Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud (Bin Salman or MbS) made his first state visit to India on February 19-20, 2019 as part of a three nation Asia tour that included Pakistan and China. The visit took place in the backdrop of the Pulwama terror attack by the Pakistani jihadi terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed in which 44 CRPF personnel were killed. Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to strongly condemn the Pulwama terror attack. Foreign Minister Adel bin Al-Jubeir denounced the attack saying that "anyone who supports and finances the menace must be designated and must be punished". Prime Minister Narendra Modi received the Crown Prince at the airport going beyond protocol. India-Saudi Arabia ties had entered an era of strategic partnership with the signing of the Riyadh Declaration in 2010, followed by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation in 2014. During the visit of MbS, the two countries agreed to fortify the partnership by establishing a high level monitoring mechanism in the form of the Strategic Partnership Council. They also signed five Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) related to investment, tourism, housing, and information and broadcasting.

After PM Modi’s last state visit to Saudi Arabia in 2016, the return state visit of  King Salman to India was scheduled but postponed twice, first in 2017 and again in 2018. But certain regional developments made it important for the Crown Prince to pay a visit in early 2019. Firstly, the alleged murder in October 2018 of the US-based Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul led to widespread criticism of the Kingdom. The Riyadh conference organized by Saudi Arabia in the same month was boycotted by the chief executives of JP Morgan, Siemens and Blackrock, as well as by the CEO of the International Monetary Fund. In addition, the Governments of France, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands pulled out of the conference. Secondly, Saudi Arabia also seems to be losing its hold on the Gulf Cooperation Council, with Qatar refusing to bow down despite the imposition of sanctions starting June 2017. Third, Russia’s proactive diplomacy in the Middle East combined with Trump signalling a less active role in the region have compelled Saudi Arabia to look east towards India and China.

Terrorism as a common concern

The key focus areas during the visit of MBS to India were terrorism, investment, energy, skill development, security and the Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia.  The Pulwama terror attack brought the issue of terrorism to the fore and both Modi and the Crown Prince emphasized that all countries should renounce the use of terrorism as an instrument of policy. India and Saudi Arabia agreed to constitute a ‘Comprehensive Security Dialogue’ at the level of National Security Advisors and set up a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism.

During the last several years, Saudi Arabia has been cooperating with India in countering terrorism. It has been repatriating Indian citizens who have been found involved in terrorist attacks and related activities. In 2012, it extradited the 26/11 suspect Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari also known as Abu Jundal or Abu Hamza to India. Since then, 18 terror suspects have been sent back by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to India. During the visit, the Saudi Crown Prince reiterated the willingness to share intelligence to combat terrorist activities. India and Saudi Arabia also signed an MoU on Technical Cooperation in Cyber Space and Combating Cyber Crime. They expressed serious concern at the misuse of cyber space as a medium to promote subversive and extremist ideologies. They also noted the need for concerted action by the international community against terrorism through the conclusion of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), which India had proposed as far back as 1996.

Building the Strategic partnership

Saudi Arabia is India’s fourth largest trading partner after the US, China and UAE. India and Saudi Arabia aim to transform their traditional buyer seller relationship into a strategic partnership. India imports nearly 80 per cent of its energy needs, and about 20 per cent of that comes from Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has been the top exporter of crude oil to India. In 2017-18, India imported US$ 16.8 billion worth of crude from Saudi Arabia. India is dependent on the Persian Gulf for its energy security and the rise in oil prices can have a destabilizing effect on its economy. With the United States imposing fresh sanctions on Iran after withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the waiver granted with respect to continued oil imports from Iran slated to end in May 2019, India, which sources nine per cent of its oil imports from Iran, has to find alternate sources. This compulsion makes Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries important for India to meet its energy requirements.

