On January 8, 2020, Israel announced an unspecified breakthrough of a laser-based missile interception system to complement the Iron Dome system. The system is still being developed and would take some time to be deployed as a weapons system.1 Since its invention in 1960, LASER, or light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation, has had high global appeal as a weapon. Substantial research has been undertaken by the major powers, with the first space-based x-ray laser anti-ballistic missile weapon system conceptualised by the United States (US) during the Cold War. Codenamed Project Excalibur, the project was shelved in 1992 due to funding issues and disintegration of the Soviet Union.2

According to the Israeli ministry of defence, the breakthrough is in power as well as accuracy of the laser beam overcoming atmospheric disturbances. In this regard, Brig. Gen. Yaniv Rotem, Head of the Directorate of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D), stated: “We are entering a new age of energy warfare in the air, land and sea. The R&D investments made by the DDR&D in the last years have placed the State of Israel among the leading countries in the field of high-energy laser systems. Throughout the year 2020 we will conduct a demo of our capabilities."3

It is not known whether the US assisted Israel on the current laser-based interception system. In the past, it has often assisted Israel in developing other state-of-the-art military systems such as the David’s Sling and Arrow missile defence system. The US has in recent times conducted advanced research in laser weapons, with 30-kilowatt laser guns installed on naval ships since 2014. Plans are reportedly underway to install and operationalise a 150-kilowatt laser gun on a small naval ship with the capability to strike down a drone or sink a boat.4 While Russia has also apparently experimented with a laser weapon system called Peresvet, its capabilities are not known.5

News reports indicate that the Israeli system would be effective against both missiles and projectiles. It is only logical to infer that a system that is successful against high-speed missiles would also be effective against aircraft and drones. A high rate of fire laser weapon battery could be an effective measure against drone swarms. Two immense advantages of the system, as claimed in the media, are that it would lead to a drastic reduction in the cost of interception as well as overcome the limitation imposed by the numbers of intercepting missiles since the system does not depend on physical interceptors but directed energy. The weapon is also likely to have scalable power against varying nature of targets.

With the ability to both rapidly engage targets in succession and quickly switch from one target to another by tactically deployed batteries, airspace could be rendered virtually impenetrable in clear weather conditions, except for a few hardened aircraft and missiles. This could immensely boost aerospace defence (AD), theatre defence and area defence of any region or nation. These would be the most cost-effective options as the cost of a single shot has been quoted to be just one dollar against tens of thousands of dollars for an Iron Dome missile.6 Such advantages would make it the most sought after anti-access (A2) weapon.

Such a system would be effectively utilisable during peacetime given its ability to respond quickly in the event of a surprise action by the enemy. The very concept of the system implies that it could be brought to alert status in a much shorter timeframe than a missile or a projectile-based system. Moreover, it could probably be kept plugged into AD networks just below the ‘ready to fire’ state, as the Iron Dome is probably being maintained at, and would come into the ready-to-fire state almost instantaneously on a signal from the radar or operator following the detection of a suspicious object/missile trajectory in airspace.

Israel’s Elbit Systems had earlier produced a laser-based countermeasure against infra-red homing missiles called Directed Infra-Red Counter Measures (DIRCM). Installed in many versions on aircraft, the system employs a laser to damage the infrared sensor head of any incoming missile, thus making them go haywire.7 This is, however, a short-range low energy system as the sensor needs a relatively small amount of energy to cause damage. Back in 2006, China had allegedly illuminated and blinded a US satellite.8 Reports also suggest that China possesses giant laser weapons to cripple and blind the US satellites.9 China is also claimed to have deployed laser weapons systems, but apparently these are lower energy systems effective against low, slow and small targets.10

The main hurdles being faced globally in developing the laser as a weapon for destroying targets physically are high energy concentrations required in the laser beam, and the stabilisation of the laser beam at a point on the high-speed target for a sufficient duration to burn and destroy it. One of the solutions that were being considered by the US Department of Defence for its Airborne Laser Programme was chemical lasers for a concentrated burst of high energy.11 However, the programme was abandoned. The latest Israeli system is claimed to be electricity based — possibly another breakthrough.

The stabilisation of laser on the target is the other major issue. Even small vibrations (jitter) tend to sway the beam considerably, especially so over long distances. Laser beams need to be kept focused on a point to cause damage – especially on a very high-speed object like an incoming missile. The ranges being talked about are in hundreds of kilometres.12 Though the problem of jitter in case of ground-based systems would certainly be lesser than airborne and ship-based systems, it cannot be completely ruled out. Besides, accurately tracking a high-speed missile and keeping the laser focussed on it would require very high computational power of the controlling system. These are probably other areas where a breakthrough may have been achieved by the Israelis, which, according to their defence ministry press release, could be put to test many times this year.

