India must jettison the attempt to maintain a balance between China and the US and instead take advantage of China’s internal and external vulnerabilities to gain an upper hand in the asymmetric power equation that has developed.
India has reportedly decided not to join the US–led counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The US initiative, which is a trilateral one involving Japan and Australia, was launched at the first Indo-Pacific Business Forum meeting on July 30 and seeks to fund infrastructure projects in the region for which about USD 113 million has been earmarked. India has opted to stay out of this initiative and thus maintain a fine balance between the US and China. Here, it is pertinent to recall that India has also stayed out of the Chinese BRI initiative.
Such an attempt to maintain a balance between China and the United States needs to be jettisoned since it is a confusing strategy that involves sitting on the fence and, at times, even appeasing the Chinese. Arguably, India could take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the Chinese system and gain an upper hand in the asymmetric power equation that has developed vis-a-vis China.
Any mention of China’s vulnerability, whose economy is USD 11 trillion-strong, is sure to raise eyebrows. But the fact remains that China is not all that strong. Geopolitically, President Trump’s outreach to North Korea and advocacy of an Indo-Pacific strategy are eroding China’s geopolitical manoeuvrability. Economically, the ongoing trade war between the US and China is expected to hurt China’s growth, and that could very well mean the erosion of the Communist Party’s credibility given that it draws its legitimacy from continued good economic performance. Internally, one-party rule might appear resilient and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) most powerful. But it is quite baffling to see the Chinese Premier visiting Tibet between 25 and 27 July and declaring it an inseparable part of China’s “sacred” territory as well as urging religious figures to promote national unity and ethnic harmony. Why has this statement been made now when Beijing has issued more than a dozen white papers on Tibet since the 1990s to bolster its claims, and has rapidly intensified the militarization of Tibet since the 2000s? Further, the fate of Muslims in Xinjiang is dire as China has detained a million ethnic Uighurs and sent some two million Uighurs and other ethnic Muslims to secret camps for indoctrination to Chinese nationalism. Clearly, all is not well inside China. It is spending an enormous amount of money on the People’s Armed Police (PAP), deployed to curb internal rebellion and dissent. China’s expenditure on internal security is reportedly USD 196 billion, larger than the PLA’s official budget. This suggests internal destabilization is a greater worry for the Communist Party than external threats. Indeed, internal vulnerabilities have only exacerbated with President Xi Jinping’s anti-graft effort, which is apparently the largest organized one in the history of Communist rule in China. More than a million people, including high-ranking military and party officials have been indicted for corruption so far. Many portray this as more of a political purge than an effort to cleanse the rot in the party ranks. Arguably, Xi might confront some kind of a rebellion from within his party ranks and society at large. That presumably explains his holding onto power and the scrapping of the two-term presidential term limit.
These rising internal vulnerabilities and external pressures have caused China to woo India, with the first such instance in the post-Doklam phase being the statement made by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the parliamentary session in March 2018, when he was quoted saying, “if China and India are united, one plus one will become eleven instead of two.” The subsequent Wuhan informal summit in April between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi should also be seen in this context. Again, during the 10th BRICS Summit held in Johannesburg between 25 and 27 July, Xi held the view that the five countries of the BRICS represented the five fingers, and that “when the BRICS come together, we form a fist that can punch.” Obviously, it is meant to punch the US. Keeping up the momentum, the Chinese defence minister, Wei Fenghe, visited New Delhi in the third week of August to seemingly re-establish military relations between the two Asian giants.
Simply put, vulnerability not only explains China’s courting of India at this juncture, but it also defines China’s broad foreign policy shifts. If one looks at China’s foreign policy strategy in the Cold War period, it was essentially based on the identification of the principal contradiction (threat), and thereafter progressively isolate it by tilting towards a lesser contradiction. Notably, the US-China rapprochement of the 1970s came about after the identification of the Soviet Union as the principal hegemon and joining hands with the capitalist United States. Mao Zedong did not regard the rapprochement with the US as an aberration of Marxist ideology. Instead, he vindicated his tilt by advocating the Three Worlds Theory in 1973-74. In other words, ideology mattered the least when China found itself vulnerable. And to end the vulnerability, China did not shy away from mending its relations with the capitalist West. This psyche of vulnerability is deep-rooted in Chinese history. In fact, if one identifies the primary characteristic undergirding China’s history, it is the constant tussle between vulnerability and stability. From the first centralized dynasty, the Qin, to the last, the Qing, the threat from nomadic barbarians or non-Han groups was the predominant source of vulnerability. Hence the construction of the Great Wall to check barbarian invasions. Interestingly, China’s rise as a maritime power, as well as decline, was significantly shaped by the barbarian threat from the north.
China’s current vulnerability emanates from Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which challenges Xi’s dream project, the BRI, with an estimated cost of USD 8 trillion. And to deal with this vulnerability, China is wooing India. At this juncture, India is a lesser contradiction, notwithstanding the 2017 Doklam crisis and New Delhi’s refusal to endorse the BRI. There is no real bonhomie between India and China, and there can never be, because according to Confucian thought, there cannot be two tigers residing on a single mountain.
In dealing with China, India should thus be aware of the former’s deep insecurities and vulnerabilities. It should shape its China policy from such ‘knowing’ and not from a superficial analysis of the immediate global circumstances. India should reconsider joining the US-led counter to the BRI, albeit after scrupulous negotiations that both uphold its foreign policy interests and shield it from the dragon’s wrath.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent tour of Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa increased to 26 the number of African countries visited by very senior leaders, thus contributing to a significant reduction in India’s visibility deficit in the continent.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s tour of Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa from 23 to 27 July 2018 reiterates the growing importance of Africa for India and will go a long way towards revitalising relations with the continent. This is Modi’s third visit to the continent. He visited Seychelles and Mauritius in 2015, followed by a tour of Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya in 2016. The current visit, along with earlier initiatives, such as the high profile Third India-Africa Forum Summit in 2015 and the launch of the Asia Africa Growth Corridor, an initiative to enhance connectivity and people to people partnership between Asia and Africa in collaboration with Japan in 2017, demonstrate the high priority that India accords to the continent.
Rwanda: Increasing strategic importance
Modi’s first stop was Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. During the visit, India signed eight MoUs and other agreements for cooperation in trade, agriculture, defence, leather and dairy products, including two lines of credit valued at $100 million each for the development of industrial parks and an agriculture irrigation scheme.1 Modi’s visit, the first by an Indian prime minister, denotes the growing importance of Rwanda. There are a number of reasons for according importance to Rwanda. First, Rwanda is one of the fastest growing economies in Central Africa. According to the World Bank, it had a GDP growth rate of eight per cent per annum between 2001 and 2015.2 Second, President Paul Kagame is the current chair of the African Union. He has supported several initiatives for African integration and reform. Earlier this year, Rwanda hosted the Extraordinary Summit of the African Union on African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The free trade area aims to deepen the African integration process and will allow free movement of people and trade across the continent.3 Third, Rwanda has moved ahead of India to become the third largest troop contributor to United Nations Peace Keeping operations.4 Currently, a total of 7086 Rwandan uniformed personnel are serving with the UN in conflict prone areas, such as Sudan (Darfur), South Sudan and Central African Republic.
Fourth, Rwanda is one of the least corrupt countries in Africa. According to the Corruption Perception Index, 2017, Rwanda is the third least corrupt country in Africa, after Botswana and Seychelles. 5 Globally ranked 45th on the index, Rwanda is way ahead of India, which is ranked 81st in the report.6 Hence there is a lot India can learn from Rwanda in the fight against corruption. Finally, Rwanda is one of the most pro-women countries in the world. According to the World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, Rwanda is among the top five countries with respect to gender equality. It appears that Rwanda is head and shoulders above a large number of developed countries, including the United States of America. For example, Rwanda has one of the highest rates of female labour force participation in the world. Similarly, in terms of political representation, the country tops the global list of the highest number of female parliamentarians.7
Uganda: Rebuilding economic and diaspora ties
Modi’s next stop was Kampala, Uganda, where he signed four MoUs on defence, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic ties and for the setting up of a material testing laboratory for highway construction. He also announced two lines of credit - one worth $141 million for energy infrastructure (power and electricity) development and another of $64 million for the agriculture and dairy sector.8 This visit by an Indian prime minister came after a long gap of 21 years. Modi was also the first Indian prime minister to address the Ugandan parliament.
Uganda’s importance for India rests on three factors. First Uganda is estimated to have oil reserves of 6.5 billion barrels,9 which were discovered in 2006. The commercial production of oil has, however, taken a while and is expected to commence in 2020. 10 A land locked country, Uganda is also planning to lay a crude oil export pipe line through Tanzania. Currently, the French company Total and the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) are the major stake holders in this field. As an energy deficit country, it is quite natural for India to be interested in energy cooperation with Uganda and opportunities for expanding this cooperation in future do exist.
Second, Uganda is important regionally, as President Yoweri Museveni is the current chair of the East Africa Community (EAC). The EAC is a regional organisation of six partner states that include Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and South Sudan. Museveni is one of Africa’s longest serving leaders and has been credited for the revival of the grouping.11 Perhaps, it is with Uganda’s role in the EAC in mind that Modi announced a million dollars in assistance to the EAC. Finally, Uganda is home to around 30,000 people of Indian origin. Before their forced exodus during the Idi Amin regime in 1972, Ugandan Indians dominated the economy and accounted for about 90 per cent of the country’s tax revenue.12 Since their return from exile in the mid-1980s at the invitation of Museveni, Ugandan Indians have started to regain prominence in the economy. Currently, they account for 65 per cent of Uganda’s tax revenues.13 Connecting with the Indian diaspora seems to be an equally important driver for Modi’s visit to the landlocked country. While addressing a gathering of Indian community in Kampala, Modi recalled the historical links between the two countries and acknowledged the role they have played in shaping Uganda’s economy and politics.14 He further remarked that the presence of a large Indian diaspora is one of the reasons for the growing importance of Africa for India.15
South Africa: BRICS Summit
Modi’s last stop was Johannesburg, South Africa, the venue of the 10th annual BRICS Summit. The visit to South Africa was also important bilaterally, as 2018 marks the 25th anniversary of the re-establishment of diplomatic ties. It is also the 125th anniversary of the Pietermaritzburg incident, related to Mahatma Gandhi, and the 100th birth anniversary of Nelson Mandela. On the sidelines of the BRICS summit, Prime Minister Modi and President Cyril Ramaphosa reaffirmed their partnership and signed three MoUs for cooperation in the fields of space technology, agriculture and skills enhancement.16
However, the larger focus of the visit was the 10th annual BRICS Summit whose theme was ‘BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution’. Brazil, Russia, India, China came together in 2009 to form an informal grouping and were joined by South Africa in 2011. Over the years, the BRICS countries have taken fresh initiatives for South-South Cooperation and global governance, the most prominent being the establishment of the New Development Bank. During the Summit Modi highlighted India’s efforts with regard to South-South Cooperation in Africa and called for multilateralism, international trade and a rule based global order that is free of terrorism and extremism. Here it is to be noted that the Johannesburg BRICS summit was held in the backdrop of the tariffs imposed by the United States on China. In his address, Xi Jinping sought the support of India and other BRICS partners in the fight against President Trump’s unilateralism and protectionist tendencies. South Africa, on the other hand, was more interested in seeking more investment in the African continent for sustainable development. The Johannesburg declaration reflected the BRICS partners’ efforts to adopt a coordinated stance on global issues. It reaffirmed the importance of multilateralism and sent a clear message against trade protectionism.17 It also factored in India’s interests by calling for a comprehensive approach to dealing with terrorism. At the same time, it reiterated its support for African development priorities and initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area.18
Conclusion
Prime Ministers Modi’s Africa tour is significant for four reasons. First, it allayed some of the criticism relating to India’s visibility deficit on the continent, which has often been articulated in the past. Over the last four years, 26 high level Indian visits have been made to the continent. Nine of these were by the Prime Minister himself, and the rest at the President and Vice President level. These visits demonstrate the Modi government’s desire to have a high level dialogue with the African leadership.
Second, the visit highlights the growing importance of Africa in India’s larger foreign policy framework. In his speech at the Ugandan parliament, Modi laid out the principles of India’s Africa policy. He emphasised that India is keen on building a development partnership with Africa that is unique, encourages free and open trade, empowers people, equips the youth, enhances mutual security and encourages reform of the global order. He emphasised that the partnership stands in “solidarity with Africa’s endeavours, is transparent and … respects the principle of equality.”19
Third, this tour may enhance business cooperation between India and African countries. While addressing the India-Rwanda Business Forum in Kigali, Modi called for greater cooperation at the business to business level between India and African countries. He stated that there were “limitless possibilities” of cooperation in various sectors such as infrastructure, small scale industry and solar power.20
Finally, the visit to the three African countries has resulted in a greater understanding of mutual concerns and priorities. In order to retain its immense goodwill on the continent, India should ensure that it delivers at the earliest on the promises made during this visit.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
5. Emmanuel Ntirenganya, “Rwanda ranked among Africa's three least corrupt nations again”, New Times, February 23, 2018, at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/229524 (Accessed August 4, 2018).
The Need for a Mid-Term Review of the 13th Defence Five Year Plan
Vinay Kaushal
August 14, 2018
The Defence Planning Committee needs to activate its ‘Plan and Capability Development’ Sub-committee and task them to review the 13th Defence Plan in a time bound manner.
The defence planning process has been historically linked to the national five year planning process, which began in 1951. While the 1st Five Year Defence Plan (1964–69) was initiated in the aftermath of the 1962 War in the midst of the 3rd Five Year Plan period, the period of subsequent defence plans was synchronised with Five Year Plans of the Planning Commission from the 4th Plan onwards, that is, 1969–74. Service Headquarters (HQ) began drawing up the first 15-year perspective plan from 1979 and the concept of Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) was introduced in 2001. The existing planning process is based on the 15 year LTIPP, the five year Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) — also called the ‘Defence Five Year Plan’, and the Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP), which is in fact a two-year roll-on plan.
Planning process post the 12th Defence Plan
The current NDA government decided to discontinue with the Five Year Plans after the end of the 12th Plan and classify expenditure into ‘plan’ and ‘non-plan’ components. On January 1, 2015, the National Institution for Transforming India, or NITI Aayog, came into existence as the government’s premier think tank. NITI Aayog was tasked to do the following:1
Formulate a long-term vision of 15 years keeping in mind the social goals set and/or proposed and sustainable development goals;
To convert the long-term vision into implementable policy and action, a seven year strategy from 2017-18 to be formulated as a part of ‘National Development Agenda’ with a mid-term review after three years;
The three-year time frame from 2017-18 to 2019-20 will be used to align financial resources during the 14thFinance Commission award period. This document is to be called ‘action plan’.
The above-mentioned National Development Agenda was to go beyond the traditional area of ‘Plan’ and cover aspects such as ‘internal security’ and ‘defence’.
13th Defence Five Year Plan
The Parliament Standing Committee on Defence was informed by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that:
‘Discontinuation of Five year Plans and Plan/Non-Plan Expenditure would have no impact on resource estimation/implementation of projects. Five year Defence Plans are still being prepared in which future requirements of the Services are projected. Activities planned are likely to proceed according to available annual budget allocations. As such, planned projects were implemented to the extent possible with the available allocations’.2
The MoD also apprised the committee that, while formulating guidelines for the 13th Defence Plan, it was decided that the Plan may be sent to the Ministry of Finance for information only and not for approval. The Ministry of Finance will be kept in the loop about the requirements of the Defence Forces in the coming years.
But the committee felt compelled to observe that successive governments had not granted approval for 10th, 11th and 12th defence five year Plans. The factual position with respect to these three plan periods is collated below.
Preparing a five year plan which is two-and-a-half times the actual expenditure of the previous plan (as seen in Table 1) is, to put it mildly, ‘very, very ambitious’, more so in the face of knowledge about the quantum of funding that was likely to be made available for the next three years. As a requirement of the FRBM Act, the government has to present a Medium-term Expenditure Framework Statement (MTEF). It is to set forth a three-year rolling target for prescribed fiscal indicators with specification of underlying assumptions. It ensures a multi-year commitment of resources to policies and is, therefore, important for expenditure prioritisation and for fostering government performance over the medium term. It is presented in parliament following the session in which the budget is presented (by default, the Monsoon session). So when the 13th plan was being prepared, the following picture was available through MTEF (see Table 2 below). As may be seen, taking the highest figures for each year, the total funding visibility for the first three years of the plan was Rs 917342 crore. To expect the double of this amount during the remaining two years was unrealistic optimism, to say the least.
Source: MTEF 2016 & MTEF 2017; Union Budget
The MTEF Statement for 2018 was presented in the Lok Sabha on August 7, 2018.3 The picture that emerges is tabulated below.
