With the attempt at peace negotiations between the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the Government of India stumbling, the insurgent group has once again chosen the path of violence. It has selectively targeted civilians belonging to a particular community to arm-twist the ruling authorities into conceding some of its immediate demands including talks on 'sovereignty of Assam'. Such violence once again exposes the ULFA's utter disregard for the most fundamental human right -- the right to life.

The ULFA was formed on April 7, 1979 with the basic demand to establish a 'Swadhin Asom' - an independent and sovereign Assam, but it had also included anti-immigrant rhetoric in its propaganda. However, over the years its attention has focused much more on the objective of independence rather than on the immigrant issue.

In Assam, the ULFA continues its subversive agenda targeting security forces personnel, bombing markets, oil and gas pipelines and other state installations. The fragile peace process, initiated in September 2005, to facilitate direct talks between ULFA and the Government of India broke down in September 2006, following the group's continued violation of the truce. For instance, between January and October 2006, at least 92 civilians were killed in about 100 explosions across Assam. And when the peace process broke down, ULFA's violence has escalated further. As the patterns of violence indicate, the ULFA has switched over from 'difficult and risky' military combat to attacks on soft targets. This change of strategy appeared mainly due to pressures exerted by the security forces coupled with the group's diminishing cadre strength. Again, during the last six-week truce (August 13, 2006 to September 24, 2006), the ULFA was believed to have recruited new cadres and used the interregnum to consolidate itself.

Between January 5 and 8, at least 65 non-Assamese migrant labourers belonging to a particular community were murdered and several others wounded in about a dozen separate incidents of indiscriminate firing by ULFA militants in five districts of Assam - Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Dhemaji, Golaghat and Sibsagar. The scale of violence was highest in Tinsukia district where 34 people were killed. These incidents have once again revived memories of similar carnage engineered by the outfit in 2000 and 2003.

These incidents were the first major attacks after the breakdown of the peace process in September last year. Earlier on November 5, 2006, at least 14 civilians - mostly Hindi speaking people - were also killed in two separate bomb blasts at Fancy Bazaar and Noonmati area in Guwahati.

The latest killings came a day after India's top home ministry official V.K. Duggal reviewed security arrangements for the 33rd National Games - India's biggest sports event - scheduled to be held in Assam in February 2007. Duggal undertook the review following an ULFA call to boycott the event 'so long as the Assam-India conflict is not resolved'. Significantly, these attacks also coincided with the result of an opinion poll conducted by a local non-governmental organization, Assam Public Works, in nine districts of the state where an overwhelming majority (95 per cent) of those surveyed rejected the ULFA's campaign for an independent Assam.

As the timing of these incidents indicates, the ULFA's move could be a well calculated strategy to convey the message that it is still in a position to strike 'virtually at will' and to persuade the Government to concede to some of its immediate demands, including the release of five of its detained leaders (Pradip Gogoi, Bhimkanta Buragohain, Mithinga Daimary, Pranati Deka and Ramu Mech), halt to the counter-insurgency offensive, and perhaps, force the Government to resume peace talks though on terms more favourable to itself. At the same time, the ULFA was trying to make sure that its call for a boycott of the upcoming National Games was taken seriously.

Overall, by selectively targeting Hindi-speaking people, ULFA again hopes to exert maximum pressure on the central leadership to take it more seriously. To most of the separatist groups of the region including the ULFA, Hindi speaking people are often categorized as aliens. The ULFA's in-house publication Freedom had recently reiterated that infiltration from mainland India was more dangerous for Assam than the so-called infiltration from neighbouring Bangladesh and called for the ouster of these people. Thus, as in the recent past, violence against civilians has primarily been concentrated on Hindi-speaking people.

But, at the same time, there is growing concern that such killings could also be part of a conspiracy hatched by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to derail the peace initiative, to disturb communal harmony, and subsequently to enable Bangladeshi migrants to fill the vacuum created by the departure of Hindi speaking people. The Indian security establishment has gathered evidence that indicate an ISI hand in sponsoring terrorism in this part of India. The ULFA-ISI nexus goes back to the early 1990s. Over the past few years, the Assam Police had managed to arrest several ISI agents from different parts of the State. One such arrest took place on May 15, 2005, when a team of Assam and Meghalaya Police arrested an alleged ISI agent, Mohammed Hasifuddin, from a spot along the Assam-Meghalaya border. He was alleged to have supplied explosives to ULFA for the 2004 Independence Day (August 15) bomb blast at Dhemaji town, which altogether killed 17 persons.

