While still in the evolution stage, BRI has the potential to be a game changer in China’s quest to shape a ‘Sino-Centric’ Global Order.
The second Belt-Road Forum (BRF) was held in Beijing from 25-27 April 2019. The three-day event was organized to promote the ‘Belt-Road Initiative’ (BRI) - President Xi Jinping’s multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure development and investment venture. The Summit was attended by 40 global leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, China’s two closest allies. The gathering was larger than the first Summit held in 2017, which had just 29 participants. Among the new entrants were Austria, Portugal, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Thailand. Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte became the first G7 leader to join the BRI. India stayed out for the second time on grounds of sovereignty given that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) traverses through Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK).
BRI has come under fire due to lack of transparency, weak institutional mechanism, scepticism about Chinese loans leading to debt trap, and poor environmental record. Besides, it is being perceived as an exclusive ‘Chinese Club’. With new deals aggregating US$ 64 billion signed and 283 concrete deliverable outcomes, despite criticism particularly from the US and its allies, the grand plan apparently remains on track and is gaining international traction. With a view to dispel growing concerns, the focus of this second Forum was on projecting BRI as an attractive investment destination. President Xi staunchly defended the Belt-Road, assuring its ‘win-win’ outcome.
BRI provides China a unique platform to pursue its multiple objectives. Besides expanding global influence, it is in sync with President Xi’s ‘China Dream’ (Zhong Quo Meng), envisioning a ‘powerful and prosperous’ China. Numerous hurdles notwithstanding, the Belt-Road Initiative is bound to impact the prevailing geopolitical dynamics and have strategic ramifications. It merits a pragmatic evaluation.
BRI: An Appraisal
The mammoth infrastructure development initiative was originally conceptualized as a ‘going out’ strategy to develop productive outlets for China’s domestic overcapacity, diversify foreign asset holdings, and contribute to the stabilization of the Western provinces and the Eurasian hinterland. It was in 2013 that President Xi Jinping launched the ‘One Belt-One Road’ (OBOR) project, later rechristened as BRI. The initiative was portrayed as a benign investment venture – a ‘road of peace and prosperity’ with vast benefits. Spanning across Asia, Africa, Oceania and South America, the total value of the scheme was estimated at $ 3.67 trillion. According to the World Bank, the plan is expected to lift global GDP growth by three per cent.
China’s initiative evinced interest from a large number of countries since it was filling the void left by International Financial Institutions (IFI) which had stopped financing infrastructure development. BRI is in no way a traditional aid programme, but a money-making investment. It blends political, economic and strategic dimensions. Being country specific, the approach adopted varies from resolving debts, accepting payments in cash, commodities or in lease. Investments in many cases seek to further core Chinese national interests including gaining access to sensitive ports and securing sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Alongside the physical infrastructure, another ambitious project on the anvil is the ‘digital silk road’ aimed at enhancing digital connectivity. This will enable Chinese dominance of 5G technology and networks, arousing concerns amongst Western nations.
A few BRI countries had expressed dissatisfaction with the on-going ventures including Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Several projects under CPEC also came under the scanner. A hydro-power project in Nepal was scrapped. The Trump administration holds the view that China’s ‘predatory financing’ pushes smaller countries into debt, endangering their sovereignty. Beijing’s acquisition of Hambantota port on 99-year lease in a debt swap agreement in 2017 is a case in point. Recently, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo slammed China while addressing the opening session of the ‘Arctic Council’ in Finland for using its power through BRI to achieve security objectives.
The exact number of projects under BRI is hard to calculate, though these run into thousands because many have been informally negotiated. Most striking of the Belt-Road ventures is the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) which will connect Malaysia’s East Coast to Southern Thailand and Kuala Lumpur. CPEC, connecting Xinjiang with Gwadar and the ‘Gulf of Oman’ is a signature project. Total trade between China and BRI nations has exceeded $ 6 trillion. Chinese investment in these countries stands at over $ 80 billion. BRI provides China an overarching framework for enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
Recalibration and Branding
In the wake of growing international criticism, President Xi recognised the need to review and recalibrate the BRI. During the April 2019 Summit, he vouched for China’s sincerity and vowed ‘zero tolerance’ on corruption while assuring deliverance of ‘high quality’ schemes in consonance with international standards. Key concerns, namely cleaning of state subsidies, reducing non-tariff barriers, boosting imports and protecting ‘Intellectual Property Rights’, were also highlighted.
China has been criticised for allowing its companies to take away 90 per cent of the business and dictating own financing terms to borrowers. Xi reaffirmed that BRI would adopt market-driven practices, making financial terms negotiable between lenders and borrowers. He also indicated that new rules will be formulated within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Signs of partial backtracking by China are evident from the fact that Malaysia has renegotiated the terms of the rail project with a much-reduced outlay and increased local participation. Even Pakistan is in the process of reviewing the terms of CPEC.
According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, with the policy refresh in implementing BRI, it will be less of a political target in future. In the image building exercise, Belt-Road has now been termed as a ‘community of common destiny’. A kind of G150, it seeks to promote multilateralism, globalisation and development, alongside human rights, providing an umbrella for plurilateral cooperation. BRI manifests China’s confidence as a global player, gradually stepping into the strategic space yielded by the USA.
India’s Stance on BRI
India once again chose to keep out of the BRF since the reasons for its abstention from the 2017 Summit remain valid. According to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality. It further stressed that projects should not create a debt burden and instead empower local communities.
At a pre-Summit conference, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasised that Sino-Indian ties were insulated from the differences over BRI. He said that China understood India’s concerns about CPEC. According to China’s Ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, better connectivity between the two countries could be the key to address the existing trade deficit and bring more strategic convergence on India’s ‘Act East Policy’.
India’s keeping out of the BRI does not count for much unless it has a blueprint to counter China’s grand design. New Delhi’s first regional initiative, its ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ (CCAP), is a step in the right direction as it reflects the nation’s will to play a larger role in the region. The ‘Trilateral Agreement’ between Afghanistan, India and Iran offers an excellent opportunity to implement a ‘Look North Strategy’. There is vast scope for connectivity with ASEAN as well.
Strategic Imperatives
Despite impediments, China remains steadfast in pushing through the BRI to achieve its multiple objectives. The BRI now dominates Beijing’s geo-economic discourse. Growing apprehensions about the sustainability of various projects and the burgeoning debt burden of the recipient countries have led to serious doubts over the long-term viability of such a mega venture, putting China’s credibility at risk. Consequently, the focus of the recent Summit was on dispelling misgivings.
BRI is primarily South Asia and IOR centric, as is evident from the number of projects in these regions – CPEC, CMEC (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor), ‘Nepal-China Trans Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network’ including Nepal-China cross border railway, besides significant projects in Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka. The Maritime Silk Route encompasses major ports such as Kyakhphu in the Bay of Bengal and Gwadar in the Arabian Sea. On completion of the above ventures, China will enjoy a competitive edge in the region.
India has rightly chosen not to participate in the Forum as there is no viable opportunity for it. New Delhi needs to closely monitor the infrastructure development activities in the region from the strategic perspective and within the larger framework of relations with Beijing. At the same time, it must pursue alternate connectivity initiatives like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) in collaboration with partners such as Japan to ensure geostrategic balance in the region.
China’s Communist leadership is known for grand initiatives. President Xi’s Belt-Road is one such mega venture. While still in the evolution stage, BRI has the potential to be a game changer in China’s quest to shape a ‘Sino-Centric’ Global Order.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
If Baghdadi has possibly moved toward the east, then the proclamation of an Indian branch flashes a note of caution for the security and intelligence agencies.
On the face of it, the proclamation by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that it has established a ‘province’ in India appears to be a case of hollow propaganda and far removed from reality. It is true that the police in Kashmir have described it as ‘pure propaganda’, as reported by Al Jazeera. However, the director of the SITE Intel Group, Rita Katz, has said that the claim "should not be written off". Though apparently seen as information hype, Indian intelligence agencies have been put on high alert.
On 10 May 2019, the Amaq news agency of ISIS claimed that the group has established the ‘Wilayah of Hind’. Amaq, however, did not elaborate on the geographical limits of the so-called province. Interestingly, the proclamation coincided with the elimination of Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi, a suspected operative of ISIS in India, by the security forces in an encounter in Shopian in south Kashmir on the same day.
A series of propaganda events unleashed by the ISIS after the Easter suicide bombings in Sri Lanka in April 2019 would be worth noting. First and foremost, ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi re-emerged from his self-imposed isolation since 2014 and applauded the jihadists of Sri Lanka for avenging the ISIS losses at Baghouz. Thereafter, ISIS declared the new emir of the ‘Bengal region’, apparently targeting the state of West Bengal and Bangladesh. The latest announcement in this series is the claim of an ISIS ‘province’ in Kashmir.
Although the terror outfit has had an ever shrinking ‘Caliphate’ of late, yet its ‘peripheral’ attacks outside its core area of the Middle East/West Asia have been on the rise, with a peak in Sri Lanka. For instance, in April-May 2019, ISIS reported three attacks in the Democratic Republic of Congo, claimed an assault on the Nigerian Army barracks in Borno, and released the video of an ambush on Chechen soldiers.
It is interesting to note that, in the context of the ISIS’s recent proclamation on Kashmir, analysts were also of the opinion that global jihadist groups have failed to exploit the Kashmir conflict, unlike conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The fundamental reason, as put forward by Mohammed Sinan Siyech, in a paper in Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses published in May 2018 was that the Kashmir issue is primarily a territorial and political dispute as opposed to a purely religious/Islamist conflict. Furthermore, cross-border terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are in opposition to the concept of a pan-global Islamic Caliphate. Consequently, ISIS has failed to establish its footprints in the Kashmir Valley.
Further, writing for the Observer Research Foundation in July 2018, Kabir Taneja espoused a similar notion insofar as the foothold or the lack of it of ISIS in Kashmir was concerned. But Taneja also cautioned the security and academic community against taking the ISIS threat too lightly. In his view, “[t]he threat ISIS poses to India, and South Asia in general, is as real as it is for any other major region or state. This does not come from an organisational pattern from the so-called caliphate or al-Baghdadi himself, but the ecosystem that has been created that allows open-source access to ISIS as a brand…….”
In a recent commentary, Adil Rasheed quoted Tim Lister while stressing that ISIS is at present increasingly focusing on India since it perceives the country as a promising territory given growing Muslim-Hindu tensions.
Post-Baghouz Trajectory
The emerging aspect in the post-Baghouz terror dynamics is the greater stress by ISIS in forging ties with local surrogate groups in Asia and Africa. Such a hypothesis has been agreed to by the former Jammu & Kashmir Director General of Police Shesh Paul Vaid when he spoke to The Wire in the wake of the elimination of Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi and the concomitant declaration by ISIS. Kashmir police officials are of the considered view that militants have no organisational link to the ISIS as such and are only motivated by their ideology. Nonetheless, Sofi’s relatives and friends asserted to the contrary. They said: “We don’t know the ideology of ISIS. For us every mujahid [jihadi] is our brother. They are fighting for our cause”. In fact, it didn’t matter to them whether the mujahids were with the Islamic State or some other group. This sense among disgruntled Kashmiri youth of being associated with the ‘mujahid’ has the necessary fallout in the form of being indoctrinated with jihadi propaganda. And ISIS has acquired a master craftsmanship in that domain.
In this backdrop, an extremely interesting bit of prediction has come up about Baghdadi. Zaid Hamid, a founding member of a threat analysis think tank, has said that Baghdadi could be in Afghanistan. Hamid’s understanding is based on the style of the bedding and pillows shown in the video featuring Baghdadi after the Easter suicide bombings. At the other end, Iraqi security adviser Hisham al-Hashemi has said that officials have narrowed the whereabouts of Baghdadi from 17 to a possible four locations. If true, then Baghdadi is moving or has moved toward the East, and hence is closer to India. ISIS had formed its Khorasan branch in 2015 to oversee the activities in Pakistan, Afghanistan and neighbouring lands.
For the time being, it could be inferred that the ISIS top brass is under tremendous pressure. It is fighting for its very survival. And if Baghdadi has possibly moved toward the east, then the proclamation of an Indian branch flashes a note of caution for the security and intelligence agencies. Baghdadi, on the other hand, now desperately seeks local alliances of the variety of Zaharan Hashim of Sri Lanka or Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi of Kashmir. ISIS would continue to float its brand image of the global caliphate and be in constant search of ‘feudal support’ at local bases.
If the ISIS leadership were to shift eastwards, the entire terror network can take up a different paradigm altogether. A vanishing Daesh could turn out to be lethal, with splinters of violence emanating randomly in every possible direction. They may not be powerful enough to take on a conventional army, but a deadly combination of suicide bombers and lone-wolf attacks could be bothersome.
In addition, ISIS may clash with other terrorist outfits and more bloodshed could be on offer. This author recently spoke to a couple of Indian police officers who were of the opinion that India still remains vulnerable to external terror threats. In sum, South Asian security in general and India’s in particular is likely to face perturbation in the days to come.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Islamic State (IS), Terrorism, Islamic Terrorism, Jammu and Kashmir, South Asia
By implementing the Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019, Singapore is demonstrating resolve to fight the growing spread of false news and misinformation campaigns.
Singapore passed the Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019 on 8 May 2019. Consisting of nine parts and 62 sections, the Act immediately drew the world’s attention and bouquets and brickbats flew in thick and fast. Irrespective of whether the act will deliver or not, the Singapore government, faced with a daunting and complex problem, decided to act.
Fake news and misinformation campaigns has been a hot topic of debate during the last couple of years. The revelations by Christopher Wylie in March 2018 concerning the role of Cambridge Analytica in harvesting millions of Facebook users’ data to create sophisticated psychological and political profiles for manufacturing targeted political advertisements during the 2016 US presidential elections opened a can of worms. This led to the firm being investigated in the US as part of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation and in the UK by both the Electoral Commission for its role in the EU referendum and by the Information Commissioner’s office for carrying out data analytics for political purposes.
India too has its fair share of problems resulting from propagation of fake news through social media platforms. Due to a slew of measures enforced by the Indian government on social media and other Information and Communication Technology (ICT) companies, there has been a significant drop in the number of internet platform-fuelled, mob-related violence post July 2018. As of January 2019, India has 310 million active social media users with a relatively poor penetration of 23 per cent. Yet, Indians are the world’s largest users of Facebook and YouTube, with the social media community in the country growing at an astonishing 24 per cent year-on-year. It is but natural that activities carried out on social media platforms in cyberspace would tend to translate into physical acts. It is in the best interests of the country not to allow social media and other new generation cyberspace platforms to become mediums for carrying out illegal activities, spreading hate, inciting violence and carrying out targeted political campaigning to influence the democratic process.
Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019
Singapore has enacted POFMA for four main reasons. Firstly, to prevent the communication of false statements of fact and enable measures to counteract the effects of such communication. Secondly, to supress the financing, promotion and support of online locations in Singapore that repeatedly communicate false statements of facts. Thirdly, to enable measures to be taken to detect, control and safeguard against coordinated inauthentic behaviour and other misuse of online accounts and bots. And lastly, to enable measures to be taken to enhance the disclosure of information concerning paid content directed towards a political end.
One of the challenges facing the world community is regarding the classification of a piece of information or news being spread on cyberspace as hateful or fake. It is not clear as to when such news is to be considered an innocent prank or a law and order problem or a threat to national security. POFMA attempts to resolve this dilemma. Article 7, Part 2 of the act states that a piece of news is deemed to be fake and worthy of action if and only if it meets two criteria. Firstly, it should be a false statement of fact. And secondly, communication of this false news is likely to affect the security of Singapore or be prejudicial to public health, safety, tranquillity or finances or be prejudicial to Singapore’s relations with other countries or influence the outcome of elections or incite feelings of hatred, enmity/ ill will or diminish public confidence in the state or its institutions. Article 10 of Part 3 of the act makes any Minister in the Singapore government competent to classify news as fake and take appropriate action to deal with such news.
Article 11 of Part 3 concerns communicating a “Correction Direction”. A Correction Direction can be issued to a person to communicate a Correction Notice (Statement nullifying a false information and inserting a corresponding true statement and/or its link next to the false statement) within a specified time limit to all persons who have received the false information and/or publish the correction notice in a newspaper or other print publications of Singapore. Article 12 of Part 3 empowers the Competent Authority to issue a “Stop Communication” direction, and Article 16 of Part 3 empowers the Minister to direct the Information Communication Media Development Authority (IMDA) to order the internet access service provider to disable access to an online location for all end users by issuing an “Access Blocking Order”.
An Internet Intermediary has been classified as a person providing internet intermediary services (like social networking services, search engine, content aggregator, internet based messaging service, video sharing services, etc.). Part 4 of POFMA deals with directions to internet intermediaries and providers of mass media services. Article 21 talks of “Targeted Correction Direction” wherein the internet intermediary that has been used as a medium to propagate the false information is required to send a correction notice within a specified time limit to all the end users in Singapore who had accessed the false information. In addition, Article 22 deals with the issuance of “Disabling Directions” by the internet intermediary to stop access to the end user in Singapore of a specified false information while Article 28 deals with “Access Blocking Order”.