Accordingly, the allocation for the first four years of the 13th plan is expected to be Rs 1237633 crore against a projected requirement for five years of Rs 2683924 crore, leaving a yawning gap of Rs 14.5 lakh crore. Peter F. Drucker, the founder of modern-day management, had aptly noted that “Unless commitment is made, there are only promises and hopes; but no plans.”
Need for Review of 13th Defence Five Year Plan
Table 3 makes it abundantly clear that one-third of government’s capital expenditure is spent on defence and that the government cannot allocate more on this front. When a defence plan is approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), each scheme in the approved SCAP is allotted a number. And while submitting the schemes proposed to be included in the AAP, the approved serial number of the five-year plan is to be quoted. In the situation as above, the number of schemes approved is more than double of what can go through. This does not augur well for a balanced capability build up and the race is on amongst service HQs to get the schemes past before the fund gate closes. Hence, what can go through and who can get their approvals fast, gets in.
Defence planning and the maintenance of capability (done through the revenue budget) have to be holistically seen as part of the big picture of the national economic situation and expectation of the people.
The above table brings out the share of the top three items of government expenditure. Defence Expenditure referred to (as also other tables) is only defence revenue and capital allocations, and does not include MoD (civil) and defence pensions. The spike in allotments for subsidies in 2018-19 is on account of food subsidy and no one would grudge the higher MSP for distressed farmers. In the given fiscal situation, this is the best the government can do and the defence planners need to go back to the drawing board and redraw their plans and prioritise to ensure a balanced build up of capability.
What Defence Planning Committee needs to do
In April 2018, the government established a Defence Planning Committee (DPC) headed by the NSA. Its mandate is to analyse and evaluate all relevant inputs relating to defence planning. These include the national defence and security priorities, foreign policy imperatives, relevant strategic and security-related doctrines, defence acquisition and infrastructure development plans, including the 15-year LTIPP, defence technology and development of the Indian defence industry and global technological advancement.
The inputs to the DPC would be managed through sub committees, the membership of which and the terms of reference were to be decided subsequently in consultation with the Chairman. One important sub-committee & its mandate is:
Plans and Capability Development
Create Capability Development Plan (CDP) and monitor its implementation
Obtain cabinet approval and help obtain budgetary support
The inaugural meeting of the Defence Planning Committee was held on May 3, 20184 during which it deliberated upon the geo-strategic landscape and agreed to chart a time-bound action plan in keeping with its broad mandate. The DPC needs to activate the ‘Plan and Capability Development’ sub-committee immediately, decide its composition and task them to review the 13th Defence Plan in a time bound manner and submit a draft plan that limits the outflow, including the committed liabilities of the contracted schemes and the stage payment that would become due for the ‘New Schemes’ within the resources likely to be available. In addition to the acquisition plans, the committee needs to examine the Capital Works plan of the Service HQs, HQ IDS, and the plan for capital expenditure of DRDO and OFB which also form a part of the Defence capital expenditure. The sub-committee next needs to address the revenue budget availability and review the plans of the service HQs as well as of other entities to bring about savings and ensure that the maintenance of capabilities and measures to enhance serviceability are submitted, examined and followed up.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. PMO ID No. 360/31/C/38/2014-ES-II, dated 9 May 2016
2. Recommendations para 42 to 44 of the 36th Report Standing Committee on Defence (2017-18) (Sixteenth Lok Sabha) accessed on 09 Aug 2018
Whenever a civilian government has attempted to improve relations with India, it has either had to backtrack on promises made or the Pakistan Army ensures that, through its actions at the LoC and inside J&K, these promises stand scuttled.
The results of Pakistan’s general elections are officially out and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led by Imran Khan has emerged as the single largest party with 115 out of the 270 seats of the national assembly for which polling was held. The Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Sharif (PML[N]) came a distant second with 64 seats, and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of Zardari Bhutto family stood third with 43 seats. The remaining seats are shared by smaller regional and fundamentalist parties as well as by independents. With support from some smaller groups/parties, Imran Khan is expected to form the government.
At the provincial level, PML(N) has emerged as the single largest party albeit with a wafer thin lead over the PTI in Punjab, the critical province. Chances are that, here too, the PTI with support from smaller parties, which are vulnerable to arm twisting/rewards, would be able to form a government in due course. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has returned the PTI with an absolute majority for the second time. The situation in both Sindh and Baluchistan remains fluid for the present, but the possibility of the PTI cobbling up a simple majority with ‘establishment’ support in either or both is not ruled out.
A large number of observers has dubbed this as Pakistan’s ‘dirtiest and most rigged’ election. Allegations of mass scale rigging are being levelled by major parties like PML(N), PPP, National Awami Party (NAP), etc., despite vehement denials by the Election Commission of Pakistan. Reports of non-supply of Form 45, unexplained delays in the announcement of results, throwing out of authorised agents of the parties from polling booths, discovery of ballot papers and empty ballot boxes from trash containers, etc. are doing the rounds regularly. In an unprecedented action, close to 370,000 army troops were deployed at polling booths across the country, ostensibly to provide ‘security’.
A look at the country’s political landscape would indicate that unlike in most other countries democracy has not been able to flourish in Pakistan. The emergence of strong political parties led by popular leaders has been systematically nipped in the bud by the ‘deep state’ which has felt threatened by such a development. Thus, ZA Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto were killed when the PPP was at the peak of its power. Today, it is a mere shadow of its former self. Nawaz Sharif, the undisputed leader of PML(N) and three time Prime Minister, is incarcerated along with his daughter on corruption charges, thanks partly to an allegedly pliable judiciary. In the process, PML(N) has faced the ignominy of a number of its middle rung leaders deserting it for the PTI and reducing it to a rump. The vacuum on the political horizon thus created has been adroitly filled by propping up Imran Khan and his PTI. In all probability, Khan’s pliability would dictate the duration of his stay at the helm.
The elections have also exposed the weakness of democratic institutions in Pakistan. Judiciary, media, legislature, election commission, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) etc. have all displayed vulnerability to manipulation. Use of strong arm tactics to coerce and subjugate any institution not towing the line has been resorted to on the pretext of national interest.
Of even greater concern is the inability of the average voter to see through the hype and be carried away by sloganeering and propaganda. The feeling that their lot is not going to improve irrespective of who comes to power is making the electorate indifferent to election outcomes. No wonder the polling percentage has remained struck at around 53 per cent despite much greater exposure to media and technology. Additionally, the participation of fundamentalists and extremists in the elections is an equally disturbing trend. While they may not have made substantial gains in terms of final results, the very fact that they are being allowed to contest shows the fault lines in the system. It also displays the increasing acquiescence and acceptance of the gun culture which is expected to make further inroads in the future.
The army has emerged stronger post the elections. Continuation of its indirect rule enables it to exercise authority without accountability. The pitfalls of direct rule a la Musharraf have been cleverly avoided especially in view of the deteriorating economic conditions. The ability to pull the rug from under the feet of a recalcitrant civilian political leadership has been retained. Clearly, the Army has benefitted from its past experiences!
With that as the backdrop to the rise of Imran Khan to power, a question that is inevitable from every Indian is how his ascent will affect Indo-Pak relations. Will there be a change in Pakistan’s policy of waging proxy war in J&K? Will the ceasefire along the line of control (LoC) hold or will violations of the ceasefire agreement continue? Will trade and business relations get normalized? Will sports competitions between the two countries be resumed? Will Pakistan stop being a catalyst in igniting communal trouble in different parts of India?
The role of the Pakistan Army during the last 70 years should give a fair indication of the shape of things to come and the answers to most of the questions posed above. It is the army which has controlled Pakistan’s India policy. Whenever a civilian government has attempted to improve relations with India, it has either had to backtrack on promises made or the Pakistan Army ensures that, through its actions at the LoC and inside J&K, these promises stand scuttled. In some cases, the government may even fall and its leaders sent to jail. Of course, the possibility of some stubborn leaders being assassinated also exists.
Thus, it would be fair to assume that Indo-Pak relations will follow a similar pattern during Imran Khan’s tenure as Prime minister. He owes his position to the army and would be conscious of the fact that, with the wafer thin majority cobbled up by alliances with smaller parties and individuals, he would be on a slippery wicket should he not adhere to the prescribed text.
Pakistan’s economic, diplomatic, moral and military support to the proxy war in J&K is likely to continue, perhaps with increased intensity. Closer coordination with China would be resorted to in dealing with India both at the regional and international levels. The development of CPEC may be speeded up. There would be an increased possibility of using the communal card to stir up trouble in different parts of India. Repeat of a state sponsored terrorist strike similar to 26/11 cannot be ruled out. Given all this, the current talk in India of embarking upon a fresh beginning with the new Pakistani leadership is an exercise in unbridled optimism.
How is the change at the top going to affect Pakistan itself? First and foremost, fundamentalism is likely to get a fillip. Imran Khan has already earned the sobriquet of ‘Taliban’. The army too is keen to use the ‘good Taliban’ to further its proxy war in J&K and safeguard its interests in Afghanistan. Whether it can control the ‘bad Taliban’ or be swamped by its fundamentalist and terrorist actions is open to debate. Suffice it to say that extremism and fundamentalism are increasingly raising their ugly head in Pakistan and in the process have caused death and destruction. Resultantly, a number of countries today do not consider Pakistan a safe place to visit even for sporting activities/ competitions.
Secondly, Pakistan’s economy is in shambles. There is serious doubt whether it is in a position to service loans coming up for redemption as early as in November and December. A number of these loans pertain to CPEC projects and are to be repaid to China. In the event of default, China will acquire tremendous leverage in securing unprecedented strategic gains as it did at Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Should Pakistan alternatively seek an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout, it has already been hinted that IMF will not allow its funds to be used to repay Chinese loans. In any case, any bailout package from the IMF is likely to be accompanied by tough conditions which Pakistan would find unpalatable. With the Pakistani rupee having depreciated to 130 a dollar, Imran Khan would face difficult choices to pull the country out of this economic morass.
Thirdly, the Pakistan Army is infatuated with the idea of ‘strategic depth’ against India. It, therefore, feels impelled to monitor the happenings in Afghanistan and control any dispensation that comes to power there. It is prepared to use all means at its command to keep India out of Afghanistan and establish a regime there which is favourable to it. With a compliant Prime Minister, these efforts are likely to intensify.
Fourthly, US-Pakistan relations are gradually moving towards a new low. The latest US defence budget caters for providing only $150 million to Pakistan as aid as opposed to a billion plus dollars during previous years. The quid pro quo approach currently being followed by Trump in all US dealings with other countries demands substantial paybacks for the goodies being doled out. It is Pakistan’s hedging on deliverables and utilisation of aid to acquire weapons for use against India in the past that prompted the current US policy. This has not gone down well with Pakistan. But with limited options at its disposal and in an effort to corner India, Pakistan has moved towards a closer embrace of China. There is a likelihood that with the passage of time, Pakistan may well become a client state of China.
Lastly, internally, the economic situation is rapidly deteriorating. Foreign exchange reserves are abysmally low at $ 9 billion, only sufficient to cover imports for two months. The current account deficit has widened and the rupee continues to slide. Poverty, unemployment, inflation, terrorism and corruption are gnawing at the vitals of the country. To top it all, a major chunk of the budget is cornered by the military annually. Imran Khan is likely to have his hands full in balancing these conflicting demands while at the same time endeavouring to keep the military happy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
New Delhi's Options Post the Publication of the NRC in Assam
Pushpita Das
August 02, 2018
The best way forward for India is to initiate talks with Bangladesh and seek a mutually acceptable political solution for the issue of illegal immigrants.
The second draft of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam was published on July 30, 2018. Of the 3.29 crore persons who applied for the inclusion of their names in the NRC, 2.89 crore have been included as citizens, leaving out around 40 lakh persons. This draft of the NRC is however not final and people can still appeal against the non-inclusion of their names in the NRC. The final list of the NRC containing the names of all Indian citizens in Assam is expected to be published by December 2018 after disposing off all claims and objections in final registers at various levels. Not surprisingly, the exclusion of some 40 lakhs names from the second draft of the NRC has generated mixed reactions. Some political leaders have criticised the NRC updation, referring to it as an exercise that will make the Bengali speaking people “refugees in their own country”. Others have welcomed the NRC, terming it as the right of the people of Assam and essential for national security. Many others have raised doubts about the manner in which the entire process has been conducted and even accused the NRC team of deliberate malfeasance.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the updation of the NRC is a positive step in a number of ways. Firstly, once the draft is finalised, it will provide a much needed perspective on the extent of illegal migration that has taken place into Assam in particular and the country in general. Since the days of the Assam agitation against illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, there have been wild speculations about their actual number. The uncertainty about the number of illegal migrants was compounded by the absence of official estimates. This allowed political parties to often exaggerate the numbers, polarise voters and exploit the issue for electoral gains. An updated NRC is likely to put an end to such speculations and provide a verified dataset to carry out meaningful debates and implement calibrated policy measures.
Secondly, the issue of illegal migrants has remained an emotive one in Assam since independence. It had even created a divergence of opinion between successive central and state leaderships as the former continued to be accommodative towards migrants describing the mass migration from East Pakistan as “homecoming”. Much to the dismay of the people of Assam, some central leaders even went to the extent of denying that any illegal migration from Bangladesh has taken place into the state. The publication of an updated NRC will vindicate the long held argument of large sections of the people of Assam that unabated infiltration from Bangladesh has indeed taken place and that it has upset the demographic profile of the state’s population, especially in the border districts. This, they note, has been causing intense competition and conflict between the indigenous people and migrants for access to resources.
Thirdly, the publication of an updated NRC is expected to deter future migrants from Bangladesh from entering Assam illegally. The publication of the draft NRC has already created a perception that staying in Assam without valid documentation will attract detention/jail term and deportation. More importantly, illegal migrants may find it even more difficult to procure Indian identity documents and avail all the rights and benefits due to all Indian citizens. Last but not least, the inclusion of their names in the NRC will provide respite to all those Bengali speaking people in Assam who have been, hitherto, suspected as being Bangladeshis.
What next? Persons whose names do not feature in the final draft of the NRC are apprehensive that they will be declared as foreigners, sent to detention centres and finally deported. However, the fact remains that the publication of the final draft of the NRC in Assam does not settle the issue of who is a citizen and who is not. The authority to declare anyone a foreigner rests with the Foreigners Tribunals for Assam, constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964. Persons whose names do not figure in the final list of the updated NRC have the right to appeal to these 100 odd Foreigners Tribunals. It is only after one of these Foreigners Tribunals declares someone a foreigner that the government can detain and deport him or her. But this entire process could be a long drawn one as the disposal of lakhs of cases is likely to take years to complete. The real test for the Union government will come only if substantial numbers of persons are finally declared as foreigners by these Tribunals, because it does not have a clear policy on how to deal with them.
There are some options which the government may consider, though these are fraught with problems and likely to prove quite difficult, if not impossible, to implement. The first option is to deport the illegal migrants to Bangladesh. This course of action is, however, a non-starter given that Bangladesh till date has refused to even acknowledge that its citizens have migrated illegally into India, let alone expressing any indication that it would consider taking them back. New Delhi is also reluctant to raise this tricky issue lest it jeopardises relations with Dhaka. In the absence of a formal agreement, India cannot forcibly push the illegal migrants back into Bangladesh. Such an attempt would not only damage bilateral relations but also sully the country’s image internationally.
The second option is to allow the illegal migrants to reside in the country on humanitarian grounds, but after stripping them of all citizenship rights. The government can grant them a modified version of work permit and let them stay on as guest workers, albeit in different states. For this, the Union government will have to enter into negotiations with state governments that are willing to accept these illegal migrants. On their part, state governments have to maintain a proper database and a strict vigil on these illegal migrants lest they disappear without a trace. But this option is likely to create a new problem: in the absence of Bangladesh acknowledging that these lakhs of people are its citizens who have migrated to India, granting them work permits will render them stateless and cause a large-scale humanitarian crisis.
The third option is to grant the proclaimed illegal migrants amnesty and, after a process of naturalisation, Indian citizenship. Such an option would not, however, be welcomed by the people of Assam who are at present protesting against the Citizenship Amendment Bill of 2016, which proposes to grant citizenship to all refugees (except Muslims) who have fled religious persecution in their home countries. In fact, a case challenging the decision to consider migrants from East Pakistan, who had entered India before or on March 24, 1971, as Indian citizens is presently pending in the Supreme Court.
Given all this, the best way forward for India appears to be to initiate talks with Bangladesh and seek a mutually acceptable political solution for the issue of illegal immigrants. To begin with, India needs to convince Bangladesh to undertake a domestic verification process for determining who among those not finally listed in the NCR are its own citizens. The next step would be to work out a deal for repatriating these persons to Bangladesh. Such a deal is in the realm of possibility given the fact that Bangladesh has agreed to take back 85 of its citizens this year after verifying that they had illegally entered Assam.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s quest for being recognized even as a regional power, let alone a global power, requires a balanced and simultaneous growth of its economic and military capabilities.
