational capabilities and erode unit morale, while continued lack of progress may lead to long-term strategic stagnation. The research concludes that theatre commands should be implemented in a measured, sequential fashion that emphasises joint education and training, development of a common doctrine and refinement of existing integrated command processes. Theaterisation should be viewed as a continuous process requiring empirical data collection, war-gaming and sustained and active government oversight, rather than a singular structural reform. Ultimately, the success of India’s military operations will rely less on the organisational chart of its command structure and more on the development of a true joint professional culture that can operate effectively and cooperatively in today’s complex, multi-domain combat environments.