Events

An MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar presentation by Ms. Shruti Pandalai, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA, on “India’s Pacific Islands’ Outreach: Understanding Regional Narratives, Geopolitics and Opportunities – An Introduction” was held on 17 August 2023. It was Chaired by Amb. Sujan Chinoy, Director General, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). The External Discussants were Dr. Stuti Banerjee, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs and Mr. Constantino Xavier, Fellow in Foreign Policy and Security Studies at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP) in New Delhi. Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA and Dr. Tenjemeren Ao, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA were Internal Discussants. 

Executive Summary

The narrative of “the return of geopolitics” to the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) has been gaining traction in the larger discourse in the Indo-Pacific, primarily driven by the anxiety over the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) expanding engagement in the region. The aggravation of international tensions are amplified by Sino-US rivalry, even as the Islands navigate intra-regional frictions, economic development challenges, illegal fishing, climate change, and issues related to self-determination and decolonisation. The presentation tried to introduce the relevance of this contested geography to regional and extra-regional players, unpack the internal dynamics of regional tensions, and examine the agency of PICs. It reflected on how China's actions are redefining geopolitics in the region and discussed these contested narratives. Within this backdrop, it also explored how Indian engagement has been perceived in the region and concluded with prescriptive options of steps India could take, including with regional partners, to anchor a meaningful presence.

Detailed Report

The seminar began with the Chair and Director–General of MP-IDSA, Amb. Sujan Chinoy – introducing the topic, panel and giving his insight on the theme of the paper. This was followed by a presentation by Ms. Shruti Pandalai. After this, the external and internal commentators gave their respective insights, followed by a round of questions and answers.

Ambassador Sujan Chinoy

In his opening remarks, the Chair, Amb. Sujan Chinoy gave extensive insights on this topic and made a critical analysis of the paper. He mentioned that China’s growing footprint in the region in regard to regional connect and infrastructural development must be examined. He said that the paper was timely and more importantly it not only introduced the region but also how this region is significant for India’s interests. It also broadly covered many important aspects of this region and sub–regions – Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia.

The Chair began by focusing on Micronesia, emphasising how this region in particular was a key theatre of World War II, and how this region today carries a baggage of history, particularly in the context of nuclear testing. He used the example of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. It was occupied by the Japanese first, and afterwards by the Americans. The Chair further highlighted the fact that this region has been at the forefront of negotiations on the problem of climate change. He also mentioned how these countries have filed a case to stop nuclear testing, an issue with historical baggage for the nations here and the PICs have a prominent voice at the United Nations.

Next, the Chair focused on Melanesia, which lies to the south of Micronesia. Many countries like the US, Germany and France, according to him have a deep interest in the region. Australia and New Zealand have traditionally enjoyed a prominent foothold here. There’s also a newfound concern about the Chinese presence here after the existence of a geopolitical vacuum here. About Polynesia, the Chair reflected that it is a huge region and, France is a big player in the region, as it has its colonies there.

At this juncture, the Chair talked about the compulsions that drive the major players in this region. The main reasons these countries propagate their relevance in the region is that they have had a presence there for a very long time. Countries like France and Britain were able to dismiss extra-regional claims due to their colonial history, as well as France holding some land (like New Caledonia and French Polynesia) that grants them an extensive maritime territory in the region. As a geopolitical player, Japan has fought key conflicts in the region and cannot be overlooked. This is especially significant in light of Japan's transformation from a coloniser to a major power investing heavily in infrastructure.

New Zealand, is a smaller player, unlike Australia and has a presence in the immediate neighbourhood. Today, Island nations do not accept patronizing historical dynamics. China is not a new presence in the region. Chinese people have had their presence there through migration. For instance, there are Chinese shopkeepers and businessmen in many Pacific Island nations for long. As a result, China also enjoys the diaspora advantage in the region which it seeks to exploit to its benefit.

China meets the impulse for infrastructural development of island nations, while they view American, Australian and New Zealand’s presence as being at a lower pitch. China has a range of interests in the region. This region is mineral-rich, and countries here have signed up for the Chinese initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The access to this area is also significant for security and geopolitical purposes for China, like satellite tracking and countering Taiwan – since some of the few remaining countries which recognize Taiwan are PICs. A critical strategic importance of this area is “breaking out in the Pacific”, since it is the only area where China can actually potentially contain and monitor American presence in its periphery. Russia was also present in the region but had limited itself only to the Kurile Islands.

As for India, the Chair said that he agreed with the presenter that India is vocal as a voice of the Global South and thus PICs come under the purview of India’s outreach to the Global South. There are drivers for engagement with the PICs. India has taken initiatives like the Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS), which showcase India’s capacity to sympathise with PICs through several iterations since 2014, which is followed by the 2017 visit of Gen. VK Singh to Fiji and PM Modi’s visit to Papua New Guinea in 2021. The Chair also cautioned about the potentiality of outreach that India can have in the region. Its lack of ground presence, and the distance between India and the PICs are major limitations. Also, India has a limited presence also due to third party partnership and our lack of ability to deliver projects we have committed to in time. Better delivery on projects and better focus, like we have been doing in Africa, can ensure that we do better in the Pacific region if that is what we want to do. There is a major logistical problem when it comes to trying to establish and maintain diplomatic presence in the region, and there are also issues relating to security, transparency and accountability.

According to the Chair, while it is true that India has good relations with the US, France, Australia and New Zealand, it does not mean that it can guarantee a better presence for India in the region. But, despite limitations, what plays to India’s advantage is that it is perceived as an alternative to the binary of US–China rivalry and that it is also viewed in a favourable light by the US, Australia, and New Zealand. The Chair stated that the scope of India expanding its presence in the region needs to be examined by scholars. And, at the end of the day, India’s primary region and interests lie in the Indian Ocean Region, while balancing the naval and continental sphere. The Pacific is not a natural sphere for India, but equally, India has interests there.

Ms. Shruti Pandalai

Ms. Pandalai started her presentation by thanking the Director General for Chairing the session and giving some valuable insights from a practitioner’s lens and as someone who has served in the Pacific region. She also thanked Dr. Xavier and Dr. Banerjee for being External Discussants and Dr. Kumar and Dr. Ao for being Internal Discussants for her Fellow Seminar. She stated that her paper is aimed at being a beginner’s guide to understand the new geostrategic space of the Pacific Island region and India’s outreach – in the context of developing geopolitical contestations in the larger Indo-Pacific region.

According to Ms. Pandalai, this region does not only come in focus because of US-China rivalry but also because of its deeply contested past and colonial legacy, as also pointed out by the Chair. It has often displayed the strength of its regionalism with several moments of unparalleled agency in multilateral forums. It is also grappling with existential crisis with the emergence of issues like climate change while navigating through the very complicated superpower competition in the region. From her perspective, this larger narrative started with many scholars focusing on this region in the larger context of Indo-Pacific geopolitics following Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Solomon Islands in 2022 which was concluded with signing of a defence pact between China and Solomon Islands. On the other end of the narrative for her, lie the visuals of Prime Minister Modi’s successful visit to the Pacific Islands for the Forum of India and Pacific Cooperation (FIPIC) Summit. She stated that between these two significant events, a lot has happened in the region – which is paramount to analyse and understand, and which she has attempted to do in this paper.

Following this, she briefly explained the structure of her paper, where she analysed the narrative of ‘return of geopolitics’ to the Pacific Islands and why it gained traction, which for her is the rising anxiety in people while witnessing increasing prominence of China in this geopolitical space. She also remarked that we have been observing exacerbation of international tensions which are further amplified by Sino – US rivalry, even as these islands navigate intra-regional frictions, challenges of economic development, illegal fishing, climate change, and issues related to self – determination and decolonisation. According to Ms. Pandalai, India’s renewed outreach to the region under the leadership of PM Modi has found a wide appeal as also seen in his recent visit. Thus, in her presentation she first introduced the relevance of this strategic geography, followed by looking into the regional tensions and what the existing narratives there are. She was to then expand on how China’s presence has redefined the geopolitics of the region and how it brought more contested narratives. With this backdrop, she would also investigate the scope of India’s engagement with the region.

Ms. Pandalai then introduced the geography of PICs and their location in the map and the sub-regions of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia. She highlighted how this region has a complicated geopolitical arrangement. This region is often seen as the backyard of Australia due to its geographical location. She also talked about the spheres of influence in the region which are highly contested and overlapping in nature.

She then showed a historical chart which showcased the full historical trajectory of these island nations and their people. Ms. Pandalai specifically focused on the beginning of colonial history of the region with the arrival of explorers like James Cook in the Pacific Islands. She then talked about the 19th century, when the island nations were occupied by different European powers, USA and Japan, followed by the Pacific Wars during the years of World War II. She mentioned that from an American perspective, this region has been like an “American Lake” where Australia and New Zealand are deputy sheriffs for the US. The region has remained majorly neglected and Chinese military presence in the region is feared by the West.

In terms of its economic imperative, Ms. Pandalai stated that there is acute poverty in the region while it is rich in resources. The PICs are dependent on western countries and have poor infrastructure. Entry of China in the region gave these countries options other than the West. On the other hand, in terms of its strategic imperative, this region is a theatre of showcasing of US-China rivalry, and while the US views the region as a part of its concept of ‘Island Chains’ as a defensive parameter, China sees the region as a springboard and an integral part of its “Blue Water Navy” capacities. She stated that the major actors in this region are the US, France, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and China and analysed their respective spheres of influence in the region.

She further stated that the US has 11 controlled territories in the region. It has amplified its outreach to the region under the Biden administration which includes the Pacific Island Summit and Blue Pacific Programme under which the US gives aid to the PICs especially in the domain of climate change. There are many unresolved undercurrent issues between the US and PICs. France, on the other hand, has an Exclusive Economic Zone in the region via French Polynesia and New Caledonia. New Caledonia also has 25% of the world’s nickel deposits. There is also significant focus on PICs in the French Strategy on Indo-Pacific. It has also invested 60 million Euros for mitigating climate change and is also cooperating in the areas of science and technology. France is also relevant because of its colonial footprint in the region.

For Japan, this region is an important strategic region due to fisheries and maritime routes. The presence of Japan in the region is also important for its own security. Japan’s aid to the region has been focused on infrastructure. Nuclear waste is a major area of contestation between the PICs and Japan. New Zealand and Australia are regional powers here. New Zealand poses itself as a nation which is “in and of the Pacific” especially because of its significant Māori population. The Pacific is an important component of New Zealand’s security documents, like defence papers, especially concerning the maritime domain. New Zealand provides PICs with massive aid because of Chinese presence and it is not comfortable with the approach of the US and Australia of militarisation in the region to counter Chinese presence. On the other hand, Australia is seen as a ‘big brother’ by the PICs, a hegemon in the region and thus Australia has testy relations with the PICs. Even though Australia has done a lot of work in the region, it fails to translate into influence with respect to the PICs. Wang Yi’s visit to Solomon Islands was a deal breaker for Australia, which turned out to be a really bad idea.

According to Ms. Pandalai, China has crafted a narrative when it comes to the region which highlights and criticises the actions of the West and historical crimes committed by them. This narrative also banks on the fact the oldest Chinese trading house still exists in the region. For China, the Pacific is an important region because it wants to diminish the influence of and further isolate Taiwan, given that the majority of its diplomatic partners are the PICs. Other than that, it also seeks to limit the US presence at its maritime periphery. The PICs are also an important part of China’s BRI project and are significant beneficiaries of Chinese investments and security agreements.

Further, the Speaker talked about the Pacific Islands’ Forum which expanded the concept of security in 2018 and in 2022 launched the ‘2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific’. This highlights that PICs have agency especially in the domain of Climate Change, and that for the PICs climate change is a more important issue than geopolitics. She highlighted that China’s increasing engagement with the region is waking up other regional powers and thus there is a renewed focus especially in areas of cooperation like 5G and climate finance.

Ms. Pandalai also talked about India’s relations with the PICs. She mentioned that India has historical and cultural ties with Fiji and PICs’ relations with India have always functioned under the framework of South – South Cooperation. The region started to matter more to India from the prism of Indo-Pacific at least normatively. India has also developed its presence as a development partner in the region. It sent aid to Tonga in 1973 for the first time and since 2006, the approach towards aid and developmental projects has been government-centric. India has a multi-sectoral approach covering areas from education, cybersecurity, climate change and others when cooperating with the PICs. For India, according to Ms. Pandalai, the drivers of engagement with the PICs are India’s rising role as a development partner of choice, beyond the binary of US and China, especially as the President of G20, their support in organisations like the UN, availability of rich resources in the PICs and checking Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region and the Pacific. India is gaining a more meaningful presence in the region via multilateral forums like the International Solar Alliance (ISA), Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) and others. She also mentioned the Indian investments in the region and the status of projects in areas like skill development, space technologies that India is working on with the PICs, and the limitations on delivering on those projects. She then deliberated upon ideas for further cooperation, which is the usage of third party resources, in other words, trilateral cooperation – which can be the solution to ‘India’s Delivery Deficit’. Some of the examples that she gave to substantiate this include trilateral cooperation with PICs and Japan in many areas, the US in food sector and cooperation with Australia and New Zealand in high-technologies and France in climate change and other areas.

In conclusion, Ms. Pandalai stated that meaningful presence is not equivalent to strategic overreach, and as an observer one should be careful about that when it comes to India’s outreach to the Pacific Islands. India needs to channel its efforts and resources in areas where PICs actually need assistance for. She also mentioned that climate change and renewable energy are important areas for cooperation for India and the PICs.

Dr. Constantino Xavier

Dr. Xavier complimented the paper, for its timeliness and the way it was presented. He also highlighted that India’s Indo–Pacific strategy does not focus enough on the Pacific region, which is why there is a need to see the best way for India to be present in the region. At this juncture, therefore, a very important and fundamental question to investigate is what is the best way for India to be present there and is this region really important for India? Dr. Xavier held the opinion that India should do less and not try to be everywhere all the time. He also pointed out that we need to understand why would India be needed in the region from the perspective of Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US. While trilateral cooperation is an effective tool for now, he highlights that it is important for India to find a niche in the long run and work upon it.

Dr. Xavier suggested that Russia could probably be added and that more attention should be paid to the EU and the UK as geopolitical actors in the region. He stated that the section on China was longer than needed since everyone has an understanding concerning Chinese presence in the region. Dr. Xavier also said that India needs to maintain a more consistent diplomatic presence in the region and it is important to analyse how that can be achieved. He emphasised on the need of having Indian missions on ground and not just having one Embassy in charge of many countries. And, by observing the actions and presence of PICs in multilateral and regional forums, and by engaging with them, India can learn from the PICs and other actors there and apply those lessons in the Indian Ocean Region. Lastly, he said that India has a rising profile but its credibility of what it is doing, in terms of the delivery of their commitment is at stake, and sometimes it is rather better to not do anything than to do something badly.

Dr. Stuti Banerjee

Dr. Banerjee congratulated Ms. Pandalai on the presentation of her paper. She suggested that the material of her paper be split into two parts, one focusing on the larger geopolitics of the Pacific Islands Region and the other on India’s outreach and engagement with the PICs. She remarked upon the timely nature of this paper. According to her, this region is not well known and thus it is important to talk about this, and this paper is a nice way to begin research on this region, which is important to understand. She drew everyone’s attention to the fact that there are differing visions of Indo-Pacific for different countries, and China rejects the notion of Indo-Pacific altogether. Unlike for other powers that have been discussed, for China, the PICs are an independent region of their own, are not a part of a larger geopolitical narrative, thus it has a different strategy for the region. India, on the other hand has advantage in the region due to two factors, its non-threatening image and the Indian diaspora. Despite the distance, the PICs are important for India because of economic reasons – financial assistance, developmental projects and so on. She suggested that we should also look into how this region is important from a political and security angle and have a holistic strategic vision.

She also brought out the crucial question of why there was a vacuum created in this region until recently, due to the pull-out and lack of engagement of the US, Australia and New Zealand since the end of Cold War. Dr. Banerjee also emphasised the need to investigate New Zealand’s outlook to the PICs – since that will highlight the differences in approach within the allied nations. At this juncture, she also mentioned the contribution of Indian diaspora in the region, and the role played by soft power aspects like people-to-people engagement and cultural relations in India’s outreach to the region. She then suggested that we also should look into the way PICs are responding to the attention they are receiving and how they plan to leverage that, what do they want and finally what do they expect from India?

She highlighted that it is important to note that there are differences between the PICs themselves and they have different perspectives. Responses of civil society in the PICs to BRI/Chinese presence and actions of other countries is another aspect that needs to be investigated, according to Dr. Banerjee. Lastly, she wanted to know how India is leveraging this strategic focus and its contributions made in multiple sectors in the region? She also asked about India’s underlying interests for being part of these developmental projects – and whether this could eventually lead to PICs collaborating with India in the Indian Ocean Region.

Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh

Dr. Singh congratulated Ms. Pandalai and commented that it was a good paper with a good topic. He suggested that the paper should not be split and should be made into a monograph. He also suggested that there should be a more sharp and in-depth focus on the historical part, especially on patterns of colonialism. According to him, when talking about ‘return to geopolitics’ in the region, we need to focus first on security, economics, environmental issues and debates; the PICs’ interests and demands, like the case of nuclear weapons and then we should come to geopolitics. He thought that there could have been more investigation done on analysing ways in which India could possibly expand its presence, rather than getting restricted to the difficulties and challenges. 

Dr. Tenjemeren Ao

Dr. Ao congratulated Ms. Pandalai for her crisp paper. He thought that the paper could be divided into different sections and the last section had a lot of scope. For him, this paper could be seen as a primer towards understanding India’s evolving engagement with the PICs. He also commended the way Ms. Pandalai analysed the role played by internal and external actors in shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape, in the larger Indo-Pacific. Dr. Ao brought out two major points. First, he commended the realistic approach taken in acknowledging India’s limitations and expectations from the PICs, while the priority for India is its extended neighbourhood. So therefore, it is paramount for India to come up with innovative ways to navigate its resources between the PICs and its extended neighbourhood. He concluded his remarks by highlighting that this region has a complex history and its internal political, economic, strategic imperatives are intertwined and are shaping PICs’ external engagement. The special focus on challenges faced by these countries like climate change and health can help us understand why these countries are engaging with specific powers. He also mentioned that the Pacific Islands’ Forum (PIF) has also identified climate change as the greatest threat for PICs and not geopolitical contestation. And that the PIF could derive some lessons from ASEAN in terms of managing to limit jostling of major powers.

Questions and Comments

There were some comments from the audience. One important comment, highlighted that from the naval side, the Pacific Islands are an important region for protecting the Sea Lines of Communication and the location of the Pacific makes it critical for both Australia and the US and Chinese control can severely restrict their movement. Another comment was focused on the recent elections in New Caledonia and the speculation about French interference. Questions centred around the reasons for India to engage with PICs and what would be the optimal strategy for India to engage with the region.

Ms. Shruti Pandalai thanked the Chair, the Discussants and the audience for their valuable feedback. She responded to the comments and mentioned that her objective was to understand this region through strategic narratives and what India as a leader of the Global South has done and can do with respect to this region.

Report prepared by Ms. Yukti Panwar, Research Intern, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, MP-IDSA.

Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Senior Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will speak on “Developments in Pakistan: The Pre-election Scenario” at the Monday Morning Meeting which will be held on 1 January 2024 at 10 AM. The venue is Seminar Hall I, Second Floor.

Ms. Sneha M, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will be the moderator.

Mr. Shailendra, Intern, will be the rapporteur.

A military delegation from the Joint Command and Staff College of Oman, led by Col. Mohammed Al-Mashaikhi, visited the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) on November 21, 2023. During this engagement, Director General Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy provided an insightful presentation detailing the establishment and structure of the Institute.