These days one often hears phrases such as ‘India has arrived at the global scene’ or ‘21st century would be India’s century’. Prime Minister Modi’s style of diplomacy at the international level has given a fillip to such a feeling. Media projection of his personal equations with a majority of the world leaders including Trump, Xi and Putin has left most Indians believing that India is at the threshold of global power. More concretely, this feeling has enabled India to punch above its weight in international fora. No wonder, Modi is listened to with respect at forums like BRICS, ASEAN, SCO etc.
Today, however, the world is in transition. Thanks to Trump’s policy of ‘America First’, we are witnessing a gradual US withdrawal from its global commitments in groupings such as TPP and NATO. A common and cooperative approach to climate change issues stands debunked, as does the Iran nuclear deal. The unpredictability of Trump’s future actions has left the world in a state of suspense and tension. Tweeting appears to have become the preferred method of governing in the world’s strongest power.
The void thus created in world affairs is rapidly being sought to be filled by China, a growing global power. Projections indicate that China would overtake the US as the world’s largest economy by 2030. In the wake of such a development, China is expected to thrust its own version of the ‘rule of law’ and international boundaries especially with relation to its territorial disputes in South China Sea (SCS) and along its land borders.
Russia, under Putin, is seeking to achieve its old glory, despite evident limitations. A gradual US withdrawal from its global role is propelling Russia to occupy the vacated space, in competition with China. Russia is willing and prepared to exploit the fault lines in the western alliance to achieve this objective. Additionally, Russia would not hesitate to ally with China if that enables it to enhance its standing at the global level. The manner in which Russia has carved out a role for itself in the Middle East and is busy exploiting anti-US sentiment in Latin America are clearly indicative of its global role aspirations.
A common feature of all these powers is that they are economically and militarily strong. The US is a shining example. While Russia may have limitations on the economic side, it makes up for this shortfall by virtue of possessing a powerful military. China, for its part, has an equally strong economy as well as military.
In sharp contrast, countries like Germany and Japan are not looked upon as global powers despite their economic strength, because of their dependence on NATO and the US, respectively, for their security. Likewise, the erstwhile USSR could not survive an economic meltdown and disintegration despite being militarily strong. It is only when economic might and military prowess grow side by side that a country makes a mark in the global pecking order.
It may be worthwhile looking at India from such a perspective before determining how successful it has been in achieving recognition as a global or even a regional player. Considering the turmoil that the world has gone through in the last two decades, India has done reasonably well economically. Though nowhere near China, an annual average growth rate of about seven per cent has ensured steady economic growth. But poor infrastructure, unemployment, rampant corruption and poor work culture have prevented us from achieving better results. Nevertheless, we still have been recognized as a country with massive potential for future growth. By 2030, we are projected to have the third largest GDP globally.
However, that would not necessarily make us the third most powerful nation in the world. The reason is the lack of matching military capabilities. Like Germany and Japan (as mentioned earlier), economic power alone would not allow India to achieve global power status. In fact, without military prowess, we would not even be recognized as a regional power. No wonder then that the Indian Ocean, which was earlier an Indian preserve, is now seen as an arena that is open to domination by China, US, and the others. In fact, with bases at Coco Isles, Hambantota, Gwadar, Djibouti and Seychelles, the Chinese have literally established a string of pearls around India.
At the regional level, the pre-eminence enjoyed by India because of its size and population over its much smaller neighbours is slowly disappearing. Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives have gradually come under increasing Chinese economic, and in some cases military, influence. Bangladesh and Bhutan are being subjected to enticements/pressure to enable greater Chinese inroads at the expense of India. While the West may try to prop up India by renaming the erstwhile Asia Pacific region as Indo Pacific region, without a matching military capability from the Indian side, such efforts are unlikely to change the ground realities substantially.
The recent NATO summit has clearly highlighted the vulnerability of European nations from a security perspective in case the US goes ahead with threats of reducing its involvement in NATO. Trump’s warning to European leaders that even a defence expenditure of two per cent of GDP may not be enough to stop a US scale down in NATO and a subtle push for defence expenditure totalling four per cent of GDP post 2024, are indications of the kind of funding required for security and stability. At $636 billion annually, the US is spending 3.6 per cent of its GDP on defence.
In India, as a percentage of GDP, the defence budget has gradually shrunk during the last 10 years. From over two per cent in 2008-09, it is down to 1.57 per cent during the current year. This has resulted in increasing hollowness and the stopping of the modernization of the services. No wonder, one hears news of a MiG 21 crashing every few days, in the process at times snuffing out precious lives of trained pilots!
We cannot be deriving satisfaction from the success of ‘surgical strikes’ or stopping the Chinese juggernaut at Doklam. Those were mere tactical landmarks. Our requirement is to be prepared to defend ourselves against a two front threat. Increasing collusion between China and Pakistan in all aspects of functioning is a matter of deep concern for national security experts. None would want India to be exposed to a debacle like 1962. However, to avoid it, we need to develop capabilities to defend ourselves appropriately. It would also be prudent to understand that while diplomacy can play a crucial role in tackling critical situations, it may not be successful always. Not having a fall back option in case of failure of diplomatic efforts would be suicidal.
A series of cost cutting studies has been undertaken from time to time to save precious resources for modernization of the military within the available budget. A number of recommendations emerging from these studies have also been implemented, some with greater success than others. Such efforts at improving the teeth-to-tail ratio are an integral part of the functioning of a good organization. However, beyond a certain point, these efforts become counterproductive as greater time and energy are thereafter spent in ‘discovering’ them. The military has reached such a point.
The ‘Make in India’ route for improving defence capabilities, which the present dispensation is now trying to follow, should have been implemented immediately after independence to achieve the desired results by this time. It is good that it has been initiated now at least. However, it would require another 10 to 15 years to fructify. Of course, during this intervening period, the world would have moved further ahead.
We need to recognize that cosmetic changes to marginally improve the methodology of defence spending to achieve a greater bang from the available buck are no longer going to achieve the desired effect. India’s quest for being recognized even as a regional power, let alone a global power, requires a balanced and simultaneous growth of its economic and military capabilities.
In a growing economy, there would always be competing requirements for scarce resources. While growth and development must get priority, a delicate balance has to be ensured by factoring in the requirement of national security. The fact that the expenditure on defence is non-productive does not diminish the importance of security. We need to appreciate that we are perpetually exposed to a two front threat. Hostile neighbours can seriously disrupt growth and development if national security is not guaranteed. It is also important to understand that an occasional large allocation of resources to overcome crises is not an answer to security concerns. Allocation of suitable resources on an ongoing basis year after year is the only solution for an adequately prepared military to defend the nation. Professional expertise puts such an allocation at three per cent of the GDP. The sooner we factor it in our budgets, the better off we would be in being recognized as an emerging regional/global power.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The UK Combat Air Strategy unveiled on July 16, 2018 can actually be termed as the Combat Aircraft Industry Strategy. India, with a nearly non-existing aircraft industry, can benefit by understanding the key rationales underpinning the CAS.
On July 16, 2018, the opening day of the Farnborough Air Show, UK Secretary of State for Defence unveiled the UK Combat Air Strategy (CAS).1 Alongside, in a significant move, a plan to develop a new combat aircraft, ‘Tempest’, was announced. The United Kingdom, a pioneer in airpower, was the first to establish an independent air arm. This year, the Royal Air Force completed 100 years of its existence. The UK led and shaped the field of military aviation with a number of innovations. Of late, rising research and development costs have forced the UK to collaborate with other partners in combat aviation. The Tornado, the Typhoon and the F-35 are its notable outcomes. However, the UK’s share in these collaborations has systematically declined, and for the F 35, it is a paltry 15 per cent.2 With a new look CAS and a pilot project “Team Tempest”, the UK is seeking to fly its way back into the space of combat aviation.
Background
The CAS is guided by the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the 2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR). The SDRS outlined an intensifying and evolving threat picture, thus necessitating a well-defined strategy for generation and employment of combat air power.3 The UK National Security Council (NSC) has placed domestic and overseas risks into three tiers, based on a judgement of the combination of both the likelihood and impact of such risks.4 Accordingly, the 2015 National Security Risk Assessment (NRSA) placed terrorism and cyber threat at the top of the Tier I category. The category also includes scenarios relating to international military crises which draw in the UK through treaty obligations. Tier II includes a conventional or hybrid attack on allies and a threat of use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. A military attack on the UK is in the Tier III category.5 The new CAS needs to be seen in this context.
Development of Combat Air Strategy
Interestingly, after the release of the SDSR, the UK Ministry of Defence put out a series of policy papers outlining strategies in various areas. These include Innovation Strategy (March 24, 2017), Shipbuilding Strategy (September 6, 2017), MOD Science and Technology Strategy (November 30, 2017), Commercial Strategy (Jan 10, 2018) and Defence Knowledge Strategy (April 3, 2018).6 These policy papers outline plans for specific fields. However, the CAS is different as it carefully intertwines combat equipment and industry considerations at the strategic level.
Divided into six chapters, the CAS begins with the Strategic Context. It emphasises the significance of combat air power for national objectives. Strangely, in this domain, the focus is only on three combat aircraft, namely, the Tornado, the Typhoon and the F35. All other facets of military aviation are not touched upon. Acknowledging diminishing technological differential with respect to prospective adversaries, the CAS assesses integrated air defence systems and electronic warfare as major concerns. Thereon, the focus shifts to the UK’s military aviation industry, with the document eulogising the technological prowess of the industry and the role it has played in the generation of employment and revenue through exports. The CAS basically pitches for the upgradation of the Typhoon for sustaining its operational relevance and garnering contracts for maintenance and upgrade of the F35. Both these proposals are designed to keep the combat aircraft industry going. Practically, the document can be termed as a Combat Aircraft Industry Strategy.
Pilot Project Team Tempest
With the Tornado scheduled to be phased out in 2019, the onus of combat aviation will be on the Typhoon and the F35. Early models of the Typhoon will start phasing out in the 2030s and their replacement by a sixth generation combat aircraft will be necessary.7 Looking at the development time and cost of the F35, it indeed is prudent to commence work now for a relevant combat aircraft capable of operation in the 2040s. The CAS brings out the gradual decline of the UK Combat Aircraft Industry. From the BE 2 in 1912 till the Tornado in 1979, 12 different types of combat aircraft were produced and in very large numbers to meet the demands of the domestic and international market.8
However, in the last 40 years, the only notable contribution is a collaborative effort to produce the Typhoon (2003) and a minor role in the manufacture of the F35.9 With the Typhoon production ceasing in 2020, barring minor support to the F35, the UK combat aircraft industry would lose relevance. So, the revival of the combat aircraft industry seems to be the lynchpin of the CAS and the pilot project called ‘Team Tempest’ the tool to help achieve the revival.
Team Tempest is part of the Future Combat Air System Technology Initiative programme announced in the SDSR. It is a government-industry partnership and planned to be used as a catalyst and test bed for industry revival. It comprises Ministry of Defence personnel from the Royal Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Defence Equipment & Support and industry partners (BAE Systems, Leonardo, MBDA and Rolls-Royce).10
The Team has a clearly defined roadmap. The plan starts with outlining the business case including military requirements by the end of 2018. This is followed by an initial assessment of the international collaboration by mid-2019 and finalising operational requirements and partners by end 2019. 2020 is the year for final decisions on these issues and final investment decisions are expected to be taken by 2025 to have the initial operating capability by 2035.
The outline plan is to have an open architecture design in Tempest. This will allow easy integration of various subsystems. Additionally, to keep the development cost and time under check, the project will keep an option to retain a number of existing systems, albeit upgraded to suit the operational environment. The significance and relevance of this approach can be assessed from the fact at a team from the USA rushed to meet UK MOD officials a day after its declaration.
Lessons for India
For a country like India, with a huge demand for combat aircraft, three clear messages underpinning the Team Tempest concept are relevant. First, development of a complex military hardware like a combat aircraft is expensive and time-consuming. An international collaborative mechanism is a necessity. Within the country, such high-risk projects need to be undertaken under the rubric of public-private partnership. The entire process needs to be audited objectively and failure to meet specific goals ought to lead to project termination. Second, continuous upgradation of current systems and making them future-ready is an economic strategy, as these subsystems can directly fit into a developing platform. Small and medium-sized local industry can effectively carry out this kind of work. This approach helps local industry to flourish besides reducing the cost and time of development. Third, all platforms being designed need to have an open architecture. This facilitates plugging in of subsystems developed elsewhere and for other purposes. It permits faster and cost-effective integration. This methodology also helps in expansion of the dual-use technologies basket. Furthermore, commercial use of subsystems thus developed leads to financial offsets.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given that Iran accounts for around 10 per cent of India total oil imports, the immediate factor for New Delhi will be to look at various options to deal with the situation without jeopardising its energy security.
Once again, India is caught in the middle of a conflict between the US and Iran. During the earlier round of sanctions, India had succeeded in deftly manoeuvring through the sanctions regime, keeping its relations with both countries intact, if somewhat bruised. However, with the latest round of US sanctions on Iran, announced on May 8, 2018, and set to be enforced through a wind-down period beginning August 6, and the final withdrawal from the JCPOA from November 4, 2018, India is once again looking at various options to ensure that its relations with both countries, and particularly its energy interests are not affected.
Not only is Iran India’s third largest source of crude oil, but both countries have ties that go beyond energy trade. These include India’s US$500 investment in developing the Chabahar port in Iran, a strategic factor in its access to Afghanistan as well as with respect to the International North South Corridor (INSTC) which aims to facilitate linkages to Central Asia and Russia.
Although the current US sanctions will be imposed unilaterally, that is, they are not endorsed by the UN, and hence not liable to be adhered to by any other country, the US government has made it clear that any country that continues to do business with Iran will be blocked from accessing the American banking and financial system.
So what are India’s options if it is forced to terminate all oil imports from Iran? Alternately, under what circumstances could India continue to do business with Iran after November 2018?
Given that Iran accounts for around 10 per cent of India total oil imports, the immediate factor for New Delhi will be to look at various options to deal with the situation without jeopardising its energy security. Although New Delhi officially maintains that it is not bound to adhere to the new sanctions regime since it has not been endorsed by the UN, the issue of payments will be the most contentious. India’s oil imports from Iran will be affected from the end of August 2018, as Iran offers Indian refiners a 60-day credit period on oil sales, and the payment for cargoes loaded from the end of August will be due in November when the second tranche of sanctions will commence. If no agreement on an alternate mechanism for funding is reached, India may cut or stop buying oil from Iran.
This is not the first time that India has faced this predicament. As in the past, India can continue to buy oil from Iran in non USD currencies. If the Europeans do not succumb to US pressure, India can trade oil in euros; alternatively, it can re-introduce the rupee-rial payment mechanism used earlier from 2011 when all payment avenues became blocked after the EU imposed a near complete trade embargo on Iran. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) also had to cease using the Tehran-based Asian Clearing Union (ACU)1 to handle transactions with Iran, making it more difficult to transfer money to that country. However, in January 2012, Iran agreed to accept payments in India rupees to settle around half of its sales to India. As per the agreement, India paid Iran 55 per cent in euros through the Ankara-based Halkbank (after Deutsche Bank, which India was using to pay Iran buckled under US pressure and stopped clearing payments to Iran). The remaining 45 per cent was remitted in rupees through the Kolkata-based UCO Bank, which did not have any assets in the US and was hence not at risk for invoking any penalties. However, the payments through Halkbank too ceased from February 2013, although 45 per cent of the money continued to be paid through UCO Bank. For the balance 55 per cent, India looked at several options, including paying in roubles and other currencies, but was unsuccessful. Eventually, Tehran agreed to accept payment entirely in rupees, and this mode of payment continued until 2015 when the P5 and Iran agreed on the final agreement.
From 2016, India’s oil imports from Iran rose substantially, to the extent that Iran, which had dropped from the position of India’s second largest supplier prior to the first round of sanctions to eighth place, it gradually climbed to the third spot – with India being Iran’s second largest market.
Of course, much will depend on how the EU nations respond to the US sanctions. In fact, in May 2018, an Indian delegation met French, German and UK bankers to assess how they would deal with the US sanctions. The fact that soon thereafter the State Bank of India (SBI) is reported to have informed refiners that it would not handle payments for the crude from November unless a new payment route is established may be a pointer that the euro payment route may not be feasible. Although New Delhi has still not taken an official position on whether to cut imports from Iran and, according to reports, will seek exemptions and is also considering alternate payment mechanisms, including re-introducing the rupee-rial route, it may have to seek alternative sources for its oil.2
Recently, the Iranian charge d’affaires at the New Delhi mission, Massoud Rezvanian Rahaghi, warned India that the “special privileges” given to it would end if it tried to replace Iranian oil with supplies from other sources. He further hinted that India’s other interests related to connectivity with Iran would also suffer, and called for a need to expedite India’s investments and accelerate the execution of projects linked to Chabahar.3 However, a day later, Iran adopted a more placatory note, saying that it would continue to be a reliable energy partner for India and adopt a flexible approach to ensuring secure oil supplies.
