The factional fighting between the Islamist Hamas, represented by the recently dismissed Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in the Gaza Strip, and the 'moderate' Fatah, headed by the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Mahmoud Abbas, took a turn for the worse on June 14 when Hamas cadres ransacked the Preventive Security Service building, the headquarters of the PA in Gaza City. The renewed fighting between the two factions, which accounted for more than 100 deaths during the week gone by, has already claimed over 600 lives since January 2006. That was when Hamas secured its electoral victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections, which set in motion a series of events that culminated in the bloody takeover in Gaza 17 months later.

Hamas's surprise victory and its refusal to acknowledge Israel as a sovereign entity, renounce violence to achieve its objectives (its 1988 Charter calling for the destruction of Israel not being rescinded), or accept interim peace deals that had already been agreed upon between the Palestinian Authority and Tel Aviv put it on a collision course with Israel and Western powers involved in negotiating a solution to the intractable Palestinian issue. The US and the European powers imposed an aid embargo in March 2006 has been badly hurting the Palestinian economy and preventing the proper functioning of the administration.

In the meantime, ill will and clashes between the Hamas and Fatah grew. The latest round of fighting not only marked the failure of the Egyptian-backed truce brokered in May 2007 between the two factions, but also the dissolution of the national unity government formed in March 2007, following the February 8 Mecca agreement between Abbas and Hamas's leader-in-exile, Khaled Meshaal, brokered under Saudi auspices. The Saudi-brokered initiative was aimed at ending the rising internal violence and facilitate the easing of Western sanctions imposed in the wake of Hamas's victory.

Abbas, operating from his West Bank headquarters in Ramallah, reacted to the Hamas takeover by declaring a state of emergency, which enabled him to bypass constitutional limits on his authority subject to a Hamas-controlled parliament, dismissed the serving Prime Minister, Haniyeh, and installed Salam Fayyad in his place. Fayyad was the Finance Minister in the short-lived national unity government formed in March. Haniyeh has refused to accept his dismissal and has accused Abbas of participating in a US-led plot to overthrow him. He has, however, ruled out the setting up of a separate Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and reiterated the Hamas's position of a Palestinian state within the borders of 1967 to include Gaza and the West Bank, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel, which considered the 'moderate' Fatah faction a better negotiating partner over the radical Islamist Hamas, has been leaning towards the Fatah to facilitate the latter's establishment of its dominance in the Palestinian domestic stakes. In the aftermath of Hamas's 'coup', it has concentrated its efforts on boosting the position and legitimacy of Abbas and has pledged to release a substantial part of the frozen tax revenues to the PA government (Israel had been withholding close to US $700 million of the same since the Hamas's electoral victory). In the short term, it has also considered dropping food aid to ease the humanitarian problems of the 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza due to the closure of all border crossings into Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also stated that Israel would give "serious consideration" for proposals to station international peacekeepers in Gaza along the international border with Egypt as a measure to cut off arms and supplies to the Hamas. The EU's Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana also voiced support to the idea and stated that the EU could consider participating in such an international force. On the other hand, the concrete administrative division between Gaza and the West Bank seems to offer a unique opportunity for Israel to enforce a political solution favourable to it, by further isolating Hamas. This was attested to by Tzipi Livni, Israel's Foreign Minister. Washington is also pressing Egypt to shut the tunnels Hamas depends upon to smuggle in cash and arms.

In the wake of the recent bloody developments, regional and international sympathies seem to lie clearly with President Abbas and his Fatah faction. The Quartet of interlocutors involved in the Middle East negotiations, including the United Nations, United States, Russia, and the European Union, have reiterated their continued support to Abbas. While UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged international support for Abbas's efforts "to restore law and order", the US lifted its aid embargo on the Palestinian Authority and pledged to immediately release $40 million to ease the suffering of the population and bolster Abbas's credentials. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice vowed not to leave "one and a half million Palestinians at the mercy of terrorist organizations" and stressed that the Middle East was confronted with a fundamental choice "between violent extremism on the one hand, and tolerance and responsibility on the other." Reports also suggested that the US has in fact been arming Fatah in its fight against the Hamas.

While aiming to isolate Hamas economically, militarily, and diplomatically in Gaza, Washington has also hoped to speed up the dialogue process between Abbas and Olmert. In his meeting with Olmert in Washington on June 19, President Bush termed Abbas the "president of all Palestinians" and promised to cooperate with him "to provide the Palestinians with a real, genuine chance for a state of their own". On his part, in a telephone conversation with Bush earlier in the week, Abbas expressed his intent to "resume the political process" and keep political channels open.