For its part, Saudi Arabia aspires to diversify its economy and promote economic stability through long term investments. During the visit, the Crown Prince highlighted his intention to invest more than US$ 100 billion in India in the areas of refining, petrochemicals, infrastructure, agriculture, minerals and mining, manufacturing, education and health. In addition, an MoU was signed to enable Saudi investments in the National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) for the building of roads, ports, airports, power etc. Furthermore, a Framework cooperation programme was signed between Invest India and Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA) to facilitate investment by the private sector and the establishment of joint ventures in the fields of petrochemical industries, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.

Under the leadership of Bin Salman, Saudi Arabia is embracing socio-economic reforms and is keen on India becoming part of this effort. The two countries agreed to align the Saudi Vision 2030 and thirteen Vision Realization Programs with India’s flagship initiatives of Make in India, Start Up India, Smart Cities, Clean India and Digital India. The Saudi Vision 2030 also focuses on developing a vibrant entertainment industry. As part of its economic reforms Saudi Arabia is building an amusement hub called Qiddiya entertainment city and seeks Indian investment in the venture.

Saudi ARAMCO, along with Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), has pledged to invest in the Ratnagiri Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited (RRPL). An Indian consortium composed of Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum Corporation, and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, RRPL is estimated to cost US$ 44 billion and expected to become operational in 2025. In addition, India and Saudi Arabia are exploring the possibility of a US$10 billion investment through the Public Investment Fund and the technology partners of RRPL. The two countries also intend to discuss other investment opportunities worth $26 billion in the Project.

Way Forward

The Crown Prince’s visit has led to a cementing of ties through commitments to enhance cooperation in a number of areas, greater investments in each other’s economy, and encouraging people to people contact. The two countries can promote cooperation in the areas of agriculture, renewable energy and Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia. Finding ways to enhance India’s farm exports to Saudi Arabia needs to be explored. Saudi Arabia imports farm produce worth more than US$ 19 billion a year, but India has only an 11 per cent share in this market. With a view to boosting Indian farm sector exports to West Asia, India has decided to remove all restrictions on organic products and processed products. Apart from that, as Saudi Arabia intends to invest in renewable energy, new facets of collaboration can be explored in line with its agreement to join the International Solar Alliance.  

Saudi Arabia is home to more than 3.2 million Indians engaged in various sectors and professions. India and Saudi Arabia look forward to integrate their migration platforms e-Migrate and e-Tawtheeq. In order to enhance people to people contact, India has consented to increase the seats of Saudi Arabian Airlines from 80,000 seats per month to 112,000. For its part, Saudi Arabia has agreed to increase India’s haj quota to two lakh.

Indo-Saudi ties have come a long way from being transactional business relations to evolving into a strategic partnership. The Crown Prince’s visit is indicative of India’s growing acceptance as an important global power and reflects the strong ties that it has forged in recent decades with Gulf countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. Last year, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj had attended the Janadriyah festival in Saudi Arabia as a guest of honour and inaugurated the India pavilion showcasing India’s growth and development along with cultural aspects. Saudi Arabia also played a key role in the invitation that was extended to India by the United Arab Emirates to be a ‘guest of honour’ at the 46th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).This broadening of the relationship between India and Saudi Arabia is likely to take the strategic partnership to new heights.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Speaking at the Chennai International Centre’s first Business Visionaries Series talk on February 09, 2019, Vembu Sridhar of Zoho Corporation declared that: “We have developed a 4G LTE Modem in stealth mode. 50 engineers worked for eight years, and it taped out just last week in Taiwan. 5G is on its way. India must have its own LTE chip for national security.”

With these many words, the Indian Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry came of age and shattered the glass ceiling by developing and manufacturing indigenous high end chipsets. The news comes in quick succession to another such remarkable achievement i.e. Project SHAKTI of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras, which in August 2018 announced the development of a family of six types of microprocessors with the initial batch of 300 chips of Class C processor called RISECREEK being manufactured free of cost by Intel Corporation at their facility in Oregon.

Development of indigenous microprocessors not only opens up immense business opportunities in the ICT space but provides a very high degree of security and assurance to strategic cyber systems ranging from space, infrastructure and navigation to power, defence and nuclear. The next step in becoming a true power house in the ICT arena would be development of indigenous systems and technologies covering the entire gamut of ICT ecosystem ranging from high end servers and routers to last mile modems and smart phones.

The Long Term Evolution (LTE) Segment in Global Cellular Market

Mobile communication standards are classified in terms of generations or “g”. The 2g networks had a maximum data rate of 64 Kilobits per second (Kbps) and could barely pass data required for multimedia messaging service (MMS). The 3g networks have a maximum data rate of 2 Megabits per second (Mbps) and are capable of sending and receiving a host of data applications including web pages, etc. In 2008, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) promulgated the 4g standards which had peak data speeds ranging from 100 Mbps (for mobile devices) to 1 Gigabits per second (Gbps) for static hot spots. Since none of the cellular networks were able to achieve these data ranges, LTE as a marketing terminology was coined to specify those systems and devices which had progressed far beyond the 3g data rates but were yet to achieve the 4g data rates. Thus, 4g LTE written near the antenna symbol on the mobile phone specified that the peak data rates were higher than 2 Mbps but had not yet achieved 100 Mbps.

Another aspect to LTE is transition from circuit switching to packet switching and Carrier Aggregation (CA). Older networks used to rely on circuit switching technology. In this a circuit was engineered end to end (from host mobile phone to destination mobile phone) before the call being processed. This ensured a higher quality of service but with a lesser data rate and the call used to get disconnected in case a link in the connection suffered a break down during the call. In packet switching technology, the data stream is divided into data packets of fixed length with each packet being sent from the host to destination device through multiple routes. The packets are combined at the destination end and some loss of packets is acceptable to the system. This technology can provide higher data rates and is used extensively in video calls as well as voice calls over a host of social media applications like Skype, etc. Sometimes, it is referred to as Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) or Voice over LTE (VoLTE). Secondly, most of the cellular service providers hold licences of a smaller block of mobile radio spectrum (one carrier channel is of 20 Megahertz or Mhz bandwidth). In order to achieve higher data rates, blocks of spectrum (carrier channels) are aggregated dynamically to achieve a higher bandwidth (say, 40 Mhz for LTE cat 6 speed) and are referred to as 2xCA or 3xCA.

There are 20 User Equipment (UE) categories (based on their uplink and down link data speeds) specified in the LTE standards. These UE categories enable the LTE base stations to communicate effectively with the terminal devices (smart phone, tablet, hotspot, etc.). LTE 0 has a maximum downlink as well as uplink data rate of 1.0 Mbps while LTE 15 has a maximum downlink data rate of 750 Mbps and uplink data rate of 226 Mbps. LTE 6 to LTE 8 are known as LTE Advance or LTE-A and use CA for increasing data rates.

The LTE market is expected to garner business of up to US$ 997 billion and grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 58.2 per cent during 2013-2020. Qualcomm is the market leader with 65 per cent of the market share. Its microprocessor Snapdragon 820 is the heart of Samsung top end smartphone Galaxy S7 as well as LG G5. The Snapdragon820 supports LTE 12 (maximum downlink data rate of 600 Mbps, uplink data rate of 150 Mbps with 3xCA). Apart from Qualcomm, the other major players are Samsung, Hi-Silicon (subsidiary of Huawei), Intel and MediaTek. The LTE chipsets are used in network transmission systems and user terminal devices like smart phones, tablets, mobile hotspots, USB dongles, ultra-books and host of Internet of Things (IoT) devices.