Part 5 of the act deals with Declaration of online locations. Such a Declaration happens “when an online location is responsible for propagating three or more different false statements subject to active Part 3 and/or Part 4 directions”. Once an online location has been “Declared”, its owner is thereafter required to inform its declaration status to all end users who access that online location. Suitable directions can also be passed to IMDA to block access to the declared online location for a specified period of time.
Part 6 of the act deals with directions to the internet intermediary to counteract inauthentic online accounts and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Part 7 of the act deals with Other Measures, while Part 8 specifies the appointment of alternate authority during elections and other specific periods. The final Part 9 of the act deals with miscellaneous issues.
Reactions to POFMA 2019
POFMA 2019 generated a lot of heat and mixed reactions from the general public, media houses and the ICT industry. The major points in favour of the bill were that, as compared to the Broadcasting act, which gave sweeping powers to the government, POFMA provides a measured and calibrated approach with the affected party given the right to appeal at every step. It provides greater oversight to the courts and makes a clear distinction between “opinion” and “fact”. It defines a “statement of fact” as “a reasonable person seeing, hearing or otherwise perceiving it would consider to be a representation of fact”. Publication of the correction notice along with the false statement of fact by the concerned person/ internet intermediary will result in greater authentication of online statements and lead to the eradication of false content.
Google, in its response to POFMA, said that the new law could hurt innovation, which is a crucial element in the hi-tech sector. Some tech firms, media houses and activists are of the opinion that POFMA could be used to curb freedom of speech and be a major impediment to a free internet. The process of appeal was also considered to be very lengthy and cumbersome. On the other hand, Singapore’s law and home affairs minister K. Shanmugam said that the law was necessary as tech companies could not be relied upon to regulate themselves.
Having an internet which identifies and detects fake news and unlawful content and stops its propagation is in the interest of all. However, the challenge lies in effective implementation. Empowering multiple ministers to decide whether a particular statement of fact is true or false and in the public interest is not likely to be conducive for administrative efficiency. For its part, the judiciary may not be able to ensure the quick dispensation of justice since the number of cases coming in for appeal are bound to be many initially. Informing each and every end user who has received a false statement would place additional resource burdens on the internet intermediary as it would be mandatory to track the origin and distribution of each and every message which originates on its platform.
All false statements which are originated and propagated on the internet need not result in any or substantial impact on the ground. The propagation speed of the message or its ability to go “viral” plays a major role in determining whether a message has sizeable traction amongst the population. This aspect has not been considered in POFMA.
Another important aspect of internet-based messaging is end-to-end encryption. A number of messaging services such as WhatsApp and Telegram have proclaimed that they use highly secure end-to-end encryption, with the private key being stored only in the end-users’ smartphones or terminals. Telegram has a bounty of USD 300,000 for anyone who can decrypt its encryption. In such a scenario, the detection of a false statement can only happen once someone approaches the law enforcement agency with the message. This would provide only a limited time for the agencies to act.
Lessons for India
By implementing POFMA, Singapore has demonstrated a resolve to fight the growing spread of false news and misinformation campaigns. There are a number of important takeaways for India from this experiment. Firstly, there is a need to acknowledge the role of social media and other ICT companies as important stakeholders in ensuring national security, and their expertise and skill set need to be optimally utilised for the same. Secondly, adequate provisions exist in the IT (Amendment) Act 2008 for monitoring and blocking internet sites and services. A proactive approach with the help of ICT companies can help in identifying messages and posts which are going viral and further analytics of these can assist in segregating messages that are likely to result in the commitment of illegal acts. Restricting the number of forwards has been a major step in this direction as it helps in slowing down message propagation. Thirdly, cyber education of our population in detecting and making considered decisions with respect to false statements will reduce the appeal and spread of such messages. Fourthly, all messages which are being originated and propagated on the internet needs to be uniquely identified and tracked so that the anonymity of the message originator, recipient and propagator can be removed and this would in turn lead to a more responsible user behaviour. Fifthly, prompt and exemplary action needs to be taken against persons and organisations resorting to the spread of false messages both within and outside the country. Lastly, collaborative and cooperative partnership needs to be forged with likeminded countries to identify the origin of misinformation campaigns and initiating counter measures against the perpetrators. The recent signing of the “Christchurch Call to Action” declaration by India is a step in the right direction.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
With China now willing to discuss issues of mutual interest with India, a well-structured bilateral dialogue on regional and global terrorism may go a long way in convincing Beijing of the need to put pressure on Islamabad to act against terror
On May 1, 2009, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council finally added Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi as the 422nd global terrorist to the UN sanctions List of individuals and entities pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267/1989/2253, after China withdrew its objection to the listing proposal, which it had blocked on four previous occasions.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson justified the reversal in position as flowing from a lengthy consultative process that China had engaged in with all the concerned parties.
The reactions from Pakistan were on expected lines - defiant and evasive. In his 1 May 2019 statement, its Foreign Ministry spokesperson castigated the Indian media for trying to project the listing as a victory and validation of India’s position. He drew attention to Prime Minister Imran Khan’s statement that Pakistan was ready to counter terrorism in its own interests.
A number of key factors were responsible for the change in China’s position after a decade of stalemating on the question of Masood Azhar’s listing. The first is the change in the geostrategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region, which has exacerbated tensions between the US and China, and contributed to China’s realisation that any extreme support for Pakistan on the question of a single individual whose organisation, the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), has already been proscribed by the United Nations (UN), would only serve to push India closer to the US in seeking to address its key security concerns. China remains extremely wary of US motives and views the nascent, as yet inchoate, concept of the Indo-Pacific, as a US-led initiative to contain China, with India being roped in as a key collaborator in that scheme.
The second factor is the US bid to escalate the matter by circulating a draft resolution directly in the UNSC to blacklist Masood Azhar and subject him to a travel ban, an assets freeze and an arms embargo, which would have compelled China to publicly provide more convincing reasons for sticking to its position on its technical hold.
Thirdly, rather than being publicly embarrassed and letting the US, France and the UK take all the credit for helping India on this crucial issue, China would have seen merit in coming forth to assuage a key Indian concern, which, alongside the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), had emerged as a major bugbear in bilateral ties in recent years. By meeting a crucial demand of India, particularly one that was underpinned by India’s determination to carry out retaliatory cross-border airstrikes on terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, China is also preparing to avoid being caught in a cleft stick in the event of future hostilities between India and Pakistan on account of Masood Azhar’s terrorist activities in India.
Mindful of the fact that such national security issues were now part of the mainstream electoral sentiments around the country, China would have favoured an appropriate adjustment to its policy. It would hope to reap the benefits of reaching out to Indian public opinion with a modicum of reassurance shortly before the formation of a new government in India and also paving the way for more common ground during the second round of the Wuhan Informal Summit to be held in India, possibly later in the year. China would also expect that such accommodation might eventually soften India’s cut-and-dried position on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Fourthly, with the increased frequency of terror attacks in India and the neighbourhood emanating from Pakistan, and the growing influence of Pakistan-based groups on radical elements throughout the region, China has realised that the game is simply not worth the candle. This is especially so given that its isolated stand in the 1267 Sanctions Committee casts doubts on its commitment to the global war on terror and adversely impacts its credibility at a time when China is projecting its “new major power diplomacy”, championing the cause of globalisation and the liberal trade order, and propounding an alternate narrative on developmental issues such as President Xi Jinping’s “community of common destiny” through the big-ticket BRI.
Such a change in China’s stand may have been difficult when the 1267 Sanctions Committee of the UNSC last considered the matter on 13 March, simply because it came too soon after the Pulwama incident, and China would have been loath to let Pakistan down and endorse India’s claim that Pakistan was complicit in the attack and was therefore legitimately being punished for it. As an “iron brother’’, China could ill-afford such a step at the time. Moreover, China would not have wanted to give other political parties in India the impression that it was aiding the BJP’s electoral prospects by vacating its ‘hold’ on the Masood Azhar issue before the elections. As things stand, the Chinese volte face came after voting was over for the majority of seats in India.
China’s ‘holds’ on the issue in the past were often attributed to its “higher-than-the-mountains-deeper-than-the-oceans” friendship with Pakistan, while India had often expressed its surprise at China’s objections in view of the fact that “China herself has declared opposition to all forms of terrorism” and more so because, Masood Azhar’s outfit, JeM, was already under the UN sanctions list since October 2001.
In this context, it is interesting to find the Pakistani media trying to claim credit for the removal of the Chinese objections. Reports from Pakistan media suggested that Pakistan and China had “held extensive discussions” and “that the breakthrough came during the recent visit of Imran Khan to China where both sides agreed to withdraw opposition to the latest move after realising that Islamabad’s concerns were addressed”.
Islamabad’s concerns were reportedly related to resolutions being moved in the UNSC linking Masood Azhar to terrorism in Kashmir. In his 1 May 2019 remarks, the Pakistan foreign office spokesperson claimed that the current proposal was agreed to only “after all political references, including…attempts to link it with Pulwama” were removed from the resolution. Quite expectedly, Pakistan reaffirmed its continued diplomatic, political and moral support “to our Kashmiri brethren”.
It must be emphasised here that following the listing of Masood Azhar, much like that of Hafiz Saeed of Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2009, Pakistan will do nothing to bring him to justice. The all-powerful deep state of Pakistan, which has been backing Azhar and his organisation since his release from an Indian prison in 1999, will ensure that he remains safe and capable of planning and executing terror attacks against India. Reports from Pakistan make it amply clear that the listing of Masood Azhar would not mean that he would be detained. Citing un-named official sources, one newspaper even wrote that “authorities were unaware of his whereabouts”! Even under the veneer of initiating conclusive action against terror as per its ‘National Action Plan’, it is improbable that Azhar would ever be punished despite Prime Minister Imran Khan’s contrived assertion that he would not allow “any proscribed organisation or its affiliates to operate from Pakistani territory” and that he is resolved to counter “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”.
Thus, with the first hurdle successfully negotiated, the next step for Indian diplomacy would be to sustain the pressure on Pakistan to take conclusive action against terror outfits operating from its soil against India. It must be emphasised that China condemned the Pulwama attack and openly empathised with India over the loss of its security personnel. It did not also react to the ‘pre-emptive strikes’ on Balakot, indirectly recognising India’s right to respond in a situation like this.
This, and China’s removal of its technical hold on Masood Azhar’s listing notwithstanding, two things remain clear. Firstly, China’s changed position does not in any way dilute its close ties and support for Pakistan. If anything, China’s changed position reflects the level of confidence in the close ties the two countries share, which were reiterated by President Xi Jinping in his meeting with Prime Minister Imran Khan during the BRI conference in Beijing just before Azhar’s listing. Secondly, post-Wuhan, India and China have embarked on a path of closer engagement and there is a genuine desire in both countries to take care of each other’s concerns. With China now willing to discuss issues of mutual interest with India, a well-structured bilateral dialogue on regional and global terrorism may go a long way in convincing Beijing of the need to put pressure on Islamabad to act against terror, which is in the interest of regional and global peace and amity.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A cyber exercise – whether CyberEx or its successor – needs to be developed as a platform for practitioners and thinkers to test conceptual and technical skills under near-real-world whole-of-nation scenarios of cyber contingencies.
The Directorate of Indian Defence University organised a two-day Cyber Exercise (CyberEx) on April 29-30, 2019. The exercise had representation from the three Services, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Computer Emergency Response Team-India (CERT-In), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), National Informatics Centre (NIC), academia and industry.1 The exercise encompassed incident reporting and response, information exchange, readiness and inter-agency coordination.
Importance of Cyber Exercises
Cyber exercises are now a routine feature in military exercises and professional military education. Exercises such as those conducted by the US National Security Agency (NSA) called Cyber Exercise,2 the US Department of Defense’s Cyber Guard,3, and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence titled Locked Shields,4 test the skills of soldiers on a range of operations relating to cybersecurity, teamwork, planning, communication, and decision-making, to name a few. In general, cyber exercises help in assessing intangible organisational attributes such as strategic decision making, inter-agency coordination, incident response procedures and reporting guidelines, etc. as well as in evaluating the effectiveness of security processes and procedures, measuring attack detection, response, mitigation and recovery capabilities.
The cyber domain calls for a broad mandate for the armed forces, including defending own networks and building capacity to exploit those of the adversary. In the military realm, cyber exercises serve multiple purposes. They test technical knowledge in the form of “catch the flag” challenges or train strategic thinkers on how to play the “cyber” card, using simulations, “live-fire” exercises and war gaming scenarios. In the “table-top” format, cyber exercises examine the efficacy of communications under cyber contingencies, which includes the collection and dissemination of incident information for enhanced situational awareness among stakeholders. Being simple and easy to convene, the table-top exercise format is a preferred choice, but it cannot simulate real world decision making experiences. Cyber exercises, at different levels, could be either technically oriented for network attack or strategy-oriented to provide a decision making experience in a simulated environment. They have emerged as an important tool, especially when armed forces utilise cyberspace for a wide spectrum of operations, ranging from C4ISR, weapons control, logistics, supply chain management and in various routine administrative functions.
Cyber exercises are a means to both test the preparedness of cyber formations and as a signalling mechanism to strengthen deterrence in cyberspace. They are part and parcel of military training now. For instance, Cyber Defense Exercise, known as NSA Cyber Exercise, has been testing the skills of cadets and midshipmen of the US Service Academies since 2001. With a broader scope and mandate, the Cyber Guard and Cyber Flag exercises – led by the US Cyber Command and in their seventh edition now – put to test both whole-of-nation defence in a simulated disaster, as well as defensive and offensive capabilities of Cyber Command across all phases of conflict. In China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is known to have cyber operations components in its various exercises since the Kuayue and Lianhe exercises in 2009 and 2011, respectively.5 The 2017 edition of the PLA’s largest exercise at Zhurihe involved land forces, aviation forces, the rocket force, and cyber and electronic warfare units from the Strategic Support Force.
A Way Forward
CyberEx appears intended to catch up with these global advances and fill an existing void in India. There is no information in the public domain on cyber exercises conducted by any of the three services – individually or together – at this level. It is worth mentioning that cyber formations are relatively well-placed to conduct cyber exercises as they have the necessary mandate and wherewithal. CyberEx is an initiative under the aegis of the national defence university, while the exercises discussed above are driven by empowered civilian and military organisations and formations, be it cyber command, technical intelligence agency or strategic forces. Going forward, CyberEx may have to migrate from the Indian Defence University to the recently established Defence Cyber Agency (DCA). If, however, CyberEx has been envisaged as, and is intended to, maintain its present character under the auspices of the Indian Defence University, the DCA will have to initiate a concurrent cyber exercise in line with its mandate and technical competency.
In general, cyber exercises would prove to be much more relevant and constructive when the armed forces successfully integrate “cyber” with training, professional military education, military doctrine and, most importantly, war fighting. Nevertheless, the formidable challenge is to bring the cyber exercises of the Indian Armed Forces to the maturity level of international military cyber exercises, if not in terms of scope, at least in terms of content. The real test for cyber exercises, therefore, would be to mature as a simulation driven or live-fire exercise from the existing table-top format of CyberEx. It may continue to remain a table-top exercise primarily for senior officers, but a technical one may be productive in aggregating cyber operations, doctrine and strategy. It would be much more effective if the three services – independently as well as under the DCA – have technical and operations oriented cyber exercises, which complement CyberEx rather than being discrete endeavours.
A lot of effort goes into a Cyber Exercise, in terms of planning, human resources and strategic thinking. Building real world scenarios, simulating classified networks, designing catch-the-flag challenges, scenario controls etc., need months of meticulous planning. An annual or biennial cyber exercise warrants dedicated resources for the whole process, and substantial exposure to international cyber exercises. It cannot afford to remain an ad hoc military function or a tick-off in the checklist. Cyber exercises also require ardent support of the military leadership and enthusiasm among participants to make substantial improvements in each successive iteration. Likewise, cyber must be a part of the curriculum and war-gaming exercises at the war and staff colleges.
Down the road, a cyber exercise – whether CyberEx or its successor – should be developed as a platform for practitioners and thinkers to test their conceptual and technical skills under near-real-world whole-of-nation scenarios of cyber contingencies. Most importantly, it should be tri-Service-driven in terms of planning and not just participation or representation. A world-class cyber exercise is needed to demonstrate the true competence and prowess of the DCA. Together, the DCA and a joint cyber exercise on this scale would be an acknowledgement that India intends to maintain its freedom of action in cyberspace, whether the situation calls for a defensive or an offensive response.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Designating Masood Azhar at the United Nations: More than a Symbolic Diplomatic Victory
Rajeesh Kumar
May 09, 2019
The decade-long effort to list Azhar showcases the pragmatism that marks India's multilateral diplomacy and questions the general perception that India's multilateral approach is ambivalent and inconsistent.
After a decade of steadfast blocking, China finally backed the proposal to designate the chief of the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) Masood Azhar as a ‘global terrorist’ at the United Nations (UN). With China lifting its objection, Azhar has been listed as a global terrorist in the 1267 Sanctions List. Consequently, he will face freezing of assets, a travel ban, and an arms embargo by all UN member states. For India, the one country that relentlessly pursued the issue at the UN Security Council, this is not only a diplomatic victory but a political triumph as well.
A long, tough struggle
In the past, several efforts to get Azhar sanctioned at the UN were thwarted by China. The latest instance of a Chinese technical ‘hold’ came on March 13, 2019 when France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) initiated a proposal for naming Azhar in the UN Sanctions List after JeM took responsibility for the terror attack that killed more than 40security personnel in Pulwama, South Kashmir. On three prior occasions in 2009, 2016 and 2017, similar proposals failed due to Chinese opposition. The first effort was made after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks when India moved the proposal in the UN Sanctions Committee. In 2016, in the context of an attack on the Pathankot airbase, India, along with the P3 of France, the UK and the US, initiated the proposal. In 2017, once again the P3 nations moved a similar motion in the Sanctions Committee. However, on all these occasions, citing insufficient proof against Azhar and absence of consensus among members of the committee, China had blocked the proposal from being adopted.
What prompted China's change of mind?
Undoubtedly, the primary credit goes to New Delhi’s patient diplomatic efforts. After the latest hold by China in March 2019, there was an outcry from Indian commentators to stop such ‘meaningless’ diplomatic efforts at the UN. However, there was a strong belief in the government, particularly in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), that patience and perseverance will ultimately lead to a favourable outcome. One reason for this belief was New Delhi's upgraded relationship with Beijing, particularly since the April 2018 Wuhan Summit. Therefore, when China placed the hold, rather than blaming it, India was ready to address the concerns raised by China.
Consequently, none of the official Indian reactions and statements mentioned China by name. The MEA statement merely noted that the Committee was not able to decide on the proposal for listing on account of "a member placing the proposal on hold." In contrast, in 2016, the MEA had named China as the country responsible for blocking the move and stated that India would keep trying to convince China with patience. Home Minister Rajnath Singh, responding to China's hold, stated that "they [China] must have some reason for this. We will need to understand what their reasons are for doing this." China also responded to this positively, noting that the matter will be resolved properly, and the hold is only for buying time for continued consultations. Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale's trip to Beijing in April also helped to expedite the shift in Chinese position. Meanwhile, India also shared all evidences of terrorist activities of Jaish-e-Mohammad and its chief with China. Considering the functional modalities of the 1267 Sanctions Committee and the hold China has in it, this was the only way to achieve India's goal.
However, it was not an easy task given China’s strategic stakes in Pakistan. Taking advantage of heightened global concern about terrorism, New Delhi pushed its friends to exert pressure on Beijing at various levels. For instance, after China put a hold on the proposal, the US had circulated a draft resolution in the UN Security Council to ban Azhar. The draft, which was backed by France and UK, discussed China's double standards on terrorism by mentioning the Xinjiang issue. Unlike the secrecy that cloaks the actions of states in the 1267 Sanctions Committee, the debate on a resolution in the Security Council is public. If the US draft had been tabled in the Security Council, China would have had to publicly justify its decade-long campaign to block the attempts to designate Azhar as a global terrorist. As a nation that seeks great power status and image, it would have been a huge setback for China to defend a known terrorist like Masood Azhar, that too in a platform like the UN Security Council. Interestingly, since 1971, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) became a permanent member of the Security Council, only thrice has Beijing cast a stand-alone veto in the Council. These were in 1972, 1997 and 1999 on resolutions related to the membership of Bangladesh, and the civil wars in Guatemala and Macedonia, respectively.
For Beijing, the emerging dissonance in the Indo-US relationship, primarily on issues such as oil sanctions on Iran and weapons procurement from Russia, was a ripe time to woo New Delhi. The Chinese behaviour at the 1267 Committee on Azhar’s listing had always been affected by the shadow of US-China strategic competition. By blocking the proposals, China was not only signalling to India but also to the US that any move to balance or contain China in the Indo-Pacific would have inevitable consequences. Moreover, given the robust relationship between India and the US, China also understood that if Azhar were to be designated at the UN, it is not Beijing but Washington that would get credit. China thus not only utilised the element of uncertainty in the Indo-US relationship but also offered a goodwill gesture to strengthen the Wuhan spirit.
Another Chinese concern that coincided with the listing of Azhar was the Second BRI Summit and India’s non-participation in and vocal opposition to the project in the past. By removing its technical hold, China not only appears to have bought a softened India's approach to the BRI, but also created an opening to pressure New Delhi to “bring the long-pending Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) rail corridor under BRI.”
In addition, the increased international support that India received after the Pulwama attack for its actions against terrorism, including France’s move to freeze the assets of Azhar and its call for a European ban on Azhar, may also have influenced the Chinese decision.
China and Pakistan also appear to have calculated the pros and cons of putting Azhar on the Sanctions List. Of late, Pakistan has come under a lot of pressure from the international community on its support to terror groups. For instance, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been tightening the screws on Pakistan. Since June 2018, Pakistan has been on the FATF 'grey list' owing to its actions such as providing safe haven and financial support to terror groups. At its last plenary meeting in February 2019, the FATF had stated that Pakistan has not done enough to check the finances of terror groups like the JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). If Pakistan did not complete its 27-point action plan to control terror finances within the two scheduled timelines of May and October 2019, the country could be blacklisted. Such an outcome would seriously harm Pakistan' eligibility for future borrowings from international and regional financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Given the fact that Pakistan has been seeking a huge bailout of about US$ 6-8 billion from the IMF, blacklisting would have serious consequences for its already crumbling economy. China and Pakistan may have calculated that by producing evidence of action against Azhar, Islamabad could escape from such a blacklisting.
Beyond a ‘symbolic diplomatic victory’
Notwithstanding the fact that the listing of Azhar is a huge diplomatic victory for India, the general perception is that the listing as such may not help India in its fight against state-sponsored terrorism unless Pakistan changes its policy of providing safe-haven and financial support to terrorists. The case of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) Chief Hafiz Saeed is instructive here. In December 2008, the UN Security Council named Saeed as a global terrorist. However, Saeed is a free man in Pakistan, with his organisation managing hundreds of religious seminaries, schools, hospitals and ambulance networks across the country. He also founded a political party that is very active in Pakistani media and frequently holds public gatherings too. The UNSC's limitations in monitoring its sanctions and the domestic litigations against the 1267 Committee measures in Pakistan have together rendered Saeed’s listing a futile move.
Yet, considering the interests and influence of the parties involved in the process of terror listing at the UN Sanctions Committee, for India, which relentlessly pursued the issue at the UN, in many ways, it is a triumph that goes beyond the label of 'symbolic diplomatic victory.' First, it is a success in terms of power politics and projection. Second, it shows how consistent and pragmatic has been India's multilateral policy.
The UN Security Council is a testing ground of power politics. Once the interests of great powers get involved, a resolution against their interest is difficult both in the Council and in the UN’s subsidiary organs. However, by being patient about China's concerns and at the same time exerting pressure on Beijing at various levels, India managed to get the desired outcome. All these efforts were made with the least material capability to influence the decisions of other actors either in the Council or outside. For the same reason, designating Azhar as a global terrorist is not a mere symbolic diplomatic victory. Instead, it should be viewed as a triumph of power politics and projection.
Similarly, the decade-long effort for listing Azhar showcases the pragmatism that marks India's multilateral diplomacy. It questions the general perception that India's multilateral approach is ambivalent and inconsistent. The fundamental character of diplomacy, especially multilateral diplomacy, is incrementalism. Therefore, expecting favourable outcomes immediately and desisting from persistent efforts due to an initial unfavourable result is a suboptimal approach in multilateral engagements. The listing of Azhar also reminds us of the underlying assumption that in international politics there are no permanent friends or enemies. It also reinforces the necessity of persevering in the efforts to gain membership in the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) despite all the setbacks hitherto.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While the purpose of the Fall Clause, a price safety mechanism in rate contracts, is indubitable, some issues concerning its applicability and implications, both for the buyer and the seller, merit a review.
‘Fall Clause’ is one of the many terms and conditions that pertains to government functioning, primarily relating to defence contracts whose value exceeds the prescribed monetary limit. In the absence of a standard definition, the Fall Clause could generally be described as a legally enforceable assurance to the buyer that it would not end up paying more than the price at which the same vendor may have sold or be selling a similar product to another government-sector buyer under a separate contract. While the purpose of the Fall Clause is indubitable, some issues concerning its applicability and implications, both for the buyer and the seller, merit a review.
Applicability
The first issue concerns application of the Fall Clause to all kinds of contracts, which, in the present context, can be divided into two categories: stand-alone contracts for a specific quantity of items/goods/products and Rate Contracts (RCs) that are basically price agreements for commonly procured items. The RCs are valid for a specific period within which the authorised persons/entities can purchase the rate-contracted items directly by simply placing a supply order on the RC-holder at the price, terms and conditions contained in the RC.
The basic instructions on public procurement are contained in the General Financial Rules, 2017 (and its earlier versions), which evidently include no reference to the Fall Clause. A reference to the Fall clause, can, however, be found in the Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017, issued by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). As per para 8.1.14 of this 2017 Manual (corresponding to para 14.14 of the Manual on Policies and Procedures for Purchase of Goods, 2006), “Fall Clause is a price safety mechanism in rate contracts”. Three of the four procurement manuals used in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) echo the same sentiment.
The Defence Procurement Manual, 2009 (DPM 2009) states in para 8.7.2 that “Fall clause is a price safety mechanism in rate contracts”. The Ordnance Factory Board’s (OFB’s) Procurement Manual, 2018 also says that the Long-term Umbrella Agreement/Contracts shall contain a Fall Clause [para 2.6 (c) (vi)] and that it is a safety mechanism in RCs (para 6.12). Similarly, para 15.14.11 of Chapter 15 in the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO’s) Purchase Manual, 2016 says that all RCs and Price Agreements will be governed by the Fall Clause.
One may add that DPM 2009 also says (in para 7.18.1) that “In cases where contracts have to be concluded with the firms, whose rate contract with DGS&D/other central procurement agencies has expired and renewal of RC has not taken place, a 'fall clause' should be incorporated in the Supply Order/Contract to the effect that during the currency of the Supply Order/Contract, in case rates are found to be lower on conclusion of rate contract, the lower rates as in the rate contract shall be applicable.” A similar provision exists in para 7.49 in the OFB Manual. However, it is obvious that in the context of these provisions, the word ‘contract’ implies a stand-alone contract for item/items which is/are likely to be covered by an RC, while the stand-alone contract is under execution.
It is clear from the above-mentioned provisions of DPM 2009, DRDO’s Purchase Manual, 2016 and OFB’s Purchase Manual, 2018, not to mention the MoF’s Manual of 2017, that the Fall Clause is primarily applicable to RCs or stand-alone contracts concluded for items which are likely to be covered by an RC while the stand-alone contract is under execution. The Defence Procurement Procedure, 2016 (DPP 2016) and its earlier versions, however, stand on a different footing in this respect, as generally, there are no RCs for capital acquisitions. Yet, para 85 of Chapter II thereof makes the Fall Clause applicable to all procurements under ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy and Make’ categories.
While the MoD is within its rights to apply the Fall Clause to stand-alone capital acquisition contracts also, notwithstanding the provisions in other manuals which indicate its applicability to RCs, the text of the standard Fall Clause prescribed in DPP 2016, as indeed in other MoD manuals, is problematic from the point of the buyer as well as the seller, which brings us to the second issue concerning the Fall Clause.
Text of the Standard Fall Clause
The text of the standard Fall Clause prescribed in DPP 2016, which is similar (but not exactly the same) to the corresponding clause prescribed in DPM 2009, reads as follows:
11. Fall Clause
11.1 The Bidder undertakes that he has not supplied/is not supplying the similar products, systems or subsystems at a price lower than that offered in the present bid in respect of any other Ministry/Department of the Government of India and if it is found at any stage that the similar system or sub-system was supplied by the Bidder to any other Ministry/Department of the Government of India at a lower price, then that very price, with due allowance for elapsed time, will be applicable to the present case and the difference in the cost would be refunded by the Bidder to the Buyer, even if the contract has already been concluded.
1.2 The Bidder shall strive to accord the most favoured customer treatment to the Buyer in respect of all matters pertaining to the present case.
(Note: The words highlighted in the text above do not figure in the text prescribed in DPM 2009)
It may be mentioned at this stage that the Fall Clause figures in the Pre-Contract Integrity Pact (PCIP) which is required to be submitted by the bidders while submitting their bids, along with an Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee (IPBG) for the prescribed amount. The following difficulties arise from the way the standard clause is worded, which the vendors are not at liberty to deviate from:
Since the PCIP is applicable to stand-alone contracts also and it has to be submitted along with the bid in all cases exceeding the prescribed monetary threshold, the Fall Clause ipso facto becomes applicable to such contracts concluded under the provisions of DPM 2009 and other manuals, although these manuals indicate that the Fall Clause is meant for RCs.
The first sentence of the standard clause contains an undertaking that the bidder ‘has not supplied’ or ‘is not supplying’ a similar item at a lower price under a different contract. This implies that the bidder is not expected to increase the price of any item in the bid under submission vis-à-vis the price at which a similar item may have been/is being supplied under a previously concluded contract, irrespective of when it was concluded, which is unrealistic.
What is a ‘product’, ‘system’ or ‘sub-system’ is not defined in the manuals, leaving it open to subjective interpretation by both the parties and, consequently, a potential dispute, especially on the question of whether the offered product, system or sub-system is ‘similar’ to the previously supplied product, especially because the yardstick for determining similarity has also not been laid down in the manuals.
Going by a plain reading of the text, if the fact of a previously supplied similar item being cheaper comes to the notice of the MoD, it will bring down the price of such an item mentioned in the current contract ‘with due allowance for elapsed time’, work out the difference, and seek refund from the seller. It is, however, not explained in the manuals how ‘due allowance’ will be given for the elapsed time and who will be the arbiter of the fairness of any such exercise.
It is not clear what will be the consequences where the fact of the previous supply of a similar item at a lesser price is not disclosed but comes to notice before the bid, in the context of which the undertaking is given by the bidder, is finalised and the contract signed.
The manuals contain no instructions on what the vendors need to do while submitting the bid, if they have supplied a similar ‘system’ or ‘sub-system’ in the past at a lesser price and they want to disclose this information along with the justification for increase in price while submitting the PCIP.
The issues mentioned above can give rise to serious disputes even before a contract is signed as well as after the conclusion of the contract. Except where the MoD determines the extent to which the price of an item covered by an ongoing contract should be reduced on account of the previous supply of a similar item at a lesser price and the seller accepts the decision without any demur, the Fall Clause provides no clue as to how the dispute would be settled, which brings us to the third issue regarding consequences of the breach of the clause.
Consequences of Breach of the Fall Clause
The PCIP is primarily meant to prevent corrupt practices in defence contracts. It is, therefore, an oddity that the Fall Clause, which is related to the issue of pricing, is a part of the PCIP. Furthermore, while DPM 2009 requires a (differently worded) Fall Clause to be included in the main contract (Para 9, Part IV, Appendix C, DPM 2009), DPP 2016 does not seem to provide for inclusion of, or a reference to, the Fall Clause in the main contract.
Be that as it may, the question is whether breach of the undertaking contained in the Fall Clause would amount to a breach of the PCIP exposing the bidder to all the consequences mentioned in Clause 10 of the standard format of PCIP, ranging from calling off of the contract negotiations to blacklisting (which are applicable if the bidder is found to be involved in some corrupt practice), or whether the consequences would be limited to the action mentioned in Clause 11 (Fall Clause) only, which is reproduced above. There is also a lack of clarity as regards the remedies available to the bidder if the MoD holds it responsible for the breach of the undertaking where the purported breach comes to MoD’s notice before or after the new contract is signed.
Need for Review
The complexities mentioned above need to be addressed. A pragmatic approach may be to (a) limit the scope of the Fall Clause to the previous contracts that are still in the course of being executed when the new bid is submitted, (b) define the terms ‘products’, ‘systems’, and ‘sub-systems’ (c) lay down the yardstick for determining ‘similarity’ of items, and (d) require the bidders to disclose the previously-charged price of the similar products, systems and subs-systems (as per the new definitions) in the commercial bid, with an explanation of why a higher price is being quoted in the bid under submission. This information could be used at the time of commercial negotiations before finalisation of the new contract. In any case, a more appropriately worded Fall Clause should form a part of the main contract and not the PCIP, which will automatically make any dispute concerning pricing of similar products that arises after conclusion of the contract on account of suppression of facts by the bidders subject to the arbitration clause.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Are the Maoists focusing more on IED-based blasts and in the process minimizing their own casualties instead of attempting to win a war of attrition by inflicting tactical and psychological blows to the security forces?
A villager was killed on the same day when an IED exploded in Aurangabad district of Magadh region, about 125 km south of Patna. The IED again was suspected to have been planted by the Maoists as a trap for the security forces.
These incidents do not appear to be exceptions. On 01 May 2019, 15 commandos of the elite ‘C 60 group’ were killed in an IED blast as they were travelling in a private vehicle on a patrol mission in Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra. Interestingly, the C-60 commando group was formed to negotiate the rise of Maoist insurgency in the Gadchiroli region, with the recruitment being carried out from the local area. The commandos have been trained in the country’s best institutions insofar as counterinsurgency operations are concerned. The personnel have an advantage of knowing the local language, society and terrain. The point to note here is that, since 2009, there was a steady decline in Maoist activity in Maharashtra and, in that context, this particular IED blast killing 15 elite commandos is a matter of concern.
However, as if this mayhem was not enough during the pre-election period in the world’s largest democracy when the police and security forces are preoccupied with managing a country-wide adult franchise, a member of the legislative assembly of a major political party lost his life in April 2019 in the Maoist den of the state of Chhattisgarh, and again due to an IED blast. This series of events appear a bit weird when, in fact, the five decade old Maoist insurgency has been on the wane since 2012, with the security forces holding the upper hand.
A top officer of the Central Reserve Police Force [CRPF] has informed that 22 out of 28 security officials lost their lives due to IED blasts in 2019, while 41 of 67 officials had died in such explosions in 2018. However, only seven security personnel among 74 were killed in IED blasts in 2017, indicating a surge of IED explosions in the last two years.
After the most recent casualty in Gadchiroli, the home ministry has said that the use of powerful IEDs by the Maoists is the next big challenge to tackle. To further add to this tale, it is reported that the Maoists are presently using various types of IEDs : from command-wire IEDs to victim-operated as well as radio-controlled IEDs.
A 2014 paper in the Proceedings of the Indian History Congress states that the Maoists learned the use of IEDs from Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE]. The Maoists are also prone to using Claymore mines or directional IEDs which could be fitted to a tree. The paper further informs that in this ‘long war’ with the left-wing ultras, over 60 per cent of the casualties among the security forces have been caused by explosives or IEDs.
In this backdrop, repeated attacks of late by the ultras through IEDs raise a few germane questions:
Are the Maoists focusing more on IED-based blasts and in the process minimizing their own casualties instead of attempting to win a war of attrition by inflicting tactical and psychological blows to the security forces?
Is this new tactic by the Maoists a reflection of the change of guard at the helm that took place in November 2018 when Nambala Keshav Rao, alias Basavaraju, took over as the new general secretary from Ganapathy? Rao holds a B Tech degree from the Regional Engineering College, Warrangal. He reportedly underwent training in the forests of Bastar from a group of former fighters of the LTTE, specialising in ambush tactics and the handling of explosives.
Due to a considerable loss of leadership and manpower, would the Maoists continue to follow this tactic for some time to come till they reorganize and re-recruit?
What are the reasons that the security forces are unable to counter this IED-tactic of the Maoists?
Beyond the Indian borders
Before these queries are addressed seriatim, a broader look beyond India is essential. IED attacks by insurgent forces are surely not limited to the Maoists in India. In Afghanistan, the American forces faced IED explosions relentlessly with close to 800 attacks in 2006 and over 15,000 attacks in 2012. During that period, more than 11,000 US soldiers were injured and about 1,300 were killed. And if the data from Iraq is included, IEDs account for almost two-thirds of all US soldiers wounded and killed in both countries.
Providing another twist to the narrative, even the Indian Army has admitted that IEDs are its “biggest enemy”, while referring to its role in containing the insurgency in Manipur. Major General Vijay Mishra spelt out the reality: “By the character of IEDs it's so easy to assemble and hide.” Though the army conducts regular Road Opening Parties (ROPs) for ‘sanitising’ roads before any military movement, yet IEDs remain a potent threat.
Cutting across geography, ideology and/or purpose, IEDs appear to be consistent and standard weapons against the ‘state forces’ used by insurgents in this asymmetric war.
It is a homemade bomb, constructed from military or non-military components. IEDs consist of an initiating mechanism, a detonator, an explosive charge, and a collection of projectiles like ball bearings or nails that produces lethal fragments upon detonation. IEDs can be made from many different kinds of objects and materials, including fertilizers, TNT, and other explosives.
Though of low technology and indigenously prepared, the ‘poor insurgent’s bomb’ forced the Pentagon to set up an office in 2006 to exclusively deal with the growing threat of IEDs. Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero of the Pentagon lamented that to ‘counter a $31 bag of fertilizer they were spending hundreds of millions of dollars on sensors and protective devices.’
There is no gainsaying that there is a need to detect the activities that precede the use of IEDs to predict the events. That requires a set of information derived from both human as well as technical sources, followed by analytical inference deduced from the data. Naturally, persistent surveillance can improve the capabilities of the security forces. Incidentally, till date, intelligence gathering remains the most powerful weapon against the IEDs.
Intelligence at ‘ground zero’ plays a pivotal role in countering IEDs as it was again validated in the Gadchiroli massacre. Initial investigations point to the fact that the Maoist insurgents had precise information pertaining to the movement of the
C 60 contingent, whereas the latter lacked any credible information about the ultras.
Reverting to the queries raised
First, it is true that, in an environment marked by depleted manpower compounded by the lack of fresh recruits and a continuous loss of top leadership, the Maoists of late have switched to the IED-model to inflict blows to the security forces with minimum loss on their side. They meticulously wish to avoid frontal confrontation but at the same time gain an apparent tactical victory in the propaganda space.
Second, it is not at all unlikely that Basavaraju is instrumental behind this change of approach. However, it is clear that the use of IEDs is not a novel technique that the Maoists are putting into effect now. Rather, they have been doing it since long. The new general secretary of the Maoists may have a greater proclivity towards the use of explosives because of his own expertise on the subject, yet does he have any viable alternative given the continuous loss of manpower due to elimination, incarceration and surrenders?
Third, it is expected that for some time to come the Maoists would focus more on low-end technology of the IEDs to inflict as much damage on the security forces and dent their morale. This tactic might, by and large, continue till regrouping takes place and fresh recruitment is on the rise. Thereafter, while the use of IEDs would continue, however the intensity of their use would expectedly go down with greater focus on reaching the third stage of the ‘strategic offence’ in the guerrilla campaign. Presently, the Maoists are in the ‘strategic defence’ phase and playing on the back foot.
Fourth, considering what conventional armed forces of the world are facing and have faced in the past with regard to IEDs, it should be easy to comprehend that it is not at all a cakewalk to tackle the ‘poor insurgent’s bomb’. If the armoured vehicles of the US Army could be breached by IEDs, then the Indian security forces ought to be empathized with in this hour of challenge. Nonetheless, it does not mean that the security forces would not follow standard operating procedures while dealing with the insurgent in a difficult topography. Being huddled together in a single vehicle would obviously make them vulnerable. Further, credible intelligence on the ultras through a local network has to be on the platter to avoid any fiasco. In addition, leakage of information to the other side should be prevented at all costs. Moreover, research on detecting and containing the IED menace needs to continue, with emphasis on less exotic and cost-effective techniques.
The fundamental issue in this entire deliberation is simple enough. A low-key technology is the motor of a ‘long war’ between two unequal actors: the relatively ‘weak’ insurgent and the powerful state. The Maoist insurgent would continue to use the low-end technology to extract as much leverage as possible, while state forces need to exercise caution, exhibit patience and wait for the earliest opportunity against the ultras.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Sri Lanka Easter bombings has allowed ISIS chief Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi to launch a public relations offensive and enunciate a dangerous new strategy.
Barely a month after losing all its territory in Syria to US-led forces, ISIS seems to be fast regaining its international notoriety as a major threat to global peace and security. After carrying out the horrific Easter Sunday attacks in Sri Lanka on 21 April 2019 — which claimed 253 lives and left over 500 people injured — ISIS supremo Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi made a video appearance last week to assert that the “fight is not over”. With an AK-47 rifle by his side, the 47-year old Baghdadi stated that the killings in Sri Lanka “were an act of revenge for ISIS’s defeat in Baghouz”, the last sliver of territory the group held in Syria before losing it to international forces in March 2019.
With this video, Baghdadi wants to show that he has overcome the shock of having lost his Caliphate and can still launch a public relations offensive, which has been in shambles for several months. Released by its hideous media arm Al-Furqan, the aim of the video is to revive the demotivated and scattered forces of ISIS and its sympathizers around the world, by showing that the so-called Caliph still holds court (albeit without a Caliphate) and that terror groups from Mali and Burkina Faso are purportedly still willing to give him the oath of allegiance (‘bayah’).
Baghdadi’s bluster
In this respect, Baghdadi finds himself in the same position in which Osama Bin Laden found himself after the latter’s lair was destroyed by US forces in Afghanistan in 2001. Following the decimation of its base and the collapse of the Taliban regime, Al-Qaeda’s leadership became more of a receiver of assistance from allies and less of a provider of terror funding, weaponry and military training. Bin Laden also had to face internal dissent from within his top brass, with Abu Musab Al-Suri and Sayed Imam Al-Sharif alias Doctor Fadl parting ways.
Thus, ISIS may have a lot to thank its allies in South Asia for its resurgence from near death and Baghdadi’s second video appearance after nearly five years may be an attempt to reaffirm his position as the undisputed leader of his transnational terror hub. It is interesting to note that Baghdadi issued a new strategic directive in his statement, in which he did not seem keen on reinstating the territorial Caliphate but called for the adoption of a more shadowy, unconventional campaign, on the lines of Al-Qaeda. Thus, the ISIS’ head honcho said: “We recommend to all of you to attack your enemies and exhaust them in all of their capabilities — human, military, economic and logistical — and in all matters. Our battle today is one of attrition and stretching the enemy.”
Return of the legions
However, the counter-argument to the ISIS not intending to reclaim the territory of its defunct ‘Caliphate’ seems to be coming from none other than the Pentagon itself. A report released in early February by the US Department of Defense cites the commander of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) answering a question about the impact of a U.S. troop departure on ISIS in Syria thus: “…absent sustained [counterterrorism] pressure, ISIS could likely resurge in Syria within six to twelve months and regain limited territory.” The report was read by many experts as contradicting President Trump’s announcement of US withdrawal from Syria in December 2018, following his assertion that “we (the US) just took over 100% caliphate”.
The absence of a political solution in Syria and the unpopularity of the Iraqi government among the Sunni community are the reasons for the continuing support for ISIS in the region. According to Syria’s Al Masdar news agency, increased terrorist activity by ISIS forces near the international highway between Baghdad and Damascus has forced authorities to keep the road closed. In late April, ISIS forces are also said to have reportedly killed 20 soldiers in a protracted engagement with Syrian troops in the Badia desert.
There is also a growing threat of dispersed ISIS fighters returning to re-instate the ISIS proto-state. American military and intelligence assessments report that thousands rather than hundreds of ISIS fighters and planners seem to have slipped out of the caliphate and are still at large in the region.
According to Edmund Fitton-Brown, coordinator of the ISIS/Al-Qaeda/ Taliban Monitoring Team at the United Nations: “We don't know how many have died. But we can assume that at least 50% survive. My personal guess is more.” CNN reporter Tim Lister cites intelligence sources claiming that ISIS fighters have slipped through Iran into the Pakistani province of Balochistan and into Afghanistan.
In recent weeks, there has been an upsurge in ISIS-linked activities in Syria, Iraq and other parts of the world. A day after the attacks in Sri Lanka, ISIS tried to carry out an attack on a state security building in Riyadh but Saudi forces foiled the attack and arrested all 13 suspects. ISIS is also said to have gained a foothold in Congo and the terror group’s news agency has claimed to have assaulted a military barracks in the area of Beni, killing eight people last month.
ISIS focused on India
The worrying fact, as Tim Lister puts it, is that ISIS is at present increasingly focusing on India. “Its propaganda suggests ISIS sees India as promising territory and is intent on aggravating Muslim-Hindu tensions there.” On April 30, ISIS named a certain Abu Muhammed al-Bengali as its new emir in ‘Bengal’ and issued a direct threat to carry out strikes in India and Bangladesh. “If you think you have silenced the soldiers of the Khilafa in Bengal and Hind and you are certain about that then listen we men are never to be silenced ... and are thirst for revenge is never to be faded away (sic),” the IS poster released in Bengali, English and Hindi reads.
As questions are asked over how small Sri Lankan outfits — the National Thowheed Jama’ath (NTJ) and a little known group, JMI — could have pulled off a series of highly sophisticated and coordinated blasts, ongoing investigations suspect the presence of a much wider network of unknown ISIS affiliates, extending deeper into India and Bangladesh.
Far from over, the ISIS threat may have become deadlier internationally and seems more intent on exploring new pastures, particularly India. The need of the hour is for the country to stand united and for citizens from every community to support intelligence agencies in a national vigil against terrorism.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Islamic State, Islamic Terrorism, Terrorism, Sri Lanka, South Asia
China’s vulnerability to terrorism behind its support for Azhar ban
Abanti Bhattacharya
May 06, 2019
It is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.
Undoubtedly, India’s relentless and intense diplomacy coupled with international pressure has succeeded in pushing China to designate Masood Azhar as a UN proscribed terrorist. Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale’s visit to China on 21-22 April and his presentation of an exhaustive dossier showing Azhar as a terrorist finally caused China to relent. This is also the official rationale given by the Chinese foreign ministry for ending its intransigence on this issue. However, it was the spread of terrorism in South Asia, with the terror attacks in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday, that acted as a last straw. In other words, it is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.
The timing of China’s lifting of its technical hold leading to Azhar’s designation as a global terrorist is telling. Post-Pulwama, China had been the only country that did not condemn the terror attack. Rather, for the fourth time, it had blocked the proposal put forward by the US, the UK and France for banning Azhar on the pretext of insufficient information, thus, clearly standing in support of its all-weather friend, Pakistan. Further, China’s state-run newspaper chided India for blaming Pakistan for Pulwama and China for blocking the Azhar ban. But the Islamic State (IS) terror strike on Sri Lanka served as a wakeup call for China. Though it is striking to note that when leaders from India, US, UK Russia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal expressed shock and condemnation over the deadly blasts at churches and hotels, China maintained a palpable silence. Of course, it could not have said much when its position on similar terror strikes on India have always been muted, thereby demonstrating its loyalty to Pakistan. But more significantly, China’s silence points to its approach towards terrorism which is critically linked to Uighur separatism in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
So far, China has addressed the terrorism issue by adopting a two-fold policy. One, internally, it has adopted the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign since the 2000s to repress and eliminate the Uighur separatists. Since 2017, this policy has acquired a strikingly virulent form with the Chinese government detaining thousands of Uighurs in internment camps and indoctrinating them to wean them away from the Islamic faith. Coupled with this, China has launched a massive surveillance-based database, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), to monitor Muslims in Xinjiang. Second, externally, China has enlisted the support of Pakistan to rein in not only the Uighurs but Pakistan’s own radical forces. The July 2007 Red Mosque incident is one such example when the Musharraf government acted at the behest of China to crack down on Pakistani radicals. Further, in 2010, there were reports of the presence of up to 11,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to counter Islamic radicals based in FATA conducting cross-border terrorist operations in Xinjiang. Besides, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has institutionally tried to address the issue of terrorism. There are as many as ten legal documents that outline the principles of anti-terrorism cooperation among member states. Plus, an anti-terror centre was established in Bishkek to fight what China calls the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Moreover, in the post-9/11 era, taking advantage of the global war on terror, China has projected Uighur separatism as terrorism and, in 2002, got the US treasury department to list the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization. Yet, the Uighur threat has remained unabated. In fact, China can no longer claim immunity to terror attacks.
In 2006, one of the splinter groups of the ETIM, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), was formed by Uighurs who had fled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1990s. In 2008, this group claimed responsibility for carrying out deadly attacks in Shanghai and Kunming. Further, a study by the European Council on Foreign Relations contends that earlier the Al-Qaeda had prohibited attacks targeting China and Chinese interests since it viewed US-China rivalry as a strategic opportunity. But now the Islamic State has called on its affiliates to ‘take revenge’ against China for carrying out atrocities in Xinjiang. Thus, China no longer enjoys the restraint exercised by Al-Qaeda and its associates. There are even reports of some 200 Uighurs joining the ranks of the Islamic State and other Jihadi organizations in Syria and Iraq.
In this context, the terror attack in Sri Lanka, which the IS has claimed responsibility for, is an alarming sign. China had so long controlled the menace of terrorism within its borders by joining hands with Pakistan and ignoring India’s sovereignty and security concerns. The spread of Islamic terrorism to Sri Lanka not only narrows the room for China to ignore terrorism in the region but also threatens to affect its BRI projects in that country. In fact, the IS has threatened to carry out further attacks in India and Bangladesh. This spread of instability bodes ill for the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is President Xi Jinping’s dream project.
It is important to note that the success of BRI is critical to China’s own economic growth and fulfilment of its two centenary goals: establishing a prosperous and well-off society by 2022 and joining the ranks of developed nations by 2050. This twin success, in turn, is fundamental to bolstering party legitimacy. In other words, the economic rationale far outweighs the geopolitical basis of the BRI. In this regard, the recently concluded second BRI summit in Beijing saw reduced enthusiasm among countries across the world. China is increasingly confronting criticism about its debt-trap diplomacy. It failed to woo India’s participation for the second consecutive time. Of the eight SAARC countries, only Nepal and Pakistan sent their heads of state to Beijing. Sri Lanka, which had participated in the 2017 summit, skipped it this year. The same was the case with Turkey, which chose not to attend on the grounds of China’s policy towards the Uighurs. At this juncture, China could ill-afford to confront international isolation on the Azhar ban issue.