The Arab League Foreign Ministers, meeting in Cairo on June 16, also came out in support of Abbas and called on the rival Palestinian factions "to immediately halt internal fighting and stop shedding Palestinian blood" and to keep unity in the Gaza Strip, eastern Jerusalem and the West Bank. Saudi Arabia, currently chairing the League, heavily criticized the factional fighting. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal expressed regret at the factions who had "vowed in the holy lands and swore on the holy Quran not to fight again".

Egypt closed its representative office in Gaza City in the aftermath of the Hamas takeover, which it condemned very strongly. Cairo has always had a tenuous relationship with Hamas as it considered the Palestinian group to be close to the Islamic Brotherhood, an anti-establishment entity in Egypt which also aims to establish Islamic theocracies across the Arab world. The fact that Iran also supports and sponsors Hamas does not go down well with the Arab states in the region. The Mecca accords in early February were in fact seen as an effort by these states to seize the initiative and reduce the Iranian foothold on the Palestinian issue. An aide to Abbas also accused Iran of encouraging Hamas to employ violence to take control of the Gaza Strip and alleged that Tehran supported what he termed 'non-democratic' groups in Palestine, Lebanon, as well as Iraq.

Hamas's takeover of Gaza City on June 14 dented the near-term hopes of establishing a single Palestinian State encompassing the four million people in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The subsequent actions taken by Israel, the United States, the EU, the Arab League and Egypt, in bolstering Abbas on the West Bank and further tightening of the screws in the Gaza Strip, could lead to further bitterness among the 1.5 million Palestinians there. It remains to be seen whether Gazans would be swayed towards the leadership of Abbas and the opportunities he can provide, given the vast international backing he has obtained. This will particularly depend on the extent to which he can provide good governance and rein in the rampant corruption, which had contributed to the PA's alienation from the population in the first place. If he cannot do this in an appropriate time frame, the populace could become more radicalized, thus adding to the cadres and support base of Hamas, the outcome which Israel and the Western interlocutors are striving to prevent. Even worse, if Hamas fails to quickly restore order and provide reasonable governance, it could attract recruits to the Al Qaeda and help it achieve a firmer foothold in the region.

Abbas, meanwhile, has rejected Hamas calls for negotiations to find a political consensus to resolve the imbroglio and has accused them of being "murderous terrorists". Hamas leaders have also warned against a crackdown on their members and sympathizers in the West Bank. It seems that a lot more than rhetoric is needed to wash away the bad blood that has flown and, more importantly, prevent a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

A surge in infiltration attempts by heavily armed terrorists across the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K has been reported in the last two months. With the snow receding on the Pir Panjal range of mountains along the LoC and the passes opening up, terrorists waiting in training camps in Pakistan/PoK are attempting to sneak into the State. The period April to July is generally a peak period of infiltration. However, the number of infiltration attempts that have been made by terrorist groups in the last two months has been unprecedented, and it sends an alarming signal of Pakistan's intentions. According to recent reports, there has been a two-fold jump in infiltration in April and May this year as compared to the last two years. The Army has successfully intercepted a number of these groups though some seem to have inevitably succeeded in getting through undetected. It has been estimated that 79 terrorists managed to infiltrate in April 2007, compared to 27 in April 2006. A majority of the terrorists killed by the Army while attempting infiltration have been identified as foreign terrorists (FTs). The ISI, which is behind all this, is presumably aiming to push in heavily armed and better-trained Pakistan-based terrorists in order to regain leverage over militancy in the State.

In 2007 so far, infiltration is also being attempted through routes that have traditionally not been used like the Sunderbani Sector of Jammu region. This has been a consequence of the Army's success in plugging the traditional routes used by terrorists, which has forced them to take less frequented routes to avoid detection and reduce casualties. The likelihood of infiltration through the IB Sector of Jammu region also appears strong. One such attempt has already been foiled by the Border Security Force on May 15, 2007. Pakistan, taking advantage of the ceasefire, has constructed defence works right up to the International Border, which provides the additional advantage of aiding the infiltration of terrorists into India.