According to Vembu, the Zoho chipset is on the transmission side (modem) and not on the terminal device side, details of which are yet to be disclosed. The latest LTE modem by Qualcomm is Snapdragon X24 which supports category 20 LTE (with peak downlink data rate of 2 Gbps and uplink of 316 Mbps). It has been estimated that the global smart phone population is expected to reach 2.5 billion in 2019 (36 per cent of the global population). With 1.3 billion smart phones, China will top the list, followed by India at 530 million, and the United States of America coming in a distant third with 229 million. In 2018, mobile devices accounted for 73 per cent of the time spent on using the internet clearly establishing the predominance of smartphones over other mobile devices, like laptops and tablets, when it came to use of internet for personal use.

Need to Indigenise ICT Capabilities

The broad categories of ICT industry include software, devices and infrastructure, IT and business services, emerging technologies and telecommunication services. By 2019, the global ICT market including video and TV services is projected to be €4.4 trillion industry. The Indian ICT sector is expected to have revenue of US$ 225 billion by 2020 with a growth CAGR of 11.1 per cent. In addition, as per the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics of 2017, India had a negative trade balance of $ -147,840 million in spite of an export growth rate of +13.3 per cent with the share of ICT goods at mere 0.89 per cent of the total export. The above statistics clearly indicate that by indigenisation of ICT industry, India will not only be able to substantially reduce its imports but also drastically improve its global exports resulting in a favourable trade balance between exports and imports, in addition to generating revenue and employment opportunities for our vast population.

Another important aspect with respect to cyber indigenisation is the growing use of cyber domain for intelligence gathering, espionage, crime and warfare. Kaspersky, in its latest report, highlighted the growing cyber threat to mobile devices especially smartphones and tablets as they become the preferred medium for accessing the internet. One of the looming threats to mobile devices employed in critical tasks is the use of embedded spyware or backdoor in the chipset, which are tough to detect and can cause not only enormous loss of critical data but can also be remotely controlled to either malfunction or preform wrongly during crucial moments.

On October 04, 2018, Bloomberg came out with the sensational news of Chinese embedding covert electronic backdoor the size of a grain of rice into servers of major American companies including Apple and Amazon during the manufacturing stage. Nowadays, chipset production technology has advanced to producing System on Chip (SoC), which essentially means integrating many different devices like antenna, transceiver and processor onto one single chip which makes it nearly impossible to detect the presence of backdoor in the chipset, which creates serious problems for devices employed in performing critical functions. Under such conditions, having indigenous ICT technologies spanning the entire ICT spectrum enables protection of critical IT systems as well as provides the much needed cyber autonomy.

Lessons from Zoho Corporation

Zoho Corporation is a fully private owned company which started off as AdventNet Inc. in 1996 with WebNMS as their first business product for telecommunication industry. Today, the company has over 25 products and 50 mobile apps and specialises in providing a complete range of software solutions for running a business including Customer Relationship Manager (CRM), Mail, Books (accounting software), Projects and Create (for developing customised software for business needs). The company not only specialises in cloud based business software but also provides specialised software to the telecommunication industry for managing IT assets and networks. Zoho Corp boasts of having a worldwide user base of 35 million and revenue of Rs. 2,468 crores.

What is unique about the company is that it runs a university which picks up talented youth from low income households and after training absorbs them in its workplace. Almost 15 per cent of the 3,600 employees of Zoho Corp are Zoho University graduates. Also, the amount of time and effort placed on Research & Development (R&D) is worth a mention. Vembu has often remarked that the reason why the company has never gone public is because it wants to work according to its own clock without worrying about giving revenue to the investors at fixed intervals. Developing and improving a product for eight years with a team of 50 scientists in such a time sensitive industry speaks volumes about the R&D efforts as well as pursuit of excellence of Zoho Corp. The company has therefore been extremely successful in producing indigenous world-class software and selling it to the world, and with the production of LTE chipset it would soon start making forays into the hardware segment of the ICT industry.

In a sense, Zoho Corp is a role model for Indian companies trying to enter the highly competitive and niche field of ICT manufacturing and services. It has proved that the global ICT market is open to absorbing new players irrespective of their size and revenue provided they offer well researched innovative solutions and products as per global standards at competitive price.