It should be noted that, in the recent past, following the JCPOA (The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) agreement, relations between India and Iran had not been all smooth sailing. In July 2017, India lowered its imports after Tehran had hardened its stance on granting development rights to an Indian consortium for developing the Farzad B gas field, which was discovered by ONGC Videsh Ltd., and threatened to give the rights to a Russian company. However, after India made a higher counter offer, Iran acquiesced and agreed in principle to buy the gas developed by India; nonetheless, payment differences have continued.
That Iran is worried is evident from the fact that it has been looking for ways to reduce the impact of sanctions on its oil exports. It has announced that, henceforth, private companies would be allowed to export crude through its exchange as against the previous system of allowing only oil products to be sold through its oil and petrochemical bourse.4
Furthermore, Iran may consider trading in China’s yuan-denominated crude oil futures on the Shanghai International Energy Exchange, which was inaugurated in March 2018, thereby circumventing any restrictions on dollar-denominated trade and US banks. Although Iranian crude is currently not deliverable into the Shanghai oil contract, this could change in the future. Already, the US decision on re-imposing sanctions on Iran appears to have increased interest in the Chinese oil futures with a doubling of volumes being traded on the exchange after the announcement.5
With regard to alternatives to Iranian oil for India, other oil producers can fill the gap if it stops or cuts its Iranian oil imports. Given India’s huge and growing market for oil, it certainly has other alternatives to source its oil imports, and has in fact begun looking at alternate supplies, including from other Gulf producers, Canada and the US. However, it may not get the preferential terms it did from Iran. These include the 60-day credit for purchases, which incidentally is double the time given by other producers, and the freight discount, which was increased from 62 to 80 per cent recently, albeit on the condition that Indian refineries increased their purchases.6 Moreover, with Iranian oil supplies decreasing in the international oil market, it would impact on prices worldwide, and will add to India’s ballooning oil import bill. It is in this context that in a recent interview India’s oil minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, had said that potential suppliers should recognise India’s huge and growing market when negotiating terms.7
Eventually, whatever decision the government takes, will be based on ensuring that the country’s energy needs are not jeopardised, which includes gaining access to oil without further hurting its energy security or economy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. The ACU is a payment arrangement where payments for intra-regional transactions were settled among the participating central banks, the objective being to facilitate payments among member countries for eligible transactions, thereby economizing on the use of forex reserves and transfer costs, as well as promoting trade and banking relations among the participating countries
Eradicating the fake news problem calls for a collective effort of individuals, governments, social media and content platforms, and innovative technology solutions.
India is a burgeoning market for social media platforms and messaging services, with close to half a billion Internet users on mobile platforms — the second largest online population in the world. The growth rates for media access on smartphones are astonishing. Equally disturbing however is the increasing instances of misleading and maliciously false online content. Social media and messaging services, which are essentially meant to share information, ideas and interests or to facilitate virtual communities interact, participate and communicate, are increasingly being abused to incite communal riots and spread false information.
In India, as of July 1, 2018, fake information-induced mob lynching has claimed 23 lives1 in 18 of such reported incidents.2 The government has taken a stern stand with clear directions to the messaging service providers such as WhatsApp,3 who have reciprocated with assurances of incorporating suitable technology to curb the menace.4 The phenomenon of fake news has wider implications for law and order, safety and security of the citizens, and to the democratic credentials of the country. Fake news, fake social media messages and campaigns have also been used to malign the reputation of organisations as well as to manipulate stock markets, as in the cases such as the ‘Arctic Ready’ hoax targeting Shell in 20125 and The Associated Press twitter account hack in 2013.6
Political parties also find these platforms and messaging applications attractive for election campaigns to distribute videos, audios, images, articles, graphics and posts. Tools, which draw in details related to the demographics of voters, their age, location coupled with plethora of available information related to the political and religious inclinations, interests, hobbies, preferences, lifestyle etc., help them in targeting content at a specific group of voters.7 Targeted content or tailor made messages find acceptance among a group of voters as it is precisely relevant to their concerns, interests and preferences, and hence influences voter behaviour. Social media campaigns of political parties, being executed over both official and non-official channels, can easily transgress the boundaries of ethics if it includes doctored content and fake news. This also runs the risk of inciting religious or communal riots, hoaxes and rumours.
Security features like end-to-end encryption in messaging services enhance privacy for the users, but it also makes them susceptible to misuse. Falsified information, in the form of provoking and doctored content, can travel over these platforms unmonitored. Well-crafted content is potent enough for opinion engineering. The problem is not specific to developing countries. It is more worrisome for mature economies, which are likely to consume more convincing fake news content than real correct information by 2022, as per a Gartner research.8 As the interest in fake news and other illicit content grows, their implications for society and the individual in turn are grim. In the quest of finding an immediate solution to this, social media giants are experimenting with Artificial Intelligence (AI), which for decades has been used to curb spam emails.
A simple AI solution for instance can run a content cross-check for the news story against a dynamic database of stories which demarcates legit and fake stories. A database of specific accounts, sources, geographical locations9 or IP addresses which are a known source of fake news, could also be handy for a quick check. AI systems can run an evaluation for the headline text and the content of the post, looking for consistency between both or sift through similar articles over other news media platforms for fact checking. AI is also being used to spot manipulated or doctored images and videos, which can further alert the users of the dubious content. Numerous fact-checking websites have sprung up and a few of them have even partnered with big players like Google and Facebook to provide factual accuracy.
However, the efficacy of AI in curbing the menace remains contentious, particularly when AI is being put to use to synthesise textual and media content which could be exceptionally convincing. As part of a collaboration project between Technical University of Munich, Stanford University and few other institutions, researchers have demonstrated a face-swapping application, which swaps the facial expressions to impersonate someone else, by using depth-sensing camera to manipulate video footage.10 As technology advances in machine and deep learning, it is quite possible that AI-generated fake content would be indistinguishable from real information for the AI-powered discriminator.
Although AI can run a meticulous fact-checker with unparalleled speed and efficiency, it may fall short of understanding the nuances of human writing with adjectives, contexts and subtleties of tone.11 Some of the fake content can even confuse human beings, as it runs on the edges of fact and fiction. While AI may find it technically challenging to decipher such content, the majority and obvious cases of misinformation or falsified information can be identified. The race between the use and abuse of AI is gearing up, making it equally challenging for AI systems to detect professionally-made fake content using AI tools. AI also has its limitations in eradicating the fake news problem. It can, at the best, filter out or label the dubious content, similar to the spam filters in email boxes. AI is not an absolute answer or solution to this problem. This is largely a human versus technology problem, and a purely technology-led solution would fall short of producing effective results.
Due diligence on part of the users, as actual consumers and targets of fake information and online content, can contain the spread of fake news. Human judgement and wisdom is critical to solving this problem, but it needs extensive awareness and education campaigning. Users, aware of the basic fact-checking methods and societal fallouts of the fake information they share, are better positioned to contain its proliferation. Before sharing dubious content, users can exercise judgement to question the source and its credibility, or to check the credentials of the individual it has come from. This could act as barriers to this uncontrolled flow of falsified information. Leveraging the competence of human networks through crowd-sourcing, few experiments have been carried out for the fake news problem, similar to the concept of Wikipedia where a network of volunteers keeps the information updated. Network of volunteers, individuals as well as organisations, can maintain database for fact-checking and even point out the articles, posts, news content carrying falsified or fake information. AI-based content verification and labelling can also warn users if the content is likely to be fake or that the authenticity of the source is not established.
By and large, eradicating the fake news problem calls for a collective effort of individuals, governments, social media and content platforms, and organisations producing innovative technology solutions. Standalone technology solutions cannot be effective, unless and until they are integrated with social causes and awareness among the masses to solve such mounting problems. This is especially so in the Indian context, when a large online community of users, who are quite prone to opinion engineering, source their news from social media or messaging platforms without paying heed to the credibility or authenticity of the source. At the end of the day, human wisdom can make the real difference, technology solutions can at the most augment human ability to differentiate between fake and real at the first look.
Tackling fake content and news raises many questions. This includes decisions pertaining to taking down of fake content, who makes that decision, or would it, in some way or the other, interfere with the freedom to speech or expression, and the manner in which technology should respond to parody and satire meant purely for entertainment. The larger question pertains to the very future of AI, with technology relating to fake content demarcation racing against technology used to generate fake content.
While fake news is a problem for every country across the globe, countries with stringent content controls, like China, are apparently in a better position to tackle the problem as they have both technical measures and legal regimes in place. The looming choice is whether it is always going to be a trade-off between freedom of expression and safety against fake content or whether the Chinese way is the right approach. For India, the problem is more immediate as general elections are around the corner and violence due to fake content has already claimed 23 lives. In the absence of controls and regulations, human wisdom and technology can together put an end to the growing menace. The sooner it happens, the better it is for the society and the democratic ethos of developing countries like India.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
7. Katharine Dommett and Luke Temple, “Digital Campaigning: The Rise of Facebook and Satellite Campaigns”, Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 71, Issue suppl_1, 1 March 2018, Pages 189–202, https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx056.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a foreign policy course-correction after realising that the strategic tilt towards the United States has not only grossly upset India’s geopolitical image but also undermined national interests.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a foreign policy course-correction after realising that the strategic tilt towards the United States has not only grossly upset India’s geopolitical image but also undermined national interests. Indian interests are being particularly affected by the US decision to link its sanctions on Iran and Russia with India, with the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) having the potential to damage India's defence preparedness. India has decided to defy the US diktat and made it clear that Trump’s “me first approach” is not acceptable and that it would not be guided by any other country on its import of weapons. It has decided to go ahead with the purchase of the Triumf missile and also announced its commitment to follow UN sanctions, not US sanctions on Iran.
There has been an overwhelming impression that India is stooping to become a regional ally of the US in the latter’s new strategic theatre of “Indo-Pacific” to keep the sea lanes of communication open, albeit in the pretext of countering China. But moving closer to Washington has been seen as having had a wide-ranging adverse impact. Firstly, it is forcing India to walk a diplomatic tightrope between the US, Russia and China. The policy of intentional ambiguity in conventional terms does play a valuable role, but a prolonged play can also lead to uncertainty, for it can be hard to maintain the balance between coherence and ambiguity. It could also potentially obscure potential harm and threats. Secondly, relying too much on fickle US policies appears risky. As can be seen on the trade front, Trump is backing out on his commitments to other US friends and allies. And there is a lurking feeling that the US was not forthcoming in articulating clear support for India during the Doklam standoff. Thirdly, closer military ties with the US could draw India into a larger political quagmire in terms of attracting the attention of global Islamic terrorist groups which are committed to undermining the interests of America and its allies wherever possible. And, lastly, the process could eventually result in the US making a Pakistan (a long-time client state or banana republic) out of India and the attendant loss of standing in the world as a great nation.
Atop all challenging issues lies the escalating trade conflict between New Delhi and Washington. India has decided to retaliate against the US by increasing import tariffs on 30 American products amounting to $240 million. This is in response to the US imposing tariffs on aluminium and steel imports from India in March 2018. But Donald Trump has threatened to impose further retaliatory import duties on Indian products. The US trade deficit of $21 billion with India is a sore point for the Trump administration, which seeks full reciprocity in trade ties. Any move by Washington to levy retaliatory tariffs would hit India’s exports to the US market. With nearly 16 per cent of India’s total exports going to the US, further and more expansive US tariffs would have implications for the political environment especially when general elections are around the corner and public discontent is rife.
So far, Indo-US trade frictions have remained at the level of posturing only. For example, among the notable items on which the import duty has been raised by India include US products like Harley-Davidson motorbikes. These retaliatory ‘protectionist’ measures seem simply symbolic in nature and are not comparable to the US-China trade war. While trade issues could still be resolved through dialogue, any escalation of retaliatory steps could widen the friction and even spill over into other areas of cooperation.
The recent talks between Commerce Minister Suresh Prabhu with US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and US Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer have failed to resolve the trade dispute. The abrupt postponement of the first 2+2 dialogue between India and the US, earlier scheduled for July 6, appeared to have everything to do with the issues of trade and sanctions, among others.
The above issues have probably triggered a change in New Delhi’s thinking, for they not only caused serious unease in India but also upset its strategic calculations.
Russian Displeasure
Obviously, the Russians couldn’t have been pleased with India switching over to the American military supply chain system. However, Moscow hasn’t made this a critical issue and continues to transfer the most sensitive strategic armaments to India – although it could have virtually brought the entire Indian defence system to its knees by stopping its supply chain including spares.
What really appears to have miffed Russia was India’s decision to forego its strategic balance by joining the ‘Quadrilateral’ talks with the US, Australia and Japan since 2017. India’s steps to joining this bloc-type security architecture in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ has evidently raised hackles in Moscow, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov strongly advising India to stick to "non-bloc principle”. Putin too was obviously not convinced that India’s role in the ‘Quad’ isn’t about aligning against Russia. In Sochi, he had obliquely reminded Modi of the obligation the two countries share under the “special and privileged strategic partnership” in “military, security and nuclear energy fields”.
China has been scornful of India joining the US bandwagon. Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the ‘Quad’ and ‘Indo-Pacific” formulations as only “headline-grabbing’’ ideas soon to “dissipate” like the “foam on the sea’.
New Delhi seems to have realised the mistake of prematurely denouncing the traditionally followed multi-engagement foreign policy or a “balancing” approach in the global system, even though conceding a space for the US had begun in 2001 when Vajpayee offered Indian bases for US military operations in Afghanistan and Advani wished to send a division to Iraq in 2003. Prime Minister Modi’s “informal” meeting with President Xi Jinping in Wuhan and "agenda-less" talks with President Vladimir Putin in Sochi proved a masterstroke and turning point for his diplomacy.
In particular, Modi’s keynote speech at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore seemed a calibrated move to prevent India falling into a dangerous geopolitical trap vis-à-vis US, Russia and China. The subtext of the speech was to reaffirm India’s commitment to multi-polarity, uphold the principles and values of peace and progress, and fight against “global dominance”. The world knew that India was as a power bloc in itself with nations around the world looking up to New Delhi for guidance and support. Modi’s Singapore speech was welcomed by every country including China.
Importantly, Modi avoided making a reference to the ‘Quad’ in Singapore and instead spoke out strongly against “protectionism” – an oblique reference to the Trump policy. Although he praised the US “Indo-Pacific” strategy, he also made it clear that India does not see it “as a club of limited members (or) as a grouping that seeks to dominate” which strongly implied that India is not seeing it as an alliance system. In fact, when US officials described India as the “fulcrum” of or “central” to US Indo-Pacific strategy, Modi deflected the idea by affirming the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Prime Minister played down the China threat except for exhorting Beijing to play by the rules, saying an “Asia of rivalry” would hold all its players back. And, in contrast to US Defense Secretary James Mattis warning China over maritime ‘intimidation’, Modi talked about seeking closer ties with China and termed “stable relations” between the two countries as “an important factor for global peace and progress.” Modi went a step further and advised other powers to avoid taking a confrontationist line to prevent “great power rivalries”. These statements were significant given that they were made about a week ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Qingdao. At Qingdao, he joined other leaders in committing to the "Shanghai Spirit" – a term coined in 2006 to invert the Cold War-era mentality.
India’s Options
New Delhi needs to be mindful of the fluid nature of the dynamics in security relationships in the Asia-Pacific. Indian interlocutors seeking exemptions from higher tariffs on Indian items in the US market need to understand that Trump is likely to agree to such a step only if he is able to make enough profits by selling US arms to India. This explains the US attempts to scuttle India’s ongoing defence deals with Russia. Trump knows that America can sell India a glut of arms by playing up Indians’ Sinophobia.
Though his dexterous diplomacy, Modi has deflated the hype created by certain sections of Indian and American think tanks and media outlets which enjoyed a great sense of vanity and smugness about the strategic importance of India for America in counterbalancing China.
To be clear, there can’t be an Asia without China just as there can’t be an Asia without India. In fact, most Asian nations, despite their disputes and differences, do not approve of all-round hostility against each other.
Instead, India’s fellow Asian societies seemed to have learnt and continue to practice Nāgārjuna’s non-dogmatic precept of Madhyamaka (fundamental verses of the Middle Way) that accepts the nature of reality and ‘interdependent co-arising or dependent co-origination’ to overcome problems.
