On 20 May 2024, Dr. Mayuri Banerjee of the East Asia Centre delivered a talk during the Monday Morning Meeting on “Contextual Analysis of President Xi Jinping’s New Year Address”. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow and Coordinator, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director- General, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

The annual practice of the Chinese President’s New Year Address acts as an important milestone in China’s overall domestic and foreign policy messaging. The Address delivered by President Xi Jinping on 31 December 2025 was crucial in this regard, as several domestic milestones merged with prominent international achievements. Dr. Mayuri Banerjee, Research Analyst, discussed key internal and international dynamics relevant to the 2025 New Year speech. She noted that the speech seemed to be concerned with constructing an image of China as a power that has effectively overcome the ‘century of humiliation’ imposed on it by Western powers. Internationally, China was projected as a peaceful power committed to global development, yet also as a country no longer willing to passively accept norms shaped by others. She argued that a technology-driven, politically centralised, militarily assertive and normatively ambitious China posed a significant challenge to India in 2026. 

Detailed Report

D.r Prashant Kumar Singh in his opening remarks set the background for the talk by Dr. Banerjee. He introduced the annual practice in China of the President’s New Year Address, which acts as an important milestone in China’s overall domestic and foreign policy messaging. The Address delivered by President Xi Jinping on 31 December 2025 came on the heels of uncertainties in China-US relations, tensions in China-Japan ties, the ‘Justice Mission’ naval drill conducted in the vicinity of the self-ruled island of Taiwan and the grand military parade organised in September 2025 to commemorate 80 years of the end of the Second World War. 2025 was also the year when China announced a new initiative, the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), to complement the existing three initiatives on development (GDI), security (GSI) and ‘civilisation’ (GCI).

Dr. Banerjee commenced her remarks by outlining the importance of Xi’s 2025 speech. She pointed out that the New Year speech traditionally offers to the domestic as well as the international audience the first annual statement overviewing notable domestic and international developments and signalling the strategic directions the party-state is likely to take. 2025 was crucial in this regard, as several domestic milestones (such as the release of the Deepseek R1 large language model, the propounding of the ‘involution model’ at the ‘two sessions’ organised in March 2025 and the issuing of the National Security White Paper on ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’) merged with prominent international achievements (such as the launching of the GGI and the International Organisation on Mediation in Hong Kong, the organisation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Tianjin summit and the commemoration of the 80^th anniversary of the end of World War Two).

Dr. Banerjee also discussed certain internal dynamics relevant to the 2025 New Year speech, especially those having to do with the ‘new quality productive forces’ intended to deliver ‘high-quality development’ to China as well the wide-ranging purges within the People’s Liberation Army. She highlighted the steady growth of the Chinese economy despite tariff doldrums and a severe demographic crisis as a feather in Xi’s cap.

Entering into a discussion of the key themes of the 2025 speech, the Speaker noted the hailing of technological self-reliance by President Xi as a key indicator of the importance science and technology is likely to play in China’s future. The confidence encapsulated in statements that ‘innovation will lead to high-quality development’ indicates that Xi’s China will continue to strengthen its scientific base. The speech’s concurrent emphasis on economic security points to China increasingly seeking some measure of indigeneity in the face of growing technological competition with the United States of America.

Another key emphasis of the New Year speech was discipline within the Communist Party of China (CPC). Xi’s reference to the need to focus on ‘self-revolution’ by Party cadres marks a change in emphasis within the Party, as the 2024 New Year speech did not explicitly mention the Party as a subject of discussion.

A third theme identified by the Speaker concerned military matters. With clear references to the urgent priority given to ‘consolidate the majestic power’ of China in order to protect China’s core interests, and the reference to Taiwan reunification as not only inevitable but unstoppable, Xi’s speech clearly communicates his intent to have China play a more assertive role in the region. On the other hand, the rise in China’s global diplomatic profile was also worthy of mention in the speech, indicating a desire to be seen as a force worth reckoning with in the corridors of global power. On the other hand, the Speaker noted, issues such as disarmament and arms control, the International Organisation for Mediation (IoM) and a message of condolence over the loss of 169 lives in deadly fires in Hong Kong were not included in the speech.

Dr. Banerjee teased out some common threads that could be discerned in Xi’s remarks. She noted that the speech seemed to be concerned with constructing an image of China as a power that has effectively overcome the ‘century of humiliation’ imposed on it by Western powers (including Japan). Simultaneously, Xi also sought to project himself as a strict disciplinarian of Party cadres and a benevolent ruler of the party-state. A renewed focus on ‘mass-line’ rhetoric, where civilians and cadres alike are expected to struggle together to achieve an objective, was perceptible. The country itself was perceived as an ecologically valuable space that housed a flourishing civilisation. Internationally, China was projected as a peaceful power committed to global development, yet also as a country no longer willing to passively accept norms shaped by others.

Based on the key themes discussed above, the Speaker laid out an outlook for China’s international activities in the year 2026. She hypothesised that China could be expected to double down on emerging technologies, lay more emphasis on Party security and strengthen its control, assert itself further militarily, and emerge as a ‘norm-shaper’ rather than a ‘norm-taker’. Discussing the implications for India, she argued that a technology-driven, politically centralised, militarily assertive and normatively ambitious China posed a significant challenge to India in 2026. She noted that long-term security challenges along the Line of Actual Control and the Indo-Pacific would continue to be relevant given increased Chinese military assertiveness. Beijing’s proactive neighbourhood diplomacy could also constrain New Delhi’s strategic space.

The Chair requested Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA to deliver his comments on the Speaker’s presentation. Amb Chinoy opened by noting that the Chinese leadership’s New Year messaging traditionally leans towards hagiographic narratives, but problems continue to beleaguer the country. He noted that though China’s ability to withstand pressures from the US is good for the world, the increasing centralisation of power under Xi Jinping without a viable succession plan is a cause for concern. India must be prepared to retain a spectrum of responses vis-à-vis Beijing, where collaboration and competition coexist. Care must be taken lest differences devolve into a clash of arms, but investment in its own version of ‘high-quality investment’ is the need of the hour as well. As India faces strategic pressures from both Washington DC and Beijing, there is a need to redefine strategic autonomy in terms of balancing engagement and confrontation with both poles.

Questions and Answers

The Chair opened the floor for questions. Dr Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow enquired whether Dr. Banerjee could list concrete examples of China’s norm-shaping initiatives. Dr. Banerjee pointed to the GGI as a good example, and conveyed that the GGI has been publicly envisaged as a booster of the United Nations system, not a replacement for it. She also informed that China no longer wants to host multilateral meetings, it seeks increasingly to shape the agenda there, to ‘consolidate the voices of the Global South’.

Dr. Nihar Ranjan Nayak, Research Fellow sought the Speaker’s clarification on the nature of the constraint that China’s neighbourhood diplomacy may impose on New Delhi. Dr Banerjee clarified that a difference in financial wherewithal available with both capitals could make a sizeable difference in the concern with which neighbouring capitals could treat Beijing vis-à-vis New Delhi. She pointed out that China sees chaos in India’s neighbourhood as an opportunity to increase its own influence there.

This report was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, Research Analyst, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA..