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Report of Monday Morning Meeting on “Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to Europe: An Analysis” May 09, 2022 1000 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Ms. Anandita Bhada, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA spoke on the topic “Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to Europe: An Analysis” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 9 May 2022. The meeting was moderated by Dr. Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA. 

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute participated in the meeting.

Executive Summary

On his first visit abroad after the COVIC Pandemic, Prime Minister Modi decided to travel to Europe. The trip included visits to Germany, Denmark and France at a time when a significant shift is underway in the European security paradigm. The Prime Minister’s visit can also be seen as India reciprocating recent visits from European leaders to India. The Prime Minister's visits ensured that many important agreements were signed and future cooperation was discussed.   

Detailed Report

The Monday morning meeting began with Dr. Swasti Rao giving a background description of the Prime Minister's visit to Europe which included Germany, Denmark and France. She stressed on the importance of the visit which concluded with a wide array of agreements in emerging areas of green energy cooperation. The success of the various visits were underscored with the signing of a number of agreements in important fields. She lay emphasis on the timing of the visit wherein Europe is undergoing a paradigm shift in its security architecture. She concluded her remarks by highlighting the European stance towards India which is now seen through a positive lens.  Europe which was until recently criticising India for its neutral position towards the Russia- Ukraine war, now sees India as an important friend and an important global player.

Ms Anandita Bhada, the Speaker, at the outset, focused on the timing of the visit, particularly with the crisis in Ukraine and the recent visits from various European leaders and delegations.

She highlighted that this visit was happening at a time when there is increased European interest in the Indo-Pacific. The common topics of deliberation in all three visits have been the Indo-Pacific, the Russia-Ukraine Crisis, the green initiatives due to the energy crisis and the reaching out to the Indian Diaspora within the three countries.

Germany and India have recently completed seventy years of diplomatic relations and Germany is India's largest trading partner in Europe. There are 1700 German companies active in India providing 4 lakh jobs. These companies contribute to the ‘Make in India’ initiative and ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’. The large Indian Diaspora is also making strides in contributing to India's relations with Germany. This also happened to be the Prime Minister's first visit with the newly elected Chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz.

The main focus of the visit was the sixth India-Germany Inter-Governmental Consultations. The major themes discussed included a green and sustainable future, growth and resilience and an open and peaceful Indo-Pacific. A total of nine agreements were signed between the two countries which include Indo- German Partnership on Green and Sustainable Development and Development Cooperation on Renewable Energy Partnership.

The next visit was to Denmark, with which India’s bilateral trade has increased from 2.8 billion dollars in 2016 to 5 billion dollars in 2021. Around 200 Danish firms investing in India in various areas like shipping, renewable energy and agriculture and the setup of manufacturing facilities under the ‘Make in India’ initiative; have given a boost to the relationship.

The main focus of the visit was on the three ‘T’s; trade, technology and talent. In the trade section, the Prime Minister addressed the India-Denmark Business Forum to attract more Danish investment. On technology, the focus was on ‘green technology’ which focused on the agreement of the Joint Science and Technology Committee, reached in January 2022. This agreement's main focus is on joint research on green fuels, especially hydrogen. On talent, the main focus was on the exchange of talent between the Indian Diaspora in Denmark and Danish companies in India. Denmark also assured India of its support for its bid for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent membership. India reciprocated with its assurance and support to Denmark in its quest for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC. There were nine agreements signed with Denmark which included the Launch of Energy Policy Dialogue at the Ministerial level and the Letter of Intent on Centre of Excellence in Green Shipping.

Another important part of the Denmark visit was the 2nd India- Nordic Summit. The Nordic countries only share this format with the United States apart from India. The main focus of this summit was cooperation in the field of climate change, innovation, digitalisation and green growth. The Prime Minister invited the Nordic countries to invest in the blue economy and digitalisation in India. There were also individual meetings with the various heads of states with a focus on certain issues blue economy, arctic, and information technology.