Being only the initial development, many necessary details to gauge the success of the Israeli breakthrough are still awaited. It is not clear at the moment as to the rate of fire that would be achievable. Also, how much would be the time interval between shots (due to charging up requirements after discharge of energy in firing the shot as well as thermal management), which would, in turn, govern as to how many weapons would be required per battery. There are also likely to be other issues in this, such as the life of components, failure rate, reliability, maintenance requirement, etc. All this would ultimately dictate the feasibility of procuring such weapon systems to build a credible capability. Going by the concept and nature of Israel’s declaration, it looks promising though. At the same time, the Israeli statement that the system may take some time to be fielded as a successful weapon indicates that there are many challenges still to be overcome and many milestones to be covered.

Such a system would also require high precision manufacture for precise targeting. For military systems, an added requirement would be battlefield ruggedness. Israel has indicated that it intends to develop the weapon system in three categories: a ground-based static system to complement the Iron Dome; a mobile platform based system for the battlefield; and an airborne version to intercept threats above cloud cover.13 Further details on these have not been revealed. Even as the cost of the system is indicated to be very high — likely more so for the non-static versions due to added ruggedness, jitter suppression, etc., the cost of usage would be extremely low.

Target characteristics are also important as hardened/heat resistant missiles like ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons may be difficult to counter with lasers, though a laser system would be most appropriate against manoeuvring targets like hypersonic weapons. There are countermeasures like giving rotation to the projectile/missile,14 reflective surfaces and ablative coatings which could reduce the effect of lasers. These are invariably likely to be developed as a counter. Whether such countermeasures are catered for in the development of the laser interception system is not yet known.

Laser weapon systems have a major limitation of operation in low visibility conditions like cloud, fog, dust haze and storms, smoke screens and rain since laser beams comprise of light waves. These are restricted to line of sight engagements. Atmospheric disturbances also disturb the beam, which the current breakthrough claims to have overcome. This limitation would constrain these being utilised as an all-in-all AD weapon system and would need to be used complementarily with the other systems. Israel envisions using laser weapons having other layered AD systems viz., Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow missiles, as standby,15 though, in all likelihood, laser weapons would have a major share of targets in clear weather.

Laser Weapons and India

For a country like India, with vast airspace across multiple frontiers to be protected, a laser-based weapons system could be the breakthrough needed to contain the escalating costs of air defence and would provide an affordable solution not only for wartime but also peacetime due to increasing non-traditional threats. The threat from drones, in particular, is going to be a big challenge in future, and a laser-based system could provide an effective solution for multiple scenarios. It could become a very cheap anti-satellite weapon too.

India already has the vision for laser weapons as well as the scientific talent to absorb and build on the technology. Two dedicated Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) laboratories — Centre for High Energy Systems and Sciences (CHESS) and Laser Science & Technology Centre (LASTEC) — have been working on developing laser weapons technology for the last few years and achieved initial successes with a vehicle-mounted 1-kilowatt laser weapon system in July 2018. Their aim is to progressively build more powerful laser weapon systems.16

With India in defence partnerships with Israel and the US, and having similar threat perception for future, Israel may be ready to share technology as well as help develop such weapons. Probably the best impetus for India would come from collaborating with them as a joint venture through public-private consortiums. Private companies have also expressed interest to enter into Directed Energy Weapons business.  It is also pertinent to keep in mind that China may not be too far behind in laser weapons technology as it has already let known its intent by targeting the US satellite. The laser-based aerospace defence assets, as and when they are deployed, could prove to be a potent deterrent.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Judah Ari Gross, “Defense Ministry announces ‘breakthrough’ in anti-missile laser development”, The Times of Israel, January 08, 2020 (Accessed January 29, 2020).
• 2. David Szondy, “Laser weapons: Is this the dawn of the death ray?”, New Atlas, March 21, 2018 (Accessed January 30, 2020).
• 3. “The Israel Ministry of Defense Reveals a Breakthrough in Laser Technology”, Press Release, Israel Ministry of Defence, January 08, 2020 (Accessed February 07, 2020)
• 4. Kyle Mizokami, “The Navy’s Smallest Warship Gets a Big Laser Gun”, Popular Mechanics, January 14, 2020 (Accessed January 30, 2020).
• 5. Ryan Pickrell, “Russian laser weapon designed to obliterate targets ‘within fractions of a second’ just entered combat service”, Business Insider, December 06, 2018 (Accessed January 30, 2020).
• 6. Judah Ari Gross, no 1.
• 7. “Directed IR Countermeasures”, Elbit Systems (Accessed January 29, 2020).
• 8. “NRO Confirms Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S. Spacecraft”, Space News, October 03, 2006 (Accessed January 20, 2020).
• 9. Gerard du Cann, “China has ‘giant laser weapon that can cripple American satellites and blind the US fleet’ in the event of World War 3”, The Sun, January 08, 2019 (Accessed January 30, 2020).
• 10. Cao Siqi, “New laser weapon could contain air reconnaissance, be deployed in Tibet: expert”, Global Times, November 11, 2018 (Accessed January 30, 2020).
• 11. The range for the airborne laser that the US attempted to develop as a weapon was about 600 km. See William G. Schulz, “Building a Chemical Laser Weapon”, Chemical & Engineering News, 82 (51), December 20, 2004, pp. 43-44 (Accessed January 29, 2020).
• 12. Ibid.
• 13. Israel Ministry of Defence, no. 3.
• 14. Preventing continued focussing of energy at a single point
• 15. Judah Ari Gross, no. 1.
• 16. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, “India gets a step closer to laser weaponry as DRDO successfully tests laser system”, The Economic Times, July 14, 2018 (Accessed January 30, 2020)