Conclusion

The almost back to back announcements of IIT Madras and Vembu Sridhar in successfully designing and carrying out initial production of microprocessors and chipsets is a much awaited shot in the arm for Indian ICT industry and signifies its coming of age. What now needs to be watched is the type of modem chipset Zoho Corp has designed and its subsequent acceptance and absorption in the cutting edge global mobile industry.

India, being the second largest smartphone market in the world, definitely needs to encourage and incentivise home-grown ICT industry for not only giving a boost to its ‘Skill India’ and ‘Make in India’ initiatives but also to provide cyber autonomy to its critical cyber assets. In addition, there is an urgent need to have the entire gamut of ICT infostructure to be indigenously manufactured including the much awaited Galium Nitride fab as proposed by the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

India and Iran are trying to manage the impact on their bilateral relationship of US withdrawal from the JCPOA and re-imposition of sanctions on Iran. The visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif to India on 7-9 January 2019 was an attempt to provide impetus to various aspects of the bilateral relationship. While the focus of engagement during Zarif’s visit was on enhancing economic cooperation, the issue of Afghanistan in the backdrop of Trump’s announcement to withdraw American troops was also discussed. Zarif termed his visit “productive”.

Economic Engagement

India-Iran ties have traditionally been dominated by oil trade. Bilateral trade during fiscal 2016-17 stood at USD 12.89 billion, with Indian imports constituting USD 10.5 billion and exports accounting for USD 2.4 billion. When the Obama administration lifted US sanctions on Iran, India increased its share of oil imports from Iran from 7 to 13 per cent. However, in 2018, the Trump administration re-imposed oil-related sanctions on Iran and urged countries to reduce their imports of Iranian oil to zero. At the same time, the Trump administration granted India, along with China, Turkey, Japan, Turkey, Italy and Greece, country specific waivers under Section 1245 of NDAA 2012, which allows companies to continue importing Iranian oil for 180 days. India, which had previously planned to raise oil imports from Iran to around 500,000 bpd in 2018-19, will now be buying only 300,000 bpd up to March 2019.

As the deadline for the waiver period approaches, Indian officials are working with their Iranian counterparts to find a way to minimize the impact of unilateral US sanctions. One mechanism they have agreed upon is the payment of dues for Iranian crude in Indian rupees, which Iran will use to source non-sanctionable and humanitarian goods like food and medicine from India. Discussions were also held in this regard during Zarif’s visit. During a public event in which Zarif participated, Minister of State V.K. Singh noted the potential for deeper cooperation in the engineering and pharmaceutical sectors. Speaking at the same event, Gholamhossein Shafei, the president of Iran Chamber of Commerce Industries, Mines and Agriculture, noted the potential for partnerships between Indian and Iranian companies in the field of medicine.

India and Iran also need to address other issues that have tended to constrain bilateral trade. For instance, on the agricultural front, Shafei stated that the imposition of high tariffs on imported Iranian farm products is a major barrier for Iranian exporters. Another matter of concern is the increasing cost of urea imports from Iran. Due to US sanctions, Tehran cannot sell fertilizers directly to India but only through intermediaries. Indian farmers are paying 38 per cent more for Iranian fertilizer than earlier. This issue merits the attention of Indian and Iranian officials.

The energy sector is another important area of concern. Iran's deputy foreign minister for economic diplomacy Gholamreza Ansari has urged India to seek another waiver from US sanctions to ensure that their oil trade does not suffer. New Delhi faced a similar situation in 2012, but on that occasion had managed to meet the US requirement by significantly reducing its imports from Iran and thus meeting the exemptions granted under the Significant Reduction Exemption (SRE) category of NDAA 2012. For India, Iranian crude is crucial because of subsided prices and 90-day credit facility. Since the SRE provision went back into effect on November 5, 2018 after the US withdrawal from JCPOA, India would now have to continue to reduce its imports of Iranian oil.