The modus operandi generally followed for infiltration is that ISI monitors the setting up of launch pads close to the LoC, in co-ordination with local army formations, based on weather conditions and assessed infiltration routes. Terrorists are brought a day or two prior to the launch to the designated launch pad and reconnaissance is carried out to ascertain areas where there are gaps in the fence or where it is damaged or not illuminated. The infiltrators are thereafter led by guides or alternately they use GPS and maps to move to the selected crossing site. In the training camps they are taught techniques for breaching the fence using insulated ladders, blankets and wire cutters, besides other means. After successful infiltration, they move to the chosen rendezvous before daybreak and lie low during daylight hours. After establishing contact with their mentors, they move to the rugged hinterland or to towns either with the help of local guides or by using GPS and maps, to join other members of their Tanzeem.

A number of reasons can be attributed to the increase in infiltration levels this year over corresponding figures of the last two years. First, terrorists especially FTs, have suffered heavy attrition at the hands of the security forces (SF) in the last few years and early replacements are crucial to continue the so-called jihad. Second, local militants are increasingly shunning the path of militancy and surrendering in large numbers to the SF, both at the LoC and in the hinterland, revealing networks, modus operandi and arms caches. Trend analysis of surrenders at the LoC has revealed that militants languishing in training camps in Pakistan/PoK wish to return back and join the mainstream. Their family members contact the Army who facilitate the surrenders at designated points at the LoC. Compared to about 200 militants who surrendered in 2006, 72 have been reported to have already surrendered this year, including 10 who surrendered to the Chief Minister on June 05, 2007 at Doda. This has dealt a heavy blow to militancy and it is likely that more FTs are being inducted to take over leadership, boost morale and enforce discipline in the ranks of the local terrorists.

The hike in infiltration without a corresponding spike in violence levels in the State reveals a deeper game plan. Though it is true that newly infiltrating terrorists take time to settle down and become active, there are enough resident terrorists to launch attacks and ensure that the conditions in the state remain disturbed. In April and May last year, the level of violence was much higher and even tourists were targeted. One reason for the reduced scale of violence this year could be that terrorists have been instructed by their masters to maintain a low profile in the hope that this would further encourage the Indian government to reduce the number of troops in J&K.

Pakistan will continue its policy of supporting cross border terrorism to keep the pot of militancy boiling in J&K. It would also aim to intensify the scale of violence in the run-up to next year's elections in the State. The coming few months are critical and the gains of the last few years must not be lost. The SF will need to deploy maximum strength backed by good intelligence to prevent infiltration across the LoC/IB and track and neutralise terrorists who have managed to get across. Lines of communication have to be properly sanitised to allow unhindered flow of military and civilian traffic. A strong message needs to be sent to Pakistan to wind down the infrastructure of support to terrorism on its soil and to stop abetting cross border terrorism.

Indian aviation has been witnessing spectacular growth in the past five years. Private low-cost airlines have proliferated and the average middle class Indian today aspires to fly rather than use rail or road transport to travel to major destinations. This has also resulted in the growth of inland tourism, and with the economy registering an impressive 8 per cent growth, this trend is likely to continue. Indian skies are now buzzing with activity.

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is upbeat about its future growth. All government and private airline operators have placed huge orders for modern aircraft. Boeing is reportedly setting up a Maintenance & Repair Organisation (MRO) hub at Nagpur. There are reports of at least one US Flight Training School setting up shop in India in the near future. Foreign companies and MNCs are setting up Joint Ventures for manufacture of aviation related products. It seems to be an altogether promising scenario.

There is, however, a problem. The human resources element of this growth has been lagging behind. Many operators face or will soon face an acute shortage of flight crews. While the requirement for cabin crews and airport management/ticketing staff is slowly being met, that for pilots, Air Traffic Control officers, flight dispatchers, engineers and technicians is not a simple matter. This is because India simply does not have adequate numbers of functioning flying clubs or flight schools to train the large numbers of pilots needed over the next decade. The recent increase in the retirement age of commercial pilots from 60 to 65 years will only help partially since an ‘over-sixty’ pilot has to necessarily fly with a ‘fully qualified’ captain of under sixty. The result: a very large number of expatriates from the US, Europe and Latin America are flying in Indian skies, with some of them barely able to speak the English language. At last count, Jet Airways employed 111 foreigners (expats) out of its total of 685 pilots, while Air Deccan had 75 foreigners out of 250 on its rolls.