Realising that India can no longer continue with the old habit of remaining a geopolitical bystander in Asia, a nuanced shift in Modi’s policy of moving away from the West-led confrontationist approach is a welcome move. What Modi essentially lacked until recently was a wise and level-headed foreign policy advisor.
Yet, one should be cautiously optimistic about the Wuhan process moving forward in the right direction. Possibly it does not represent a change of hearts but only a tactical adjustment with both sides buying a temporary truce due to the imperatives of their respective external and domestic agenda. For the overall atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust to go will take time and require sustained efforts by both sides. But the process of resetting the ties may have begun in Wuhan, probably with India’s willingness to stop playing the Dalai Lama card in return for China’s willingness to end using Pakistan as a proxy. India should try and avert further challenges posed by China from multiplying. One hopes that the new team led by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale is able to navigate engagement with China in good faith and not indulge in tactical ploys.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India must jettison the attempt to maintain a balance between China and the US and instead take advantage of China’s internal and external vulnerabilities to gain an upper hand in the asymmetric power equation that has developed.
India has reportedly decided not to join the US–led counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The US initiative, which is a trilateral one involving Japan and Australia, was launched at the first Indo-Pacific Business Forum meeting on July 30 and seeks to fund infrastructure projects in the region for which about USD 113 million has been earmarked. India has opted to stay out of this initiative and thus maintain a fine balance between the US and China. Here, it is pertinent to recall that India has also stayed out of the Chinese BRI initiative.
Such an attempt to maintain a balance between China and the United States needs to be jettisoned since it is a confusing strategy that involves sitting on the fence and, at times, even appeasing the Chinese. Arguably, India could take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the Chinese system and gain an upper hand in the asymmetric power equation that has developed vis-a-vis China.
Any mention of China’s vulnerability, whose economy is USD 11 trillion-strong, is sure to raise eyebrows. But the fact remains that China is not all that strong. Geopolitically, President Trump’s outreach to North Korea and advocacy of an Indo-Pacific strategy are eroding China’s geopolitical manoeuvrability. Economically, the ongoing trade war between the US and China is expected to hurt China’s growth, and that could very well mean the erosion of the Communist Party’s credibility given that it draws its legitimacy from continued good economic performance. Internally, one-party rule might appear resilient and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) most powerful. But it is quite baffling to see the Chinese Premier visiting Tibet between 25 and 27 July and declaring it an inseparable part of China’s “sacred” territory as well as urging religious figures to promote national unity and ethnic harmony. Why has this statement been made now when Beijing has issued more than a dozen white papers on Tibet since the 1990s to bolster its claims, and has rapidly intensified the militarization of Tibet since the 2000s? Further, the fate of Muslims in Xinjiang is dire as China has detained a million ethnic Uighurs and sent some two million Uighurs and other ethnic Muslims to secret camps for indoctrination to Chinese nationalism. Clearly, all is not well inside China. It is spending an enormous amount of money on the People’s Armed Police (PAP), deployed to curb internal rebellion and dissent. China’s expenditure on internal security is reportedly USD 196 billion, larger than the PLA’s official budget. This suggests internal destabilization is a greater worry for the Communist Party than external threats. Indeed, internal vulnerabilities have only exacerbated with President Xi Jinping’s anti-graft effort, which is apparently the largest organized one in the history of Communist rule in China. More than a million people, including high-ranking military and party officials have been indicted for corruption so far. Many portray this as more of a political purge than an effort to cleanse the rot in the party ranks. Arguably, Xi might confront some kind of a rebellion from within his party ranks and society at large. That presumably explains his holding onto power and the scrapping of the two-term presidential term limit.
These rising internal vulnerabilities and external pressures have caused China to woo India, with the first such instance in the post-Doklam phase being the statement made by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the parliamentary session in March 2018, when he was quoted saying, “if China and India are united, one plus one will become eleven instead of two.” The subsequent Wuhan informal summit in April between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi should also be seen in this context. Again, during the 10th BRICS Summit held in Johannesburg between 25 and 27 July, Xi held the view that the five countries of the BRICS represented the five fingers, and that “when the BRICS come together, we form a fist that can punch.” Obviously, it is meant to punch the US. Keeping up the momentum, the Chinese defence minister, Wei Fenghe, visited New Delhi in the third week of August to seemingly re-establish military relations between the two Asian giants.
Simply put, vulnerability not only explains China’s courting of India at this juncture, but it also defines China’s broad foreign policy shifts. If one looks at China’s foreign policy strategy in the Cold War period, it was essentially based on the identification of the principal contradiction (threat), and thereafter progressively isolate it by tilting towards a lesser contradiction. Notably, the US-China rapprochement of the 1970s came about after the identification of the Soviet Union as the principal hegemon and joining hands with the capitalist United States. Mao Zedong did not regard the rapprochement with the US as an aberration of Marxist ideology. Instead, he vindicated his tilt by advocating the Three Worlds Theory in 1973-74. In other words, ideology mattered the least when China found itself vulnerable. And to end the vulnerability, China did not shy away from mending its relations with the capitalist West. This psyche of vulnerability is deep-rooted in Chinese history. In fact, if one identifies the primary characteristic undergirding China’s history, it is the constant tussle between vulnerability and stability. From the first centralized dynasty, the Qin, to the last, the Qing, the threat from nomadic barbarians or non-Han groups was the predominant source of vulnerability. Hence the construction of the Great Wall to check barbarian invasions. Interestingly, China’s rise as a maritime power, as well as decline, was significantly shaped by the barbarian threat from the north.
China’s current vulnerability emanates from Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which challenges Xi’s dream project, the BRI, with an estimated cost of USD 8 trillion. And to deal with this vulnerability, China is wooing India. At this juncture, India is a lesser contradiction, notwithstanding the 2017 Doklam crisis and New Delhi’s refusal to endorse the BRI. There is no real bonhomie between India and China, and there can never be, because according to Confucian thought, there cannot be two tigers residing on a single mountain.
In dealing with China, India should thus be aware of the former’s deep insecurities and vulnerabilities. It should shape its China policy from such ‘knowing’ and not from a superficial analysis of the immediate global circumstances. India should reconsider joining the US-led counter to the BRI, albeit after scrupulous negotiations that both uphold its foreign policy interests and shield it from the dragon’s wrath.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent tour of Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa increased to 26 the number of African countries visited by very senior leaders, thus contributing to a significant reduction in India’s visibility deficit in the continent.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s tour of Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa from 23 to 27 July 2018 reiterates the growing importance of Africa for India and will go a long way towards revitalising relations with the continent. This is Modi’s third visit to the continent. He visited Seychelles and Mauritius in 2015, followed by a tour of Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya in 2016. The current visit, along with earlier initiatives, such as the high profile Third India-Africa Forum Summit in 2015 and the launch of the Asia Africa Growth Corridor, an initiative to enhance connectivity and people to people partnership between Asia and Africa in collaboration with Japan in 2017, demonstrate the high priority that India accords to the continent.
Rwanda: Increasing strategic importance
Modi’s first stop was Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. During the visit, India signed eight MoUs and other agreements for cooperation in trade, agriculture, defence, leather and dairy products, including two lines of credit valued at $100 million each for the development of industrial parks and an agriculture irrigation scheme.1 Modi’s visit, the first by an Indian prime minister, denotes the growing importance of Rwanda. There are a number of reasons for according importance to Rwanda. First, Rwanda is one of the fastest growing economies in Central Africa. According to the World Bank, it had a GDP growth rate of eight per cent per annum between 2001 and 2015.2 Second, President Paul Kagame is the current chair of the African Union. He has supported several initiatives for African integration and reform. Earlier this year, Rwanda hosted the Extraordinary Summit of the African Union on African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The free trade area aims to deepen the African integration process and will allow free movement of people and trade across the continent.3 Third, Rwanda has moved ahead of India to become the third largest troop contributor to United Nations Peace Keeping operations.4 Currently, a total of 7086 Rwandan uniformed personnel are serving with the UN in conflict prone areas, such as Sudan (Darfur), South Sudan and Central African Republic.
Fourth, Rwanda is one of the least corrupt countries in Africa. According to the Corruption Perception Index, 2017, Rwanda is the third least corrupt country in Africa, after Botswana and Seychelles. 5 Globally ranked 45th on the index, Rwanda is way ahead of India, which is ranked 81st in the report.6 Hence there is a lot India can learn from Rwanda in the fight against corruption. Finally, Rwanda is one of the most pro-women countries in the world. According to the World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, Rwanda is among the top five countries with respect to gender equality. It appears that Rwanda is head and shoulders above a large number of developed countries, including the United States of America. For example, Rwanda has one of the highest rates of female labour force participation in the world. Similarly, in terms of political representation, the country tops the global list of the highest number of female parliamentarians.7
Uganda: Rebuilding economic and diaspora ties
Modi’s next stop was Kampala, Uganda, where he signed four MoUs on defence, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic ties and for the setting up of a material testing laboratory for highway construction. He also announced two lines of credit - one worth $141 million for energy infrastructure (power and electricity) development and another of $64 million for the agriculture and dairy sector.8 This visit by an Indian prime minister came after a long gap of 21 years. Modi was also the first Indian prime minister to address the Ugandan parliament.
Uganda’s importance for India rests on three factors. First Uganda is estimated to have oil reserves of 6.5 billion barrels,9 which were discovered in 2006. The commercial production of oil has, however, taken a while and is expected to commence in 2020. 10 A land locked country, Uganda is also planning to lay a crude oil export pipe line through Tanzania. Currently, the French company Total and the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) are the major stake holders in this field. As an energy deficit country, it is quite natural for India to be interested in energy cooperation with Uganda and opportunities for expanding this cooperation in future do exist.
Second, Uganda is important regionally, as President Yoweri Museveni is the current chair of the East Africa Community (EAC). The EAC is a regional organisation of six partner states that include Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and South Sudan. Museveni is one of Africa’s longest serving leaders and has been credited for the revival of the grouping.11 Perhaps, it is with Uganda’s role in the EAC in mind that Modi announced a million dollars in assistance to the EAC. Finally, Uganda is home to around 30,000 people of Indian origin. Before their forced exodus during the Idi Amin regime in 1972, Ugandan Indians dominated the economy and accounted for about 90 per cent of the country’s tax revenue.12 Since their return from exile in the mid-1980s at the invitation of Museveni, Ugandan Indians have started to regain prominence in the economy. Currently, they account for 65 per cent of Uganda’s tax revenues.13 Connecting with the Indian diaspora seems to be an equally important driver for Modi’s visit to the landlocked country. While addressing a gathering of Indian community in Kampala, Modi recalled the historical links between the two countries and acknowledged the role they have played in shaping Uganda’s economy and politics.14 He further remarked that the presence of a large Indian diaspora is one of the reasons for the growing importance of Africa for India.15
South Africa: BRICS Summit
Modi’s last stop was Johannesburg, South Africa, the venue of the 10th annual BRICS Summit. The visit to South Africa was also important bilaterally, as 2018 marks the 25th anniversary of the re-establishment of diplomatic ties. It is also the 125th anniversary of the Pietermaritzburg incident, related to Mahatma Gandhi, and the 100th birth anniversary of Nelson Mandela. On the sidelines of the BRICS summit, Prime Minister Modi and President Cyril Ramaphosa reaffirmed their partnership and signed three MoUs for cooperation in the fields of space technology, agriculture and skills enhancement.16
However, the larger focus of the visit was the 10th annual BRICS Summit whose theme was ‘BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution’. Brazil, Russia, India, China came together in 2009 to form an informal grouping and were joined by South Africa in 2011. Over the years, the BRICS countries have taken fresh initiatives for South-South Cooperation and global governance, the most prominent being the establishment of the New Development Bank. During the Summit Modi highlighted India’s efforts with regard to South-South Cooperation in Africa and called for multilateralism, international trade and a rule based global order that is free of terrorism and extremism. Here it is to be noted that the Johannesburg BRICS summit was held in the backdrop of the tariffs imposed by the United States on China. In his address, Xi Jinping sought the support of India and other BRICS partners in the fight against President Trump’s unilateralism and protectionist tendencies. South Africa, on the other hand, was more interested in seeking more investment in the African continent for sustainable development. The Johannesburg declaration reflected the BRICS partners’ efforts to adopt a coordinated stance on global issues. It reaffirmed the importance of multilateralism and sent a clear message against trade protectionism.17 It also factored in India’s interests by calling for a comprehensive approach to dealing with terrorism. At the same time, it reiterated its support for African development priorities and initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area.18
Conclusion
Prime Ministers Modi’s Africa tour is significant for four reasons. First, it allayed some of the criticism relating to India’s visibility deficit on the continent, which has often been articulated in the past. Over the last four years, 26 high level Indian visits have been made to the continent. Nine of these were by the Prime Minister himself, and the rest at the President and Vice President level. These visits demonstrate the Modi government’s desire to have a high level dialogue with the African leadership.
Second, the visit highlights the growing importance of Africa in India’s larger foreign policy framework. In his speech at the Ugandan parliament, Modi laid out the principles of India’s Africa policy. He emphasised that India is keen on building a development partnership with Africa that is unique, encourages free and open trade, empowers people, equips the youth, enhances mutual security and encourages reform of the global order. He emphasised that the partnership stands in “solidarity with Africa’s endeavours, is transparent and … respects the principle of equality.”19
Third, this tour may enhance business cooperation between India and African countries. While addressing the India-Rwanda Business Forum in Kigali, Modi called for greater cooperation at the business to business level between India and African countries. He stated that there were “limitless possibilities” of cooperation in various sectors such as infrastructure, small scale industry and solar power.20
Finally, the visit to the three African countries has resulted in a greater understanding of mutual concerns and priorities. In order to retain its immense goodwill on the continent, India should ensure that it delivers at the earliest on the promises made during this visit.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Defence Planning Committee needs to activate its ‘Plan and Capability Development’ Sub-committee and task them to review the 13th Defence Plan in a time bound manner.
The defence planning process has been historically linked to the national five year planning process, which began in 1951. While the 1st Five Year Defence Plan (1964–69) was initiated in the aftermath of the 1962 War in the midst of the 3rd Five Year Plan period, the period of subsequent defence plans was synchronised with Five Year Plans of the Planning Commission from the 4th Plan onwards, that is, 1969–74. Service Headquarters (HQ) began drawing up the first 15-year perspective plan from 1979 and the concept of Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) was introduced in 2001. The existing planning process is based on the 15 year LTIPP, the five year Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) — also called the ‘Defence Five Year Plan’, and the Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP), which is in fact a two-year roll-on plan.
Planning process post the 12th Defence Plan
The current NDA government decided to discontinue with the Five Year Plans after the end of the 12th Plan and classify expenditure into ‘plan’ and ‘non-plan’ components. On January 1, 2015, the National Institution for Transforming India, or NITI Aayog, came into existence as the government’s premier think tank. NITI Aayog was tasked to do the following:1
The above-mentioned National Development Agenda was to go beyond the traditional area of ‘Plan’ and cover aspects such as ‘internal security’ and ‘defence’.
13th Defence Five Year Plan
The Parliament Standing Committee on Defence was informed by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that:
‘Discontinuation of Five year Plans and Plan/Non-Plan Expenditure would have no impact on resource estimation/implementation of projects. Five year Defence Plans are still being prepared in which future requirements of the Services are projected. Activities planned are likely to proceed according to available annual budget allocations. As such, planned projects were implemented to the extent possible with the available allocations’.2
The MoD also apprised the committee that, while formulating guidelines for the 13th Defence Plan, it was decided that the Plan may be sent to the Ministry of Finance for information only and not for approval. The Ministry of Finance will be kept in the loop about the requirements of the Defence Forces in the coming years.
But the committee felt compelled to observe that successive governments had not granted approval for 10th, 11th and 12th defence five year Plans. The factual position with respect to these three plan periods is collated below.
Preparing a five year plan which is two-and-a-half times the actual expenditure of the previous plan (as seen in Table 1) is, to put it mildly, ‘very, very ambitious’, more so in the face of knowledge about the quantum of funding that was likely to be made available for the next three years. As a requirement of the FRBM Act, the government has to present a Medium-term Expenditure Framework Statement (MTEF). It is to set forth a three-year rolling target for prescribed fiscal indicators with specification of underlying assumptions. It ensures a multi-year commitment of resources to policies and is, therefore, important for expenditure prioritisation and for fostering government performance over the medium term. It is presented in parliament following the session in which the budget is presented (by default, the Monsoon session). So when the 13th plan was being prepared, the following picture was available through MTEF (see Table 2 below). As may be seen, taking the highest figures for each year, the total funding visibility for the first three years of the plan was Rs 917342 crore. To expect the double of this amount during the remaining two years was unrealistic optimism, to say the least.
