India has signed four military logistics support agreements with partner countries and is in the process of finalising the fifth with Russia. The issue came up for discussion during the recent visit of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to Russia from November 05-07, 2019.1 When signed, the agreement with Russia, termed the Reciprocal Logistics Support Agreement (RLSA), will be an important milestone in bilateral relations. As the name signifies, the Agreement will facilitate reciprocal usage of logistics facilities by the militaries of both nations during visits to each other’s ports, bases and military installations.

This Agreement is similar to the four other logistics agreements India has signed with partner countries, viz., Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States (US) in August 2016, Implementing Arrangement Concerning Mutual Coordination, Logistics and Services Support with Singapore in June 2018, Agreement for the Provision of Reciprocal Logistics Support between the Armed Forces with France in March 2018, and, most recently, Agreement to Extend Logistical Support to each other’s navies with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in September 2019. Similar agreements are in the pipeline to be signed with Japan, United Kingdom and Australia.

Logistics agreements are administrative arrangements which help to facilitate the replenishment of fuel, rations, spares (where required), and berthing and maintenance for the other nations’ warships, military aircraft and troops during routine port calls, joint exercises and training carried out in each other’s countries as well as during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). These agreements simplify the bookkeeping during such events and ensure that the forces of the visiting countries are benefitted by using the host nation’s existing logistics network, which additionally reduces overall costs and saves on time.

These agreements feed into the Indian Navy’s requirement to maintain round-the-clock and round-the-year presence in its primary areas of interest, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and, going forward, the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Navy has been maintaining presence through its concept of mission-based deployments, wherein over a dozen major surface combatants are deployed across the length and breadth of the IOR.  These deployments have contributed, among other things, to significantly enhance India’s maritime domain awareness (MDA) picture, facilitate tracking of vessels of interest and also to be the first responder in case of a developing HADR scenario.

Prior to these agreements, the mission-deployed Indian warships were constrained to periodically replenish their fuel and logistics supplies from either an Indian naval fleet tanker deployed in the area or by entering the nearest Indian or foreign port. With the signing of these agreements, Indian warships have been able to extend their ‘sea-legs’ on station by taking fuel from naval fleet tankers of partner countries deployed in the region or by entering their ports.

For instance, since the signing of LEMOA with the US in 2016, Indian warships deployed near the Gulf of Aden have been fuelling from the US Navy tankers in the region and similarly have the flexibility to fuel from the US naval tankers worldwide or enter ports under their control when required. The versatility and reach of this arrangement was highlighted recently when INS Kiltan, an Indian Navy anti-submarine warfare corvette, conducted replenishment-at-sea (RAS) with US Merchant Marine vessel USNS Richard E. Byrd, a Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ship, in the South China Sea.2 Also, having signed the logistics agreement with France in 2018, Indian warships and military aircraft can utilise the French base of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa or the French territory of Reunion Islands in the Indian Ocean for a quick ‘turn-around’ of its assets.3 A logistics agreement with Russia would give the Indian Navy access to the Arctic seaports, which are likely to be ice-free for longer periods in the future due to global warming.

In addition to extending the range of Indian warships, such agreements provide for added operational flexibility of the Indian Navy’s long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft. The Indian Navy has in its inventory the extremely potent Boeing P8I acquired in 2013. The aircraft carries a variety of state-of-the-art weapons and sensors that are capable of engaging both surface and subsurface targets. With an operational range of 1200 nm (with four hours on station) and speed of 789 kmph, the aircraft forms India’s maritime ‘first line of defence’.4 The logistics agreements with partner countries thus facilitate the landing and refuelling of these aircraft at reciprocal bases, as agreed, thereby extending their operational envelope by a substantial degree.

The logistics agreements in certain ways also divests the need for a nation to invest in overseas bases or dual-use infrastructure. This is because the efficacy of overseas bases would have to be measured vis-à-vis installation, maintenance and manpower costs. Therefore, depending on a nation’s strategic interests in a region, the development of overseas bases has to be assessed against the relative flexibility that a logistics agreement provides for expanding a nation’s operational footprint and diversifying its international presence at the same time at a much lesser cost.