Given the critical link between terrorism and the BRI, China realised the futility of its opposition to Azhar being designated as a global terrorist. This pragmatism on the part of the Chinese leadership has not only ended the spectre of China’s international isolation but also raised the prospects of restoring the Wuhan spirit. New Delhi should not be hoodwinked into thinking that Beijing has given up its Pakistan card against India. China’s decision was guided by a realistic assessment of its national interest.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While still in the evolution stage, BRI has the potential to be a game changer in China’s quest to shape a ‘Sino-Centric’ Global Order.
The second Belt-Road Forum (BRF) was held in Beijing from 25-27 April 2019. The three-day event was organized to promote the ‘Belt-Road Initiative’ (BRI) - President Xi Jinping’s multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure development and investment venture. The Summit was attended by 40 global leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, China’s two closest allies. The gathering was larger than the first Summit held in 2017, which had just 29 participants. Among the new entrants were Austria, Portugal, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Thailand. Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte became the first G7 leader to join the BRI. India stayed out for the second time on grounds of sovereignty given that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) traverses through Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK).
BRI has come under fire due to lack of transparency, weak institutional mechanism, scepticism about Chinese loans leading to debt trap, and poor environmental record. Besides, it is being perceived as an exclusive ‘Chinese Club’. With new deals aggregating US$ 64 billion signed and 283 concrete deliverable outcomes, despite criticism particularly from the US and its allies, the grand plan apparently remains on track and is gaining international traction. With a view to dispel growing concerns, the focus of this second Forum was on projecting BRI as an attractive investment destination. President Xi staunchly defended the Belt-Road, assuring its ‘win-win’ outcome.
BRI provides China a unique platform to pursue its multiple objectives. Besides expanding global influence, it is in sync with President Xi’s ‘China Dream’ (Zhong Quo Meng), envisioning a ‘powerful and prosperous’ China. Numerous hurdles notwithstanding, the Belt-Road Initiative is bound to impact the prevailing geopolitical dynamics and have strategic ramifications. It merits a pragmatic evaluation.
BRI: An Appraisal
The mammoth infrastructure development initiative was originally conceptualized as a ‘going out’ strategy to develop productive outlets for China’s domestic overcapacity, diversify foreign asset holdings, and contribute to the stabilization of the Western provinces and the Eurasian hinterland. It was in 2013 that President Xi Jinping launched the ‘One Belt-One Road’ (OBOR) project, later rechristened as BRI. The initiative was portrayed as a benign investment venture – a ‘road of peace and prosperity’ with vast benefits. Spanning across Asia, Africa, Oceania and South America, the total value of the scheme was estimated at $ 3.67 trillion. According to the World Bank, the plan is expected to lift global GDP growth by three per cent.
China’s initiative evinced interest from a large number of countries since it was filling the void left by International Financial Institutions (IFI) which had stopped financing infrastructure development. BRI is in no way a traditional aid programme, but a money-making investment. It blends political, economic and strategic dimensions. Being country specific, the approach adopted varies from resolving debts, accepting payments in cash, commodities or in lease. Investments in many cases seek to further core Chinese national interests including gaining access to sensitive ports and securing sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Alongside the physical infrastructure, another ambitious project on the anvil is the ‘digital silk road’ aimed at enhancing digital connectivity. This will enable Chinese dominance of 5G technology and networks, arousing concerns amongst Western nations.
A few BRI countries had expressed dissatisfaction with the on-going ventures including Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Several projects under CPEC also came under the scanner. A hydro-power project in Nepal was scrapped. The Trump administration holds the view that China’s ‘predatory financing’ pushes smaller countries into debt, endangering their sovereignty. Beijing’s acquisition of Hambantota port on 99-year lease in a debt swap agreement in 2017 is a case in point. Recently, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo slammed China while addressing the opening session of the ‘Arctic Council’ in Finland for using its power through BRI to achieve security objectives.
The exact number of projects under BRI is hard to calculate, though these run into thousands because many have been informally negotiated. Most striking of the Belt-Road ventures is the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) which will connect Malaysia’s East Coast to Southern Thailand and Kuala Lumpur. CPEC, connecting Xinjiang with Gwadar and the ‘Gulf of Oman’ is a signature project. Total trade between China and BRI nations has exceeded $ 6 trillion. Chinese investment in these countries stands at over $ 80 billion. BRI provides China an overarching framework for enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
Recalibration and Branding
In the wake of growing international criticism, President Xi recognised the need to review and recalibrate the BRI. During the April 2019 Summit, he vouched for China’s sincerity and vowed ‘zero tolerance’ on corruption while assuring deliverance of ‘high quality’ schemes in consonance with international standards. Key concerns, namely cleaning of state subsidies, reducing non-tariff barriers, boosting imports and protecting ‘Intellectual Property Rights’, were also highlighted.
China has been criticised for allowing its companies to take away 90 per cent of the business and dictating own financing terms to borrowers. Xi reaffirmed that BRI would adopt market-driven practices, making financial terms negotiable between lenders and borrowers. He also indicated that new rules will be formulated within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Signs of partial backtracking by China are evident from the fact that Malaysia has renegotiated the terms of the rail project with a much-reduced outlay and increased local participation. Even Pakistan is in the process of reviewing the terms of CPEC.
According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, with the policy refresh in implementing BRI, it will be less of a political target in future. In the image building exercise, Belt-Road has now been termed as a ‘community of common destiny’. A kind of G150, it seeks to promote multilateralism, globalisation and development, alongside human rights, providing an umbrella for plurilateral cooperation. BRI manifests China’s confidence as a global player, gradually stepping into the strategic space yielded by the USA.
India’s Stance on BRI
India once again chose to keep out of the BRF since the reasons for its abstention from the 2017 Summit remain valid. According to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality. It further stressed that projects should not create a debt burden and instead empower local communities.
At a pre-Summit conference, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasised that Sino-Indian ties were insulated from the differences over BRI. He said that China understood India’s concerns about CPEC. According to China’s Ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, better connectivity between the two countries could be the key to address the existing trade deficit and bring more strategic convergence on India’s ‘Act East Policy’.
India’s keeping out of the BRI does not count for much unless it has a blueprint to counter China’s grand design. New Delhi’s first regional initiative, its ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ (CCAP), is a step in the right direction as it reflects the nation’s will to play a larger role in the region. The ‘Trilateral Agreement’ between Afghanistan, India and Iran offers an excellent opportunity to implement a ‘Look North Strategy’. There is vast scope for connectivity with ASEAN as well.
Strategic Imperatives
Despite impediments, China remains steadfast in pushing through the BRI to achieve its multiple objectives. The BRI now dominates Beijing’s geo-economic discourse. Growing apprehensions about the sustainability of various projects and the burgeoning debt burden of the recipient countries have led to serious doubts over the long-term viability of such a mega venture, putting China’s credibility at risk. Consequently, the focus of the recent Summit was on dispelling misgivings.
BRI is primarily South Asia and IOR centric, as is evident from the number of projects in these regions – CPEC, CMEC (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor), ‘Nepal-China Trans Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network’ including Nepal-China cross border railway, besides significant projects in Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka. The Maritime Silk Route encompasses major ports such as Kyakhphu in the Bay of Bengal and Gwadar in the Arabian Sea. On completion of the above ventures, China will enjoy a competitive edge in the region.
India has rightly chosen not to participate in the Forum as there is no viable opportunity for it. New Delhi needs to closely monitor the infrastructure development activities in the region from the strategic perspective and within the larger framework of relations with Beijing. At the same time, it must pursue alternate connectivity initiatives like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) in collaboration with partners such as Japan to ensure geostrategic balance in the region.
China’s Communist leadership is known for grand initiatives. President Xi’s Belt-Road is one such mega venture. While still in the evolution stage, BRI has the potential to be a game changer in China’s quest to shape a ‘Sino-Centric’ Global Order.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
If Baghdadi has possibly moved toward the east, then the proclamation of an Indian branch flashes a note of caution for the security and intelligence agencies.
On the face of it, the proclamation by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that it has established a ‘province’ in India appears to be a case of hollow propaganda and far removed from reality. It is true that the police in Kashmir have described it as ‘pure propaganda’, as reported by Al Jazeera. However, the director of the SITE Intel Group, Rita Katz, has said that the claim "should not be written off". Though apparently seen as information hype, Indian intelligence agencies have been put on high alert.
On 10 May 2019, the Amaq news agency of ISIS claimed that the group has established the ‘Wilayah of Hind’. Amaq, however, did not elaborate on the geographical limits of the so-called province. Interestingly, the proclamation coincided with the elimination of Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi, a suspected operative of ISIS in India, by the security forces in an encounter in Shopian in south Kashmir on the same day.
A series of propaganda events unleashed by the ISIS after the Easter suicide bombings in Sri Lanka in April 2019 would be worth noting. First and foremost, ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi re-emerged from his self-imposed isolation since 2014 and applauded the jihadists of Sri Lanka for avenging the ISIS losses at Baghouz. Thereafter, ISIS declared the new emir of the ‘Bengal region’, apparently targeting the state of West Bengal and Bangladesh. The latest announcement in this series is the claim of an ISIS ‘province’ in Kashmir.
Although the terror outfit has had an ever shrinking ‘Caliphate’ of late, yet its ‘peripheral’ attacks outside its core area of the Middle East/West Asia have been on the rise, with a peak in Sri Lanka. For instance, in April-May 2019, ISIS reported three attacks in the Democratic Republic of Congo, claimed an assault on the Nigerian Army barracks in Borno, and released the video of an ambush on Chechen soldiers.
It is interesting to note that, in the context of the ISIS’s recent proclamation on Kashmir, analysts were also of the opinion that global jihadist groups have failed to exploit the Kashmir conflict, unlike conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The fundamental reason, as put forward by Mohammed Sinan Siyech, in a paper in Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses published in May 2018 was that the Kashmir issue is primarily a territorial and political dispute as opposed to a purely religious/Islamist conflict. Furthermore, cross-border terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are in opposition to the concept of a pan-global Islamic Caliphate. Consequently, ISIS has failed to establish its footprints in the Kashmir Valley.
Further, writing for the Observer Research Foundation in July 2018, Kabir Taneja espoused a similar notion insofar as the foothold or the lack of it of ISIS in Kashmir was concerned. But Taneja also cautioned the security and academic community against taking the ISIS threat too lightly. In his view, “[t]he threat ISIS poses to India, and South Asia in general, is as real as it is for any other major region or state. This does not come from an organisational pattern from the so-called caliphate or al-Baghdadi himself, but the ecosystem that has been created that allows open-source access to ISIS as a brand…….”
In a recent commentary, Adil Rasheed quoted Tim Lister while stressing that ISIS is at present increasingly focusing on India since it perceives the country as a promising territory given growing Muslim-Hindu tensions.
Post-Baghouz Trajectory
The emerging aspect in the post-Baghouz terror dynamics is the greater stress by ISIS in forging ties with local surrogate groups in Asia and Africa. Such a hypothesis has been agreed to by the former Jammu & Kashmir Director General of Police Shesh Paul Vaid when he spoke to The Wire in the wake of the elimination of Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi and the concomitant declaration by ISIS. Kashmir police officials are of the considered view that militants have no organisational link to the ISIS as such and are only motivated by their ideology. Nonetheless, Sofi’s relatives and friends asserted to the contrary. They said: “We don’t know the ideology of ISIS. For us every mujahid [jihadi] is our brother. They are fighting for our cause”. In fact, it didn’t matter to them whether the mujahids were with the Islamic State or some other group. This sense among disgruntled Kashmiri youth of being associated with the ‘mujahid’ has the necessary fallout in the form of being indoctrinated with jihadi propaganda. And ISIS has acquired a master craftsmanship in that domain.
In this backdrop, an extremely interesting bit of prediction has come up about Baghdadi. Zaid Hamid, a founding member of a threat analysis think tank, has said that Baghdadi could be in Afghanistan. Hamid’s understanding is based on the style of the bedding and pillows shown in the video featuring Baghdadi after the Easter suicide bombings. At the other end, Iraqi security adviser Hisham al-Hashemi has said that officials have narrowed the whereabouts of Baghdadi from 17 to a possible four locations. If true, then Baghdadi is moving or has moved toward the East, and hence is closer to India. ISIS had formed its Khorasan branch in 2015 to oversee the activities in Pakistan, Afghanistan and neighbouring lands.
For the time being, it could be inferred that the ISIS top brass is under tremendous pressure. It is fighting for its very survival. And if Baghdadi has possibly moved toward the east, then the proclamation of an Indian branch flashes a note of caution for the security and intelligence agencies. Baghdadi, on the other hand, now desperately seeks local alliances of the variety of Zaharan Hashim of Sri Lanka or Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi of Kashmir. ISIS would continue to float its brand image of the global caliphate and be in constant search of ‘feudal support’ at local bases.
If the ISIS leadership were to shift eastwards, the entire terror network can take up a different paradigm altogether. A vanishing Daesh could turn out to be lethal, with splinters of violence emanating randomly in every possible direction. They may not be powerful enough to take on a conventional army, but a deadly combination of suicide bombers and lone-wolf attacks could be bothersome.
In addition, ISIS may clash with other terrorist outfits and more bloodshed could be on offer. This author recently spoke to a couple of Indian police officers who were of the opinion that India still remains vulnerable to external terror threats. In sum, South Asian security in general and India’s in particular is likely to face perturbation in the days to come.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
By implementing the Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019, Singapore is demonstrating resolve to fight the growing spread of false news and misinformation campaigns.
Singapore passed the Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019 on 8 May 2019. Consisting of nine parts and 62 sections, the Act immediately drew the world’s attention and bouquets and brickbats flew in thick and fast. Irrespective of whether the act will deliver or not, the Singapore government, faced with a daunting and complex problem, decided to act.
Fake news and misinformation campaigns has been a hot topic of debate during the last couple of years. The revelations by Christopher Wylie in March 2018 concerning the role of Cambridge Analytica in harvesting millions of Facebook users’ data to create sophisticated psychological and political profiles for manufacturing targeted political advertisements during the 2016 US presidential elections opened a can of worms. This led to the firm being investigated in the US as part of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation and in the UK by both the Electoral Commission for its role in the EU referendum and by the Information Commissioner’s office for carrying out data analytics for political purposes.
India too has its fair share of problems resulting from propagation of fake news through social media platforms. Due to a slew of measures enforced by the Indian government on social media and other Information and Communication Technology (ICT) companies, there has been a significant drop in the number of internet platform-fuelled, mob-related violence post July 2018. As of January 2019, India has 310 million active social media users with a relatively poor penetration of 23 per cent. Yet, Indians are the world’s largest users of Facebook and YouTube, with the social media community in the country growing at an astonishing 24 per cent year-on-year. It is but natural that activities carried out on social media platforms in cyberspace would tend to translate into physical acts. It is in the best interests of the country not to allow social media and other new generation cyberspace platforms to become mediums for carrying out illegal activities, spreading hate, inciting violence and carrying out targeted political campaigning to influence the democratic process.
Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019
Singapore has enacted POFMA for four main reasons. Firstly, to prevent the communication of false statements of fact and enable measures to counteract the effects of such communication. Secondly, to supress the financing, promotion and support of online locations in Singapore that repeatedly communicate false statements of facts. Thirdly, to enable measures to be taken to detect, control and safeguard against coordinated inauthentic behaviour and other misuse of online accounts and bots. And lastly, to enable measures to be taken to enhance the disclosure of information concerning paid content directed towards a political end.
One of the challenges facing the world community is regarding the classification of a piece of information or news being spread on cyberspace as hateful or fake. It is not clear as to when such news is to be considered an innocent prank or a law and order problem or a threat to national security. POFMA attempts to resolve this dilemma. Article 7, Part 2 of the act states that a piece of news is deemed to be fake and worthy of action if and only if it meets two criteria. Firstly, it should be a false statement of fact. And secondly, communication of this false news is likely to affect the security of Singapore or be prejudicial to public health, safety, tranquillity or finances or be prejudicial to Singapore’s relations with other countries or influence the outcome of elections or incite feelings of hatred, enmity/ ill will or diminish public confidence in the state or its institutions. Article 10 of Part 3 of the act makes any Minister in the Singapore government competent to classify news as fake and take appropriate action to deal with such news.
Article 11 of Part 3 concerns communicating a “Correction Direction”. A Correction Direction can be issued to a person to communicate a Correction Notice (Statement nullifying a false information and inserting a corresponding true statement and/or its link next to the false statement) within a specified time limit to all persons who have received the false information and/or publish the correction notice in a newspaper or other print publications of Singapore. Article 12 of Part 3 empowers the Competent Authority to issue a “Stop Communication” direction, and Article 16 of Part 3 empowers the Minister to direct the Information Communication Media Development Authority (IMDA) to order the internet access service provider to disable access to an online location for all end users by issuing an “Access Blocking Order”.