Source: MTEF 2016 & MTEF 2017; Union Budget
The MTEF Statement for 2018 was presented in the Lok Sabha on August 7, 2018.3 The picture that emerges is tabulated below.
Accordingly, the allocation for the first four years of the 13th plan is expected to be Rs 1237633 crore against a projected requirement for five years of Rs 2683924 crore, leaving a yawning gap of Rs 14.5 lakh crore. Peter F. Drucker, the founder of modern-day management, had aptly noted that “Unless commitment is made, there are only promises and hopes; but no plans.”
Need for Review of 13th Defence Five Year Plan
Table 3 makes it abundantly clear that one-third of government’s capital expenditure is spent on defence and that the government cannot allocate more on this front. When a defence plan is approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), each scheme in the approved SCAP is allotted a number. And while submitting the schemes proposed to be included in the AAP, the approved serial number of the five-year plan is to be quoted. In the situation as above, the number of schemes approved is more than double of what can go through. This does not augur well for a balanced capability build up and the race is on amongst service HQs to get the schemes past before the fund gate closes. Hence, what can go through and who can get their approvals fast, gets in.
Defence planning and the maintenance of capability (done through the revenue budget) have to be holistically seen as part of the big picture of the national economic situation and expectation of the people.
The above table brings out the share of the top three items of government expenditure. Defence Expenditure referred to (as also other tables) is only defence revenue and capital allocations, and does not include MoD (civil) and defence pensions. The spike in allotments for subsidies in 2018-19 is on account of food subsidy and no one would grudge the higher MSP for distressed farmers. In the given fiscal situation, this is the best the government can do and the defence planners need to go back to the drawing board and redraw their plans and prioritise to ensure a balanced build up of capability.
What Defence Planning Committee needs to do
In April 2018, the government established a Defence Planning Committee (DPC) headed by the NSA. Its mandate is to analyse and evaluate all relevant inputs relating to defence planning. These include the national defence and security priorities, foreign policy imperatives, relevant strategic and security-related doctrines, defence acquisition and infrastructure development plans, including the 15-year LTIPP, defence technology and development of the Indian defence industry and global technological advancement.
The inputs to the DPC would be managed through sub committees, the membership of which and the terms of reference were to be decided subsequently in consultation with the Chairman. One important sub-committee & its mandate is:
The inaugural meeting of the Defence Planning Committee was held on May 3, 20184 during which it deliberated upon the geo-strategic landscape and agreed to chart a time-bound action plan in keeping with its broad mandate. The DPC needs to activate the ‘Plan and Capability Development’ sub-committee immediately, decide its composition and task them to review the 13th Defence Plan in a time bound manner and submit a draft plan that limits the outflow, including the committed liabilities of the contracted schemes and the stage payment that would become due for the ‘New Schemes’ within the resources likely to be available. In addition to the acquisition plans, the committee needs to examine the Capital Works plan of the Service HQs, HQ IDS, and the plan for capital expenditure of DRDO and OFB which also form a part of the Defence capital expenditure. The sub-committee next needs to address the revenue budget availability and review the plans of the service HQs as well as of other entities to bring about savings and ensure that the maintenance of capabilities and measures to enhance serviceability are submitted, examined and followed up.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Whenever a civilian government has attempted to improve relations with India, it has either had to backtrack on promises made or the Pakistan Army ensures that, through its actions at the LoC and inside J&K, these promises stand scuttled.
The results of Pakistan’s general elections are officially out and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led by Imran Khan has emerged as the single largest party with 115 out of the 270 seats of the national assembly for which polling was held. The Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Sharif (PML[N]) came a distant second with 64 seats, and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of Zardari Bhutto family stood third with 43 seats. The remaining seats are shared by smaller regional and fundamentalist parties as well as by independents. With support from some smaller groups/parties, Imran Khan is expected to form the government.
At the provincial level, PML(N) has emerged as the single largest party albeit with a wafer thin lead over the PTI in Punjab, the critical province. Chances are that, here too, the PTI with support from smaller parties, which are vulnerable to arm twisting/rewards, would be able to form a government in due course. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has returned the PTI with an absolute majority for the second time. The situation in both Sindh and Baluchistan remains fluid for the present, but the possibility of the PTI cobbling up a simple majority with ‘establishment’ support in either or both is not ruled out.
A large number of observers has dubbed this as Pakistan’s ‘dirtiest and most rigged’ election. Allegations of mass scale rigging are being levelled by major parties like PML(N), PPP, National Awami Party (NAP), etc., despite vehement denials by the Election Commission of Pakistan. Reports of non-supply of Form 45, unexplained delays in the announcement of results, throwing out of authorised agents of the parties from polling booths, discovery of ballot papers and empty ballot boxes from trash containers, etc. are doing the rounds regularly. In an unprecedented action, close to 370,000 army troops were deployed at polling booths across the country, ostensibly to provide ‘security’.
A look at the country’s political landscape would indicate that unlike in most other countries democracy has not been able to flourish in Pakistan. The emergence of strong political parties led by popular leaders has been systematically nipped in the bud by the ‘deep state’ which has felt threatened by such a development. Thus, ZA Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto were killed when the PPP was at the peak of its power. Today, it is a mere shadow of its former self. Nawaz Sharif, the undisputed leader of PML(N) and three time Prime Minister, is incarcerated along with his daughter on corruption charges, thanks partly to an allegedly pliable judiciary. In the process, PML(N) has faced the ignominy of a number of its middle rung leaders deserting it for the PTI and reducing it to a rump. The vacuum on the political horizon thus created has been adroitly filled by propping up Imran Khan and his PTI. In all probability, Khan’s pliability would dictate the duration of his stay at the helm.
The elections have also exposed the weakness of democratic institutions in Pakistan. Judiciary, media, legislature, election commission, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) etc. have all displayed vulnerability to manipulation. Use of strong arm tactics to coerce and subjugate any institution not towing the line has been resorted to on the pretext of national interest.
Of even greater concern is the inability of the average voter to see through the hype and be carried away by sloganeering and propaganda. The feeling that their lot is not going to improve irrespective of who comes to power is making the electorate indifferent to election outcomes. No wonder the polling percentage has remained struck at around 53 per cent despite much greater exposure to media and technology. Additionally, the participation of fundamentalists and extremists in the elections is an equally disturbing trend. While they may not have made substantial gains in terms of final results, the very fact that they are being allowed to contest shows the fault lines in the system. It also displays the increasing acquiescence and acceptance of the gun culture which is expected to make further inroads in the future.
The army has emerged stronger post the elections. Continuation of its indirect rule enables it to exercise authority without accountability. The pitfalls of direct rule a la Musharraf have been cleverly avoided especially in view of the deteriorating economic conditions. The ability to pull the rug from under the feet of a recalcitrant civilian political leadership has been retained. Clearly, the Army has benefitted from its past experiences!
With that as the backdrop to the rise of Imran Khan to power, a question that is inevitable from every Indian is how his ascent will affect Indo-Pak relations. Will there be a change in Pakistan’s policy of waging proxy war in J&K? Will the ceasefire along the line of control (LoC) hold or will violations of the ceasefire agreement continue? Will trade and business relations get normalized? Will sports competitions between the two countries be resumed? Will Pakistan stop being a catalyst in igniting communal trouble in different parts of India?
The role of the Pakistan Army during the last 70 years should give a fair indication of the shape of things to come and the answers to most of the questions posed above. It is the army which has controlled Pakistan’s India policy. Whenever a civilian government has attempted to improve relations with India, it has either had to backtrack on promises made or the Pakistan Army ensures that, through its actions at the LoC and inside J&K, these promises stand scuttled. In some cases, the government may even fall and its leaders sent to jail. Of course, the possibility of some stubborn leaders being assassinated also exists.
Thus, it would be fair to assume that Indo-Pak relations will follow a similar pattern during Imran Khan’s tenure as Prime minister. He owes his position to the army and would be conscious of the fact that, with the wafer thin majority cobbled up by alliances with smaller parties and individuals, he would be on a slippery wicket should he not adhere to the prescribed text.
Pakistan’s economic, diplomatic, moral and military support to the proxy war in J&K is likely to continue, perhaps with increased intensity. Closer coordination with China would be resorted to in dealing with India both at the regional and international levels. The development of CPEC may be speeded up. There would be an increased possibility of using the communal card to stir up trouble in different parts of India. Repeat of a state sponsored terrorist strike similar to 26/11 cannot be ruled out. Given all this, the current talk in India of embarking upon a fresh beginning with the new Pakistani leadership is an exercise in unbridled optimism.
How is the change at the top going to affect Pakistan itself? First and foremost, fundamentalism is likely to get a fillip. Imran Khan has already earned the sobriquet of ‘Taliban’. The army too is keen to use the ‘good Taliban’ to further its proxy war in J&K and safeguard its interests in Afghanistan. Whether it can control the ‘bad Taliban’ or be swamped by its fundamentalist and terrorist actions is open to debate. Suffice it to say that extremism and fundamentalism are increasingly raising their ugly head in Pakistan and in the process have caused death and destruction. Resultantly, a number of countries today do not consider Pakistan a safe place to visit even for sporting activities/ competitions.
Secondly, Pakistan’s economy is in shambles. There is serious doubt whether it is in a position to service loans coming up for redemption as early as in November and December. A number of these loans pertain to CPEC projects and are to be repaid to China. In the event of default, China will acquire tremendous leverage in securing unprecedented strategic gains as it did at Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Should Pakistan alternatively seek an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout, it has already been hinted that IMF will not allow its funds to be used to repay Chinese loans. In any case, any bailout package from the IMF is likely to be accompanied by tough conditions which Pakistan would find unpalatable. With the Pakistani rupee having depreciated to 130 a dollar, Imran Khan would face difficult choices to pull the country out of this economic morass.
Thirdly, the Pakistan Army is infatuated with the idea of ‘strategic depth’ against India. It, therefore, feels impelled to monitor the happenings in Afghanistan and control any dispensation that comes to power there. It is prepared to use all means at its command to keep India out of Afghanistan and establish a regime there which is favourable to it. With a compliant Prime Minister, these efforts are likely to intensify.
Fourthly, US-Pakistan relations are gradually moving towards a new low. The latest US defence budget caters for providing only $150 million to Pakistan as aid as opposed to a billion plus dollars during previous years. The quid pro quo approach currently being followed by Trump in all US dealings with other countries demands substantial paybacks for the goodies being doled out. It is Pakistan’s hedging on deliverables and utilisation of aid to acquire weapons for use against India in the past that prompted the current US policy. This has not gone down well with Pakistan. But with limited options at its disposal and in an effort to corner India, Pakistan has moved towards a closer embrace of China. There is a likelihood that with the passage of time, Pakistan may well become a client state of China.
Lastly, internally, the economic situation is rapidly deteriorating. Foreign exchange reserves are abysmally low at $ 9 billion, only sufficient to cover imports for two months. The current account deficit has widened and the rupee continues to slide. Poverty, unemployment, inflation, terrorism and corruption are gnawing at the vitals of the country. To top it all, a major chunk of the budget is cornered by the military annually. Imran Khan is likely to have his hands full in balancing these conflicting demands while at the same time endeavouring to keep the military happy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The best way forward for India is to initiate talks with Bangladesh and seek a mutually acceptable political solution for the issue of illegal immigrants.
The second draft of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam was published on July 30, 2018. Of the 3.29 crore persons who applied for the inclusion of their names in the NRC, 2.89 crore have been included as citizens, leaving out around 40 lakh persons. This draft of the NRC is however not final and people can still appeal against the non-inclusion of their names in the NRC. The final list of the NRC containing the names of all Indian citizens in Assam is expected to be published by December 2018 after disposing off all claims and objections in final registers at various levels. Not surprisingly, the exclusion of some 40 lakhs names from the second draft of the NRC has generated mixed reactions. Some political leaders have criticised the NRC updation, referring to it as an exercise that will make the Bengali speaking people “refugees in their own country”. Others have welcomed the NRC, terming it as the right of the people of Assam and essential for national security. Many others have raised doubts about the manner in which the entire process has been conducted and even accused the NRC team of deliberate malfeasance.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the updation of the NRC is a positive step in a number of ways. Firstly, once the draft is finalised, it will provide a much needed perspective on the extent of illegal migration that has taken place into Assam in particular and the country in general. Since the days of the Assam agitation against illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, there have been wild speculations about their actual number. The uncertainty about the number of illegal migrants was compounded by the absence of official estimates. This allowed political parties to often exaggerate the numbers, polarise voters and exploit the issue for electoral gains. An updated NRC is likely to put an end to such speculations and provide a verified dataset to carry out meaningful debates and implement calibrated policy measures.
Secondly, the issue of illegal migrants has remained an emotive one in Assam since independence. It had even created a divergence of opinion between successive central and state leaderships as the former continued to be accommodative towards migrants describing the mass migration from East Pakistan as “homecoming”. Much to the dismay of the people of Assam, some central leaders even went to the extent of denying that any illegal migration from Bangladesh has taken place into the state. The publication of an updated NRC will vindicate the long held argument of large sections of the people of Assam that unabated infiltration from Bangladesh has indeed taken place and that it has upset the demographic profile of the state’s population, especially in the border districts. This, they note, has been causing intense competition and conflict between the indigenous people and migrants for access to resources.
Thirdly, the publication of an updated NRC is expected to deter future migrants from Bangladesh from entering Assam illegally. The publication of the draft NRC has already created a perception that staying in Assam without valid documentation will attract detention/jail term and deportation. More importantly, illegal migrants may find it even more difficult to procure Indian identity documents and avail all the rights and benefits due to all Indian citizens. Last but not least, the inclusion of their names in the NRC will provide respite to all those Bengali speaking people in Assam who have been, hitherto, suspected as being Bangladeshis.
What next? Persons whose names do not feature in the final draft of the NRC are apprehensive that they will be declared as foreigners, sent to detention centres and finally deported. However, the fact remains that the publication of the final draft of the NRC in Assam does not settle the issue of who is a citizen and who is not. The authority to declare anyone a foreigner rests with the Foreigners Tribunals for Assam, constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964. Persons whose names do not figure in the final list of the updated NRC have the right to appeal to these 100 odd Foreigners Tribunals. It is only after one of these Foreigners Tribunals declares someone a foreigner that the government can detain and deport him or her. But this entire process could be a long drawn one as the disposal of lakhs of cases is likely to take years to complete. The real test for the Union government will come only if substantial numbers of persons are finally declared as foreigners by these Tribunals, because it does not have a clear policy on how to deal with them.
There are some options which the government may consider, though these are fraught with problems and likely to prove quite difficult, if not impossible, to implement. The first option is to deport the illegal migrants to Bangladesh. This course of action is, however, a non-starter given that Bangladesh till date has refused to even acknowledge that its citizens have migrated illegally into India, let alone expressing any indication that it would consider taking them back. New Delhi is also reluctant to raise this tricky issue lest it jeopardises relations with Dhaka. In the absence of a formal agreement, India cannot forcibly push the illegal migrants back into Bangladesh. Such an attempt would not only damage bilateral relations but also sully the country’s image internationally.
The second option is to allow the illegal migrants to reside in the country on humanitarian grounds, but after stripping them of all citizenship rights. The government can grant them a modified version of work permit and let them stay on as guest workers, albeit in different states. For this, the Union government will have to enter into negotiations with state governments that are willing to accept these illegal migrants. On their part, state governments have to maintain a proper database and a strict vigil on these illegal migrants lest they disappear without a trace. But this option is likely to create a new problem: in the absence of Bangladesh acknowledging that these lakhs of people are its citizens who have migrated to India, granting them work permits will render them stateless and cause a large-scale humanitarian crisis.
The third option is to grant the proclaimed illegal migrants amnesty and, after a process of naturalisation, Indian citizenship. Such an option would not, however, be welcomed by the people of Assam who are at present protesting against the Citizenship Amendment Bill of 2016, which proposes to grant citizenship to all refugees (except Muslims) who have fled religious persecution in their home countries. In fact, a case challenging the decision to consider migrants from East Pakistan, who had entered India before or on March 24, 1971, as Indian citizens is presently pending in the Supreme Court.
Given all this, the best way forward for India appears to be to initiate talks with Bangladesh and seek a mutually acceptable political solution for the issue of illegal immigrants. To begin with, India needs to convince Bangladesh to undertake a domestic verification process for determining who among those not finally listed in the NCR are its own citizens. The next step would be to work out a deal for repatriating these persons to Bangladesh. Such a deal is in the realm of possibility given the fact that Bangladesh has agreed to take back 85 of its citizens this year after verifying that they had illegally entered Assam.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s quest for being recognized even as a regional power, let alone a global power, requires a balanced and simultaneous growth of its economic and military capabilities.