Signing of these agreements has been in consonance with India’s growing maritime engagement with navies of the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Navy presently carries out bilateral naval exercises with fourteen navies and coordinated patrols with four, most of which are in the Indo-Pacific. The recent India-Singapore-Thailand Joint Maritime Exercise, conducted at Port Blair on September 16, 2019, has further added to the Indian Navy’s repertoire of joint exercises conducted in the region.5 Such operational engagements, coupled with the signing of logistics agreements, indicate maturing of strategic trust between nations.

The timing of India’s aforementioned logistics agreements with respect to the then prevalent geostrategic calculus is also interesting. US President Barack Obama had announced his ‘Rebalance to Asia’ strategy in 2011. In September-October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping had proposed the ambitious ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ or ‘One Belt, One Road’, later renamed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was preceded by more than a decade of aggressive maritime infrastructure development by China in most of the IOR littoral countries surrounding India. This included the development of islands in the South China Sea, constant forays of Chinese warships into the Indian Ocean and acquisition of a military base at Djibouti. China’s increasing economic and military heft thus required an effective counterbalance. As can be inferred, all the four logistics agreements India signed were after 2016, the first being LEMOA with the US.

India has managed to steer a straight course through the choppy geostrategic environment by concluding military logistics agreements with the US, France, Singapore and South Korea, and is looking forward to signing a similar agreement with Russia shortly and more to follow. The endeavour has been to increase cooperation in the field of maritime security, joint exercise, HADR and interoperability between navies. Though Indian warships can always extend their operational reach by using their fleet tankers, the availability of logistics support facilities with other countries will further enhance the ability of the Indian Navy to maintain appropriate ‘presence’ for extended periods in its areas of interest in the wider Indo-Pacific.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh co-chairs IRIGC-M&MTC meeting with his Russian counterpart General Sergei Shoigu,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, November 06, 2019 (Accessed November 08, 2019)
• 2. Ankit Panda, “US Merchant Marine Ship Replenishes Indian Navy Ship in South China Sea,” The Diplomat, November 06, 2019 (Accessed November 08, 2019)
• 3. “Indian Navy benefits from strategic logistics pacts with US, France,” The Economic Times, June 16, 2019 (Accessed November 04, 2019)
• 4. “P-8I Aircraft: 21st Century Maritime Security for the Indian Navy,” Boeing, January 2014 (Accessed November 05, 2019)
• 5. “Sea Phase of maiden IN-RSN-RTN Trilateral Exercise Commences,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, September 19, 2019 (Accessed November 05, 2019)

It has been more than three months since Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the decision to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in his Independence Day address. The delay in appointing the first CDS and assigning its precise role and responsibility is indicative of the complexities involved in implementing what could arguably be the biggest defence reform of the Modi Government. Coming just after the creation of the National Security Advisor-led Defence Planning Committee (DPC) in April 2018, it heralds a radical departure from the past in so far as India’s higher defence management is conducted. Since the prime minister’s announcement, numerous recommendations have been made by different quarters, often repeating what the Group of Ministers (GoM) and other expert bodies had suggested in the past. Few have examined other pressing areas pertaining to planning, procurement, joint-service institutions, military diplomacy and quality assurance where an institution like CDS could make a big difference.

Defence Planning

India has so far prepared 13 defence five-year plans (FYPs), beginning with the first plan post the war with China in 1962. These FYPs are in addition to numerous other procurement plans articulated in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999. These plans and in particular the processes involved in formulating them have, however, hardly been satisfactory. The major deficiency of the planning process has been the lack of inter- and intra-service prioritisation, leading to duplication of efforts, haphazard capability development and sub-optimal utilisation of resources. The reason for such a lacklustre planning process has been the glaring absence of an overarching institution with the requisite authority to translate India’s overall defence requirements into a holistic capability development plan while keeping in view the scarcity of resources, technological advancements, self-reliance goals and politico-diplomatic engagements with other countries. The absence of an overarching agency has led to individual service headquarters (SHQ) to plan and project requirements that are not necessarily in harmony with those of other services. This is not how major countries in the world undertake defence planning.