ULFA's dastardly killings warrant stringent action to curb its terrorism and establish the rule of law. However, military means alone would not be sufficient to tackle the 28 year-old-insurgency, especially given the outfit's easy access to neighbouring countries, principally Bangladesh and Myanmar. But at the same time, it is also true that military means are necessary for a successful counter-insurgency effort. This has to be coupled with efforts to persuade the group to come forward for a political dialogue. Obviously, such a political dialogue cannot take place unless the ULFA eschews the path of violence.

Among the foremost security concerns of the US after 9/11 is the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by terrorists on its territory and their proliferation through inimical states. The global stretch of the predominantly maritime threat and the 'overstretch' of the US Navy have led to the initiation of a series of American initiatives like Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), all aimed at mobilizing global support to secure the US 'homeland'.

A "Thousand-ship Navy" (TSN) is another novel concept; recently defined by the US Navy's Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Mike Mullen as "a global maritime partnership that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address mutual concerns." He added that it "isn't just about the US Navy having relationships with 10 countries and adding up all those ships. It's the fact that these nations have relationships contributing to a greater global maritime security." The TSN is thus showcased as a benign initiative, aimed at obtaining the co-operation of "friendly navies" (including the Indian Navy), primarily through information exchange, to enhance what the US Navy calls its "maritime domain awareness".

What imperatives led to the TSN after a series of similar initiatives? What is its import and implication for India in case the Indian Navy joins it? Answers to these questions are probably linked to the initiatives that precede TSN. The PSI has not succeeded in garnering sufficient support, particularly from the key states located astride the likely proliferation sea-routes. The reasons are that maritime interdictions under PSI are neither within the ambit of the UN Charter nor within that of the UNCLOS; and more importantly, its agenda of targeting "states of proliferation concern" is perceived to bear an escalatory potential (currently in the context of North Korea and Iran). Through the RMSI launched in mid-2004, the US intended to deploy its Marines and Special Forces on fast boats in the Malacca Straits. While the stated aim of this initiative was to counter piracy and terrorism, its hidden agenda was again to further PSI in the vital waterway used by more than 60,000 ships every year carrying a quarter of global trade. Given that a major portion of the Malacca Straits falls within the territorial-sea limits of the Straits-littorals, Indonesia and Malaysia rejected it outright stating that it would violate their national sovereignty.

The TSN is thus evidently an effort to remove the contentious facets of PSI, and yet continue with the goal of counter-proliferation. The concept therefore negates the possibility of the US deploying its forces in the territorial waters of other states. It does not speak about interdictions of suspect vessels in the high seas. Furthermore, it does not target state actors. The 'carrot' to these "friendly navies" is the benefit they would derive through access to information on maritime threats that directly impinge on their security. Only time will tell as to what extent it would translate into 'practical terms', because the US may be unwilling to part with much of the intelligence data that is sensitive.

Notwithstanding that the TSN amounts to 'PSI by other means', India's support to the concept could be favourably considered. Although the TSN is another exercise by the US that projects itself as a 'globo-cop', it would contribute to arresting the increasing disorder in the maritime realm. New Delhi's principal objection to the PSI has been its conflict with the international legal regime, which is not the case with TSN. By backing TSN, India would be enmeshed within the US intelligence grid, for whatever it may be worth. Finally, but not the least important, is the dividend that would accrue to India in terms of politico-diplomatic goodwill and symbolism in being a partner in managing the gravest global threat of proliferation and possible terrorist use of WMDs.

That the Taliban power stands resurrected is a fact now. At the same time, the 'war on terror' is also showing signs of fatigue. It has already come to a halt in the north-western tribal expanse of Pakistan, the cradle of the Taliban's resurrection. Dubbed as 'remnants' until recently, the Taliban today are a power to reckon with, effectively redrawing the power equations within Afghanistan. NATO-led forces, which were meant to have acted as an effective deterrent against the Taliban are proving to be a mere buffer force between the Taliban in the south and the mujahideen factions in the north. The five-year old political process and the paradoxical 'war on terror' have failed to transform the political dynamics in Afghanistan. With the levels of violence and poppy boom breaking all previous records, and effective institutions of governance still a far cry, Afghanistan seems to be galloping backward. A sense of perplexity and growing uncertainty has certainly come to grip the campaigners of the 'war on terror'.