The final leg of the Prime Minister’s Europe visit was to France. The re-election of Emmanuel Macron meant a return of a continued French foreign policy including the French engagement in the Indo-Pacific. France also holds the Presidency of the European Council; therefore, Macron’s return re-enforces prior plans concerning the steering of the European Union as well. France is also an important defence ally for India with which it conducts joint defence exercises. The alliance also focuses on Indian diversification, co-designing and co-production of defence equipment.

The main theme of this meeting was the Indo-Pacific, Ukraine, clean energy and sustainable development. The two nations have been Strategic Partners since 1998 and with regard to the Indo-Pacific, they are both committed to a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. France is looking to work with India in third countries in the Western Indian Ocean. There were also discussions on various topics ranging from space, trade, defence, green energy, cyber security and food security.

In the conclusion, the Speaker stated the need for sustained enthusiasm in Europe’s engagement with India and vice versa.  India’s defence cooperation with Europe needs to go beyond the buyer-seller relationship and aim for transfer of technology. India also needs to convey to its western partners that India’s relations with Russia are based on its national interest. The speaker ended her presentation by stating that India-Europe relations have a long way to go.  

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA stated that the United Nations Security Council's recent statements which have avoided mention of  words like ‘conflict’ and ‘invasion’ show that India’s neutral stance on the same since the beginning is finding more legitimacy at the international level. The statement is reminiscent of India's consistent stand concerning the conflict. UN’s position also sits well with the Europeans and has eased some of the pressures between India- Europe relations. He also stated that the Europeans are reaching out to India in their individual capacity as well and not limiting their outreach within the EU framework only.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA brought out India's Arctic Policy while discussing the Nordic states. He asked whether the Arctic Council figured in India’s discussion with the Nordic states.

The second question was on the Indo-Pacific and the Western Indian Ocean region. The French and European Union views are not aligned with the views of the United States and United Kingdom as is apparent from the AUKUS deal. The Speaker was asked about the evolving engagement of leading European nations towards a combined enhanced strategic engagement in the Indian Ocean Region.

Ms. Anandita Bhada, the Speaker, gave detailed and insightful replies in response to comments and questions received from the participants.

The Report was prepared by Mr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Europe and Eurasia Europe
Talk by H.E. Sidikov Furkat Ahmedovich on "30 Years of India-Uzbekistan Ties: Multifaceted Cooperation based on Shared Past and Bright Future” May 10, 2022 1530-1630 hrs Talk

Talk by H.E. Sidikov Furkat Ahmedovich, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Topic: 30 Years of India-Uzbekistan Ties: Multifaceted Cooperation based on Shared Past and Bright Future

Welcome and Opening Address By Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy

Eurasia & West Asia
Report of Monday Morning Meeting on Withdrawal of French Troops from Mali: Implications and Challenges May 02, 2022 1000 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Event Report

Ms. Sindhu Dinesh, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, spoke on “Withdrawal of French Troops from Mali: Implications and Challenges” at the Monday Morning Meeting which was held on 02 May 2022 at 10 AM in the Auditorium. The session was moderated by Ms. Ruchita Beri, Senior Research Associate and Centre Coordinator, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean, and United Nations (ALACUN) Centre, MP-IDSA. The Director-General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and all scholars of MP-IDSA were in attendance.

Executive Summary

In February 2022, France and its allies announced a coordinated withdrawal of their forces from Mali due to multiple obstructions by the military-led government. The talk shed light on the various dimensions, implications, and challenges of this move. The speaker highlighted the political, economic, and security developments in Mali, while also outlining the role of international actors in the region and underscoring the origins of French involvement in Mali, and discussing the ramifications of its withdrawal. The implications of the withdrawal on the G-5 Sahel countries, particularly as it pertained to security, were also underscored. India’s cooperation with France in Africa was discussed, along with France’s internal political and economic motivations behind the withdrawal.