United States Air Force Chief, Gen. David L. Goldfein, created a sensation at the Dubai Airshow in October 2019 by revealing plans for automation of the kill chain during lethal engagements. Humans in their design would enter the picture only at the last stage of target engagement, while rest of the kill chain – detection of objects, their identification, decision to initiate lethal engagement and assignment of targets to weapons platforms – would be fully automated. This development would be in sync with the need for quicker response time to effectively respond to future threats. To quote Goldfein, “In most kill chains today there is a human in every step of the loop, but the future would require humans on the loop – not in the loop, making final decisions for lethal or non-lethal fires.”1 It is also argued that in future a human would be ‘on the loop’ when even the last stage is automated, although he would only oversee the operation with a veto power.

The rapidly advancing technology has, of late, started bringing about some radical transformation to long standing concepts and beliefs at large. Warfare is no exception in this regard, with some of its seemingly enduring concepts transforming under the impact of technology. Keeping humans in the chain of killing and destruction is one such issue. The terminology for the same - being used more after the proliferation of computers and networking in warfare - is ‘keeping human in the loop’.

Leaving the decision to kill or destroy totally to machines is invariably seen as cold-blooded and a gross violation of human ethics. Even the military league is generally strongly opposed to the idea. In certain cases, such automation is there even now with human on the loop. In air defence and missile defence, for example, the time available to take a decision is extremely limited, especially with modern high speed aircraft and missiles, and it is “either they or us situation” most of the time. Here, often computers are trusted to open lethal fire. A human operator in such cases is sitting ready on the ‘abort’ button to exercise his veto power. A majority of veterans and doyens in the military still contend that a human will always remain involved in making a decision to kill and this will never change.

The game changer in recent years has been the artificial intelligence (AI), which is no more a thing unfamiliar and is evolving to become more capable, credible and trustworthy with time. Better electronics, higher computational power, better sensors, etc. are speeding up military activities and shortening the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) cycle, leaving ever reducing times for decision making and action. Better propellants that give weapons higher speed and long-range kinetic killers are shortening the time available for defence. With miniaturised electronics and advanced software, multitudes of deceptive weapon designs are also evolving often in the garb of something else. The number of entities that could pose a threat is increasing by the day and will multiply in future. Human capacity to tackle all such threats effectively in a complex threat environment is only going to fall well short of what would be needed.

Autonomy brought about by AI has, therefore, become an inescapable feature as it allows functionality where humans could flounder – timely analysis of a threat and action to counter it effectively in a complex environment. Humans would eventually be removed from even the final stages of the threat neutralising cycle. AI would perform all the activities in the OODA cycle and also choose the right weapons to tackle the threat, where needed.

On the other hand, AI is also making offensive weapons formidable – deadlier, speedier, smarter and more difficult to counter. Humans in this case, would invariably fall short. In warfare, the scenario emerging is AI versus AI. Soon the role left for the human would be to use his good judgement only to veto or abort where needed.

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are already emerging as products of AI and other associated modern technologies mentioned earlier. LAWS have been described as the third revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear weapons.2 The debates on LAWS are, however, mainly focussed on the ethics of warfare, including responsibility and accountability if things go wrong. Will the responsibility and accountability be that of the system designer or the software designer, or the programmer, or the operator or the commander or no human at all?3 In spite of all such apprehensions and criticisms, the United States Armed Forces have moved a step closer to full automation of the kill chain as stated by its chief. Roboticist Ronald C. Arkin believes that with AI improvement, AI decision making is likely to be superior and more ‘humane’ to that of humans during war.4

It is also pertinent to note that AI-infused weapons are not only going to remain the forte of militaries but also of non-state actors. There is no dearth of malevolently inclined talented individuals who are ready to work for unscrupulous organisations or terrorist outfits.

Considering the loss of tactical advantage that would come about by not adopting automation and autonomous weapon systems in future, militaries would invariably be obligated to adopt the concept of full automation while keeping humans on the loop.