Established in 1965, MP-IDSA operates as an independent entity supported by the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Its governance is overseen by the Executive Council, traditionally presided over by the Defence Minister of India. Amb. Chinoy highlighted the diverse spectrum of research initiatives undertaken by the Institute's various Centres, shedding light on key issues and areas of research by the scholars. Emphasising MP-IDSA's contributions, he mentioned significant publications, specifying two esteemed peer-reviewed research journals: Strategic Analysis and Journal of Defence Studies.

Amb. Chinoy also briefed the delegation about the multifaceted bilateral relationship between India and Oman including defence, security, infrastructure, education, energy and power sectors. He stated that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Sultanate of Oman in 2018 has contributed to further strengthening the bilateral relationship between the two countries. The special friendship of India with Oman was also visible through the Indian invitation to Oman as a Guest Country in India’s G20 Summit. Amb. Chinoy also emphasised the strategic importance of Oman for India.

Both countries have conducted several joint military exercises such as the Air exercise “Eastern Bridge” and the joint Army exercise called Al Najah. He mentioned that Oman is one of the few countries with which India conducts joint military exercises with all the three wings of the defence forces. He also highlighted the participation of Omani officers in the ITEC programme with 125 slots in India and the presence of a large Indian diaspora community in Oman among others.

Amb. Chinoy noted that India is among Oman’s top trading partners. Bilateral trade between the two countries stands at around US$ 12. 38 billion in 2022-23. It has more than doubled in the last few years. In 2020-21 total trade was US$ 5.44 billion. India remained the 2nd largest market for Oman’s crude oil in 2022.

Discussion

The following key issues and suggestions were discussed by the members of the Omani delegation and scholars of MP-IDSA during the meeting:

1. India-Oman Security Cooperation: The scope for security cooperation between India and Oman is extensive, given their shared commitment to regional stability and counterterrorism efforts. Both countries can collaborate on intelligence-sharing, joint military exercises and maritime security initiatives to address the common security threats in the Arabian Sea. Enhanced defence ties can include the exchange of expertise in counterinsurgency operations, cybersecurity and disaster management. Also, joint efforts in capacity-building, military training programs and strategic dialogues can contribute to a robust security framework, ensuring the safeguarding of shared interests and promoting peace and stability in the region.

   Oman, strategically positioned at the southeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, has a vast and significant maritime domain. With a coastline stretching over 1,700 kilometres along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, Oman plays a pivotal role in the geopolitics of the region. The country’s maritime space encompasses critical sea lanes, making it a key player in global maritime trade. It was suggested that the maritime cooperation between India and Oman should be further expanded. Strengthening maritime connectivity can facilitate smoother trade routes and boost bilateral relations. Additionally, the development of ports and shipping infrastructure through mutual cooperation can enhance both countries’ capabilities in handling goods and services, thereby fostering economic growth.

2. Expanding Al-Najah Exercise: The Al-Najah is a joint military exercise which aims to enhance the level of defence cooperation between the Indian Army and the Royal Army of Oman, thereby enhancing the bilateral relations between the two nations. The scope of the exercise includes professional interaction, mutual understanding of drills and procedures, establishment of joint command and control structures and elimination of terrorist threats. In the discussion, it was suggested that Al-Najah exercises could be expanded into a joint tri-services exercise, bringing in personnel from the Navy and Air Force as well.

3. Cooperation in the Defence Industrial Sector: There exists a significant avenue for bilateral collaboration in the defence industrial sector for both India and Oman that needs to be explored further. The potential for synergy between the two nations in this domain is highly promising and holds the prospect of yielding mutually advantageous outcomes. Moreover, the establishment of exchange programmes for defence personnel, technical experts and engineers can serve as platforms for the exchange of expertise and skill sets, further strengthening defence and security cooperation between the two countries.

4. Research on Water Security: A member of the Omani delegation stated that there is scope for research collaboration between the Middle East Desalination Research Centre (MEDRC) and MP-IDSA in the field of water security. Founded in 1996 as a component of the Middle East Peace Process, the MEDRC is an international organisation that addresses freshwater scarcity issues. Situated in Muscat, the organisation is tasked with conducting research, providing training, fostering development cooperation and overseeing transboundary water projects – all aimed at finding solutions to the challenges posed by limited freshwater resources. There are good prospects for collaboration, which may be further discussed based on mutual understanding.