Detailed Report

Ms. Ruchita Beri opened the session by underlining the growing unpopularity of the French presence in Francophone countries. With this observation, she invited Ms. Dinesh to make her presentation. Ms. Dinesh’s talk covered the implications and challenges of the withdrawal of French troops from Mali and its impact on the neighboring countries. She began her presentation by highlighting the political, economic, and security developments in Mali, including the coups, terrorist activities, prevailing poverty, and communal violence. She drew the audience’s attention to the fact that a rise in insurgent activity in northern Mali and the government’s inability to quell it led to a coup in 2012. Fearing an entrenchment of such activities in the central and southern regions, the interim government of Mali requested France’s aid in counter-terrorism, leading to Operation Serval and France’s arrival in the country in 2013. In 2020, another coup was led by Colonel Assimi Goïta against the government and in May 2021—in what the speaker said is referred to as ‘a coup within a coup’—Col. Goïta seized power and President Ndaw and Prime Minister Ouane were detained. This was the immediate political context of France’s decision to reduce its troops and later withdraw. Ms. Dinesh gave an economic overview, outlining Mali’s poverty and dependence on oil imports. She also noted that the growth of local terrorist outfits, communal violence between the herding and farming communities, drug trafficking, and other organised crimes have given rise to a complex security climate. She also provided a comprehensive overview of the activities of international bodies such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (UN MINUSMA), European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali, and European Union Training Mission in Mali.

Talking about the inception and triggers of Operation Serval, Ms. Dinesh called attention to France’s moral obligation to look after its formal colonies. She also mentioned the success of Operation Serval in pushing back rebels to the northern part, giving rise to Operation Barkhane focused on counter-terrorism operations in the region, which although has eliminated the top leadership of several terrorist outfits and neutralised insurgents, has had limited success as the security threats in Mali have only increased. Ms. Dinesh pointed out that, after the May 2021 coup France refused to work with an unconstitutional government and President Macron announced a reduction of troops deployed to Mali. In February of 2022, France and its allies (part of Takuba Task Force) announced a coordinated withdrawal of their forces due to ‘multiple obstructions’ by the military-led government. In addition to this, a delay in elections and deterioration of bilateral ties also motivated France’s withdrawal. The speaker also shed light on the entry of new actors such as a Russian paramilitary organisation, the Wagner Group, into Mali. According to the government, the purpose of the Wagner Group is to train the armed forces of Mali but this reasoning is met with skepticism by the West. 

Ms. Dinesh outlined the internal as well as the external implications of the withdrawal. According to her, the withdrawal has immediate security consequences in both of these realms. It will open Mali to a potential increase in terrorist activities and an escalation of its security crisis. However, with the exit of foreign presence, it remains to be seen whether the insurgent and jihadist groups would now engage in talks with the Malian authorities. It will also impact the operation of MINUSMA, which is heavily dependent on France’s air support, and is not mandated to deal with counter-terrorist operations. The withdrawal also accelerates the challenges to development and humanitarian efforts extended to the nation. In the external domain, France’s withdrawal, according to Ms. Dinesh, poses concerns about the rise of transnational terrorist attacks in the region and a very real threat to countries south of the Sahel which may witness a spillover of jihadist terrorism. At the same time, she also brings to the audience’s attention the fact that the troops have not withdrawn from the entire region but only Mali.

Ms. Dinesh concluded by highlighting the possibility of the emergence of a security vacuum after France’s exit, along with Russian involvement in the region. She urged that the region is in need of a streamlined international effort, particularly a people and government-centric one, focused on the empowerment of the government apparatus and civil society.

After the conclusion of Ms. Dinesh’s presentation, Ms. Beri opened the floor for questions and discussion. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy complimented the speaker for a comprehensive presentation and also commented that care must be taken while assessing strategic partnerships with former colonial powers. Ms. Beri agreed with Ambassador Chinoy’s comments. Questions were raised on the extent of the success of the Russian Wagner Group in Mali. Underlining that Russia is Africa’s biggest arms supplier at the moment, Ms. Beri added that it is only natural that Russia would want to increase its presence in Mali. It remains to be seen as to how successful it is in dealing with the prevailing challenges.  

Some questions from the audience focused on France’s economic ambitions behind its involvement in Mali. France’s internal politics and economy were also discussed in this context. Questions were also asked about the reaction of neighboring countries to France’s withdrawal. In response, Ms. Dinesh outlined the rise of concerns in the region regarding the containment of terrorism, a potential increase in defense spending, and escalation of anxieties regarding migration. India’s cooperation with France, as well as Mali, was also discussed. The session was concluded by Ms. Beri with an acknowledgment of the fact that France is only withdrawing from Mali and still continues operations in other countries in the region, along with a comment on India-Mali relations and the future of Mali.