An Internet Intermediary has been classified as a person providing internet intermediary services (like social networking services, search engine, content aggregator, internet based messaging service, video sharing services, etc.). Part 4 of POFMA deals with directions to internet intermediaries and providers of mass media services. Article 21 talks of “Targeted Correction Direction” wherein the internet intermediary that has been used as a medium to propagate the false information is required to send a correction notice within a specified time limit to all the end users in Singapore who had accessed the false information. In addition, Article 22 deals with the issuance of “Disabling Directions” by the internet intermediary to stop access to the end user in Singapore of a specified false information while Article 28 deals with “Access Blocking Order”.
Part 5 of the act deals with Declaration of online locations. Such a Declaration happens “when an online location is responsible for propagating three or more different false statements subject to active Part 3 and/or Part 4 directions”. Once an online location has been “Declared”, its owner is thereafter required to inform its declaration status to all end users who access that online location. Suitable directions can also be passed to IMDA to block access to the declared online location for a specified period of time.
Part 6 of the act deals with directions to the internet intermediary to counteract inauthentic online accounts and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Part 7 of the act deals with Other Measures, while Part 8 specifies the appointment of alternate authority during elections and other specific periods. The final Part 9 of the act deals with miscellaneous issues.
Reactions to POFMA 2019
POFMA 2019 generated a lot of heat and mixed reactions from the general public, media houses and the ICT industry. The major points in favour of the bill were that, as compared to the Broadcasting act, which gave sweeping powers to the government, POFMA provides a measured and calibrated approach with the affected party given the right to appeal at every step. It provides greater oversight to the courts and makes a clear distinction between “opinion” and “fact”. It defines a “statement of fact” as “a reasonable person seeing, hearing or otherwise perceiving it would consider to be a representation of fact”. Publication of the correction notice along with the false statement of fact by the concerned person/ internet intermediary will result in greater authentication of online statements and lead to the eradication of false content.
Google, in its response to POFMA, said that the new law could hurt innovation, which is a crucial element in the hi-tech sector. Some tech firms, media houses and activists are of the opinion that POFMA could be used to curb freedom of speech and be a major impediment to a free internet. The process of appeal was also considered to be very lengthy and cumbersome. On the other hand, Singapore’s law and home affairs minister K. Shanmugam said that the law was necessary as tech companies could not be relied upon to regulate themselves.
Having an internet which identifies and detects fake news and unlawful content and stops its propagation is in the interest of all. However, the challenge lies in effective implementation. Empowering multiple ministers to decide whether a particular statement of fact is true or false and in the public interest is not likely to be conducive for administrative efficiency. For its part, the judiciary may not be able to ensure the quick dispensation of justice since the number of cases coming in for appeal are bound to be many initially. Informing each and every end user who has received a false statement would place additional resource burdens on the internet intermediary as it would be mandatory to track the origin and distribution of each and every message which originates on its platform.
All false statements which are originated and propagated on the internet need not result in any or substantial impact on the ground. The propagation speed of the message or its ability to go “viral” plays a major role in determining whether a message has sizeable traction amongst the population. This aspect has not been considered in POFMA.
Another important aspect of internet-based messaging is end-to-end encryption. A number of messaging services such as WhatsApp and Telegram have proclaimed that they use highly secure end-to-end encryption, with the private key being stored only in the end-users’ smartphones or terminals. Telegram has a bounty of USD 300,000 for anyone who can decrypt its encryption. In such a scenario, the detection of a false statement can only happen once someone approaches the law enforcement agency with the message. This would provide only a limited time for the agencies to act.
Lessons for India
By implementing POFMA, Singapore has demonstrated a resolve to fight the growing spread of false news and misinformation campaigns. There are a number of important takeaways for India from this experiment. Firstly, there is a need to acknowledge the role of social media and other ICT companies as important stakeholders in ensuring national security, and their expertise and skill set need to be optimally utilised for the same. Secondly, adequate provisions exist in the IT (Amendment) Act 2008 for monitoring and blocking internet sites and services. A proactive approach with the help of ICT companies can help in identifying messages and posts which are going viral and further analytics of these can assist in segregating messages that are likely to result in the commitment of illegal acts. Restricting the number of forwards has been a major step in this direction as it helps in slowing down message propagation. Thirdly, cyber education of our population in detecting and making considered decisions with respect to false statements will reduce the appeal and spread of such messages. Fourthly, all messages which are being originated and propagated on the internet needs to be uniquely identified and tracked so that the anonymity of the message originator, recipient and propagator can be removed and this would in turn lead to a more responsible user behaviour. Fifthly, prompt and exemplary action needs to be taken against persons and organisations resorting to the spread of false messages both within and outside the country. Lastly, collaborative and cooperative partnership needs to be forged with likeminded countries to identify the origin of misinformation campaigns and initiating counter measures against the perpetrators. The recent signing of the “Christchurch Call to Action” declaration by India is a step in the right direction.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
With China now willing to discuss issues of mutual interest with India, a well-structured bilateral dialogue on regional and global terrorism may go a long way in convincing Beijing of the need to put pressure on Islamabad to act against terror
On May 1, 2009, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council finally added Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi as the 422nd global terrorist to the UN sanctions List of individuals and entities pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267/1989/2253, after China withdrew its objection to the listing proposal, which it had blocked on four previous occasions.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson justified the reversal in position as flowing from a lengthy consultative process that China had engaged in with all the concerned parties.
The spokesperson of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) hailed the sanctions committee’s decision as a step in the right direction that demonstrated the international community’s resolve to fight against terrorism and its enablers.
The reactions from Pakistan were on expected lines - defiant and evasive. In his 1 May 2019 statement, its Foreign Ministry spokesperson castigated the Indian media for trying to project the listing as a victory and validation of India’s position. He drew attention to Prime Minister Imran Khan’s statement that Pakistan was ready to counter terrorism in its own interests.
A number of key factors were responsible for the change in China’s position after a decade of stalemating on the question of Masood Azhar’s listing. The first is the change in the geostrategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region, which has exacerbated tensions between the US and China, and contributed to China’s realisation that any extreme support for Pakistan on the question of a single individual whose organisation, the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), has already been proscribed by the United Nations (UN), would only serve to push India closer to the US in seeking to address its key security concerns. China remains extremely wary of US motives and views the nascent, as yet inchoate, concept of the Indo-Pacific, as a US-led initiative to contain China, with India being roped in as a key collaborator in that scheme.
The second factor is the US bid to escalate the matter by circulating a draft resolution directly in the UNSC to blacklist Masood Azhar and subject him to a travel ban, an assets freeze and an arms embargo, which would have compelled China to publicly provide more convincing reasons for sticking to its position on its technical hold.
Thirdly, rather than being publicly embarrassed and letting the US, France and the UK take all the credit for helping India on this crucial issue, China would have seen merit in coming forth to assuage a key Indian concern, which, alongside the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), had emerged as a major bugbear in bilateral ties in recent years. By meeting a crucial demand of India, particularly one that was underpinned by India’s determination to carry out retaliatory cross-border airstrikes on terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, China is also preparing to avoid being caught in a cleft stick in the event of future hostilities between India and Pakistan on account of Masood Azhar’s terrorist activities in India.
Mindful of the fact that such national security issues were now part of the mainstream electoral sentiments around the country, China would have favoured an appropriate adjustment to its policy. It would hope to reap the benefits of reaching out to Indian public opinion with a modicum of reassurance shortly before the formation of a new government in India and also paving the way for more common ground during the second round of the Wuhan Informal Summit to be held in India, possibly later in the year. China would also expect that such accommodation might eventually soften India’s cut-and-dried position on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Fourthly, with the increased frequency of terror attacks in India and the neighbourhood emanating from Pakistan, and the growing influence of Pakistan-based groups on radical elements throughout the region, China has realised that the game is simply not worth the candle. This is especially so given that its isolated stand in the 1267 Sanctions Committee casts doubts on its commitment to the global war on terror and adversely impacts its credibility at a time when China is projecting its “new major power diplomacy”, championing the cause of globalisation and the liberal trade order, and propounding an alternate narrative on developmental issues such as President Xi Jinping’s “community of common destiny” through the big-ticket BRI.
Such a change in China’s stand may have been difficult when the 1267 Sanctions Committee of the UNSC last considered the matter on 13 March, simply because it came too soon after the Pulwama incident, and China would have been loath to let Pakistan down and endorse India’s claim that Pakistan was complicit in the attack and was therefore legitimately being punished for it. As an “iron brother’’, China could ill-afford such a step at the time. Moreover, China would not have wanted to give other political parties in India the impression that it was aiding the BJP’s electoral prospects by vacating its ‘hold’ on the Masood Azhar issue before the elections. As things stand, the Chinese volte face came after voting was over for the majority of seats in India.
China’s ‘holds’ on the issue in the past were often attributed to its “higher-than-the-mountains-deeper-than-the-oceans” friendship with Pakistan, while India had often expressed its surprise at China’s objections in view of the fact that “China herself has declared opposition to all forms of terrorism” and more so because, Masood Azhar’s outfit, JeM, was already under the UN sanctions list since October 2001.
In this context, it is interesting to find the Pakistani media trying to claim credit for the removal of the Chinese objections. Reports from Pakistan media suggested that Pakistan and China had “held extensive discussions” and “that the breakthrough came during the recent visit of Imran Khan to China where both sides agreed to withdraw opposition to the latest move after realising that Islamabad’s concerns were addressed”.
Islamabad’s concerns were reportedly related to resolutions being moved in the UNSC linking Masood Azhar to terrorism in Kashmir. In his 1 May 2019 remarks, the Pakistan foreign office spokesperson claimed that the current proposal was agreed to only “after all political references, including…attempts to link it with Pulwama” were removed from the resolution. Quite expectedly, Pakistan reaffirmed its continued diplomatic, political and moral support “to our Kashmiri brethren”.
It must be emphasised here that following the listing of Masood Azhar, much like that of Hafiz Saeed of Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2009, Pakistan will do nothing to bring him to justice. The all-powerful deep state of Pakistan, which has been backing Azhar and his organisation since his release from an Indian prison in 1999, will ensure that he remains safe and capable of planning and executing terror attacks against India. Reports from Pakistan make it amply clear that the listing of Masood Azhar would not mean that he would be detained. Citing un-named official sources, one newspaper even wrote that “authorities were unaware of his whereabouts”! Even under the veneer of initiating conclusive action against terror as per its ‘National Action Plan’, it is improbable that Azhar would ever be punished despite Prime Minister Imran Khan’s contrived assertion that he would not allow “any proscribed organisation or its affiliates to operate from Pakistani territory” and that he is resolved to counter “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”.
Thus, with the first hurdle successfully negotiated, the next step for Indian diplomacy would be to sustain the pressure on Pakistan to take conclusive action against terror outfits operating from its soil against India. It must be emphasised that China condemned the Pulwama attack and openly empathised with India over the loss of its security personnel. It did not also react to the ‘pre-emptive strikes’ on Balakot, indirectly recognising India’s right to respond in a situation like this.
This, and China’s removal of its technical hold on Masood Azhar’s listing notwithstanding, two things remain clear. Firstly, China’s changed position does not in any way dilute its close ties and support for Pakistan. If anything, China’s changed position reflects the level of confidence in the close ties the two countries share, which were reiterated by President Xi Jinping in his meeting with Prime Minister Imran Khan during the BRI conference in Beijing just before Azhar’s listing. Secondly, post-Wuhan, India and China have embarked on a path of closer engagement and there is a genuine desire in both countries to take care of each other’s concerns. With China now willing to discuss issues of mutual interest with India, a well-structured bilateral dialogue on regional and global terrorism may go a long way in convincing Beijing of the need to put pressure on Islamabad to act against terror, which is in the interest of regional and global peace and amity.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A cyber exercise – whether CyberEx or its successor – needs to be developed as a platform for practitioners and thinkers to test conceptual and technical skills under near-real-world whole-of-nation scenarios of cyber contingencies.
The Directorate of Indian Defence University organised a two-day Cyber Exercise (CyberEx) on April 29-30, 2019. The exercise had representation from the three Services, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Computer Emergency Response Team-India (CERT-In), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), National Informatics Centre (NIC), academia and industry.1 The exercise encompassed incident reporting and response, information exchange, readiness and inter-agency coordination.
Importance of Cyber Exercises
Cyber exercises are now a routine feature in military exercises and professional military education. Exercises such as those conducted by the US National Security Agency (NSA) called Cyber Exercise,2 the US Department of Defense’s Cyber Guard,3, and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence titled Locked Shields,4 test the skills of soldiers on a range of operations relating to cybersecurity, teamwork, planning, communication, and decision-making, to name a few. In general, cyber exercises help in assessing intangible organisational attributes such as strategic decision making, inter-agency coordination, incident response procedures and reporting guidelines, etc. as well as in evaluating the effectiveness of security processes and procedures, measuring attack detection, response, mitigation and recovery capabilities.
The cyber domain calls for a broad mandate for the armed forces, including defending own networks and building capacity to exploit those of the adversary. In the military realm, cyber exercises serve multiple purposes. They test technical knowledge in the form of “catch the flag” challenges or train strategic thinkers on how to play the “cyber” card, using simulations, “live-fire” exercises and war gaming scenarios. In the “table-top” format, cyber exercises examine the efficacy of communications under cyber contingencies, which includes the collection and dissemination of incident information for enhanced situational awareness among stakeholders. Being simple and easy to convene, the table-top exercise format is a preferred choice, but it cannot simulate real world decision making experiences. Cyber exercises, at different levels, could be either technically oriented for network attack or strategy-oriented to provide a decision making experience in a simulated environment. They have emerged as an important tool, especially when armed forces utilise cyberspace for a wide spectrum of operations, ranging from C4ISR, weapons control, logistics, supply chain management and in various routine administrative functions.
Cyber exercises are a means to both test the preparedness of cyber formations and as a signalling mechanism to strengthen deterrence in cyberspace. They are part and parcel of military training now. For instance, Cyber Defense Exercise, known as NSA Cyber Exercise, has been testing the skills of cadets and midshipmen of the US Service Academies since 2001. With a broader scope and mandate, the Cyber Guard and Cyber Flag exercises – led by the US Cyber Command and in their seventh edition now – put to test both whole-of-nation defence in a simulated disaster, as well as defensive and offensive capabilities of Cyber Command across all phases of conflict. In China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is known to have cyber operations components in its various exercises since the Kuayue and Lianhe exercises in 2009 and 2011, respectively.5 The 2017 edition of the PLA’s largest exercise at Zhurihe involved land forces, aviation forces, the rocket force, and cyber and electronic warfare units from the Strategic Support Force.
A Way Forward
CyberEx appears intended to catch up with these global advances and fill an existing void in India. There is no information in the public domain on cyber exercises conducted by any of the three services – individually or together – at this level. It is worth mentioning that cyber formations are relatively well-placed to conduct cyber exercises as they have the necessary mandate and wherewithal. CyberEx is an initiative under the aegis of the national defence university, while the exercises discussed above are driven by empowered civilian and military organisations and formations, be it cyber command, technical intelligence agency or strategic forces. Going forward, CyberEx may have to migrate from the Indian Defence University to the recently established Defence Cyber Agency (DCA). If, however, CyberEx has been envisaged as, and is intended to, maintain its present character under the auspices of the Indian Defence University, the DCA will have to initiate a concurrent cyber exercise in line with its mandate and technical competency.
In general, cyber exercises would prove to be much more relevant and constructive when the armed forces successfully integrate “cyber” with training, professional military education, military doctrine and, most importantly, war fighting. Nevertheless, the formidable challenge is to bring the cyber exercises of the Indian Armed Forces to the maturity level of international military cyber exercises, if not in terms of scope, at least in terms of content. The real test for cyber exercises, therefore, would be to mature as a simulation driven or live-fire exercise from the existing table-top format of CyberEx. It may continue to remain a table-top exercise primarily for senior officers, but a technical one may be productive in aggregating cyber operations, doctrine and strategy. It would be much more effective if the three services – independently as well as under the DCA – have technical and operations oriented cyber exercises, which complement CyberEx rather than being discrete endeavours.
A lot of effort goes into a Cyber Exercise, in terms of planning, human resources and strategic thinking. Building real world scenarios, simulating classified networks, designing catch-the-flag challenges, scenario controls etc., need months of meticulous planning. An annual or biennial cyber exercise warrants dedicated resources for the whole process, and substantial exposure to international cyber exercises. It cannot afford to remain an ad hoc military function or a tick-off in the checklist. Cyber exercises also require ardent support of the military leadership and enthusiasm among participants to make substantial improvements in each successive iteration. Likewise, cyber must be a part of the curriculum and war-gaming exercises at the war and staff colleges.
Down the road, a cyber exercise – whether CyberEx or its successor – should be developed as a platform for practitioners and thinkers to test their conceptual and technical skills under near-real-world whole-of-nation scenarios of cyber contingencies. Most importantly, it should be tri-Service-driven in terms of planning and not just participation or representation. A world-class cyber exercise is needed to demonstrate the true competence and prowess of the DCA. Together, the DCA and a joint cyber exercise on this scale would be an acknowledgement that India intends to maintain its freedom of action in cyberspace, whether the situation calls for a defensive or an offensive response.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The decade-long effort to list Azhar showcases the pragmatism that marks India's multilateral diplomacy and questions the general perception that India's multilateral approach is ambivalent and inconsistent.