5. Joint Research and Exchange of Scholars: The meeting explored the potential for collaborative research endeavours and the exchange of scholars between MP-IDSA and counterparts from Oman, aiming to deepen mutual comprehension of pertinent bilateral issues. Amb. Chinoy highlighted MP-IDSA's recent engagement with two African Fellows, underscoring the success of such academic collaborations. Extending a similar initiative to involve scholars from Oman was proposed as a strategic step towards fostering stronger ties and shared research initiatives between the two countries.

Report was prepared by Mr. Abhishek Yadav, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA.

On 13 November 2023, Dr. Rajiv Nayan of the Nuclear and Arms Control Centre delivered a talk during the Monday Morning Meeting on ““America’s Strategic Posture”: An Analysis (Report of the US Congressional Commission Released in October 2023)”. The meeting was chaired by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R K Narang, VM (Retd), Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

The Report on “America’s Strategic Posture” is intended to provide a bipartisan assessment of the United States strategic posture, and offers a glimpse of its nuclear strategy, even though its recommendations are not binding on the US Government and armed forces. The current report (issued October 2023) is especially significant, as it not only elevates China to the level of a peer competitor, but also envisages a tripolar deterrence scheme where the US and its allies may have to deter (or combat) two nuclear-armed states in the form of China and Russia. The report is also significant because it seems to abandon the US’ diplomatic commitments to nuclear disarmament and arms control, while strongly suggesting a build-up of US nuclear forces and arms in response to perceived threats from the two powers mentioned above. Dr. Rajiv Nayan’s talk shines a light on the evolution of the US’ nuclear doctrine contained within the report, and discusses its implications for regional and global security.

Detailed Report

The meeting was called to order by the Chair, Gp. Capt. Narang, who introduced the Speaker and delivered short introductory remarks on the topic under discussion. He introduced to the audience the structure of the United States Congressional Commission that drafted the report, the nodal agencies involved in its formulation as well as the wide scope of the commission’s deliberations. He then invited the Speaker to address the audience.

Dr. Nayan commenced his talk by providing an overview of the report entitled “America’s Strategic Structure”, the second edition of which was issued in October 2023 after a hiatus of 14 years. He informed the audience that the report aims to provide bipartisan assessments on the US’ long-term strategic posture, and gave a brief overview of the 131 findings and 81 recommendations mentioned in the 2023 report. He then compared the table of contents of both the 2009 and 2023 editions in order to give a bird’s-eye view of the key issues taken up in the report.

Dr. Nayan proceeded to give a brief introduction to the rationale of the report, which according to him entailed reviewing existing policy, assessing factors affecting strategic stability and offering non-partisan assessment of the overall scenario. To accomplish this, the Commission adopted a methodology of meetings with US policymakers, allies and partners and non-governmental experts, classified presentations by members of the intelligence community, field trips to classified locations and referencing from public-domain documents issued by the Pentagon and others.

Next, the Speaker introduced some of the definitions the study provides in order to clarify the subject. He discussed in some detail the concepts of strategy, strategic posture and strategic stability in particular, and questioned the meanings and significance of these, given that some terms, especially strategic stability are contested in nature. He then moved to the definition of what the report refers to as the “US-led international order”, and how it defines military conflict and disruption by “authoritarian” regimes such as China and Russia as the key external variables impacting US vital interests.

The Speaker then discussed the findings of the report, which he assessed as being quite pessimistic in nature. In particular, he called attention to the touting of a “whole-of-government” approach to strategic security, as well as the recognition that major power conflict in today’s era can easily lead to nuclear conflict, which will be a catastrophic outcome. He further noted the report’s recognition that future wars are likely to be very expensive for all parties involved.

Next, the Speaker discussed the report’s discussion of Russia’s nuclear modernisation. The report assessed that Russia would retain the world’s largest nuclear arsenal till 2035, and remained pessimistic on bilateral arms control agreements as it blamed Russia for violation of several agreements such as New START. The report also discussed the conventional capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, and noted their willingness to take huge losses as seen in Ukraine.