This report has been prepared by Ms. Halima Z. Ansari, Intern, MP-IDSA.

Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN
Report of Monday Morning Meeting on “Developments in Pakistan Since the Fall of the Imran Government” April 25, 2022 1000 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Event Report

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a talk on “Developments in Pakistan Since the Fall of the Imran Government” by Senior Fellow, Dr. Ashok K. Behuria at MP-IDSA on 25 April 2022, at 10AM in Seminar Hall I. Dr. Nazir Ahmad Mir, Research Assistant at MP-IDSA was the moderator. The talk was attended by all scholars at MP-IDSA.

Executive Summary

Imran tried his best to retain power by all means and resorted to undemocratic means to deny his opponents any chance of coming to power. However, he could not stop the trust vote and had to leave office after losing the vote. Despite all this, he retains his popularity and might well come back to power in the next elections. The army might have stayed neutral in the current political scenario but is unlikely to quit on Imran Khan. Shehbaz Sharif may find it difficult to steer his government through the economic crisis and the political snares he is faced with given the political opportunism being displayed by his coalition partners. Whosoever comes to power in the next elections is not likely to reverse Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir and India, which is largely being dictated by the military establishment in Pakistan.

Detailed Report

The talk by Dr. Behuria drew attention to Imran’s rallies after he lost the trust vote in the National Assembly and said that the large crowds that he had managed to attract in Peshawar, Karachi and Lahore indicated that Imran Khan continued to be popular among the people of Pakistan. During the rallies, he said that the Judiciary, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the powers-that-be (the deep state) had a role in his ouster. He stuck to his allegation of foreign conspiracy (meaning the US) resulting in the defections from his coalition and tabling of the no trust motion against him leading to the fall of his government and demanded early elections to get rid of the ‘imported’ government of Shehbaz Sharif.

Dr. Behuria pointed out that the recent National Security Committee meeting as well as the previous one disagreed with Imran’s allegations and held that there was no conspiracy afoot to oust Imran. He said that Imran Khan might have been outvoted in the national assembly but it is too early to count him out of the Pakistani political calculus, which was also acknowledged by the army chief in his closed door address to the army veterans a few days after the new government was sworn in.

Asked about the prospects of the Shehbaz Sharif Government, Dr. Behuria held that he was heading a messy coalition where the constituent parties were pulling in different directions and it would be difficult to hold them together for long. He also said that the new government had assumed office at a very difficult time when the country was facing an economic crisis and in order to avail of the loan from IMF, Shehbaz would have to take unpopular decisions which would turn the people against him and indirectly boost Imran’s electoral prospects further.

He was of the opinion that if the elections were to be delayed till 2023, when the term of the present National Assembly would end, the anti-incumbency factor might kick in to the benefit of Imran and the latter could even get majority. Therefore, the army would, in all probability, play it safe and wait it out rather than betting on any one of the parties at the moment. He indicated nonetheless that sections within the army might be backing Imran even today while the top echelons might be playing neutral, because Imran, the maverick that he is, had apparently gone against their wishes and visited Russia at an inappropriate time and had unnecessarily jeopardised Pakistan’s relations with the US.

Talking about the impact on India, Dr. Behuria said that the ground reality would suggest that the new government as well as the government that would follow it after the elections might not be able to change the direction of Pakistan’s policy towards India, which was being decided by the military of Pakistan. He also indicated that there was an overemphasis on resolution of Kashmir issue through United Nations resolutions and the Pakistani establishment knew fully well that it was a red herring for India. Therefore, there was no possibility of any fruitful engagement between the two countries beyond exchange of courtesy messages indicating mutual desire for peace and normalisation.