There is no solution in sight and young people aspiring for a career in aviation do not know whom to turn to. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), through the July 06 issue of its Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR) notification, has made the training of pilots a little more difficult and this is when the number of students passing the examinations is abysmally low. Effective July 2007, only those candidates who have a minimum of 50 hours of flying experience, gained in a DGCA-recognised flight school, will be eligible to appear for the Commercial Pilots Licence (CPL) Examination that the DGCA conducts every quarter and until then only those who already have the DGCA computer number, i.e., those already registered but failed, appeared in the January and April 2007 examinations. The ostensible reason for this new requirement is to ensure that a prospective pilot has some rudimentary flying experience and also the basic knowledge of aviation and receives ground training from a DGCA-recognised flight school. The unfortunate ground reality, however, is that there is no such school in the country except the Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udaan Academy (IGRUA) located at Rae Bareilly in UP. Started over two decades ago, the IGRUA has of late been facing a shortage of flying instructors and other training staff. The period of CPL training is two years while most of the flight schools abroad conduct the same in six to eight months.

Most of the government aided and private flying clubs in India are also in a similar state, since the new low-cost airlines have mopped up every available Indian pilot below the age of sixty and only very few of these Flying Clubs have two or more competent and experienced instructors, some with indifferent records. The huge rush for flying has allegedly caused some undesirable practices such as payments under the table, over-logging of flying hours and poor quality of training. The DGCA has traditionally authorised three IAF Medical Establishments to conduct the ‘Class One’ Medical Examination for aircrews. With thousands aspiring for a CPL, the earliest medical appointment takes more than eight months. Leave aside meeting future needs, our airlines are likely to face a severe pilot crunch as more and more pilots retire in the next few years or if ex-pats go back.

In decades gone by, when Indian aviation activity was at a low key, the few Flying Clubs and a ‘generous’ supply, every two to three years, of some ten to fifteen qualified and experienced pilots from the Indian Air Force (IAF) used to adequately meet the needs of commercial aviation (read Air India & Indian Airlines). The government-owned airlines were happy as they did not have to spend on costly ab initio training; flying clubs were happy graduating a few pilots every two to three years; and the IAF equally happy to get rid of senior Wing Commanders and Group Captains who could no longer be fitted into the pyramidal career structure. Typically, a flying instructor in a club was happy with a monthly salary of around Rs. 20-25,000 if he was lucky. Things have, however, drastically changed in the recent past with domestic airlines offering salaries of over Rs. 2-3 lakh a month. As a result, all flying instructors have joined them.

So, with no DGCA authorised/recognised ground school and no flying instructors in the country’s flying clubs, how do we train commercial pilots? The IAF is reportedly running short of pilots and can at best release a dozen pilots every year.

The really keen and rich Indian youngster goes to Canada, the United States, Australia or New Zealand, Malaysia and the Philippines, finishes his or her 200 hours of flying training in some six to eight months, passes the necessary qualifying tests, obtains a US FAA or European JAA CPL, returns to India, appears for a ‘composite’ test to get an Indian DGCA endorsement and is then hopefully picked up by a domestic airline. But this costs over Rs. 20 lakh, with all the hassle of getting a visa, security clearance, residential permit and the like, something only a rich well-connected kid can achieve. Another hurdle is that banks are reluctant to give loans for flight training, as it is not approved by the All India Council of Technical Training (AICTE). More importantly, it also means that India loses this business when it actually has all the necessary facilities and infrastructure.

Two possible options come to mind here.

First, in India, the IAF arguably has the best facilities for flight training and produces some of the most competent pilots in the world. There are many qualified and medically fit IAF flight instructors who, after retirement at 50 to 60, are by and large unemployed. If the DGCA can in one stroke extend the retirement age of commercial pilots to 65 when they are responsible for carrying some 200 fare-paying passengers in a complex airliner, it can easily allow the good old medically fit ex-IAF Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) with over 3000 hours of flying experience on a variety of transports and fighter aircraft, to fly up to the age of 65 with a single pupil in a Cessna-152 or similar light aircraft that flies no higher that 5000 feet and no faster that 200 km per hour, in and around a quiet airfield or on a cross-country flight of a few hundred kilometres. But it is unfair to expect this old instructor to obtain a CPL; existing rules permit some relaxation. Such a dispensation may add, at a very conservative estimate, some 50 to 100 desperately needed flying instructors to the various flying clubs that already have over four to six aircraft each. On average, each instructor could very easily train six to eight pilots every year. Surely, 800 to 1200 new pilots is not a small number. This would also reduce the cost of training and avoid all the hassle of training abroad. The current shortage is estimated to be around 1000 pilots a year.