With the creation of the post of CDS, India has an opportunity to rectify this historical deficiency in its defence planning process. The CDS could be entrusted with the task of defence planning, subject to overall guidance and directions from the DPC. It could be mandated to prepare and own a holistic 15-year plan from which would follow the five-year capital acquisition plan and the two-year procurement plan. While preparing the plan documents, the CDS would require to weigh the cost and benefit of different options to achieve the larger security goals, while remaining well within a pre-defined fiscal roadmap and constantly furthering the Make in India initiative in defence production. In essence, the CDS, through the planning mechanism, would need to determine the most cost effective and self-reliant force structure and its distribution among the services. It may entail right-sizing manpower to fund capital assets.

Capital Procurement

Contrary to popular perceptions, the armed forces play a vital role in arms procurement. In fact, two critical stages of procurement – formulation of qualitative requirements (QRs) or technical specifications and conduct of trials – that have the maximum bearing on subsequent decision making and speed of procurement are undertaken at the SHQ level. These two stages of procurement are, however, most susceptible to delays and controversies because of a variety of reasons, prominent of them being lack of expertise and professionalism. In the past, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, government-appointed committees, study groups and think tanks all have voiced their concerns and emphasised on greater professionalism and transparency in these two critical aspects. The CDS could be the overall in-charge of these two aspects. Dedicated and professional teams could be set up under the CDS to undertake these two tasks, which would go a long way in expediting the procurement process.

Along with the tasks of QR formulation and conduct of trials, the government may also like to review the existing powers exercised for the purpose of according Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) and sanctioning of capital acquisition proposals (see table below). Being the head of the tri-service agency, the CDS would be ideally suited to have larger delegated financial powers, over and above those exercised at the SHQ level, to expedite the procurement process. Suffice it to say that the existing financial powers which were substantially enhanced in the recent past have led to full utilisation of the procurement budget.

Source: Extrapolated from “Defence Procurement Procedure 2016,” Ministry of Defence, Government of India, March 2016.

Tri-Service Agencies

With the appointment of a CDS, it is only natural that all existing joint-service organisations such as training establishments, Defence Space Agency, Special Operations Division, Defence Cyber Agency and integrated commands come under its administrative control. While bringing them under the control of the CDS, it is imperative to address some of the critical deficiencies facing the joint agencies. For instance, though the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) is an integrated theatre command, it lacks teeth due to differing perceptions and priorities of the contributing services. The Commander-in-Chief of the ANC (CINCAN) is constrained in requisitioning critical assets from the services to perform its assigned task. Addressing such deficiencies would be vital in making the CDS effective.

Defence Diplomacy

With the rise of India’s economic and military profile, defence diplomacy has assumed a great deal of importance. Presently, this crucial aspect is being conducted in an ad-hoc manner without an overarching policy direction from or the effective control of the Ministry of Defence. It would be ideal if the CDS is made responsible for all aspects of defence diplomacy, subject to clear policy guidelines from the government. All initial vetting of bilateral/multilateral exercises and visits of higher military authorities - to name just a few aspects of defence diplomacy - need to be centrally processed at the CDS level before it is finally approved at higher levels.

Quality Assurance

The Department of Defence Production (DDP) is often accused of conflict of interest because of its dual responsibility of being the administrative department for both production and quality assurance, the latter function being provided largely through the Directorate General Quality Assurance (DGQA). Though there is no hard evidence to suggest DDP’s interference in QA matters, it would be far more important for the DDP to focus on production, leaving the QA function to be dealt with by a neutral agency. The CDS, given its tri-service nature, would be ideally suited to take up this responsibility. However, any handover of QA functions to the CDS must not come in the way of reforms of DGQA and other such agencies. Self-certification, a global best practice, must be encouraged to the extent possible to encourage arms producers to own responsibility for their products and be accountable for quality.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Modi’s August 15 announcement to appoint a CDS is undoubtedly a bold and decisive step in reforming India’s higher defence management. The next logical step for the government is to quickly define the contours of the CDS’s charter of duties and responsibilities to allow him to function in a well-defined territory. While articulating the roles and functions, the government needs to examine not just the CDS’s role as a single-point military advisor, but also his role in other matters that are equally important in driving critical reforms. By assigning the CDS a key role in planning, procurement, tri-service institutions, defence diplomacy and quality assurance, the government would simultaneously unleash a host of critical reforms that have been unheard of until now.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