While Pakistan prescribes the replication of the deals similar to the ones it has struck with militants in Waziristan in southern Afghanistan, the West appears to be reconciling to Taliban control in these areas. Pakistan and the resurrected Taliban have certainly emerged as the biggest gainers from the 'war on terror'. They are the 'new winners' of the 'war on terror', whereas the 'old winners', the mujahideen factions of the United Front and the pro-Karzai elements, are being subjected to criticism for the failures of 'war on terror' in Afghanistan. It is no secret that the US has been looking for an ally from within the Taliban.

It would not be wrong to say that Afghan politics has begun moulding the West to its own advantage. Instead of the 'war on terror' shaping the Afghan conflict, it is the Taliban and Pakistan who have begun laying terms and conditions for the 'resolution' of the conflict. The fact that both Pakistan and the US have, since the rout of the Taliban in 2001, been proposing the inclusion of 'moderate' Taliban in the Afghan government, makes the cooption of 'sections' of the Taliban not so distant a possibility.

Ironically, post-2001 Afghanistan has witnessed the resurgence of both the mujahideen factions and the Taliban, the two prime actors in the Afghan civil war. With Pakistan determined to regain its share of influence in Afghan politics, another round of jockeying for power, involving both domestic and external actors, could be on the anvil.

The term 'Taliban' has undoubtedly come to assume a more generic connotation. In the meanwhile, a plethora of anti-West extremist forces, both local and foreign, have come together with a unity of purpose. The western forces engaging the anti-Kabul forces are finding the exercise costlier day by day, both in terms of expenditure and human casualties. About 40,000 international forces present in Afghanistan today appear to be clueless in developing an effective counter-strategy against the anti-Kabul forces. Needless to say that the kind of mobilization that has taken place in the vast rural Pashtun tribal belt from NWFP in Pakistan to south-western Afghanistan was ignored and trivialized by the campaigners of the 'war on terror' in favour of the US war in Iraq. No wonder, the Taliban have been shifting their battle lines further close to the urban centres in the southern and eastern provinces around Kabul.

The Taliban are expected to move sooner or later to areas where factions aligned with Kabul appear to be in control. They have already filled the vacuum in rural Pashtun areas and NATO-led forces are left with no option but to remain content with control over the urban centres around Kabul either by striking deals with the local Taliban or launching military operations against them, whichever way it works. Worst of all is the prevalent trans-Atlantic divide among NATO member-states, which is reflected in NATO's faltering Afghan mission. Similarly, the commitment of the myriad Afghan factions that comprise the anti-Taliban coalition kept together under an externally-sponsored political process also remains questionable.

The role of highly experienced former mujahideen Pashtun commanders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalal-ud Din Haqqani in rejuvenating the military power of the Taliban is a notable phenomenon. It may not be far-fetched to say that the mujahideen politics with its deep ethnic undertones has also contributed to the resurrection of the Taliban. Given the trend of shifting loyalties and changing alliances in the Afghan civil war, the possibility of more disgruntled Pashtun commanders aligning with the Taliban cannot be ruled out in the coming years.

It is difficult to say as to what extent the Taliban could be de-linked from the Pakistani State in future. The probability of the Taliban having acquired a certain dynamic of its own and assuming relative autonomy from the Pakistani State is worth enquiring into. Among the Pashtun tribes straddling the contentious Durand Line, the Taliban definitely have a strong rear base to fall back upon in times of urgency. Pakistan's failure to subdue the tribes in its north-western region has gone a long way in exposing the institutional weaknesses of Pakistan and its enforcement agencies to rein in the tribal populace and the militant Islamists of all hues present in the region. In fact, the tenuous hold of the Pakistani State over the region has left pro-Taliban Pakistani religio-political parties emboldened to carry on their experiment with medieval ideological fantasies. Thus, the extensive support for the Afghan Taliban among the Pashtun tribes in Pakistan's north-western tribal areas and the influential religious political parties are proven assets for the Taliban.