After a decade of steadfast blocking, China finally backed the proposal to designate the chief of the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) Masood Azhar as a ‘global terrorist’ at the United Nations (UN). With China lifting its objection, Azhar has been listed as a global terrorist in the 1267 Sanctions List. Consequently, he will face freezing of assets, a travel ban, and an arms embargo by all UN member states. For India, the one country that relentlessly pursued the issue at the UN Security Council, this is not only a diplomatic victory but a political triumph as well.
A long, tough struggle
In the past, several efforts to get Azhar sanctioned at the UN were thwarted by China. The latest instance of a Chinese technical ‘hold’ came on March 13, 2019 when France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) initiated a proposal for naming Azhar in the UN Sanctions List after JeM took responsibility for the terror attack that killed more than 40 security personnel in Pulwama, South Kashmir. On three prior occasions in 2009, 2016 and 2017, similar proposals failed due to Chinese opposition. The first effort was made after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks when India moved the proposal in the UN Sanctions Committee. In 2016, in the context of an attack on the Pathankot airbase, India, along with the P3 of France, the UK and the US, initiated the proposal. In 2017, once again the P3 nations moved a similar motion in the Sanctions Committee. However, on all these occasions, citing insufficient proof against Azhar and absence of consensus among members of the committee, China had blocked the proposal from being adopted.
What prompted China's change of mind?
Undoubtedly, the primary credit goes to New Delhi’s patient diplomatic efforts. After the latest hold by China in March 2019, there was an outcry from Indian commentators to stop such ‘meaningless’ diplomatic efforts at the UN. However, there was a strong belief in the government, particularly in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), that patience and perseverance will ultimately lead to a favourable outcome. One reason for this belief was New Delhi's upgraded relationship with Beijing, particularly since the April 2018 Wuhan Summit. Therefore, when China placed the hold, rather than blaming it, India was ready to address the concerns raised by China.
Consequently, none of the official Indian reactions and statements mentioned China by name. The MEA statement merely noted that the Committee was not able to decide on the proposal for listing on account of "a member placing the proposal on hold." In contrast, in 2016, the MEA had named China as the country responsible for blocking the move and stated that India would keep trying to convince China with patience. Home Minister Rajnath Singh, responding to China's hold, stated that "they [China] must have some reason for this. We will need to understand what their reasons are for doing this." China also responded to this positively, noting that the matter will be resolved properly, and the hold is only for buying time for continued consultations. Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale's trip to Beijing in April also helped to expedite the shift in Chinese position. Meanwhile, India also shared all evidences of terrorist activities of Jaish-e-Mohammad and its chief with China. Considering the functional modalities of the 1267 Sanctions Committee and the hold China has in it, this was the only way to achieve India's goal.
However, it was not an easy task given China’s strategic stakes in Pakistan. Taking advantage of heightened global concern about terrorism, New Delhi pushed its friends to exert pressure on Beijing at various levels. For instance, after China put a hold on the proposal, the US had circulated a draft resolution in the UN Security Council to ban Azhar. The draft, which was backed by France and UK, discussed China's double standards on terrorism by mentioning the Xinjiang issue. Unlike the secrecy that cloaks the actions of states in the 1267 Sanctions Committee, the debate on a resolution in the Security Council is public. If the US draft had been tabled in the Security Council, China would have had to publicly justify its decade-long campaign to block the attempts to designate Azhar as a global terrorist. As a nation that seeks great power status and image, it would have been a huge setback for China to defend a known terrorist like Masood Azhar, that too in a platform like the UN Security Council. Interestingly, since 1971, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) became a permanent member of the Security Council, only thrice has Beijing cast a stand-alone veto in the Council. These were in 1972, 1997 and 1999 on resolutions related to the membership of Bangladesh, and the civil wars in Guatemala and Macedonia, respectively.
For Beijing, the emerging dissonance in the Indo-US relationship, primarily on issues such as oil sanctions on Iran and weapons procurement from Russia, was a ripe time to woo New Delhi. The Chinese behaviour at the 1267 Committee on Azhar’s listing had always been affected by the shadow of US-China strategic competition. By blocking the proposals, China was not only signalling to India but also to the US that any move to balance or contain China in the Indo-Pacific would have inevitable consequences. Moreover, given the robust relationship between India and the US, China also understood that if Azhar were to be designated at the UN, it is not Beijing but Washington that would get credit. China thus not only utilised the element of uncertainty in the Indo-US relationship but also offered a goodwill gesture to strengthen the Wuhan spirit.
Another Chinese concern that coincided with the listing of Azhar was the Second BRI Summit and India’s non-participation in and vocal opposition to the project in the past. By removing its technical hold, China not only appears to have bought a softened India's approach to the BRI, but also created an opening to pressure New Delhi to “bring the long-pending Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) rail corridor under BRI.”
In addition, the increased international support that India received after the Pulwama attack for its actions against terrorism, including France’s move to freeze the assets of Azhar and its call for a European ban on Azhar, may also have influenced the Chinese decision.
China and Pakistan also appear to have calculated the pros and cons of putting Azhar on the Sanctions List. Of late, Pakistan has come under a lot of pressure from the international community on its support to terror groups. For instance, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been tightening the screws on Pakistan. Since June 2018, Pakistan has been on the FATF 'grey list' owing to its actions such as providing safe haven and financial support to terror groups. At its last plenary meeting in February 2019, the FATF had stated that Pakistan has not done enough to check the finances of terror groups like the JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). If Pakistan did not complete its 27-point action plan to control terror finances within the two scheduled timelines of May and October 2019, the country could be blacklisted. Such an outcome would seriously harm Pakistan' eligibility for future borrowings from international and regional financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Given the fact that Pakistan has been seeking a huge bailout of about US$ 6-8 billion from the IMF, blacklisting would have serious consequences for its already crumbling economy. China and Pakistan may have calculated that by producing evidence of action against Azhar, Islamabad could escape from such a blacklisting.
Beyond a ‘symbolic diplomatic victory’
Notwithstanding the fact that the listing of Azhar is a huge diplomatic victory for India, the general perception is that the listing as such may not help India in its fight against state-sponsored terrorism unless Pakistan changes its policy of providing safe-haven and financial support to terrorists. The case of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) Chief Hafiz Saeed is instructive here. In December 2008, the UN Security Council named Saeed as a global terrorist. However, Saeed is a free man in Pakistan, with his organisation managing hundreds of religious seminaries, schools, hospitals and ambulance networks across the country. He also founded a political party that is very active in Pakistani media and frequently holds public gatherings too. The UNSC's limitations in monitoring its sanctions and the domestic litigations against the 1267 Committee measures in Pakistan have together rendered Saeed’s listing a futile move.
Yet, considering the interests and influence of the parties involved in the process of terror listing at the UN Sanctions Committee, for India, which relentlessly pursued the issue at the UN, in many ways, it is a triumph that goes beyond the label of 'symbolic diplomatic victory.' First, it is a success in terms of power politics and projection. Second, it shows how consistent and pragmatic has been India's multilateral policy.
The UN Security Council is a testing ground of power politics. Once the interests of great powers get involved, a resolution against their interest is difficult both in the Council and in the UN’s subsidiary organs. However, by being patient about China's concerns and at the same time exerting pressure on Beijing at various levels, India managed to get the desired outcome. All these efforts were made with the least material capability to influence the decisions of other actors either in the Council or outside. For the same reason, designating Azhar as a global terrorist is not a mere symbolic diplomatic victory. Instead, it should be viewed as a triumph of power politics and projection.
Similarly, the decade-long effort for listing Azhar showcases the pragmatism that marks India's multilateral diplomacy. It questions the general perception that India's multilateral approach is ambivalent and inconsistent. The fundamental character of diplomacy, especially multilateral diplomacy, is incrementalism. Therefore, expecting favourable outcomes immediately and desisting from persistent efforts due to an initial unfavourable result is a suboptimal approach in multilateral engagements. The listing of Azhar also reminds us of the underlying assumption that in international politics there are no permanent friends or enemies. It also reinforces the necessity of persevering in the efforts to gain membership in the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) despite all the setbacks hitherto.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While the purpose of the Fall Clause, a price safety mechanism in rate contracts, is indubitable, some issues concerning its applicability and implications, both for the buyer and the seller, merit a review.
‘Fall Clause’ is one of the many terms and conditions that pertains to government functioning, primarily relating to defence contracts whose value exceeds the prescribed monetary limit. In the absence of a standard definition, the Fall Clause could generally be described as a legally enforceable assurance to the buyer that it would not end up paying more than the price at which the same vendor may have sold or be selling a similar product to another government-sector buyer under a separate contract. While the purpose of the Fall Clause is indubitable, some issues concerning its applicability and implications, both for the buyer and the seller, merit a review.
Applicability
The first issue concerns application of the Fall Clause to all kinds of contracts, which, in the present context, can be divided into two categories: stand-alone contracts for a specific quantity of items/goods/products and Rate Contracts (RCs) that are basically price agreements for commonly procured items. The RCs are valid for a specific period within which the authorised persons/entities can purchase the rate-contracted items directly by simply placing a supply order on the RC-holder at the price, terms and conditions contained in the RC.
The basic instructions on public procurement are contained in the General Financial Rules, 2017 (and its earlier versions), which evidently include no reference to the Fall Clause. A reference to the Fall clause, can, however, be found in the Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017, issued by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). As per para 8.1.14 of this 2017 Manual (corresponding to para 14.14 of the Manual on Policies and Procedures for Purchase of Goods, 2006), “Fall Clause is a price safety mechanism in rate contracts”. Three of the four procurement manuals used in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) echo the same sentiment.
The Defence Procurement Manual, 2009 (DPM 2009) states in para 8.7.2 that “Fall clause is a price safety mechanism in rate contracts”. The Ordnance Factory Board’s (OFB’s) Procurement Manual, 2018 also says that the Long-term Umbrella Agreement/Contracts shall contain a Fall Clause [para 2.6 (c) (vi)] and that it is a safety mechanism in RCs (para 6.12). Similarly, para 15.14.11 of Chapter 15 in the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO’s) Purchase Manual, 2016 says that all RCs and Price Agreements will be governed by the Fall Clause.
One may add that DPM 2009 also says (in para 7.18.1) that “In cases where contracts have to be concluded with the firms, whose rate contract with DGS&D/other central procurement agencies has expired and renewal of RC has not taken place, a 'fall clause' should be incorporated in the Supply Order/Contract to the effect that during the currency of the Supply Order/Contract, in case rates are found to be lower on conclusion of rate contract, the lower rates as in the rate contract shall be applicable.” A similar provision exists in para 7.49 in the OFB Manual. However, it is obvious that in the context of these provisions, the word ‘contract’ implies a stand-alone contract for item/items which is/are likely to be covered by an RC, while the stand-alone contract is under execution.
It is clear from the above-mentioned provisions of DPM 2009, DRDO’s Purchase Manual, 2016 and OFB’s Purchase Manual, 2018, not to mention the MoF’s Manual of 2017, that the Fall Clause is primarily applicable to RCs or stand-alone contracts concluded for items which are likely to be covered by an RC while the stand-alone contract is under execution. The Defence Procurement Procedure, 2016 (DPP 2016) and its earlier versions, however, stand on a different footing in this respect, as generally, there are no RCs for capital acquisitions. Yet, para 85 of Chapter II thereof makes the Fall Clause applicable to all procurements under ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy and Make’ categories.
While the MoD is within its rights to apply the Fall Clause to stand-alone capital acquisition contracts also, notwithstanding the provisions in other manuals which indicate its applicability to RCs, the text of the standard Fall Clause prescribed in DPP 2016, as indeed in other MoD manuals, is problematic from the point of the buyer as well as the seller, which brings us to the second issue concerning the Fall Clause.
Text of the Standard Fall Clause
The text of the standard Fall Clause prescribed in DPP 2016, which is similar (but not exactly the same) to the corresponding clause prescribed in DPM 2009, reads as follows:
11. Fall Clause
11.1 The Bidder undertakes that he has not supplied/is not supplying the similar products, systems or subsystems at a price lower than that offered in the present bid in respect of any other Ministry/Department of the Government of India and if it is found at any stage that the similar system or sub-system was supplied by the Bidder to any other Ministry/Department of the Government of India at a lower price, then that very price, with due allowance for elapsed time, will be applicable to the present case and the difference in the cost would be refunded by the Bidder to the Buyer, even if the contract has already been concluded.
1.2 The Bidder shall strive to accord the most favoured customer treatment to the Buyer in respect of all matters pertaining to the present case.
(Note: The words highlighted in the text above do not figure in the text prescribed in DPM 2009)
It may be mentioned at this stage that the Fall Clause figures in the Pre-Contract Integrity Pact (PCIP) which is required to be submitted by the bidders while submitting their bids, along with an Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee (IPBG) for the prescribed amount. The following difficulties arise from the way the standard clause is worded, which the vendors are not at liberty to deviate from:
The issues mentioned above can give rise to serious disputes even before a contract is signed as well as after the conclusion of the contract. Except where the MoD determines the extent to which the price of an item covered by an ongoing contract should be reduced on account of the previous supply of a similar item at a lesser price and the seller accepts the decision without any demur, the Fall Clause provides no clue as to how the dispute would be settled, which brings us to the third issue regarding consequences of the breach of the clause.
Consequences of Breach of the Fall Clause
The PCIP is primarily meant to prevent corrupt practices in defence contracts. It is, therefore, an oddity that the Fall Clause, which is related to the issue of pricing, is a part of the PCIP. Furthermore, while DPM 2009 requires a (differently worded) Fall Clause to be included in the main contract (Para 9, Part IV, Appendix C, DPM 2009), DPP 2016 does not seem to provide for inclusion of, or a reference to, the Fall Clause in the main contract.
Be that as it may, the question is whether breach of the undertaking contained in the Fall Clause would amount to a breach of the PCIP exposing the bidder to all the consequences mentioned in Clause 10 of the standard format of PCIP, ranging from calling off of the contract negotiations to blacklisting (which are applicable if the bidder is found to be involved in some corrupt practice), or whether the consequences would be limited to the action mentioned in Clause 11 (Fall Clause) only, which is reproduced above. There is also a lack of clarity as regards the remedies available to the bidder if the MoD holds it responsible for the breach of the undertaking where the purported breach comes to MoD’s notice before or after the new contract is signed.
Need for Review
The complexities mentioned above need to be addressed. A pragmatic approach may be to (a) limit the scope of the Fall Clause to the previous contracts that are still in the course of being executed when the new bid is submitted, (b) define the terms ‘products’, ‘systems’, and ‘sub-systems’ (c) lay down the yardstick for determining ‘similarity’ of items, and (d) require the bidders to disclose the previously-charged price of the similar products, systems and subs-systems (as per the new definitions) in the commercial bid, with an explanation of why a higher price is being quoted in the bid under submission. This information could be used at the time of commercial negotiations before finalisation of the new contract. In any case, a more appropriately worded Fall Clause should form a part of the main contract and not the PCIP, which will automatically make any dispute concerning pricing of similar products that arises after conclusion of the contract on account of suppression of facts by the bidders subject to the arbitration clause.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Are the Maoists focusing more on IED-based blasts and in the process minimizing their own casualties instead of attempting to win a war of attrition by inflicting tactical and psychological blows to the security forces?
On 03 May 2019, an office of a major political party in India’s eastern state of Jharkhand was partially damaged by an Improvised Explosive Device [IED]. Initial reports indicated that the blast was triggered by the Maoist insurgents. Fortunately, there was no casualty.
A villager was killed on the same day when an IED exploded in Aurangabad district of Magadh region, about 125 km south of Patna. The IED again was suspected to have been planted by the Maoists as a trap for the security forces.
These incidents do not appear to be exceptions. On 01 May 2019, 15 commandos of the elite ‘C 60 group’ were killed in an IED blast as they were travelling in a private vehicle on a patrol mission in Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra. Interestingly, the C-60 commando group was formed to negotiate the rise of Maoist insurgency in the Gadchiroli region, with the recruitment being carried out from the local area. The commandos have been trained in the country’s best institutions insofar as counterinsurgency operations are concerned. The personnel have an advantage of knowing the local language, society and terrain. The point to note here is that, since 2009, there was a steady decline in Maoist activity in Maharashtra and, in that context, this particular IED blast killing 15 elite commandos is a matter of concern.
However, as if this mayhem was not enough during the pre-election period in the world’s largest democracy when the police and security forces are preoccupied with managing a country-wide adult franchise, a member of the legislative assembly of a major political party lost his life in April 2019 in the Maoist den of the state of Chhattisgarh, and again due to an IED blast. This series of events appear a bit weird when, in fact, the five decade old Maoist insurgency has been on the wane since 2012, with the security forces holding the upper hand.
A top officer of the Central Reserve Police Force [CRPF] has informed that 22 out of 28 security officials lost their lives due to IED blasts in 2019, while 41 of 67 officials had died in such explosions in 2018. However, only seven security personnel among 74 were killed in IED blasts in 2017, indicating a surge of IED explosions in the last two years.