As far as national level stances and policies are concerned, till about halfway through the previous decade, ‘human in the loop’ was a strongly contested view by militaries as well as policymakers. Both the US and China had earlier issued statements implying continuation of such a policy in the future development of warfare means. However, since 2016, both countries have started indicating a change of policy. Robert Work, the 32nd US Deputy Secretary of Defence, had stated that while the US will “always prioritize human control,” it will also allow war machines to “independently compose and select among different courses of action to accomplish assigned goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the world, itself, and the situation.”5 In 1995, China too called for a legally binding protocol on non-usage of LAWS, but changed its outlook in 2016 and called for responsible use of LAWS in accordance with the United Nations charter and laws of armed conflict.6

In the modern accelerated pace of technology development, things are evolving rapidly and unforeseeably. With the quickening of the decision cycle and the increasing number of threats, the issue of losing tactical advantage or not being able to counter threats effectively due to human in the loop is going to be crucial and needs some serious thinking by policymakers, strategists and militaries. Such a changeover to the automation of kill cycle with human on the loop seems inevitable in the not too distant future.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Video: Here's how the US Air Force is automating the future kill chain. Dubai Airshow 2019”, Defense News, November 16, 2019 (Accessed November 28, 2019).
• 2. Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, “Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapon Systems”, Military Review, May-June 2017, pp. 72-81 (Accessed April 5, 2018).
• 3. Ajey Lele, “Debating Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, Journal of Defence Studies, 13 (1), January-March 2019, pp. 33-49 (Accessed January 10, 2020)
• 4. Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, no. 2.
• 5. Zachary Cohen, “US risks losing artificial intelligence arms race to China and Russia”, CNN, November 29, 2017 (Accessed March 9, 2018).
• 6. Bedavyasa Mohanty, “Lethal Autonomous Dragon: China’s approach to artificial intelligence weapons”, Observer Research Foundation, November 15, 2017 (Accessed April 20, 2018).

In its ‘Naya Pakistan’ poll manifesto, the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) had stated that they are “committed to maintaining a vigorous free media, which will evolve its own rules to ensure responsible journalism both in the electronic and print media.”1 However, about a year later, on October 27, 2019, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) issued a directive calling upon news channels [vide 6(d) of the order] to ensure that anchors “[exclude] themselves from their personal opinions, biases and judgments on any issue.” The directive further stated that “anchors hosting exclusive regular shows should not appear in talk shows whether own and other channels as subject matter experts.” They were also told to select their guests with “due care.”2

The directive drew widespread criticism from media personnel and opposition parties. Some members of the PTI-led government also spoke against it. Former finance minister and senior PTI leader Asad Umar called it “suppressing the rights of individuals.”3 In the wake of such criticism, PEMRA issued a rejoinder a day later stating that its orders were “misinterpret[ed]” and that “there is no advisory to ban participation of journalists in talk shows.”4

The directive was clearly aimed at restraining the anchors and commentators in news channels from expressing their views or speculating on sub-judice matters in a manner that “[derogated] and maligned judiciary and institutions.” However, point 6(d) of the directive, which sought to stop anchors from participating in talk shows and airing their views, was certainly an act of over-reach. However, PEMRA’s rejoinder somewhat restored the balance in favour of media anchors and journalists.

Nevertheless, the intentions of the government appeared quite clear as Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Information and Broadcasting, Firdous Ashiq Awan, put up a strong defence of the directive stating that it was a reiteration of PEMRA’s “existing code of conduct.”5 She even complained to the Prime Minister about ministers/leaders opposed to the order,6 implying that the government remained adamant in its resolve. On October 30, PEMRA issued another advisory to the private channels, quoting orders of the Accountability Court, asking them “to stop maligning the courts for their political motives.”7 Given the political nature of accountability trials being conducted in Pakistan targeting opposition leaders, PEMRA’s directives confirm the ruling dispensation’s extreme sensitivity to media criticism. It also highlighted its intentions to rein in the media by all means. Constitutionally, PEMRA is a federal institution formed in 2002 through an ordinance with the mandate “to regulate electronic media in Pakistan”8 and to improve the standard of information and provide good analysis. However, it has frequently been used by the government to gag the media.9

In July 2019, Prime Minister Khan had said during an interaction at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington DC that “the Pakistan media, in my opinion, is even freer than the British media” and “the media in Pakistan is not just free but sometimes out of control.” He acknowledged that media personnel were beaten up during the tenures of Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif but asserted that similar incidents will not be tolerated under his premiership. Taking an indirect dig at the Pakistani journalists, he even said, though in a lighter vein, “what we need is to control the media, not through the government but through media watchdog.”10 Since then, however, different measures have been put forth including setting up of “media courts” and channels being issued notices to not air interviews, culminating in the recent directives from PEMRA.