Second, the IAF could help in a novel way. It has many airfields such as Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu, Bihta in Bihar and Bakshi-ka-Talab in Uttar Pradesh, where flying activity is always at a low key if not altogether non-existent. But each of these bases has adequate infrastructure such as runways, hangars, ATC, Indian Oil Corporation depot, office and living accommodation and messing arrangements and sports facilities. Some of these are known as Care & Maintenance Units (C&MU) and that is exactly what they are. These are so far away from sensitive operational areas that there is no danger of national security being jeopardised. All that the IAF and the government have to do is to invoke the already existing ‘Auxiliary Air Force Reserve’ provisions and depute some ten serving IAF flying instructors and co-opt another ten retired officers with the necessary qualifications and train a batch of 40 to 50 civilian candidates every six months and charge them at reasonable market rates. This would not only put to rightful use facilities that are already available but would be a new beginning in what I would call reverse out-sourcing. At first glance, this may sound somewhat impracticable (the IAF & DGCA are bound to raise serious objections), but serious introspection would show that such a scheme is not only eminently doable but is also desirable. Such an arrangement can also help train ATC officers and technicians — including ex-IAF personnel proceeding on ‘discharge’ and make them fit for civilian employment. The DGCA could help by waiving certain requirements of flying ‘currency’ since all the instructors have considerable flying and instructional experience. Unlike air force flying, civil/commercial flight training does not involve aerobatics or risky tactical flying exercises and can very easily be managed by retired air force officers. The IAF could also earmark a small number of instructors desirous of leaving the IAF, for a two-year long tenure in such a flight training school before they are released, thus helping those not fitting into the career pyramid of the IAF to leave with dignity.

What is, however, urgently needed is a comprehensive dialogue between the IAF, Ministry of Defence (MoD), the DGCA and the Ministry of Civil Aviation. A ‘tie-up’ with private airline operators for ‘campus’ selection and perhaps an ‘apprentice pilot scheme’ under which the airlines subsidise the cost of training and assure jobs to the young CPL graduates, may also be feasible.

To be counted among the advanced countries of the world, India must first become an ‘air power’ nation. The classical and universally acceptable definition of air power goes like this. “The air power of a country is its ability to impose its will on others through the medium of air and includes the nation’s total air assets, civil and commercial, private and public, potential and existing.” Further, it is well known that this air power is indivisible. It is time the decision makers in the MoD, IAF, DGCA and Civil Aviation Ministry sat up and took notice. Else, a great opportunity would be lost and as usual India will muddle through but at great expense

On April 19, 2007, the provincial Chinese court in Xinjiang sentenced Huseyin Celil, a Uyghur, to life imprisonment for taking part in "terrorist activities" and "plotting to split the country". The verdict of the People's Court of Urumchi states that Huseyin Celil will be deprived of his "political rights for life". This verdict has once again incensed human rights activists, who have begun a debate on Chinese intentions towards Uyghurs and Beijing's currently imprecise reportage on terrorism in Xinjiang. More importantly, the issue has led many strategic experts to take a fresh view of recent Chinese policy on Xinjiang and examine if there is any consistent Chinese constitutional approach to convict "suspected Uyghurs" as terrorists? This has become important given that China makes little distinction between separatists, terrorists, and civil rights activities.

The Huseyin Celil verdict is the second in 2007, after the Urumchi court sentenced Ablikim Abdureyim for nine years of imprisonment. Abdureyim is the son of the prominent human rights defender and leader of the Uyghur movement Rebiya Kadeer. 2007 has already seen a lot of action from the Chinese government in cracking down on Uyghurs in connection with terrorism in Xinjiang. On January 5, the Chinese Public Security Bureau raided a "terrorist training camp" in the Pamir Plateau of Xinjiang and arrested 17 suspected ETIM (East Turkistan Independence Movement) members. Going by the official Xinhua News Agency report, 18 suspected terrorists and a policeman were reported killed in a shootout between the ETIM and Chinese public security forces. Further clarifying on this incident, Xinhua speculated that almost 1,000 ETIM members have been trained by al-Qaeda and that these ETIM members are directly or indirectly in contact with many local Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

These recent incidents clearly highlight the nature and intention of the Chinese government - to conduct a comprehensive campaign aimed at both domestic and international audiences, to label all Uyghur opposition as linked to Al-Qaeda. In fact, for a long time, China has equated the activities of independent religious groups and practitioners with "separatism," which is a statutory crime against State Security under Chinese criminal law. But it must be noted that never before has the Chinese government explicitly linked these religious groups and voices in Xinjiang with terrorism. This new approach is in contrast to the position taken by China earlier. In fact, prior to 9/11, Chinese authorities tended to play down the seriousness of ethnic strife in Xinjiang by arguing that it is a "domestic problem of China" and that China is very positive about the future of the minorities in Xinjiang.