After the most recent casualty in Gadchiroli, the home ministry has said that the use of powerful IEDs by the Maoists is the next big challenge to tackle. To further add to this tale, it is reported that the Maoists are presently using various types of IEDs : from command-wire IEDs to victim-operated as well as radio-controlled IEDs.
With a large mass of explosives to the tune of 50 kilogrammes, the Maoists could even blow up an otherwise well designed Mine Protected Vehicle [MPV] in Chhattisgarh in October 2018 due to which some CRPF troopers were martyred. MPVs are effective as powerful shields from bullets and have safeguards for mine blasts of 14 Kg TNT under the wheels and 10 Kg TNT under the hull.
A 2014 paper in the Proceedings of the Indian History Congress states that the Maoists learned the use of IEDs from Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE]. The Maoists are also prone to using Claymore mines or directional IEDs which could be fitted to a tree. The paper further informs that in this ‘long war’ with the left-wing ultras, over 60 per cent of the casualties among the security forces have been caused by explosives or IEDs.
The CRPF on the other hand is in the process of upgrading their IED detection equipment and Bomb Disposal Squad (BDS) unit to reduce casualties in the ongoing tussle with the insurgents.
In this backdrop, repeated attacks of late by the ultras through IEDs raise a few germane questions:
Beyond the Indian borders
Before these queries are addressed seriatim, a broader look beyond India is essential. IED attacks by insurgent forces are surely not limited to the Maoists in India. In Afghanistan, the American forces faced IED explosions relentlessly with close to 800 attacks in 2006 and over 15,000 attacks in 2012. During that period, more than 11,000 US soldiers were injured and about 1,300 were killed. And if the data from Iraq is included, IEDs account for almost two-thirds of all US soldiers wounded and killed in both countries.
In the recent past, communist rebels in the Philippines have also used IEDs on several occasions against Filipino security forces. In Iraq, some Shia militia groups used explosively formed projectiles to destroy the most heavily armoured M1 Abrams tanks of the US forces.
Providing another twist to the narrative, even the Indian Army has admitted that IEDs are its “biggest enemy”, while referring to its role in containing the insurgency in Manipur. Major General Vijay Mishra spelt out the reality: “By the character of IEDs it's so easy to assemble and hide.” Though the army conducts regular Road Opening Parties (ROPs) for ‘sanitising’ roads before any military movement, yet IEDs remain a potent threat.
Cutting across geography, ideology and/or purpose, IEDs appear to be consistent and standard weapons against the ‘state forces’ used by insurgents in this asymmetric war.
What is an IED?
It is a homemade bomb, constructed from military or non-military components. IEDs consist of an initiating mechanism, a detonator, an explosive charge, and a collection of projectiles like ball bearings or nails that produces lethal fragments upon detonation. IEDs can be made from many different kinds of objects and materials, including fertilizers, TNT, and other explosives.
Though of low technology and indigenously prepared, the ‘poor insurgent’s bomb’ forced the Pentagon to set up an office in 2006 to exclusively deal with the growing threat of IEDs. Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero of the Pentagon lamented that to ‘counter a $31 bag of fertilizer they were spending hundreds of millions of dollars on sensors and protective devices.’
IEDs give insurgents “visibility, power, and influence,” contends Anthony Cordesman, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. US Army Sgt. Maj. Todd Burnett is, however, of the old school as he puts his bet on the well-trained soldier and his eyes, rather than on any exotic technology to tackle IEDs in the battlefield.
There is no gainsaying that there is a need to detect the activities that precede the use of IEDs to predict the events. That requires a set of information derived from both human as well as technical sources, followed by analytical inference deduced from the data. Naturally, persistent surveillance can improve the capabilities of the security forces. Incidentally, till date, intelligence gathering remains the most powerful weapon against the IEDs.
Intelligence at ‘ground zero’ plays a pivotal role in countering IEDs as it was again validated in the Gadchiroli massacre. Initial investigations point to the fact that the Maoist insurgents had precise information pertaining to the movement of the
C 60 contingent, whereas the latter lacked any credible information about the ultras.
Reverting to the queries raised
First, it is true that, in an environment marked by depleted manpower compounded by the lack of fresh recruits and a continuous loss of top leadership, the Maoists of late have switched to the IED-model to inflict blows to the security forces with minimum loss on their side. They meticulously wish to avoid frontal confrontation but at the same time gain an apparent tactical victory in the propaganda space.
Second, it is not at all unlikely that Basavaraju is instrumental behind this change of approach. However, it is clear that the use of IEDs is not a novel technique that the Maoists are putting into effect now. Rather, they have been doing it since long. The new general secretary of the Maoists may have a greater proclivity towards the use of explosives because of his own expertise on the subject, yet does he have any viable alternative given the continuous loss of manpower due to elimination, incarceration and surrenders?
Third, it is expected that for some time to come the Maoists would focus more on low-end technology of the IEDs to inflict as much damage on the security forces and dent their morale. This tactic might, by and large, continue till regrouping takes place and fresh recruitment is on the rise. Thereafter, while the use of IEDs would continue, however the intensity of their use would expectedly go down with greater focus on reaching the third stage of the ‘strategic offence’ in the guerrilla campaign. Presently, the Maoists are in the ‘strategic defence’ phase and playing on the back foot.
Fourth, considering what conventional armed forces of the world are facing and have faced in the past with regard to IEDs, it should be easy to comprehend that it is not at all a cakewalk to tackle the ‘poor insurgent’s bomb’. If the armoured vehicles of the US Army could be breached by IEDs, then the Indian security forces ought to be empathized with in this hour of challenge. Nonetheless, it does not mean that the security forces would not follow standard operating procedures while dealing with the insurgent in a difficult topography. Being huddled together in a single vehicle would obviously make them vulnerable. Further, credible intelligence on the ultras through a local network has to be on the platter to avoid any fiasco. In addition, leakage of information to the other side should be prevented at all costs. Moreover, research on detecting and containing the IED menace needs to continue, with emphasis on less exotic and cost-effective techniques.
The fundamental issue in this entire deliberation is simple enough. A low-key technology is the motor of a ‘long war’ between two unequal actors: the relatively ‘weak’ insurgent and the powerful state. The Maoist insurgent would continue to use the low-end technology to extract as much leverage as possible, while state forces need to exercise caution, exhibit patience and wait for the earliest opportunity against the ultras.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Sri Lanka Easter bombings has allowed ISIS chief Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi to launch a public relations offensive and enunciate a dangerous new strategy.
Barely a month after losing all its territory in Syria to US-led forces, ISIS seems to be fast regaining its international notoriety as a major threat to global peace and security. After carrying out the horrific Easter Sunday attacks in Sri Lanka on 21 April 2019 — which claimed 253 lives and left over 500 people injured — ISIS supremo Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi made a video appearance last week to assert that the “fight is not over”. With an AK-47 rifle by his side, the 47-year old Baghdadi stated that the killings in Sri Lanka “were an act of revenge for ISIS’s defeat in Baghouz”, the last sliver of territory the group held in Syria before losing it to international forces in March 2019.
With this video, Baghdadi wants to show that he has overcome the shock of having lost his Caliphate and can still launch a public relations offensive, which has been in shambles for several months. Released by its hideous media arm Al-Furqan, the aim of the video is to revive the demotivated and scattered forces of ISIS and its sympathizers around the world, by showing that the so-called Caliph still holds court (albeit without a Caliphate) and that terror groups from Mali and Burkina Faso are purportedly still willing to give him the oath of allegiance (‘bayah’).
Baghdadi’s bluster
In this respect, Baghdadi finds himself in the same position in which Osama Bin Laden found himself after the latter’s lair was destroyed by US forces in Afghanistan in 2001. Following the decimation of its base and the collapse of the Taliban regime, Al-Qaeda’s leadership became more of a receiver of assistance from allies and less of a provider of terror funding, weaponry and military training. Bin Laden also had to face internal dissent from within his top brass, with Abu Musab Al-Suri and Sayed Imam Al-Sharif alias Doctor Fadl parting ways.
Thus, ISIS may have a lot to thank its allies in South Asia for its resurgence from near death and Baghdadi’s second video appearance after nearly five years may be an attempt to reaffirm his position as the undisputed leader of his transnational terror hub. It is interesting to note that Baghdadi issued a new strategic directive in his statement, in which he did not seem keen on reinstating the territorial Caliphate but called for the adoption of a more shadowy, unconventional campaign, on the lines of Al-Qaeda. Thus, the ISIS’ head honcho said: “We recommend to all of you to attack your enemies and exhaust them in all of their capabilities — human, military, economic and logistical — and in all matters. Our battle today is one of attrition and stretching the enemy.”
Return of the legions
However, the counter-argument to the ISIS not intending to reclaim the territory of its defunct ‘Caliphate’ seems to be coming from none other than the Pentagon itself. A report released in early February by the US Department of Defense cites the commander of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) answering a question about the impact of a U.S. troop departure on ISIS in Syria thus: “…absent sustained [counterterrorism] pressure, ISIS could likely resurge in Syria within six to twelve months and regain limited territory.” The report was read by many experts as contradicting President Trump’s announcement of US withdrawal from Syria in December 2018, following his assertion that “we (the US) just took over 100% caliphate”.
The absence of a political solution in Syria and the unpopularity of the Iraqi government among the Sunni community are the reasons for the continuing support for ISIS in the region. According to Syria’s Al Masdar news agency, increased terrorist activity by ISIS forces near the international highway between Baghdad and Damascus has forced authorities to keep the road closed. In late April, ISIS forces are also said to have reportedly killed 20 soldiers in a protracted engagement with Syrian troops in the Badia desert.
There is also a growing threat of dispersed ISIS fighters returning to re-instate the ISIS proto-state. American military and intelligence assessments report that thousands rather than hundreds of ISIS fighters and planners seem to have slipped out of the caliphate and are still at large in the region.
According to Edmund Fitton-Brown, coordinator of the ISIS/Al-Qaeda/ Taliban Monitoring Team at the United Nations: “We don't know how many have died. But we can assume that at least 50% survive. My personal guess is more.” CNN reporter Tim Lister cites intelligence sources claiming that ISIS fighters have slipped through Iran into the Pakistani province of Balochistan and into Afghanistan.
In recent weeks, there has been an upsurge in ISIS-linked activities in Syria, Iraq and other parts of the world. A day after the attacks in Sri Lanka, ISIS tried to carry out an attack on a state security building in Riyadh but Saudi forces foiled the attack and arrested all 13 suspects. ISIS is also said to have gained a foothold in Congo and the terror group’s news agency has claimed to have assaulted a military barracks in the area of Beni, killing eight people last month.
ISIS focused on India
The worrying fact, as Tim Lister puts it, is that ISIS is at present increasingly focusing on India. “Its propaganda suggests ISIS sees India as promising territory and is intent on aggravating Muslim-Hindu tensions there.” On April 30, ISIS named a certain Abu Muhammed al-Bengali as its new emir in ‘Bengal’ and issued a direct threat to carry out strikes in India and Bangladesh. “If you think you have silenced the soldiers of the Khilafa in Bengal and Hind and you are certain about that then listen we men are never to be silenced ... and are thirst for revenge is never to be faded away (sic),” the IS poster released in Bengali, English and Hindi reads.
As the dust refuses to settle over the Easter Sunday attacks in Sri Lanka, investigations reportedly reveal that the Sri Lankan Muslim preacher Zahran Hashim, who masterminded the attacks in Colombo, had already radicalized several Indian youths in different parts of South India. One of his suspected followers has been arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and has reportedly confessed to his plan to carry out a suicide attack in Kerala. Although the young radical may not have met Zahran Hashim personally, it is believed that he may have been in contact with an IS module in Tamil Nadu.
As questions are asked over how small Sri Lankan outfits — the National Thowheed Jama’ath (NTJ) and a little known group, JMI — could have pulled off a series of highly sophisticated and coordinated blasts, ongoing investigations suspect the presence of a much wider network of unknown ISIS affiliates, extending deeper into India and Bangladesh.
Far from over, the ISIS threat may have become deadlier internationally and seems more intent on exploring new pastures, particularly India. The need of the hour is for the country to stand united and for citizens from every community to support intelligence agencies in a national vigil against terrorism.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
It is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.
Undoubtedly, India’s relentless and intense diplomacy coupled with international pressure has succeeded in pushing China to designate Masood Azhar as a UN proscribed terrorist. Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale’s visit to China on 21-22 April and his presentation of an exhaustive dossier showing Azhar as a terrorist finally caused China to relent. This is also the official rationale given by the Chinese foreign ministry for ending its intransigence on this issue. However, it was the spread of terrorism in South Asia, with the terror attacks in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday, that acted as a last straw. In other words, it is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.
The timing of China’s lifting of its technical hold leading to Azhar’s designation as a global terrorist is telling. Post-Pulwama, China had been the only country that did not condemn the terror attack. Rather, for the fourth time, it had blocked the proposal put forward by the US, the UK and France for banning Azhar on the pretext of insufficient information, thus, clearly standing in support of its all-weather friend, Pakistan. Further, China’s state-run newspaper chided India for blaming Pakistan for Pulwama and China for blocking the Azhar ban. But the Islamic State (IS) terror strike on Sri Lanka served as a wakeup call for China. Though it is striking to note that when leaders from India, US, UK Russia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal expressed shock and condemnation over the deadly blasts at churches and hotels, China maintained a palpable silence. Of course, it could not have said much when its position on similar terror strikes on India have always been muted, thereby demonstrating its loyalty to Pakistan. But more significantly, China’s silence points to its approach towards terrorism which is critically linked to Uighur separatism in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
So far, China has addressed the terrorism issue by adopting a two-fold policy. One, internally, it has adopted the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign since the 2000s to repress and eliminate the Uighur separatists. Since 2017, this policy has acquired a strikingly virulent form with the Chinese government detaining thousands of Uighurs in internment camps and indoctrinating them to wean them away from the Islamic faith. Coupled with this, China has launched a massive surveillance-based database, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), to monitor Muslims in Xinjiang. Second, externally, China has enlisted the support of Pakistan to rein in not only the Uighurs but Pakistan’s own radical forces. The July 2007 Red Mosque incident is one such example when the Musharraf government acted at the behest of China to crack down on Pakistani radicals. Further, in 2010, there were reports of the presence of up to 11,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to counter Islamic radicals based in FATA conducting cross-border terrorist operations in Xinjiang. Besides, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has institutionally tried to address the issue of terrorism. There are as many as ten legal documents that outline the principles of anti-terrorism cooperation among member states. Plus, an anti-terror centre was established in Bishkek to fight what China calls the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Moreover, in the post-9/11 era, taking advantage of the global war on terror, China has projected Uighur separatism as terrorism and, in 2002, got the US treasury department to list the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization. Yet, the Uighur threat has remained unabated. In fact, China can no longer claim immunity to terror attacks.
In 2006, one of the splinter groups of the ETIM, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), was formed by Uighurs who had fled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1990s. In 2008, this group claimed responsibility for carrying out deadly attacks in Shanghai and Kunming. Further, a study by the European Council on Foreign Relations contends that earlier the Al-Qaeda had prohibited attacks targeting China and Chinese interests since it viewed US-China rivalry as a strategic opportunity. But now the Islamic State has called on its affiliates to ‘take revenge’ against China for carrying out atrocities in Xinjiang. Thus, China no longer enjoys the restraint exercised by Al-Qaeda and its associates. There are even reports of some 200 Uighurs joining the ranks of the Islamic State and other Jihadi organizations in Syria and Iraq.
In this context, the terror attack in Sri Lanka, which the IS has claimed responsibility for, is an alarming sign. China had so long controlled the menace of terrorism within its borders by joining hands with Pakistan and ignoring India’s sovereignty and security concerns. The spread of Islamic terrorism to Sri Lanka not only narrows the room for China to ignore terrorism in the region but also threatens to affect its BRI projects in that country. In fact, the IS has threatened to carry out further attacks in India and Bangladesh. This spread of instability bodes ill for the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is President Xi Jinping’s dream project.
It is important to note that the success of BRI is critical to China’s own economic growth and fulfilment of its two centenary goals: establishing a prosperous and well-off society by 2022 and joining the ranks of developed nations by 2050. This twin success, in turn, is fundamental to bolstering party legitimacy. In other words, the economic rationale far outweighs the geopolitical basis of the BRI. In this regard, the recently concluded second BRI summit in Beijing saw reduced enthusiasm among countries across the world. China is increasingly confronting criticism about its debt-trap diplomacy. It failed to woo India’s participation for the second consecutive time. Of the eight SAARC countries, only Nepal and Pakistan sent their heads of state to Beijing. Sri Lanka, which had participated in the 2017 summit, skipped it this year. The same was the case with Turkey, which chose not to attend on the grounds of China’s policy towards the Uighurs. At this juncture, China could ill-afford to confront international isolation on the Azhar ban issue.
Given the critical link between terrorism and the BRI, China realised the futility of its opposition to Azhar being designated as a global terrorist. This pragmatism on the part of the Chinese leadership has not only ended the spectre of China’s international isolation but also raised the prospects of restoring the Wuhan spirit. New Delhi should not be hoodwinked into thinking that Beijing has given up its Pakistan card against India. China’s decision was guided by a realistic assessment of its national interest.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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