There are also other barriers to importing Iranian crude. India mostly used to employ foreign carriers to import oil from Iran. But US sanctions have deterred international shippers and insurers from extending their services. Currently, Iran is providing both tankers and insurance under CIF contract (Cost, Insurance and Freight). But this is not sustainable because, according to the Merchant Shipping Rules 2012, it is mandatory for foreign ships entering Indian ports to hold a valid third-party liability cover, commonly referred to as protection and indemnity (P&I). Such third-party liability risks have to be insured with the London-based International Group of P&I companies or an insurance company authorized by the Indian government. As foreign firms are susceptible to sanctions, it is imperative that India and Iran negotiate the matters of insurance and identify a host to cover the liability.

Although economic diplomacy was the key highlight of Zarif’s visit to India, not much was said about the impasse over the Farzad B gas deal. The negotiation of the deal was meant to be completed by September 2017, but has been delayed due to issues over pricing. Last year, the bilateral relationship became strained after Tehran sought investors like Russia’s Gazprom, while accusing India of being slow and inflexible on issues relating to pricing. In order to make their energy cooperation more significant, India and Iran have to reach a common understanding that addresses the interests of both countries.

The Afghanistan Situation

During the visit, Zarif raised the issue of the Afghan conflict and stressed the need to strengthen bilateral cooperation on regional security issues. For both countries, the situation in Afghanistan is a matter of acute concern. In the 1990s, they, along with Russia, had played a role in preventing the complete takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban. But now, the two countries have diverging views on issues concerning Afghanistan.

Firstly, their views differ on the role of the US in Afghanistan. India considers the US presence in Afghanistan as a net benefit. But Iran is of the view that the presence of US troops has only contributed to the deterioration of security and stability in Afghanistan.

Secondly, India and Iran have differing views on the Taliban. Like Russia, China and the US, Iran views Taliban not only as a problem in Afghanistan but also as a solution. Iran’s position is that it would be impossible to have a stable Afghanistan without a role for the Taliban in governance. In January 2019, a high-level Iranian delegation affirmed Tehran’s influence over the Taliban and offered to use that influence for New Delhi. However, India is apprehensive and fears that Taliban returning to power will lead to a spike in extremism in the region.

Lastly, Iran, as much as it is appreciative of India’s role in Afghanistan, is also trying to engage with Pakistan. During his visit, Zarif alluded that Islamabad is trying to play a positive role in getting the peace process underway and sees extremism as an existential threat. India, of course, does not see Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan as being positive. It remains to be seen how India and Iran address their divergences on the Afghan conflict in order to strengthen regional security cooperation.

Prognosis

Javad Zarif’s visit to India can be viewed as an attempt to re-energize economic and security cooperation. While the payment mechanism and banking issues seem to have been resolved with the implementation of the barter system and the decision to establish an Iranian bank of Pasargad branch in Mumbai, issues relating to shipping and insurance need immediate attention. Further, India and Iran must coordinate with other countries like the European Union, Russia and China to find an arrangement to circumvent US sanctions. On regional issues like Afghanistan, India and Iran need more engagement to gain a better understanding of each other’s viewpoints and further cement their partnership. Overall, Zarif’s visit has created a better environment to take the relationship forward. But the challenge lies in sustaining the current momentum.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Note: This commentary has been amended. The US legislation under which the country-specific waiver for India and other countries was provided was originally wrongly specified as the Iran Sanctions Act of 2006. The waiver is provided under Section 1245 of NDAA 2012. The relevant sentence has been amended.

The killing of Naqeebullah Mehsud, a young Pashtun from Waziristan in Karachi on January 13, 2018, opened the floodgates of protests by the Pashtuns, giving rise to the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), which roughly translates into ‘Movement for Safety and Security of the Pashtuns’. The movement’s main aim was to highlight the plight of the Pashtun community, the second largest ethnic group in Pakistan, constituting nearly 15.42 per cent of the population. 