If one looks at the 2006 Annual Report of the China Aid Association (CAA), throughout the year the Chinese authorities have taken intensive action even against non-Uyghur communities that belong to religious minority groups in the region. Chinese actions were directed basically against house churches and religious freedom groups, which saw the detention of almost 600 Christians. Some Chinese authorities went to the extent of interrogating church members during various raids rather than taking official action by arresting them. In addition, the strict control exercised by Chinese authorities over the state-controlled Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) has led to a massive protest in China. This was clearly seen in June 2006 when the Shanxi administration evicted Hu Qinghua, a Pastor of TSPM church in Pinglu. More importantly, this has become an international issue after the recent restriction imposed by the Chinese government on the relationships between unregistered Chinese Protestants and fellow believers abroad, which is in clear contravention of international human rights standards.

The 2007 episodes in Xinjiang can be seen in this connection as a deliberate exercise on the part of the Chinese government to term and link the Uyghurs and other religious minorities with the ETIM "terrorists" and seize the opportunity to reduce the activities of these groups ahead of the 2008 Olympics scheduled to be held in Beijing. In fact, Beijing has taken a number of fresh initiatives to control Uyghur "unrests" in Xinjiang and adjacent areas by establishing networks with foreign intelligence agencies to prevent terrorist incidents, all in the name of tightening security before Olympics 2008. Through a multilateral body like Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), Beijing has established "new intelligence-sharing" and "co-operative counter-terrorism measures" with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. On the military front, a number of initiatives are being taken in the Xinjiang Military Region to develop "mobile operations and joint exercises" with Central Asian countries in order to check any possible insurgency in Xinjiang.

To address the Xinjiang problem more effectively, China has also tightened legal and constitutional measures. Vigilance police posts in Xinjiang, higher readiness levels of military and vigilant police units in the region have been established as part of various security initiatives. The National Anti-Terrorism Co-ordination Group (NATCG) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has jointly formulated action plans like establishing early warning and prevention system to monitor the activities of terrorist groups, a quick response mechanism, as well as a crisis control and management system. A mass education and mobilization system too has been introduced to develop awareness among Chinese citizens about terrorism and counter-terrorism operations. At the constitutional level, efforts have been made to update anti-terrorism laws and legislation. The main changes brought about by the amendments recently are Articles 114, 120 and 191 of the criminal law. These amendments have detailed explanations of the criminal responsibility of a variety of terrorist activities. It further stipulates that people who organize and direct terrorist activities should be severely punished. Importantly, China is in the process of formulating a counter-terrorism law, which will be in place by the end of this year.

Overall one can say that China does not wish to waste any opportunity in controlling the Uyghurs and Xinjiang particularly ahead of the 2008 Olympics when Xinjiang will be closely monitored by the international media. In the post-9/11 period, China has gone to the extent of arguing that the Uyghur separatists movement has been extensively financed by Osama bin Laden and has direct connections to the al-Qaeda network. A number of official reports and documents have been released recently by the Chinese government to draw the attention of the international media that there is a close proximity between Uyghurs and al-Qaeda members. For example, in the January 2002 official document titled East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity, the Chinese government stated that "Bin Laden has schemed with the heads of the Central and West Asian terrorist organizations many times to help the 'East Turkistan' terrorist forces in Xinjiang to launch a 'holy war'." Interestingly, the Chinese government has never provided any substantial evidence about the Uyghur-Al-Qaeda link. In fact, in a recent statement, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao has gone to the extent of saying that "we think that cracking down on international terrorist organizations, including East Turkistan terrorism, benefits China and the world…no country in the world wishes to see another al-Qaeda in China".

All this suggests that Beijing's approach to Xinjiang is very similar to its recent actions against Tibetans. In Tibet, Beijing has carried out a crackdown on many religious supporters of the Dalai Lama after 9/11, terming them "terrorists" because they are involved in "illegal" activities. Beijing's policy towards Xinjiang is also similar, and is aimed at maintaining firm control over the Uyghurs.