During the talk, Dr. Behuria also drew attention to the Information Warfare being waged by Pakistan and held that the Indian response has not been that effective in neutralising the spurious narratives on Kashmir and Indian democracy being spread by Pakistan. The Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, expanded on this point and said that Pakistan was likely to resort to international propaganda in the days to come. Dwelling on the implications of all this on Kashmir, Dr. Behuria said that Pakistan had been trying to divert the attention of some of the constituents of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) towards Kashmir, but given the pressures on Pakistan on account of the Financial Action Task Force, it might find it difficult to launch them as a separate terrorist group especially when TTP-splinter groups might not agree to operate under other Kashmir-focused jihadi groups sponsored by Pakistan.

In the Q&A session, Dr. Behuria, responding to queries, indicated that the Pakistani narrative on Kashmir had been more popular than the Indian narrative and there was a need for India to expose Pakistan’s terror strategy and its disinclination for constructive dialogue with India.

The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, who had returned from a weeklong stay in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir said that situation in Kashmir was not in favor of Pakistan. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA said that Information Warfare is something where a lot of attention has to be paid by everyone which includes different branches of the government.

The Report has been prepared by Mr. Jay Desai, Intern, MP-IDSA.

South Asia
Report of Monday Morning Meeting on “India-US 2+2 Dialogue: Bolstering the Strategic Partnership” April 18, 2022 1030 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Priyanka Singh, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, spoke on “India-US 2+2 Dialogue: Bolstering the Strategic Partnership” at the Monday Morning Meeting which was held on 18 April 2022 at 1000hrs in the Seminar Hall I. Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA chaired the session with Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director-General, Manohar Parrikar IDSA and scholars of the institute being in attendance.

Executive Summary

The India-US 2+2 Dialogue in the broader context of the India-US relationship was analysed at the meeting. The trajectory of the India-US 2+2 Dialogue since September 2018 was analysed briefly. The India-US bilateral relationship from Cold-War ideological divisions and divergent priorities to mutually beneficial strategic ties, including in the realm of defence domain was traced. It was concluded that given India’s balanced position in international affairs, the country could get the best out of the US by optimising convergences and minimising differences. India could do this by further extending its reach in the South Asian region and shielding its strategic autonomy.

Detailed Report

Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh opened the session by posing a question regarding the convergences and divergences in the India-US relationship. According to him, India’s position on the Ukraine crisis was a major divergence in the discussion. However, the candid discussion between India and the US, followed by one of the longest joint statements, indicated the robustness of the relationship. With this observation, the Chair invited Dr. Priyanka Singh to make her presentation. Dr. Singh put the India-US 2+2 Dialogue in perspective by giving a brief background of India’s 2+2 engagements with the countries concerned, including the US. She drew the audience's attention to the fact that India had 2+2 arrangements with all the Quad members and Russia. The speaker presented a brief trajectory of the India-US 2+2 Dialogue since September 2018, when the first such meeting took place. She touched upon the issue of India signing the US defence foundational pacts and India-US cooperation under the Indo-Pacific framework. Dr. Singh called the 2+2 dialogue a platform that nurtures bilateral cohesion and provides an opportunity to amalgamate the issues concerning the two sides in the realm of defence, security, and intelligence sharing. According to her, the 2+2 platform provides a personalised interface for strengthening the bilateral relationship by moving forward on specific issues of mutual interests while weeding out the differences.

Commenting on the 2+2 Dialogue that was held on 11 April 2022 in Washington DC in the presence of Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken and Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J. Austin III from the US side and Minister of External Affairs (EAM), S. Jaishankar and Raksha Mantri, Rajnath Singh from the Indian side, the speaker referred to the statement by the Ministry of External Affairs, India, which had positioned the dialogue as a forum to further consolidate the bilateral relationship between India and the US. The speaker also highlighted Raksha Mantri, Rajnath Singh’s visit to the Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) based in Hawaii. Further, Dr. Singh presented key developments that had taken place in the run-up to the 2+2 Dialogue. She mentioned the meeting between Foreign Secretary of India, Harsh Vardhan Shringla and the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria Nuland as a part of a diplomatic exercise undertaken by the US with the countries that had taken a neutral stance at the United Nations (UN) vis-à-vis the Ukraine crisis. The speaker also referred to the controversial statement by the US Deputy National Security Advisor, Daleep Singh during his India visit where he had warned countries trying to circumvent American sanctions against Russia. Further, Donald Lu, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, had referred to the 2+2 Dialogue as a health check of the India-US strategic partnership. Moreover, President Biden had termed India as a ‘shaky ally’ amongst the Quad countries. Thus, there were a series of critical statements regarding India from the US’ top political echelon before the 2+2 Dialogue.