After Russia, Dr. Nayan discussed the report’s treatment of China. Here he urged the audience to pay particular attention to the upgradation of the China ‘threat’ to that of a ‘peer’, marking a significant escalation. The report assessed China’s nuclear arsenal as on track to achieve quantitative parity with the US by the 2030s, and rated highly, the conventional capacity of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Dr. Nayan also drew attention to the report’s claim that a new nuclear test in China’s Lop Nor testing facility could be in the offing. Thus, the report concluded, the cost of inaction over Taiwan may weigh heavily on the US, as it would become easier for the Chinese to take and keep Taiwan with such nuclear cover as its expanded arsenal could provide.

Dr. Nayan also introduced briefly the report’s discussion of “non-peer” nuclear powers such as North Korea and Iran, before introducing the geopolitical outlook. Here he introduced one of the key takeaways of the report, its vision of a “tripolar deterrence” mechanism, by which the US and its allies may have to deter two peer competitors (China and Russia) at the same time, as well as non-peer actors such as North Korea and Iran. This, the report argues, is something the US and its allies are not yet prepared for, and thus there is a need to adjust the US’ strategic posture. The Commission’s majority-proposed solution, as reflected in the report, is to increase the nuclear stockpile across the board while adapting the nuclear doctrine to what is called the “modern triad”. This is envisaged as having a dedicated sea, air and land leg each, which is necessary to “ride-out” (i.e. survive) a pre-emptive enemy strike while “launching under attack” (i.e. firing nuclear weapons before they are destroyed). The commission also recommends in the report that the President be given “low-yield” (i.e. tactical/theatre nuclear weapons) options in case of an attack.

After this Dr. Nayan introduced the report’s critical view of the state of nuclear industries in the US, and the recommendation for a top-to-bottom overhaul of said industries in order to prevent technological leakage while preserving optimum performance. He also noted the report’s silence on India and several other countries in the report, as well as the relative de-emphasising of strategic risk reduction and disarmament. He finally offered his own assessment, in which he noted that the report seemed to point to the concern of many lawmakers within the US regarding its vulnerability to strategic surprises (for example, Pearl Harbour, 9/11 and the end of the Cold War), which led to the report’s dismissal of disarmament as a realistic policy, ramping up of a security-centric narrative where peer states again become a core focus, the re-introduction of theatre nuclear weapons, and the provision of doctrinal clarity.

After the conclusion of the Speaker’s talk, the Chair made a few remarks in summary and opened the floor for questions.

Questions and Answers

Mr. Arvind Khare, Research Fellow, Defence Economics and Industry Centre asked whether the US reflection on its role in Afghanistan and Vietnam informed the report’s emphasis on ‘viable opportunities’ to engage US forces, and whether the report had a tutelary function. To the first question, the Speaker replied that the report was not reflecting on Afghanistan and terror in general, as the latter has been completely neglected. To the latter point, he replied that the report is intended not to educate, but to generate debate among the strategic community, while signalling to other countries the US’ vital interests as well.

Capt. Anurag Bisen, Research Fellow, Non-Traditional Security Centre, asked whether the report envisaged dismantling the US’ land-based stockpile of obsolete missiles, and whether the US strategy emphasised counter-base or counter-population strikes more. To this the Speaker replied that the current report does not intend to dismantle the triad, but rather to upgrade them. To the latter question, he noted that the report explicitly is against counter-value strikes for its targeting strategy, though in a nuclear conflict it may be difficult to differentiate civilians and military personnel.

Ms. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed, Research Analyst, Defence Economics and Industry Centre, inquired about tripolar deterrence and its redressal. The Speaker answered by affirming that the fear of tripolar deterrence (with two peers in China and Russia and a non-peer power such as North Korea and Iran) existed throughout the report, but dismissed Iran’s significance as a nuclear threat, while also denying North Korea’s seriousness in actually seeking nuclear conflict with the US. Thus the focus was more on the peer rivals.

With the conclusion of Q&A, the chair gave his closing remarks and brought an end to the meeting.

This report was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, Research Analyst, East Asia Centre.