The first review of the Agenda 2030 or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 was held on September 24-25, 2019 at the SDG Summit with some follow-up meetings taking place until mid-October 2019. It was preceded by a related review conference on the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the third Financing for Development (FFD) Conference in April 2019. The two are held in parallel as the FFD process is aimed at garnering domestic and external sources of finance for achieving the SDGs. The progress made by India in implementing the SDGs was documented in India’s first voluntary national review that was submitted to the High Level Political Forum on the SDGs in 2017.1 The report also highlighted the measures adopted to spruce up the domestic resources through mainly internal tax reforms. The second report on progress will be presented at the High Level Political Forum in 2020.

As mentioned in the 2017 national review report, India is making the effort to ensure that its impressive growth trickles down to the last man standing through proactive state interventions. At both the review conferences, India’s representatives in the United Nations (UN) highlighted the domestic actions and flagship schemes that have had a notable impact. The National Institution for Transforming India or NITI Aayog, the nodal agency for implementing the SDGs, has launched the India Index2, an online dashboard, which monitors the implementation of the SDGs at the state level. It also provides incentives to the states, bringing in competition to better their performance. As of now, the states of Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and the union territories of Chandigarh and Puducherry are the front-runners with high composite scores, relating to thirteen of the seventeen goals that have been used to prepare the dashboard.3 Their scores are in the range of 65-69 of the total 100 points. On individual goals, the scores go much higher in states other than the front runners. Some states have even achieved the targets on individual goals.

Table 1: States and Goals with a Score of 1004

The FFD and SDGs processes, however, are not only important for the synergies they bring to the actual achievement of goals. Their significance also lies in what they bring to the high table of global governance of development.

Significance

In the yesteryears, issues of the have-nots that were pushed onto to the agenda of the UN by countries of the South was often regarded as instances of “the tyranny of the majority” by the North. Notwithstanding the ideological turn to liberalism by many countries of the South, their issues did not fade away. “Embedded liberalism” therefore needed to find ways of addressing the quandaries of the new entrants to the liberal order. As a result of efforts from within the UN system, as well as flexible responses of the North and the South, a discursive middle ground on issues of development seems to have been arrived at. The FFD and SDG processes represent this middle ground.

The beginning of this process was in the mid-1990s, and the first notable achievement was the Monterrey Consensus of 2002, which, uniquely, was arrived at with the substantial involvement of Bretton Woods Institutions. It was accepted that the needs of the liberal South required special attention from the North, but that the South itself needed to do much more to address its issues and could choose its own ways to do so. That set the ball rolling for a renewed focus on the importance of the official development assistance (ODA), a fairer system of international taxation, etc., which had been a part of the Southern discourse for decades. The adoption of the SDGs even resulted in a complete revamping of the UN system for providing development assistance with the new system being unveiled in January 2019. It is important to highlight some aspects of India’s role in this process.

India’s Role

Ideationally, as gleaned from interactions with the officials of the ministry of external affairs, India made three conscious contributions to the SDG and FFD processes. India argued for the adoption of nationally determined indicators for the SDG goals, thus ensuring that nations remained committed to the goals adopted and the goals themselves were achievable. It also pushed for greater sensibility towards women’s requirements in the adoption of the SDGs. And finally, it pushed for the creation of a Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM) to further the achievement of the SDGs. The significance of these is evident from the fact that all the three eventually found a place in the outcome documents of the processes.

Diplomatically, India participated in these processes as part of the G77, a group of developing countries or the South that was formed in the 1960s and was responsible in part for the “tyranny” referred to earlier. On some issues, these countries had the support of some developed countries as well. Within the group though, India’s commitment to South-South Cooperation too has come of age. India has set up the India-UN Development Partnership Fund by providing US$150 million for it. The Fund works to promote the SDGs in developing countries and functions on the principles of South-South Cooperation. Since its inception in March 2017, 38 projects have been identified with 36 partner countries, and 29 are at various stages of implementation. India’s funding helps track progress through data collection on achieving the targets related to the SDGs. A sum of $176 million has been committed to the Fund for the next decade to focus on developmental projects in the least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS) in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe.