In Pakistan, where democracy is still struggling to take roots, media has been under perennial threat from unelected but powerful institutions. As the seasoned journalist Cyril Almeida said while speaking in a talk on “Reign of Censorship” in London in November 2019: “Censorship is not going to get better in Pakistan. The two questions now are: how much worse will it get and how quickly that will happen.”11

Arguably, fair reporting has cost many journalists their lives in Pakistan.12 Attacks on journalists, who allegedly speak either against the high-handedness of state institutions or in favour of minorities, are on the rise since 2008.13 A report on the press freedom by Reporters Without Borders in 2019 said that in Pakistan, journalists operate in a “difficult situation.”14

Silencing Journalism

Several journalists have borne the brunt of politicians, military, secret agencies and extremists in Pakistan. Sometimes they are hit and killed, sometimes warned and at times they are picked up by the agencies and roughed up.15 Journalists like Taha Siddiqui, Raza Rumi, among others, have even been forced to leave the country. Others like Hamid Mir and Cyril Almeida, despite being subjected to attacks or coercion, have stayed back.

Since 2002, according to the Pakistan Press Foundation, “8 journalists have been killed in targeted attacks and 24 for their work till 2019….171 suffered serious assaults and 77 minor attacks….18 got arrested, 26 detained and 36 booked in different cases.”16 Most of these cases were not seriously investigated and the perpetrators went scot-free.17 The authorities have not demonstrated any credible commitment to pursue cases that involve attacks on or killing of journalists critical of religious groups, military, politicians or state institutions.18

Taha Siddiqui, an award-winning journalist, was attacked in Islamabad on January 10, 2018. He was beaten and “threatened with death”.19 A year later, Taha wrote that he survived “an abduction and possible assassination” attempt and that “the attack was orchestrated by the Pakistani army, which has been threatening me for years over my journalistic work on military abuses in Pakistan.”20 Earlier in 2017, Taha was summoned by the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA), a counter-intelligence and security agency under the ISI, for his online activities.

According to Raza Rumi, attacked in 2014 for speaking against some religious extremist groups, “it is not difficult to find out who these unknown attackers are. Technological tools are available but what is missing is the political will of the political elites who are afraid or, worse, indifferent.”21 Long pending demands of the journalists that they should be protected and enquiries on attacks fast-tracked have all fallen on deaf ears.

In Pakistan, there is a tendency of powerful actors operating indiscriminately and attempting to dominate the system and socio-political narratives. The religious parties do not approve of media reporting and analysis that they consider sacrilegious.22 Similarly, the security agencies are sensitive to how they are reported and portrayed in popular imagination by the media.23 Lately, the current government of Imran Khan is also becoming overly sensitive to media criticism. Due to these factors, the space for free journalism and fearless reportage is shrinking by the day. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) in its 2018 report said that the climate for freedom of press in Pakistan was deteriorating and that “the military has quietly, but effectively, set restrictions on reporting.”24 Journalists like Umer Cheema, Hamid Mir, Taha Siddiqui, have been targeted for keeping up their professional ethics and talk shows, interviews, or editorials were being stopped from reaching out to the wider public.25 The Director General of Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR) went on record in 2018 to warn some journalists about their online anti-Army activities. He threatened them by stating that the secret agency was keeping an eye on them for spreading propaganda against the Army.26

In view of growing criticism from sections of the media for his economic policies and political situation prevalent in the country, especially amid allegations that the government was using National Accountability Bureau (NAB) as a political tool against the opposition leaders,27 Imran Khan’s government is keeping a close tab on the media. PEMRA’s October 2019 directive is the latest attempt at gagging the freedom of press in the country.

Some commentators have pointed out that Imran Khan enjoys the backing of the powerful military establishment. In the aftermath of the 2013 general elections, when the PTI did not do well, Imran Khan started a protest movement to bring down the Nawaz Sharif Government. The protests were given wide coverage, unlike the recent protests of Maulana Fazl-ur Rehman which were banned from being broadcast.28 According to a Pakistani scholar, Neha Ansari, in 2014, the Pakistani media houses had “received instructions from the military to support the ‘dissenting’ leaders and their sit-ins. The military, therefore, was using the media to lend its support and might to the anti-government movement in an attempt to cut Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif down to size.”29 However, when Imran Khan’s government faced similar protests couple of months back, the army did not support the protest movement against him. It even came out in support of the government stating that the army is “supporting the elected government within the limits described in the Constitution.”30 Unlike in the 2014 protests, the army said that it would not back Azadi March of Fazl-ur Rehman and create instability in the country.