However, the possibility of the Taliban repeating its conquest of the 1990s may not be possible as minority ethnic factions have consolidated their strength in the last five years and the US is not likely to completely withdraw from Afghanistan. Kabul's limited strength, which lies in the international support it has enjoyed over the last five years, could wane with the elections in the US and UK. Given the changing scenario, a new political configuration may also emerge in Kabul. In this context, it may be worth considering whether it is time to revive something on the lines of the earlier 'Six-plus-Two' Group. Perhaps, a 'Seven-plus-Two' Group, including India, could be formed to monitor, discuss and analyse the Afghan situation on a regular basis and to engage various Afghan factions more meaningfully with the objective of resolving the Afghan conflict.

However, as of now, the fact remains that Afghanistan is years away from stability and peace, if any has to come to the land of buzkashi.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's seemingly 'inadvertent' admission of his country's nuclear status in an interview broadcast on German television on December 11 at the start of his trip to Berlin once again focussed world attention on the country's nuclear status. It is widely known that Israel has a nuclear arsenal consisting of about 150-200 weapons from the plutonium produced at the Dimona nuclear reactor, situated in the Negev desert near Beer Sheva. The fact that Israel has not tested a nuclear device, or officially acknowledged its capabilities, has allowed it to maintain its stated position that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. This posture of 'nuclear ambiguity' regarding its 'bomb in the basement' has survived many onslaughts and by all accounts, achieved its policy objectives, of ensuring a deterrent, withstanding Arab criticism, and making it easier for key allies like the United States to reluctantly acquiesce in its nuclear status.

The government of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion was pressured to come clean on its activities at Dimona during the administrations of President Dwight Eisenhower and John F Kennedy. The Israelis are reported to have insisted that what the American U-2 spy planes revealed was in fact a 'textile' plant. However, it is widely held by critics of the Israeli nuclear programme that successive US administrations either turned a blind eye to Israeli efforts to get the bomb or did not pressure it enough to change its course. As long as Israel kept 'low' on matters nuclear, the pressure on the Americans to bear hard on the Israelis was also minimized.

Having the most sophisticated fighting force in West Asia, and with operative peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan securing its immediate borders, Israel on paper does not seem to require the nuclear buttress. It achieved overwhelming victories in its wars with the combined Arab coalitions without recourse to the dreaded N-option. In the heat of the reverses suffered during the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), Gen. David Elazar, according to his biographer, reportedly dismissed the suggestion to use 'special means'/unconventional weapons to halt the Arab advance. The Israeli nuclear quest is however unique in contemporary world history. Born with an extreme sense of insecurity, surrounded by Arab neighbours hostile to its formation, and having withstood series of wars and continuing tensions, Israel, from its earliest days has invested in the nuclear option as the ultimate guarantor of its security.

Israel's Arab neighbours, on their part, tried to buttress their own capabilities to counter the Israeli nuclear efforts. Some of them, most prominently Iraq and Egypt, tried to go down the nuclear route but could not succeed for a variety of technical, political, and economic reasons. The Israeli attack on the 70 MW Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981 destroyed nascent Iraqi nuclear capabilities. After the attack, Iraq opted for the route of enriching uranium through centrifuges. Analysts contend that its ill-timed invasion of Kuwait, the resultant defeat at the hands of the American-led coalition and multi-national sanctions prevented Iraq from realizing its stated goal of achieving a nuclear capability, which otherwise, would have taken it scarcely another half-a-decade, according to some estimates. Egypt signed the NPT in 1981. A major contributing factor in its decision to do so was the desire to get nuclear power reactors, encouraged under Article IV of the NPT to further the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Libyan regime of Col. Muammar Gadhafi made strenuous efforts to be nuclear-capable, mostly through smuggling of nuclear-related components and technology. Iran pursued a vigorous nuclear programme under Shah Reza Pahlavi, which however was not given sufficient attention after the 1979 revolution.

Most of the Arab countries pursued chemical and biological arsenals, the 'poor man's' weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, they received positive support from their great power patrons and friends, including the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Apart from these efforts, the Arab nations tried very hard to get West Asia declared a nuclear-weapon free zone and to force Israel to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In fact, it was Iran that first proposed a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone (MENWFZ) in 1974. Israel, along with India and Pakistan, is a prominent holdout from the NPT regime. The May 1998 nuclear tests by the latter two have meant that Israel is in a unique league by itself.