As highlighted in the report of the Fund, the projects cover a range of thematic areas such as climate resilience, environmental sustainability, gender equality, renewable energy, improving women’s and maternal health, water and sanitation, education, employment and livelihoods, disaster recovery and risk management, and agricultural development and infrastructure.5 India also supports the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development through the India-UN Development Partnership Fund.

Institutionally, India has demonstrated a bold commitment to multilateralism by providing funding to the UN Tax Trust Fund since its establishment in 2017; bold as it is the only country to have done so. An amount of $100,000 has been provided for two consecutive years. At a special meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on International Cooperation in Tax Matters in April 2019, the Indian representative explained that in addition to the major tasks at hand like the UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, and the mutual agreement procedure for dispute avoidance and resolution, the Transfer Pricing Manual, the Extractive Industries Handbook, the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties, etc., the Council should especially focus on the issue that is going to impact the developing countries the most i.e. tax consequences of the digitised economy on the achievement of SDGs.

An Enduring Lineage

On all three parameters – ideational, diplomatic and institutional – India’s role is a continuation of a long lineage. In the realm of ideas, India has long been associated with contributions to international norms that have upheld the economic sovereignty of developing countries. Diplomatically, India has worked mostly with the G77 coalition on economic matters which overtime has found a way of arriving at consensus statements that benefit the least well off and do not harm the better off. Institutionally, since the inception of Bretton Woods Institutions and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) outside the purview of the UN, India’s endeavour has always been to strengthen the role of the UN in economic matters through the establishment of forums such as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) for transfer of technology and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for ensuring that the trading system is deferential to the developmental requirements of the Southern nations.

While the UNCTAD endures with partial successes, the SUNFED, similar to initiatives like the New International Economic Order (NIEO), was not successful for lack of support from the developed world despite the adoption of General Assembly resolutions. It therefore remains to be seen if this renewed attempt at seeking financial support for achieving the SDGs, this time being worked through the ECOSOC, will succeed.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “India: Voluntary National Review Report on the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals,” United Nations High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, New York, July 2017 (Accessed October 10, 2019).
• 2. “Sustainable Development Goals India Index 2018,” NITI Aayog and United Nations, 2018 (Accessed November 07, 2019).
• 3. Ibid. Also, see “State-wise Performance across SDGs,” (Accessed November 07, 2019).
• 4. Ibid. Extrapolated by the author.
• 5. The India-UN Development Partnership Fund, UNDP/UNOSSC, May 2019 (Accessed October 10, 2019)

Not long ago, Beijing’s perspective towards Nepal was limited to that of a ‘good neighbour’ only.1 Though the presence of about 20,000 Tibetans in Nepal has been an issue of major concern to Beijing, it has carefully managed its relations with Nepal which it sees as a strategic geographic zone in the Himalayan valley. The Chinese outlook seems to be changing fast as evident from the outcomes of President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal on October 12-13, 2019. With growing emphasis on strengthening bilateral cooperation especially on building sub-regional connectivity,2 Beijing seems to be orchestrating a Himalayan approach in its relations with Kathmandu – revealing a grander Chinese policy in making.

On the side-lines of his Nepal visit, President Xi’s article published in Nepali newspapers sketched a bigger Chinese ambition with a view to forge “strategic and long-term” cooperation between the two sides.3 Stressing on a ‘renewed friendship’, Xi’s article was a curtain raiser to the joint statement which outlined resolute Chinese goals to promote “trans-Himalayan multi-dimensional connectivity network” in the region. Such ambitions are not unusual in Chinese strategic calculus — a similar approach could be noticed in China’s interactions with other immediate neighbours such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar in particular. What is striking about China’s recent outreach to Nepal is its effort to transform the relationship into a comprehensive partnership, aiming to integrate with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Himalayan valley.

In other words, Xi’s recent visit to Nepal could be viewed within the spectrum of China’s ‘neighbourhood’ policy that Beijing has been reinforcing for some time through greater strategic presence and multi-modal connectivity plans, and importantly, offering attractive financial aids. Orchestrating a pragmatic mode of comprehensive partnership, rather than just a simple form of engagement, is becoming the highpoint of China’s Himalayan approach.