Imran's Volte-Face

In contrast to the promise made in 2018 poll manifesto that “PEMRA will be made autonomous so it does not become a political tool in the hands of any government to target the freedom of the electronic media,”31 the PTI-led government is using the same regulatory body to stifle the media. Moreover, the government’s decision to set up media courts is another sinister move against the freedom of media. In September 2019, the federal cabinet chaired by Imran Khan approved a plan to set up media tribunals under the pretext of seeking speedy disposal of media-related cases within a time limit of 90 days. So far, cases pertaining to media were being dealt by PEMRA and the Press Council of Pakistan. However, under the new plan, all new as well as pending cases will be sent to these tribunals. An editorial in Dawn argued that there is no sign that these tribunals are meant for any benign purpose. It stated that “we can be sure, the proposed tribunals will be yet another device to harass and persecute outspoken journalists.”32

The government’s close tab on media houses that tend to critique its policies has led to stoppage of government advertisements, shutting down of cable channels, and intimidation of media house owners. These punitive measures have adversely affected their business.33 The latest tactic being followed by the Imran Khan Government is to use its army of sympathisers in the social media to troll journalists who are critical of the government. Iram Abbasi wrote that “what’s happening under Prime Minister Imran Khan might not be as brutal as the suppression of previous governments, but it's far more insidious and pervasive.”34

Ahmed Waleed, the Lahore bureau chief of a privately-owned channel, Samaa TV, also said that “There was pressure before, but it has multiplied several times now.”35 On October 18, Steven Butler, head of CPJ, was stopped from speaking in a seminar on late human rights activist Asma Jahangir and was deported from Lahore airport. Butler later said that “it would be speculative for me to say why I was stopped. In any case, local journalists bear the brunt of the crackdown. It's certainly getting worse for them.”36 More recently, the sudden resignation of senior and award-winning journalist Cyril Almeida from Dawn newspaper has raised several eyebrows. Almeida was involved in leaking the minutes of a meeting held between the army and government officials in 2016. He was put on Exit Control List (ECL) immediately afterwards. His May 2018 interview of Nawaz Sharif, where the former prime minister expressed his dismay at being unable to bring the perpetrators of Mumbai attacks to justice, had irritated the deep state.37 This was followed by a case of treason being filed against him.38

The current elected government in Pakistan appears less tolerant of media criticism than its predecessors. The government and the military appear quite determined to either silence or censor media by all means. This may prove counter-productive since such restrictions can fuel further criticism, especially at a time when the government seems unable to fulfil its promises and meet the expectations of the people. Given the government’s strong links with the deep state and Imran’s aversion to criticism – a trait he shares with his benefactors – it is likely that efforts to further throttle and tame the media will continue. This raises serious questions about Imran Khan’s promises on strengthening country’s democratic institutions that he keeps invoking to muster popular support. In such circumstances, media in Pakistan will be walking a tightrope and looking over their backs, unsure of what the future holds for them.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “The Road to Naya Pakistan”, PTI Manifesto 2018, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2018, p. 16.
• 2. Report PEMRA, Twitter Post, October 27, 2019, 5:33 AM.
• 3. “PTI leaders slam Pemra order, come to defence of media anchors”, Geo TV, October 28, 2019.
• 4. Report PEMRA, Twitter Post, October 29, 2019, 1:08 AM.
• 5. Firdous Ashiq Awan, Twitter Post, October 28, 2019, 2:19 AM.
• 6. Syed Irfan Raza, “PM chides ministers over Pemra row after Firdous grouse”, Dawn, October 30, 2019.
• 7. Report PEMRA, Twitter Post, October 30, 2019, 4:22 AM.
• 8. “The PEMRA Ordinance 2002 as amended by the PEMRA (Amendment) Act, 2007”, World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2007.
• 9. “Freedom of the Press 2009”, Freedom House, 2009, p. 167.
• 10. “One Year In: A Conversation with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan”, YouTube, Uploaded by United States Institute of Peace (USIP), July 23, 2019 (see 45 minutes onward).
• 11. Atika Rehman, “Media freedom in Pakistan is seeing dark times, says panel”, Dawn, November 10, 2019.
• 12. “33 journalists killed in Pakistan in past six years: report”, Dawn, November 1, 2019.
• 13. “UNESCO observatory of killed journalists – Pakistan”, UNESCO.
• 14. “2019 World Press Freedom Index – A cycle of fear”, Reporters Without Borders.
• 15. Iram Abbasi, “Redlining the News in Pakistan”, Voice of America, September 22, 2019.
• 16. “When journalists become bad news”, Editorial, Daily Times, November 6, 2019.
• 17. Waleed Tariq, “Pakistan among world’s worst for unsolved journalists’ murders”, The Express Tribune, October 29, 2019.
• 18. Kamal Siddiqi, “Crimes against journalism”, The Express Tribune, November 4, 2019.
• 19. Shakeel Qarar, “Journalist Taha Siddiqui beaten by '10-12 armed men', escapes 'attempted abduction'”, Dawn, January 10, 2018.
• 20. Taha Siddiqui, “I’m a journalist who fled Pakistan, but I no longer feel safe in exile”, The Washington Post, January 9, 2019.
• 21. Raza Rumi, “End this culture of impunity”, Daily Times, January 14, 2018.
• 22. Raza Rumi, “On the run”, Aeon, November 25, 2015.
• 23. Iram Abbasi, no. 15.
• 24. “Acts of Intimidation: In Pakistan, journalists' fear and censorship grow even as fatal violence declines”, Committee to Protect Journalists, September 12, 2018.
• 25. Iram Abbasi, no. 15.
• 26. “DG ISPR Press Conference”, pscp.tv, June 4, 2018.
• 27. “PML-N sees PTI’s hand in NAB tapes scandal”, The Express Tribune, May 25, 2019.
• 28. Roohan Ahmed, “TV channels barred from airing Fazl’s live media talk: journalists”, Samaa, October 16, 2019.
• 29. Neha Ansari, “An Insider Account of Pakistani Censorship”, Pakistan Press Foundation, November 22, 2014.
• 30. “‘Azadi March’: Army spox responds to Maulana Fazl’s tirade against State of Pakistan”, Daily Pakistan, November 1, 2019.
• 31. PTI Manifesto 2018, no. 1, p. 17.
• 32. “Media Courts”, Editorial, Dawn, September 20, 2019.
• 33. Iram Abbasi, no. 15.
• 34. Ibid.
• 35. Ibid.
• 36. Asad Hashim, “CPJ official Steven Butler denied entry into Pakistan”, Al Jazeera, October 18, 2019.
• 37. Cyril Almeida, “For Nawaz, it’s not over till it’s over”, Dawn, May 12, 2018.
• 38. “Cyril Almeida resigns from Dawn”, The Week, October 21, 2019.