These days one often hears phrases such as ‘India has arrived at the global scene’ or ‘21st century would be India’s century’. Prime Minister Modi’s style of diplomacy at the international level has given a fillip to such a feeling. Media projection of his personal equations with a majority of the world leaders including Trump, Xi and Putin has left most Indians believing that India is at the threshold of global power. More concretely, this feeling has enabled India to punch above its weight in international fora. No wonder, Modi is listened to with respect at forums like BRICS, ASEAN, SCO etc.
Today, however, the world is in transition. Thanks to Trump’s policy of ‘America First’, we are witnessing a gradual US withdrawal from its global commitments in groupings such as TPP and NATO. A common and cooperative approach to climate change issues stands debunked, as does the Iran nuclear deal. The unpredictability of Trump’s future actions has left the world in a state of suspense and tension. Tweeting appears to have become the preferred method of governing in the world’s strongest power.
The void thus created in world affairs is rapidly being sought to be filled by China, a growing global power. Projections indicate that China would overtake the US as the world’s largest economy by 2030. In the wake of such a development, China is expected to thrust its own version of the ‘rule of law’ and international boundaries especially with relation to its territorial disputes in South China Sea (SCS) and along its land borders.
Russia, under Putin, is seeking to achieve its old glory, despite evident limitations. A gradual US withdrawal from its global role is propelling Russia to occupy the vacated space, in competition with China. Russia is willing and prepared to exploit the fault lines in the western alliance to achieve this objective. Additionally, Russia would not hesitate to ally with China if that enables it to enhance its standing at the global level. The manner in which Russia has carved out a role for itself in the Middle East and is busy exploiting anti-US sentiment in Latin America are clearly indicative of its global role aspirations.
A common feature of all these powers is that they are economically and militarily strong. The US is a shining example. While Russia may have limitations on the economic side, it makes up for this shortfall by virtue of possessing a powerful military. China, for its part, has an equally strong economy as well as military.
In sharp contrast, countries like Germany and Japan are not looked upon as global powers despite their economic strength, because of their dependence on NATO and the US, respectively, for their security. Likewise, the erstwhile USSR could not survive an economic meltdown and disintegration despite being militarily strong. It is only when economic might and military prowess grow side by side that a country makes a mark in the global pecking order.
It may be worthwhile looking at India from such a perspective before determining how successful it has been in achieving recognition as a global or even a regional player. Considering the turmoil that the world has gone through in the last two decades, India has done reasonably well economically. Though nowhere near China, an annual average growth rate of about seven per cent has ensured steady economic growth. But poor infrastructure, unemployment, rampant corruption and poor work culture have prevented us from achieving better results. Nevertheless, we still have been recognized as a country with massive potential for future growth. By 2030, we are projected to have the third largest GDP globally.
However, that would not necessarily make us the third most powerful nation in the world. The reason is the lack of matching military capabilities. Like Germany and Japan (as mentioned earlier), economic power alone would not allow India to achieve global power status. In fact, without military prowess, we would not even be recognized as a regional power. No wonder then that the Indian Ocean, which was earlier an Indian preserve, is now seen as an arena that is open to domination by China, US, and the others. In fact, with bases at Coco Isles, Hambantota, Gwadar, Djibouti and Seychelles, the Chinese have literally established a string of pearls around India.
At the regional level, the pre-eminence enjoyed by India because of its size and population over its much smaller neighbours is slowly disappearing. Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives have gradually come under increasing Chinese economic, and in some cases military, influence. Bangladesh and Bhutan are being subjected to enticements/pressure to enable greater Chinese inroads at the expense of India. While the West may try to prop up India by renaming the erstwhile Asia Pacific region as Indo Pacific region, without a matching military capability from the Indian side, such efforts are unlikely to change the ground realities substantially.
The recent NATO summit has clearly highlighted the vulnerability of European nations from a security perspective in case the US goes ahead with threats of reducing its involvement in NATO. Trump’s warning to European leaders that even a defence expenditure of two per cent of GDP may not be enough to stop a US scale down in NATO and a subtle push for defence expenditure totalling four per cent of GDP post 2024, are indications of the kind of funding required for security and stability. At $636 billion annually, the US is spending 3.6 per cent of its GDP on defence.
In India, as a percentage of GDP, the defence budget has gradually shrunk during the last 10 years. From over two per cent in 2008-09, it is down to 1.57 per cent during the current year. This has resulted in increasing hollowness and the stopping of the modernization of the services. No wonder, one hears news of a MiG 21 crashing every few days, in the process at times snuffing out precious lives of trained pilots!
We cannot be deriving satisfaction from the success of ‘surgical strikes’ or stopping the Chinese juggernaut at Doklam. Those were mere tactical landmarks. Our requirement is to be prepared to defend ourselves against a two front threat. Increasing collusion between China and Pakistan in all aspects of functioning is a matter of deep concern for national security experts. None would want India to be exposed to a debacle like 1962. However, to avoid it, we need to develop capabilities to defend ourselves appropriately. It would also be prudent to understand that while diplomacy can play a crucial role in tackling critical situations, it may not be successful always. Not having a fall back option in case of failure of diplomatic efforts would be suicidal.
A series of cost cutting studies has been undertaken from time to time to save precious resources for modernization of the military within the available budget. A number of recommendations emerging from these studies have also been implemented, some with greater success than others. Such efforts at improving the teeth-to-tail ratio are an integral part of the functioning of a good organization. However, beyond a certain point, these efforts become counterproductive as greater time and energy are thereafter spent in ‘discovering’ them. The military has reached such a point.
The ‘Make in India’ route for improving defence capabilities, which the present dispensation is now trying to follow, should have been implemented immediately after independence to achieve the desired results by this time. It is good that it has been initiated now at least. However, it would require another 10 to 15 years to fructify. Of course, during this intervening period, the world would have moved further ahead.
We need to recognize that cosmetic changes to marginally improve the methodology of defence spending to achieve a greater bang from the available buck are no longer going to achieve the desired effect. India’s quest for being recognized even as a regional power, let alone a global power, requires a balanced and simultaneous growth of its economic and military capabilities.
In a growing economy, there would always be competing requirements for scarce resources. While growth and development must get priority, a delicate balance has to be ensured by factoring in the requirement of national security. The fact that the expenditure on defence is non-productive does not diminish the importance of security. We need to appreciate that we are perpetually exposed to a two front threat. Hostile neighbours can seriously disrupt growth and development if national security is not guaranteed. It is also important to understand that an occasional large allocation of resources to overcome crises is not an answer to security concerns. Allocation of suitable resources on an ongoing basis year after year is the only solution for an adequately prepared military to defend the nation. Professional expertise puts such an allocation at three per cent of the GDP. The sooner we factor it in our budgets, the better off we would be in being recognized as an emerging regional/global power.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The UK Combat Air Strategy unveiled on July 16, 2018 can actually be termed as the Combat Aircraft Industry Strategy. India, with a nearly non-existing aircraft industry, can benefit by understanding the key rationales underpinning the CAS.
On July 16, 2018, the opening day of the Farnborough Air Show, UK Secretary of State for Defence unveiled the UK Combat Air Strategy (CAS).1 Alongside, in a significant move, a plan to develop a new combat aircraft, ‘Tempest’, was announced. The United Kingdom, a pioneer in airpower, was the first to establish an independent air arm. This year, the Royal Air Force completed 100 years of its existence. The UK led and shaped the field of military aviation with a number of innovations. Of late, rising research and development costs have forced the UK to collaborate with other partners in combat aviation. The Tornado, the Typhoon and the F-35 are its notable outcomes. However, the UK’s share in these collaborations has systematically declined, and for the F 35, it is a paltry 15 per cent.2 With a new look CAS and a pilot project “Team Tempest”, the UK is seeking to fly its way back into the space of combat aviation.
Background
The CAS is guided by the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the 2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR). The SDRS outlined an intensifying and evolving threat picture, thus necessitating a well-defined strategy for generation and employment of combat air power.3 The UK National Security Council (NSC) has placed domestic and overseas risks into three tiers, based on a judgement of the combination of both the likelihood and impact of such risks.4 Accordingly, the 2015 National Security Risk Assessment (NRSA) placed terrorism and cyber threat at the top of the Tier I category. The category also includes scenarios relating to international military crises which draw in the UK through treaty obligations. Tier II includes a conventional or hybrid attack on allies and a threat of use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. A military attack on the UK is in the Tier III category.5 The new CAS needs to be seen in this context.
Development of Combat Air Strategy
Interestingly, after the release of the SDSR, the UK Ministry of Defence put out a series of policy papers outlining strategies in various areas. These include Innovation Strategy (March 24, 2017), Shipbuilding Strategy (September 6, 2017), MOD Science and Technology Strategy (November 30, 2017), Commercial Strategy (Jan 10, 2018) and Defence Knowledge Strategy (April 3, 2018).6 These policy papers outline plans for specific fields. However, the CAS is different as it carefully intertwines combat equipment and industry considerations at the strategic level.
Divided into six chapters, the CAS begins with the Strategic Context. It emphasises the significance of combat air power for national objectives. Strangely, in this domain, the focus is only on three combat aircraft, namely, the Tornado, the Typhoon and the F35. All other facets of military aviation are not touched upon. Acknowledging diminishing technological differential with respect to prospective adversaries, the CAS assesses integrated air defence systems and electronic warfare as major concerns. Thereon, the focus shifts to the UK’s military aviation industry, with the document eulogising the technological prowess of the industry and the role it has played in the generation of employment and revenue through exports. The CAS basically pitches for the upgradation of the Typhoon for sustaining its operational relevance and garnering contracts for maintenance and upgrade of the F35. Both these proposals are designed to keep the combat aircraft industry going. Practically, the document can be termed as a Combat Aircraft Industry Strategy.
Pilot Project Team Tempest
With the Tornado scheduled to be phased out in 2019, the onus of combat aviation will be on the Typhoon and the F35. Early models of the Typhoon will start phasing out in the 2030s and their replacement by a sixth generation combat aircraft will be necessary.7 Looking at the development time and cost of the F35, it indeed is prudent to commence work now for a relevant combat aircraft capable of operation in the 2040s. The CAS brings out the gradual decline of the UK Combat Aircraft Industry. From the BE 2 in 1912 till the Tornado in 1979, 12 different types of combat aircraft were produced and in very large numbers to meet the demands of the domestic and international market.8
However, in the last 40 years, the only notable contribution is a collaborative effort to produce the Typhoon (2003) and a minor role in the manufacture of the F35.9 With the Typhoon production ceasing in 2020, barring minor support to the F35, the UK combat aircraft industry would lose relevance. So, the revival of the combat aircraft industry seems to be the lynchpin of the CAS and the pilot project called ‘Team Tempest’ the tool to help achieve the revival.
Team Tempest is part of the Future Combat Air System Technology Initiative programme announced in the SDSR. It is a government-industry partnership and planned to be used as a catalyst and test bed for industry revival. It comprises Ministry of Defence personnel from the Royal Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Defence Equipment & Support and industry partners (BAE Systems, Leonardo, MBDA and Rolls-Royce).10
The Team has a clearly defined roadmap. The plan starts with outlining the business case including military requirements by the end of 2018. This is followed by an initial assessment of the international collaboration by mid-2019 and finalising operational requirements and partners by end 2019. 2020 is the year for final decisions on these issues and final investment decisions are expected to be taken by 2025 to have the initial operating capability by 2035.
The outline plan is to have an open architecture design in Tempest. This will allow easy integration of various subsystems. Additionally, to keep the development cost and time under check, the project will keep an option to retain a number of existing systems, albeit upgraded to suit the operational environment. The significance and relevance of this approach can be assessed from the fact at a team from the USA rushed to meet UK MOD officials a day after its declaration.
Lessons for India
For a country like India, with a huge demand for combat aircraft, three clear messages underpinning the Team Tempest concept are relevant. First, development of a complex military hardware like a combat aircraft is expensive and time-consuming. An international collaborative mechanism is a necessity. Within the country, such high-risk projects need to be undertaken under the rubric of public-private partnership. The entire process needs to be audited objectively and failure to meet specific goals ought to lead to project termination. Second, continuous upgradation of current systems and making them future-ready is an economic strategy, as these subsystems can directly fit into a developing platform. Small and medium-sized local industry can effectively carry out this kind of work. This approach helps local industry to flourish besides reducing the cost and time of development. Third, all platforms being designed need to have an open architecture. This facilitates plugging in of subsystems developed elsewhere and for other purposes. It permits faster and cost-effective integration. This methodology also helps in expansion of the dual-use technologies basket. Furthermore, commercial use of subsystems thus developed leads to financial offsets.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given that Iran accounts for around 10 per cent of India total oil imports, the immediate factor for New Delhi will be to look at various options to deal with the situation without jeopardising its energy security.
Once again, India is caught in the middle of a conflict between the US and Iran. During the earlier round of sanctions, India had succeeded in deftly manoeuvring through the sanctions regime, keeping its relations with both countries intact, if somewhat bruised. However, with the latest round of US sanctions on Iran, announced on May 8, 2018, and set to be enforced through a wind-down period beginning August 6, and the final withdrawal from the JCPOA from November 4, 2018, India is once again looking at various options to ensure that its relations with both countries, and particularly its energy interests are not affected.
Not only is Iran India’s third largest source of crude oil, but both countries have ties that go beyond energy trade. These include India’s US$500 investment in developing the Chabahar port in Iran, a strategic factor in its access to Afghanistan as well as with respect to the International North South Corridor (INSTC) which aims to facilitate linkages to Central Asia and Russia.
Although the current US sanctions will be imposed unilaterally, that is, they are not endorsed by the UN, and hence not liable to be adhered to by any other country, the US government has made it clear that any country that continues to do business with Iran will be blocked from accessing the American banking and financial system.
So what are India’s options if it is forced to terminate all oil imports from Iran? Alternately, under what circumstances could India continue to do business with Iran after November 2018?
Given that Iran accounts for around 10 per cent of India total oil imports, the immediate factor for New Delhi will be to look at various options to deal with the situation without jeopardising its energy security. Although New Delhi officially maintains that it is not bound to adhere to the new sanctions regime since it has not been endorsed by the UN, the issue of payments will be the most contentious. India’s oil imports from Iran will be affected from the end of August 2018, as Iran offers Indian refiners a 60-day credit period on oil sales, and the payment for cargoes loaded from the end of August will be due in November when the second tranche of sanctions will commence. If no agreement on an alternate mechanism for funding is reached, India may cut or stop buying oil from Iran.
This is not the first time that India has faced this predicament. As in the past, India can continue to buy oil from Iran in non USD currencies. If the Europeans do not succumb to US pressure, India can trade oil in euros; alternatively, it can re-introduce the rupee-rial payment mechanism used earlier from 2011 when all payment avenues became blocked after the EU imposed a near complete trade embargo on Iran. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) also had to cease using the Tehran-based Asian Clearing Union (ACU)1 to handle transactions with Iran, making it more difficult to transfer money to that country. However, in January 2012, Iran agreed to accept payments in India rupees to settle around half of its sales to India. As per the agreement, India paid Iran 55 per cent in euros through the Ankara-based Halkbank (after Deutsche Bank, which India was using to pay Iran buckled under US pressure and stopped clearing payments to Iran). The remaining 45 per cent was remitted in rupees through the Kolkata-based UCO Bank, which did not have any assets in the US and was hence not at risk for invoking any penalties. However, the payments through Halkbank too ceased from February 2013, although 45 per cent of the money continued to be paid through UCO Bank. For the balance 55 per cent, India looked at several options, including paying in roubles and other currencies, but was unsuccessful. Eventually, Tehran agreed to accept payment entirely in rupees, and this mode of payment continued until 2015 when the P5 and Iran agreed on the final agreement.
From 2016, India’s oil imports from Iran rose substantially, to the extent that Iran, which had dropped from the position of India’s second largest supplier prior to the first round of sanctions to eighth place, it gradually climbed to the third spot – with India being Iran’s second largest market.
Of course, much will depend on how the EU nations respond to the US sanctions. In fact, in May 2018, an Indian delegation met French, German and UK bankers to assess how they would deal with the US sanctions. The fact that soon thereafter the State Bank of India (SBI) is reported to have informed refiners that it would not handle payments for the crude from November unless a new payment route is established may be a pointer that the euro payment route may not be feasible. Although New Delhi has still not taken an official position on whether to cut imports from Iran and, according to reports, will seek exemptions and is also considering alternate payment mechanisms, including re-introducing the rupee-rial route, it may have to seek alternative sources for its oil.2
Recently, the Iranian charge d’affaires at the New Delhi mission, Massoud Rezvanian Rahaghi, warned India that the “special privileges” given to it would end if it tried to replace Iranian oil with supplies from other sources. He further hinted that India’s other interests related to connectivity with Iran would also suffer, and called for a need to expedite India’s investments and accelerate the execution of projects linked to Chabahar.3 However, a day later, Iran adopted a more placatory note, saying that it would continue to be a reliable energy partner for India and adopt a flexible approach to ensuring secure oil supplies.