Bilaterally, Xi’s visit to Nepal was the first-ever by a Chinese President since 1996. With more than 20 agreements, his visit outlined an ambitious Chinese approach not only to promote the flagship BRI-funded projects but also to link it strategically with its various trans-Himalayan connectivity projects that are being discussed between the two sides. For instance, the intended cooperation on Kathmandu-Pokhara-Lumbini Railway project, restoration of Zhangmu/Khasa port, implementation of various highway projects in the Himalayan valley promoting transit–transport connectivity and plans to promote three north-south corridors in Nepal (Koshi Economic Corridor, Gandaki Economic Corridor and Karnali Economic Corridor) – all outlining China’s ambitions to deepen connectivity with Nepal,4 both within and outside the purview of the BRI.

Nepal, a signatory to the BRI, signed the Transit Transport Agreement (TTA) with China in September 2018, which in a way assured Nepal of access to seven transit points in China – four seaports (Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang) and three land ports (Lanzhou, Lhasa and Xigatse).5 Further, based on the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 21, 2018, both countries agreed to cooperate in the field of energy, hydropower, wind power, solar power, biomass energy and other kinds of new energy. While the ports would be enabling Nepal to end its transit dependence on India slowly, the same also operated as an assurance of continued economic as well as strategic relations between China and Nepal.

Xi’s recent visit to Nepal should also be seen beyond the purview of bilateralism. An upgrade in the China-Nepal relationship comes amidst Beijing’s effort to increase its influence in South Asia. Such Chinese intent was aptly noted during Xi’s first visit to India in September 2014. In his speech, he explicitly factored in all the South Asian countries including Nepal as being central to the BRI (then referred to as ‘One Belt One Road’).6

Further, the locus of geo-politics has been increasingly shifting towards the Indo-Pacific which is also encouraging China to accord more importance to Nepal and other immediate neighbours in the region. With many countries viewing China’s BRI doubtfully due to concerns over its opaque and unjust policies, creating financial debt burdens in the process, it has increasingly become a challenge for Xi to ensure the sustenance and success of the connectivity initiative, a focal point of China’s foreign policy. In this regard, Nepal’s enthusiastic stance towards the BRI comes as an advancement of China’s greater connectivity ambitions with a focus on the Himalayan region. The Chinese attempt is to gradually change Nepal “from a landlocked to a land-linked country”.7 For Nepal, inclusion in BRI means a much-wider strategic platform to connect with China as much as with the entire Himalayan region.

From envisioning cooperation between the two sides in the United Nations to multilateral trading regimes to various infrastructural development and regional connectivity projects, the two countries are increasingly exhibiting signs of an evolving relationship. However, the China-Nepal relations are not unidimensional. Trade and economic contacts are an important aspect. China remains the second largest import partner to Nepal with bilateral trade worth $1.523 billion in 2017-18, a shift from mere $445 million in 2009.8 Further, their commitment to promote exchange and cooperation in the fields of culture, education, tourism, traditional medicine, media, think tanks and youth at different levels re-emphasise a comprehensive outlook to their relations. China has offered 100 Confucius Institute scholarships to the Nepali side and initiated the ‘friendship city’ concept to strengthen the ties between Kathmandu and Nanjing and also Butwal and Xi’an. This approach of connecting city to city is a classic Chinese scheme, a part of its ‘development partnership’ strategy that is even evidenced in the case of India-China, China-Pakistan, China-Sri Lanka, China-Bangladesh and China-Maldives ‘Sister City’ cooperation framework.

Importantly, any advancement in the China-Nepal relations should also be perceived from the perspective of Beijing’s rising footprint in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, under Xi, China’s South Asia policy has been heavily influenced by connectivity and infrastructural initiatives such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), deep seaports at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan and Chittagong Port in Bangladesh. In a way, these only validate China’s traditional “peripheral diplomacy” that Xi revitalised through the October 2013 “Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference” by focusing on land and maritime domains. These projects give China strategic access into the Indian Ocean and expand its presence in the region to protect its sea lanes of communication (SLOC). In this regard, while developing relations with Nepal might not directly provide China access to the Indo-Pacific, a strategic dimension to the China-Nepal relations in tandem with China’s South Asia policy would help Beijing expand its influence in the region.