Major General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), was killed in an American drone strike at Baghdad Airport on January 03, 2020. General Soleimani was a senior and popular military figure in Iran. He was the architect of Iran’s military expansion in West Asia (or the Middle East) through the creation and sustenance of armed militias that acted as Iranian proxies. Through Hezbollah, for example, Tehran has been able to exert significant influence in the Lebanese politics. Likewise, the Quds Force was behind the creation of Hashd al-Shabbi or Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF) in Iraq, which was not only instrumental in defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but also played a key role in establishing Tehran as an invincible political and military force in Baghdad. In Syria too, the Quds Force was actively involved in arming and training Shiite militias, who fought along with Hezbollah to defeat ISIS and the Syrian opposition.

The IRGC is also credited with aiding and supporting Houthi rebels in Yemen and Hamas as well as Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories posing grave security threats to Saudi Arabia and Israel, two key regional allies of the United States (US). Through these proxies, Iran was able to challenge the US military dominance in various theatres in West Asia.

While the US and Iran have been at loggerheads for over four decades, tensions have sharply risen under the Donald Trump Administration. Trump was a vocal critic of Iranian policies and its nuclear programme even before his election in November 2016. In May 2018, he withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between Iran and P5+1 (representing five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran. Since then, the situation in the Persian Gulf has been on the boil with several tit-for-tat actions raising the chances of a direct military confrontation.

In June 2019, the US and Iran were on the verge of war after Iran shot down an unarmed US surveillance drone over the Strait of Hormuz. At the time, President Trump had remarked that the US decided to desist from military action only at the last minute considering the disproportionate casualty Iran would have suffered. In a series of tweets on June 21, Trump said “We were cocked & loaded to retaliate last night” and decided to stop only “10 minutes before the strike” after getting to know that nearly 150 Iranians will die in the process which would not be “proportionate to shooting down an unmanned drone.”1

The situation again come to a head in September 2019 after the drone attacks on Aramco oil processing facilities in Khurais and Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia. Though Yemen’s Houthi rebels had claimed responsibility for the attacks, both the US and Saudi Arabia blamed Iran for targeting the Saudi oil installations. Again, President Trump had tweeted that the US is “locked and loaded” and that it will “work something out” with Saudi Arabia to device an appropriate response.2 Trump had then authorised the use of the US emergency oil reserves to ensure stable global supplies and issued new economic sanctions against Iranian financial agencies.

The current escalation is largely a result of the simmering situation in Iraq since October 2019. Iraq has witnessed a series of protests against corruption, ineffective governance and economic hardships as well as Iranian and American meddling in government and politics. The protestors had on more than one occasion targeted the Iranian consulates in different Iraqi cities including Najaf and Basra.3 Reports suggest that over 500 Iraqis have lost their lives due to action taken by police and PMF against the protestors in 2019.4 To counter popular discontent against Iran, Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militia, had organised a protest in Baghdad which culminated in the attack and arson at the US Embassy on December 31.