There have been serious debates within Israel regarding the continued relevance and the benefits of Israeli exceptionality in the fast changing global scenario. Some strategic analysts contend that for the Israeli nuclear deterrent to be effective, it is very important to convey Israel's nuclear status unambiguously so that there won't be a mistake on the part of Israel's enemies in misinterpreting Israeli capabilities. This would mean coming clean on a fact that the rest of the world already considers a fait accompli, and making known its war-fighting doctrines incorporating nuclear weapons. However, successive Israeli governments have resisted such talk and continued with the traditional Israeli posture.

During the July 2004 visit of Mohamad El Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Israel, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, in remarks to the Israeli Army Radio, stated that the Israeli policy of ambiguity has proved its worth and will continue, adding, "I don't know what he [ElBaradei] is coming to see". In the light of renewed pressure to give up its nuclear weapons in response to the Libyan decision to give up its nuclear ambitions in late 2003, the Israeli foreign ministry repeated that peace and security were important pre-conditions for the Middle East to be a nuclear weapon free zone.

Iran's continuing efforts in pursuing a nuclear programme and acquiring nuclear technology, and Israel's contention that it is aimed at threatening the very survival of the Jewish state, coupled with the harsh rhetoric emanating from Tehran, has made the West Asian nuclear equation very fluid and unstable. If and when Tehran succeeds in its objective of developing a nuclear weapon, there is a real danger of an unfolding crisis taking on a nuclear dimension due to the lack of any direct channel of communication between the two sides. There is also a real danger of a multi-nuclear West Asia worsening the already fragile situation there.

It is instructive to note that Prime Minister Olmert's 'nuclear slip' was made in the context of the Iran threat. Pointing out Iran's rhetoric of wiping out Israel from the world map, Olmert continued ""Can you say that this is the same level, when they [Iran] are aspiring to have nuclear weapons, as America, France, Israel, Russia?" Mr. Olmert's interview came in the wake of the statement of the incoming US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates the previous week, in which he apparently acknowledged Israeli nuclear status. During his Senate confirmation hearings, Mr. Gates pointed out that Tehran was "surrounded by powers with nuclear weapons: Pakistan to their east, the Russians to the north, the Israelis to the west and us in the Persian Gulf".

Olmert's 'slip' has elicited varied reactions. Domestic commentators have pointed out that the prime minister's admission has weakened Israeli position in that it has led to unwanted focus on the Israeli nuclear capabilities, renewed calls from the Arab countries to give up its nuclear weapons, demands from the international non-proliferation and disarmament community to agree to a nuclear weapon free West Asia, more rigorous justifications by the Iranians for a nuclear deterrent and criticisms of the so-called 'double standards' of the US and Europe in applying non-proliferation yardsticks. Analysts swearing by the nuclear option however will no doubt point to the fact that the prime minister's admission has unambiguously 'signaled' Israel's nuclear status for Iran to take note of. These analysts will read in the statement a continuing effort by Israel to make its deterrent more effective. These include the decision to purchase 2 more German Dolphin submarines in a deal approved by the then Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in November 2005, in addition to the three it already operates. These can be used effectively as secure, second-strike platforms, negating Israel's lack of strategic depth. There are reports that Israel will equip the subs with cruise missiles tipped with nuclear warheads, housed in their 650mm torpedo tubes.

It is possible to read Olmert's 'slip', in its widest interpretation, as a precursor to Israel preparing to maintain a more overt nuclear profile in the face of Iranian attempts to go nuclear. The decision to acquire the Dolphin submarines, efforts to build a missile-defence shield, made up of the US-Israeli Arrow-2 missile system and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, are all measures designed to make Israel more secure to face the possibility and eventuality of the Iranian nuclear capability, in case efforts to stop Iran in its nuclear quest fail. The Prime Minister's statement has succeeded in opening up the taboo question of the Israeli nuclear posture to greater public debate and scrutiny, both within the country and in its immediate neighbourhood. The unfolding nuclear drama in West Asia will no doubt make further 'interesting' headlines. The world will hope and pray that these do not produce 'deadly' consequences.