Beijing also acknowledges Nepal’s fervent yet cautious approach towards China and its connectivity initiatives, in the context of India’s staunch condemnation of the CPEC as well as the BRI. Nepal acknowledges the need to tread carefully between India and China so as to preserve its growth and territorial integrity.9 Aware of Nepal’s dependence and historically close relations with India, China too would be cautious not to hurt its developing partnership with India at the cost of its new strategic partnership with Nepal. This was aptly reflected in Wang Yi’s recent press briefing, post Xi’s visit to Nepal, where he stated that “no matter how the external situation unfolds, China would continue to create opportunities for both countries”, hinting at a long-term cooperation with both Nepal and India.10 China’s continuous pitch for a “China-India Plus” cooperation framework, as Wang Yi’s statement indicates, refers to an open South Asia policy that is much more engaging. Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, former prime minister of Nepal, had espoused his vision of a trilateral cooperation between India, China and Nepal during his visit to New Delhi in April 2013.11 Since then, Nepal and China have been pushing for such a cooperation.

Beijing takes serious note of India’s rising profile as a power, mainly as a strategic pivot in the Indo-Pacific construct. 12 The same is encouraging China to view its relationship with India through a new spectrum, specifically after Xi’s visit to India for the Mamallapuram ‘informal summit’, just ahead of his trip to Nepal. Hence, China would aim to forge a partnership with Nepal without disrupting its growing engagement with India.

In brief, Xi’s visit to Nepal signifies China’s emerging approach towards its immediate neighbours. Solidifying relationship with Nepal strengthens China’s sub-regional outreach in the Himalayan valley. Xi’s Kathmandu visit thus sets a new parameter for the China-Nepal ties to imbibe a regional approach, moving away from the traditional interstate relations based on simple bilateral modes of engagement.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. China’s ‘good neighbourly’ policy witnessed a new beginning with its economy doing well towards the end of Jiang Zemin’s tenure, though historically it was Mao Zedong who emphasised on such a policy repeatedly. See “Full text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 16th Party Congress on Nov 8, 2002,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, November 18, 2002. Subsequently, Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society” proposition also emphasised on ‘good neighbourly’ policy. The same policy/strategy has been revitalised by the current president Xi Jinping. He has referred to China’s “good-neighbourly” policy on several occasions, beginning with the ‘Conference on the Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring Countries’ held on October 24-25, 2013. See “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, October 25, 2013 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 2. The joint statements between China and Nepal have become more comprehensive over the years. See “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and Nepal,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, June 22, 2018; and “Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, October 13, 2019 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 3. Xi Jinping, “Toward Greater Progress of China-Nepal Friendship Across the Himalayas,” published in three Nepali newspapers, The Gorkhapatra Daily, The Rising Nepal and Kantipur Daily. For the English version of the article, see “Full text of Xi’s signed article on Nepali newspapers,” Xinhua, October 11, 2019 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 4. “Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, October 13, 2019 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 5. “Nepali gov't endorses protocol of Nepal-China Transit Transport Agreement: official,” Xinhua, March 15, 2019 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 6. “Special Address by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping,” Indian Council of World Affairs, Taj Palace, New Delhi, September 18, 2014 (Accessed October 30, 2019)
• 7. “The Road Ahead Is Long and Winding Though, A Start Will Bring An Arrival,” State Council and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on President Xi Jinping’s Attendance at the Second Informal Meeting Between Chinese and Indian Leaders in India and His State Visit to Nepal, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, October 17, 2019 (Accessed October 18, 2019).
• 8. “Nepal-China Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, February 2019; “Nepal Trade Summary 2009,” World Integrated Trade Solution, 2009; and “Nepal: Trade Statistics,” globalEDGE (Accessed October 16, 2019).
• 9. Bhairaja Panday, “Nepal now has to Balance not just India and China, but also the West,” Nepali Times, February 01, 2019 (Accessed October 29, 2019)
• 10. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, no. 7.
• 11. “India-Nepal Relations: Vision for the next Decade,” Report on Third Sapru House Lecture by H.E. Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, former Prime Minister of Nepal, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, April 29, 2013 (Accessed October 30, 2019)
• 12. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, no. 7.