Since its beginning, PTM has organized protest rallies in most of the major cities including Quetta, Peshawar, Lahore, Swat, Karachi, Dera Ismail Khan, Swab and Bannu. The latest rally was held in Tank, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, on January 13, 2019, to observe the first anniversary of the  killing of Mehsud. Against the backdrop of the tight scrutiny from the government of the media coverage of the PTM protests and arrest of Pashtun leader Alamzeb Mehsud on January 21, 2019 under the provisions of the anti-terrorism law, this article seeks to place in perspective the significances of PTM in Pakistan’s overall political landscape.

Pashtuns mostly occupy the north-western part of the country and have the second largest representation in the Pakistan Army as well. As an ethnic community straddling two sovereign countries — Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pashtuns share common nationalist feelings. Given persistent ethnic and familial ties between the Pashtuns in both countries and intermittent demand from Afghan leaders for a greater Afghanistan comprising of the Pashtun areas in Pakistan, any manifestation of Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan is a point of worry for the Pakistani authorities, as it is often construed as a potentially disintegrative development. 

The Af-Pak border region has been in turmoil since the days of the Afghan jihad, when the Pakistani tribal areas along the border hosted the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet forces. Post-9/11, the tribal areas again came under focus as Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban cadres fleeing Afghanistan landed up there forcing the Pakistan Army to launch multiple operations to either eliminate or flush out these elements. In the days since, the whole area dominated by the Pashtuns has witnessed armed action leading to death, deprivation, disappearances and large-scale displacement of civilian population. The resultant anxieties and concerns have naturally flown into the movement that we see today in the shape of the PTM.

The movement led by Manzoor Pastheen gained lots of traction in January 2018 and triggered protests in big cities like Lahore and Karachi where PTM leaders addressed huge public rallies. This was seen as the largest non-violent protests in Pakistan and thus attracted considerable international attention. Although there was only sporadic and controlled reporting of the movement in the Pakistani media, the international media covered the issue in greater detail. This encouraged PTM members to organize more rallies and reiterate their demands, which included the removal of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), the release of missing persons, stopping the humiliation of Pashtuns at security checkpoints, and removal of landmines in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

The pressure on the Pakistan government was such that it had to give in to some of the movement’s demands. Firstly, it agreed to no longer impose curfews in the region and promised to develop a mechanism to find the missing persons. Most important of all, the FATA Interim Governance Regulation 2018, signed by the President of Pakistan on May 28, 2018, replaced the FCR and outlined how FATA would be governed, "within a timeframe of two years", even as the region is merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).

Interestingly, this new interim regulation placed a check on the actions of the security forces that previously operated in the backdrop of the prevailing lawlessness in the region.  Thanks to the PTM, the public pressure around the Naqeebullah case was such that the then Senior Superintendent of Police of Karachi's Malir District, Rao Anwar Ahmed Khan, who led the fake encounter of Mehsud, was forced to go into hiding. The movement became so prominent that some analysts in Pakistan as well as outside predicated that it could turn into a political party. Riding on the high tides of the PTM, Pashtun leaders Mohsin Dawar and Ali Wazir fought the general elections of 2018 as independent candidates and secured their respective seats in the parliament. They kept supporting the PTM and voiced the rights of the Pashtuns at the political level and therefore faced the wrath of the PTI government.

By over-emphasizing the negative role of the Pakistan Army in the region, the PTM unwittingly let the movement lose steam a few months later. The overuse of the term, Yeh jo dehshat gardi hai, iss ke peechhay wardi hai (‘Behind this terrorism is the uniformed army’) by PTM protesters irritated the Pakistan Army, which, in turn, accused the PTM of being a tool of anti-Pakistan forces at the regional and international levels, alluding to the involvement of Indian agencies. Therefore, rather than addressing PTM’s genuine grievances, the then PML-N government went on the defensive. With Imran Khan’s government, which assumed power in August 2018 and is regarded as an extension of the Pakistan Army, there is very little attention being paid to PTM and its demands.