The US blamed General Soleimani of authorising the attack on its embassy. It also revealed that the decision to eliminate Soleimani was taken in order to neutralise an imminent attack on the US interests that he was planning.5 The statement issued by the US Department of Defence noted that Soleimani was “actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region” and that “this strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.”6 For his part, Trump stated that “General Qassem Soleimani has killed or badly wounded thousands of Americans over an extended period of time, and was plotting to kill many more” and that he “should have been taken out [killed] many years ago!”7 US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo too said that “There was an attack that was imminent that could have killed dozens or hundreds of Americans. We found an opportunity and we delivered ... we took him off the battlefield.”8

Soleimani’s killing has evoked angry reactions from Tehran and Baghdad. Many senior Iranian and Iraqi leaders have condemned the American strike and have called for avenging Soleimani’s death. While announcing a three-day mourning, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that the General was martyred in the service of Iran and Muslims and that “harsh revenge awaits those criminals who have tainted their filthy hands with his blood.”9 Khamenei also called an extraordinary meeting of the Supreme National Security Council to review the situation after the US strike. The outpouring of public angst against the US action on the streets of Tehran, Mashhad and Ahvaz during Soleimani’s funeral procession indicated the popular sentiment prevailing in Iran. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted that “The US bears responsibility for all consequences of its rogue adventurism.”10

On January 08, Iran attacked important US military bases in Iraq. Khamenei termed the attack as a “slap in the face” of the US. Zarif, however, was more circumspect when he tweeted that Iran took the action in “self-defense under Article 51 of UN Charter” and that “we do not seek escalation or war.”11 After initial speculations about casualties, it became clear that the missile attack did not lead to any American or Iraqi loss of life. President Trump stated that “Iran appears to be standing down, which is a good thing for all parties concerned and a very good thing for the world.”12 Their statements seem to underline that both parties wish to avoid a full-blown war at the moment.

However, this does not indicate cessation of hostilities. Both the US and Iran have the ability to indulge in covert activities to harm each other’s interest. Tehran can use its proxies in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to mount attacks against the US military personnel and installations in the region. Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and other Shiite militias can start insurgency within Iraq to harass the US forces there, especially since their deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis too perished in the attack that killed Soleimani. The KH has launched rockets targeting the US Embassy in Baghdad and the al-Balad airbase nearby, housing the US Air Force personnel, though this also did not lead to any casualty.

In the long term, Iran might push for the complete ouster of the American military from both Iraq and Syria. On January 05, the Iraqi Parliament passed a resolution calling “to end the presence of any foreign troops on Iraqi soil and prohibit them from using its land, airspace or water for any reason.”13 Iran, however, will be cautious in choosing an all-out war given its vulnerabilities against the US military might.

Soleimani’s killing is the culmination of a series of events that began with the US withdrawal from JCPOA and re-imposition of unilateral sanctions on Iran. The US and Iran have been engaged in an intense geopolitical rivalry, but so far both had largely acted through proxies and regional allies. Iran is the only regional power that resists American military dominance in West Asia (or the Middle East). The incidents of the past year and a half underline that the US and Iran are heading towards greater confrontation, and General Soleimani’s killing is the clearest indication so far.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Donald Trump, President of the United States of America, Twitter Post, June 21, 2019, 6:03 AM.
• 2. Roberta Rampton and Arshad Mohammed, “U.S. Blames Iran for Saudi Oil Attack, Trump Says ‘Locked and Loaded’,” Reuters, September 16, 2019.
• 3. “Iraq Condemns Attack on Iranian Consulate in Najaf,” Al Jazeera, November 28, 2019.
• 4. See Iraq Body Count, Conflict Casualties Monitor, Updated December 31, 2019.
• 5. Notably, on April 08, 2019, the US Department of State had designated IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) for its engagement in terrorist activities and active involvement with entities that indulge in terrorist acts against the US. For details, see Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Named a Terrorist Organisation,” CRS Insight, No. IN11093, April 09, 2019.
• 6. “Statement by the Department of Defense,” US Department of Defense, January 02, 2020.
• 7. Donald Trump, President of the United States of America, Twitter Post, January 03, 2020, 5:54 AM.
• 8. Charles Creitz, “Pompeo: Iranian general Soleimani was ‘aiming to take down significant amounts of Americans’,” Fox News, January 03, 2020.
• 9. “Iran Leader vows 'harsh revenge' following assassination of Gen. Soleimani”, Press TV, January 03, 2020.
• 10. Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister of Iran, Twitter Post, January 02, 2020, 7:58 PM
• 11. Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister of Iran, Twitter Post, January 07, 2020, 6:32 PM.
• 12. Peter Baker, “Trump Backs Away from Further Military Conflict with Iran,” The New York Times, January 08, 2020.
• 13. “Iraqi Parliament Passes Resolution to End Foreign Troop Presence,” Reuters, January 05, 2020.