Apart from the statements, the 2+2 Dialogue was preceded by important geopolitical events in the region such as the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, India’s cautious position on the Ukraine crisis, and the rupture in the US-Pakistan relationship. Thus, the 2+2 Dialogue was an attempt to find a way to accommodate the varying priorities of India and the US that would resurrect confidence in the bilateral relationship. Emphasising the importance of the Dialogue, Dr. Singh observed that the 2+2 Dialogue was prefaced by a virtual meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Biden, which showed the strategic importance accorded by both sides to the Dialogue. The joint statement released after the 2+2 Dialogue prominently mentioned Global Partnership and Indo-Pacific Cooperation; Mutual Prosperity, Innovation, and Resilient Supply Chains; Climate, Environment, and Clean Energy; Science, Technology, Cybersecurity, and Space; Global Health; Defence and Security; Counterterrorism and Counter Narcotics; and Education and People-to-People Ties. Civilian deaths in Ukraine were condemned, and the cessation of hostilities was stressed on by both sides. The joint statement and presser after suggested that the US understood India’s position on issues of mutual interest. Additionally, there were efforts to augment bilateral investments, signing of a bilateral space situational awareness arrangement, expansion of ties in the cyber and space domain, promotion and review of working groups of the Quad, and a waiver from Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions for the time being. The joint statement also called on Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism from its soil.

The statement welcomed the convening of the 18th meeting of the India-US joint working group on counter-terrorism and the fourth Session of the India-U.S. Designations Dialogue in October 2021. Thus, the net result of the Dialogue was that things were back on track and the US and India decided to agree to disagree on the Ukraine crisis. The key focus of the discussion was the Indo-Pacific. Dr. Singh argued that India-US relations have moved from Cold-War ideological divisions and divergent priorities to mutually beneficial strategic ties, including in the defence domain. History and circumstances have shaped India-US relations. India-US defence cooperation dates back to 1951, when the first military agreement was signed between the two countries. Both countries participated in the joint military exercise ‘Shiksha’ way back in 1962. However, issues such as the Cold-War and the US’ stand on Kashmir did not let the relationship evolve. The root of the present synergy between the two sides goes back to 1991, before which the relationship was moving forward in an extremely cautious way under a conservative framework. In conclusion, the speaker pondered about whether the India-US relationship has already plateaued, even though the China factor might act as an adhesive? She maintained that given India’s balanced position in international affairs, the country could get the best out of the US by optimising convergences and minimising differences. India could do this by further extending its reach in the South Asian region and by shielding its strategic autonomy.

Participating in the discussion, Deputy Director-General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi complimented the speaker and asserted that India is navigating in an extremely complicated international scenario. India’s defence agreements with the US came about in a space where it helped India posture against China with a dormant Russia. Now Russia has suddenly re-emerged on the international canvas, which has made the situation extremely volatile. The Quad has no security implications as of now. India is the only intersection point in the BRICS, the RIC and the Quad. Thus, the country has to straddle both sides, balancing the competing priorities. A lot of things in the realm of India-US defence cooperation may not be in the public domain. In the security arena, the two countries have an anti-terrorism assistance programme. In the domain of technology transfer, things are moving forward positively, with Boeing announcing that Chinook chassis will be made in India. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bakshi observed that US-Pakistan relations are likely to improve. He drew attention to the fact that Pakistan had accused Afghanistan of promoting terrorism against the former. Pakistan Air Force aircraft had gone across the border to bomb the Khost province of Afghanistan. He raised the possibility of the US-Russia-India relationship turning into a zero-sum game and raised the question that if India moves closer to the US, does India have to go away from Russia? Or can India manage both relations?