Charging the PTM of being supported by an external hand, Pakistani authorities have restricted the coverage the movement’s activities get, both in local as well as international media. Radio Mashaal, a Pashto language broadcaster funded by the US, was banned and blocked for covering PTM’s activities. Voice of America’s Urdu Language website, Deewa, which primarily catered to the Pashto-speaking audience in the border regions near Afghanistan, was sporadically blocked in October 2018 and then permanently dropped by various service providers in December 2018. Additionally, various police cases were filed against journalists covering the local rallies of the PTM.

These bans and coercive scrutiny of the media came at a time when the Pashtun activists were charging that freedom of expression in Pakistan was under severe attack. Mohsin Dawar and Ali Wazir were stopped from travelling to Dubai to attend a Pashtun Cultural event and their names were put on the Exit Control List (ECL). The recent arrest of Alamzeb on the pretext of rioting and inciting hatred at a PTM protest demonstration in Karachi yet again reflects the coercive strategy of the government to muzzle the movement.

The balance sheet of PTM after one year of rallies and protests is not as impressive as it promised to be. Although it has been able to mainstream the Pashtun issue in Pakistan and inspired popular empathy, its anti-establishment thrust has made it a soft target of the pro-establishment media and political actors. The perception created by the state that it is acting as a proxy of outside powers, especially India, to de-stabilise Pakistan, has made it lose steam too soon. Even if the allegation has no evidence whatsoever, it has deep resonance in Pakistani society, where anti-India sentiments have been periodically mobilised by the security establishment as a rallying point to stave off the efforts of ethnic groups demanding their rights.

While Manzoor Pastheen and PTM were given wide space in the Pakistani media initially, there was a complete ban on the coverage of its rallies after rumours of it being sponsored by foreign agencies did the rounds. The international media was not granted access to the Pashtuns. Soon, the PTM’s demand to try and punish Rao Anwar, who led the fake encounter of Naqeebullah Mehsud, was ignored by the media. Instead of taking any action against the erring policeman, the state has allowed him to go underground. Rao Anwar has been allegedly provided a safe haven by the Army, according to Pakistani media.

Against this backdrop, the recent protests in Tank, KP, was a bit of a surprise. The massive gathering of Pashtuns in Tank to observe the first anniversary of the murder of Naqeebullah Mehsud signalled the persistence of Pashtun nationalist sentiments and the continued existence of a sense of grievance among the Pashtuns vis-à-vis the state of Pakistan. Addressing the gathering, Manzoor Pastheen reiterated his resolve to continue the protests “even if it takes hundred years” to seek justice through peaceful means.

However, predictably, there was no coverage of the event in the Pakistani media. The international media also seems to have lost interest in the issue. Only sporadic amateur videos shot by the protesters are available in the social media in Pashto language. In an interesting article in Al Jazeera, Taha Siddiqui, who fled the country after abduction attempt, and is now living in exile in France, argued forcefully that efforts by the Pakistani government to silence the movement have backfired. He stressed that as a “result of this state-led harassment campaign, the PTM gained more traction and its gatherings are becoming larger than ever”.  He cautioned the government that this movement, although nonviolent until now, has the potential to become violent, if the government continues with its heavy-handed tactics to suppress it.

At the political level, the PTI governments in KP and in Islamabad have raised the aspirations of the people but not done anything to fulfil them. The presence of a large number of protesters in Tank may also indicate popular disillusionment with the way the present government has treated the Pashtuns. In this context, it remains uncontested that the PTM is a grassroots movement of the Pashtuns demanding basic rights within the constitution. It thus has the potential to transform itself into a political party. But if the Pakistan government continues to handle the Pashtun issue with an iron fist, the movement has the potential to transform into a violent struggle in an environment where gun-culture reigns supreme. A lot will thus depend on the state’s overall policy towards the Pashtuns in general and the PTM in particular. 

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.