It should be noted that, in the recent past, following the JCPOA (The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) agreement, relations between India and Iran had not been all smooth sailing. In July 2017, India lowered its imports after Tehran had hardened its stance on granting development rights to an Indian consortium for developing the Farzad B gas field, which was discovered by ONGC Videsh Ltd., and threatened to give the rights to a Russian company. However, after India made a higher counter offer, Iran acquiesced and agreed in principle to buy the gas developed by India; nonetheless, payment differences have continued.
That Iran is worried is evident from the fact that it has been looking for ways to reduce the impact of sanctions on its oil exports. It has announced that, henceforth, private companies would be allowed to export crude through its exchange as against the previous system of allowing only oil products to be sold through its oil and petrochemical bourse.4
Furthermore, Iran may consider trading in China’s yuan-denominated crude oil futures on the Shanghai International Energy Exchange, which was inaugurated in March 2018, thereby circumventing any restrictions on dollar-denominated trade and US banks. Although Iranian crude is currently not deliverable into the Shanghai oil contract, this could change in the future. Already, the US decision on re-imposing sanctions on Iran appears to have increased interest in the Chinese oil futures with a doubling of volumes being traded on the exchange after the announcement.5
With regard to alternatives to Iranian oil for India, other oil producers can fill the gap if it stops or cuts its Iranian oil imports. Given India’s huge and growing market for oil, it certainly has other alternatives to source its oil imports, and has in fact begun looking at alternate supplies, including from other Gulf producers, Canada and the US. However, it may not get the preferential terms it did from Iran. These include the 60-day credit for purchases, which incidentally is double the time given by other producers, and the freight discount, which was increased from 62 to 80 per cent recently, albeit on the condition that Indian refineries increased their purchases.6 Moreover, with Iranian oil supplies decreasing in the international oil market, it would impact on prices worldwide, and will add to India’s ballooning oil import bill. It is in this context that in a recent interview India’s oil minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, had said that potential suppliers should recognise India’s huge and growing market when negotiating terms.7
Eventually, whatever decision the government takes, will be based on ensuring that the country’s energy needs are not jeopardised, which includes gaining access to oil without further hurting its energy security or economy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Eradicating the fake news problem calls for a collective effort of individuals, governments, social media and content platforms, and innovative technology solutions.
India is a burgeoning market for social media platforms and messaging services, with close to half a billion Internet users on mobile platforms — the second largest online population in the world. The growth rates for media access on smartphones are astonishing. Equally disturbing however is the increasing instances of misleading and maliciously false online content. Social media and messaging services, which are essentially meant to share information, ideas and interests or to facilitate virtual communities interact, participate and communicate, are increasingly being abused to incite communal riots and spread false information.
In India, as of July 1, 2018, fake information-induced mob lynching has claimed 23 lives1 in 18 of such reported incidents.2 The government has taken a stern stand with clear directions to the messaging service providers such as WhatsApp,3 who have reciprocated with assurances of incorporating suitable technology to curb the menace.4 The phenomenon of fake news has wider implications for law and order, safety and security of the citizens, and to the democratic credentials of the country. Fake news, fake social media messages and campaigns have also been used to malign the reputation of organisations as well as to manipulate stock markets, as in the cases such as the ‘Arctic Ready’ hoax targeting Shell in 20125 and The Associated Press twitter account hack in 2013.6
Political parties also find these platforms and messaging applications attractive for election campaigns to distribute videos, audios, images, articles, graphics and posts. Tools, which draw in details related to the demographics of voters, their age, location coupled with plethora of available information related to the political and religious inclinations, interests, hobbies, preferences, lifestyle etc., help them in targeting content at a specific group of voters.7 Targeted content or tailor made messages find acceptance among a group of voters as it is precisely relevant to their concerns, interests and preferences, and hence influences voter behaviour. Social media campaigns of political parties, being executed over both official and non-official channels, can easily transgress the boundaries of ethics if it includes doctored content and fake news. This also runs the risk of inciting religious or communal riots, hoaxes and rumours.
Security features like end-to-end encryption in messaging services enhance privacy for the users, but it also makes them susceptible to misuse. Falsified information, in the form of provoking and doctored content, can travel over these platforms unmonitored. Well-crafted content is potent enough for opinion engineering. The problem is not specific to developing countries. It is more worrisome for mature economies, which are likely to consume more convincing fake news content than real correct information by 2022, as per a Gartner research.8 As the interest in fake news and other illicit content grows, their implications for society and the individual in turn are grim. In the quest of finding an immediate solution to this, social media giants are experimenting with Artificial Intelligence (AI), which for decades has been used to curb spam emails.
A simple AI solution for instance can run a content cross-check for the news story against a dynamic database of stories which demarcates legit and fake stories. A database of specific accounts, sources, geographical locations9 or IP addresses which are a known source of fake news, could also be handy for a quick check. AI systems can run an evaluation for the headline text and the content of the post, looking for consistency between both or sift through similar articles over other news media platforms for fact checking. AI is also being used to spot manipulated or doctored images and videos, which can further alert the users of the dubious content. Numerous fact-checking websites have sprung up and a few of them have even partnered with big players like Google and Facebook to provide factual accuracy.
However, the efficacy of AI in curbing the menace remains contentious, particularly when AI is being put to use to synthesise textual and media content which could be exceptionally convincing. As part of a collaboration project between Technical University of Munich, Stanford University and few other institutions, researchers have demonstrated a face-swapping application, which swaps the facial expressions to impersonate someone else, by using depth-sensing camera to manipulate video footage.10 As technology advances in machine and deep learning, it is quite possible that AI-generated fake content would be indistinguishable from real information for the AI-powered discriminator.
Although AI can run a meticulous fact-checker with unparalleled speed and efficiency, it may fall short of understanding the nuances of human writing with adjectives, contexts and subtleties of tone.11 Some of the fake content can even confuse human beings, as it runs on the edges of fact and fiction. While AI may find it technically challenging to decipher such content, the majority and obvious cases of misinformation or falsified information can be identified. The race between the use and abuse of AI is gearing up, making it equally challenging for AI systems to detect professionally-made fake content using AI tools. AI also has its limitations in eradicating the fake news problem. It can, at the best, filter out or label the dubious content, similar to the spam filters in email boxes. AI is not an absolute answer or solution to this problem. This is largely a human versus technology problem, and a purely technology-led solution would fall short of producing effective results.
Due diligence on part of the users, as actual consumers and targets of fake information and online content, can contain the spread of fake news. Human judgement and wisdom is critical to solving this problem, but it needs extensive awareness and education campaigning. Users, aware of the basic fact-checking methods and societal fallouts of the fake information they share, are better positioned to contain its proliferation. Before sharing dubious content, users can exercise judgement to question the source and its credibility, or to check the credentials of the individual it has come from. This could act as barriers to this uncontrolled flow of falsified information. Leveraging the competence of human networks through crowd-sourcing, few experiments have been carried out for the fake news problem, similar to the concept of Wikipedia where a network of volunteers keeps the information updated. Network of volunteers, individuals as well as organisations, can maintain database for fact-checking and even point out the articles, posts, news content carrying falsified or fake information. AI-based content verification and labelling can also warn users if the content is likely to be fake or that the authenticity of the source is not established.
By and large, eradicating the fake news problem calls for a collective effort of individuals, governments, social media and content platforms, and organisations producing innovative technology solutions. Standalone technology solutions cannot be effective, unless and until they are integrated with social causes and awareness among the masses to solve such mounting problems. This is especially so in the Indian context, when a large online community of users, who are quite prone to opinion engineering, source their news from social media or messaging platforms without paying heed to the credibility or authenticity of the source. At the end of the day, human wisdom can make the real difference, technology solutions can at the most augment human ability to differentiate between fake and real at the first look.
Tackling fake content and news raises many questions. This includes decisions pertaining to taking down of fake content, who makes that decision, or would it, in some way or the other, interfere with the freedom to speech or expression, and the manner in which technology should respond to parody and satire meant purely for entertainment. The larger question pertains to the very future of AI, with technology relating to fake content demarcation racing against technology used to generate fake content.
While fake news is a problem for every country across the globe, countries with stringent content controls, like China, are apparently in a better position to tackle the problem as they have both technical measures and legal regimes in place. The looming choice is whether it is always going to be a trade-off between freedom of expression and safety against fake content or whether the Chinese way is the right approach. For India, the problem is more immediate as general elections are around the corner and violence due to fake content has already claimed 23 lives. In the absence of controls and regulations, human wisdom and technology can together put an end to the growing menace. The sooner it happens, the better it is for the society and the democratic ethos of developing countries like India.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a foreign policy course-correction after realising that the strategic tilt towards the United States has not only grossly upset India’s geopolitical image but also undermined national interests.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a foreign policy course-correction after realising that the strategic tilt towards the United States has not only grossly upset India’s geopolitical image but also undermined national interests. Indian interests are being particularly affected by the US decision to link its sanctions on Iran and Russia with India, with the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) having the potential to damage India's defence preparedness. India has decided to defy the US diktat and made it clear that Trump’s “me first approach” is not acceptable and that it would not be guided by any other country on its import of weapons. It has decided to go ahead with the purchase of the Triumf missile and also announced its commitment to follow UN sanctions, not US sanctions on Iran.
There has been an overwhelming impression that India is stooping to become a regional ally of the US in the latter’s new strategic theatre of “Indo-Pacific” to keep the sea lanes of communication open, albeit in the pretext of countering China. But moving closer to Washington has been seen as having had a wide-ranging adverse impact. Firstly, it is forcing India to walk a diplomatic tightrope between the US, Russia and China. The policy of intentional ambiguity in conventional terms does play a valuable role, but a prolonged play can also lead to uncertainty, for it can be hard to maintain the balance between coherence and ambiguity. It could also potentially obscure potential harm and threats. Secondly, relying too much on fickle US policies appears risky. As can be seen on the trade front, Trump is backing out on his commitments to other US friends and allies. And there is a lurking feeling that the US was not forthcoming in articulating clear support for India during the Doklam standoff. Thirdly, closer military ties with the US could draw India into a larger political quagmire in terms of attracting the attention of global Islamic terrorist groups which are committed to undermining the interests of America and its allies wherever possible. And, lastly, the process could eventually result in the US making a Pakistan (a long-time client state or banana republic) out of India and the attendant loss of standing in the world as a great nation.
Atop all challenging issues lies the escalating trade conflict between New Delhi and Washington. India has decided to retaliate against the US by increasing import tariffs on 30 American products amounting to $240 million. This is in response to the US imposing tariffs on aluminium and steel imports from India in March 2018. But Donald Trump has threatened to impose further retaliatory import duties on Indian products. The US trade deficit of $21 billion with India is a sore point for the Trump administration, which seeks full reciprocity in trade ties. Any move by Washington to levy retaliatory tariffs would hit India’s exports to the US market. With nearly 16 per cent of India’s total exports going to the US, further and more expansive US tariffs would have implications for the political environment especially when general elections are around the corner and public discontent is rife.
So far, Indo-US trade frictions have remained at the level of posturing only. For example, among the notable items on which the import duty has been raised by India include US products like Harley-Davidson motorbikes. These retaliatory ‘protectionist’ measures seem simply symbolic in nature and are not comparable to the US-China trade war. While trade issues could still be resolved through dialogue, any escalation of retaliatory steps could widen the friction and even spill over into other areas of cooperation.
The recent talks between Commerce Minister Suresh Prabhu with US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and US Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer have failed to resolve the trade dispute. The abrupt postponement of the first 2+2 dialogue between India and the US, earlier scheduled for July 6, appeared to have everything to do with the issues of trade and sanctions, among others.
The above issues have probably triggered a change in New Delhi’s thinking, for they not only caused serious unease in India but also upset its strategic calculations.
Russian Displeasure
Obviously, the Russians couldn’t have been pleased with India switching over to the American military supply chain system. However, Moscow hasn’t made this a critical issue and continues to transfer the most sensitive strategic armaments to India – although it could have virtually brought the entire Indian defence system to its knees by stopping its supply chain including spares.
What really appears to have miffed Russia was India’s decision to forego its strategic balance by joining the ‘Quadrilateral’ talks with the US, Australia and Japan since 2017. India’s steps to joining this bloc-type security architecture in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ has evidently raised hackles in Moscow, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov strongly advising India to stick to "non-bloc principle”. Putin too was obviously not convinced that India’s role in the ‘Quad’ isn’t about aligning against Russia. In Sochi, he had obliquely reminded Modi of the obligation the two countries share under the “special and privileged strategic partnership” in “military, security and nuclear energy fields”.
China has been scornful of India joining the US bandwagon. Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the ‘Quad’ and ‘Indo-Pacific” formulations as only “headline-grabbing’’ ideas soon to “dissipate” like the “foam on the sea’.
New Delhi seems to have realised the mistake of prematurely denouncing the traditionally followed multi-engagement foreign policy or a “balancing” approach in the global system, even though conceding a space for the US had begun in 2001 when Vajpayee offered Indian bases for US military operations in Afghanistan and Advani wished to send a division to Iraq in 2003. Prime Minister Modi’s “informal” meeting with President Xi Jinping in Wuhan and "agenda-less" talks with President Vladimir Putin in Sochi proved a masterstroke and turning point for his diplomacy.
In particular, Modi’s keynote speech at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore seemed a calibrated move to prevent India falling into a dangerous geopolitical trap vis-à-vis US, Russia and China. The subtext of the speech was to reaffirm India’s commitment to multi-polarity, uphold the principles and values of peace and progress, and fight against “global dominance”. The world knew that India was as a power bloc in itself with nations around the world looking up to New Delhi for guidance and support. Modi’s Singapore speech was welcomed by every country including China.
Importantly, Modi avoided making a reference to the ‘Quad’ in Singapore and instead spoke out strongly against “protectionism” – an oblique reference to the Trump policy. Although he praised the US “Indo-Pacific” strategy, he also made it clear that India does not see it “as a club of limited members (or) as a grouping that seeks to dominate” which strongly implied that India is not seeing it as an alliance system. In fact, when US officials described India as the “fulcrum” of or “central” to US Indo-Pacific strategy, Modi deflected the idea by affirming the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Prime Minister played down the China threat except for exhorting Beijing to play by the rules, saying an “Asia of rivalry” would hold all its players back. And, in contrast to US Defense Secretary James Mattis warning China over maritime ‘intimidation’, Modi talked about seeking closer ties with China and termed “stable relations” between the two countries as “an important factor for global peace and progress.” Modi went a step further and advised other powers to avoid taking a confrontationist line to prevent “great power rivalries”. These statements were significant given that they were made about a week ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Qingdao. At Qingdao, he joined other leaders in committing to the "Shanghai Spirit" – a term coined in 2006 to invert the Cold War-era mentality.
India’s Options
New Delhi needs to be mindful of the fluid nature of the dynamics in security relationships in the Asia-Pacific. Indian interlocutors seeking exemptions from higher tariffs on Indian items in the US market need to understand that Trump is likely to agree to such a step only if he is able to make enough profits by selling US arms to India. This explains the US attempts to scuttle India’s ongoing defence deals with Russia. Trump knows that America can sell India a glut of arms by playing up Indians’ Sinophobia.
Though his dexterous diplomacy, Modi has deflated the hype created by certain sections of Indian and American think tanks and media outlets which enjoyed a great sense of vanity and smugness about the strategic importance of India for America in counterbalancing China.
To be clear, there can’t be an Asia without China just as there can’t be an Asia without India. In fact, most Asian nations, despite their disputes and differences, do not approve of all-round hostility against each other.
Instead, India’s fellow Asian societies seemed to have learnt and continue to practice Nāgārjuna’s non-dogmatic precept of Madhyamaka (fundamental verses of the Middle Way) that accepts the nature of reality and ‘interdependent co-arising or dependent co-origination’ to overcome problems.
Realising that India can no longer continue with the old habit of remaining a geopolitical bystander in Asia, a nuanced shift in Modi’s policy of moving away from the West-led confrontationist approach is a welcome move. What Modi essentially lacked until recently was a wise and level-headed foreign policy advisor.
Yet, one should be cautiously optimistic about the Wuhan process moving forward in the right direction. Possibly it does not represent a change of hearts but only a tactical adjustment with both sides buying a temporary truce due to the imperatives of their respective external and domestic agenda. For the overall atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust to go will take time and require sustained efforts by both sides. But the process of resetting the ties may have begun in Wuhan, probably with India’s willingness to stop playing the Dalai Lama card in return for China’s willingness to end using Pakistan as a proxy. India should try and avert further challenges posed by China from multiplying. One hopes that the new team led by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale is able to navigate engagement with China in good faith and not indulge in tactical ploys.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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