Responding to the ensuing questions, Dr. Singh claimed that India does not have an option to be with either Russia or the US. India has to deal with both simultaneously. Both the US and Russia are important for India in its quest to deal with China. If one leaves Russia, it will move closer to China. Thus, the challenge before India is to strike a balance between Russia and a strategic partnership with the US. India’s stand on Ukraine is a testament of India’s balancing act. It will take time for the US to replace Russia in India’s strategic calculus, and even the US understands it. India seems to be listening to the US but not reacting so much. The priority for the regional actors is China and the Indo-Pacific. According to Dr. Singh, there is no threat to India on account of US-Pakistan relations.

Participating in the discussion, Cmde. Singh said that the US is constantly pushing back against Chinese assertiveness through regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels, although there exists a perception that the US was not doing enough. Moreover, Cmde. Singh contended that the Quad had an overt military security hand. But the Quad members purposely made efforts not to make the Quad look like an Asian NATO. However, the military-security domain remains the backbone of the Quad. Moreover, the Quad countries have enhanced security relations amongst one another in a bilateral and trilateral format. Cmde. Singh stated that Russia’s reputation had taken a hit due to the Ukraine crisis, while the perception of US decline had existed for the past 20 years. With this thought-provoking discussion, the Monday Morning Meeting came to an end.

The report was prepared by Mr. Niranjan Chandrashekhar Oak, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA.

Report of Monday Morning Webinar on The Ukraine Crisis: Africa’s Response March 21, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Ms. Ruchita Beri, Senior Research Associate and Centre Coordinator, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean and United Nations (ALACUN) Centre, MP-IDSA, spoke on “The Ukraine Crisis: Africa’s Response” at the Monday Morning Webinar held on March 21, 2022. Col. Deepak Kumar, Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA, chaired the webinar. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA, Dr. Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA and Ms. Sindhu Dinesh, Research Analyst, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA participated as panellists in the discussion. The webinar was attended by scholars of the Institute and invited members.

Executive Summary

The webinar shed light on the multiple factors shaping the response of the African countries to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis and its implications for the African continent. Ms. Ruchita Beri underscored that Africa is not a monolith but rather a continent of 54 countries, therefore a divided response would be an obvious scenario. However, considering that African countries seek to portray a united stance on international issues, it was assessed that differing national interests as well as a lack of time for the continent to discuss the matter rigorously amongst each other could have been  contributing factors for the divided response.

Delving into the underlying factors affecting the African narrative on the crisis, the voting pattern of the African nations at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was explained. The webinar focused on the predominant implications of the Russia-Ukraine crisis on Africa’s military security, energy security and food security crisis. It was observed that the Ukraine crisis posed challenges and opportunities for Africa. Other key issues that were addressed include the numerous African students stuck in Ukraine, issues of racial discrimination during the evacuation process, migration issues and Russia’s military presence in the African continent.

Detailed Report

The Chair, Col. Deepak Kumar, began the webinar by sharing introductory remarks on Russia’s ongoing special military operation against Ukraine and its aftershocks being felt across the world due to interdependent supply chains which reinforces embeddedness among nation-states. He stated that Ukraine and Russia play an important role in Africa and the Russia-Ukraine crisis has immediate as well as long-term implications on the economy and politics of the African continent. He raised concerns about the likely food shortages and humanitarian crisis in Africa as its agricultural imports from Ukraine and Russia are  impacted, about the political front due to a division among African countries as seen in their vote at the UNGA, strain on the African economies due to the current Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) sanctions on Russia, impact on security due its close military ties and agreements with Russia and finally, on energy which could be an opportunity if Africa focuses on diversifying its export choices away from China. The chair invited the Speaker to further elucidate on these issues.

Ms. Ruchita Beri, at the outset, underscored that Africa is not a monolith, the continent constitutes 54 countries and thereby naturally the response would not be uniform. She enumerated the factors shaping Africa’s response to the crisis, the African continent’s connection with Russia and Ukraine, related issues and implications of the crisis for African countries. She explained that although Africa has been seeking an integrated response on global issues, the divided response reflects disunity. Ms. Beri assessed that the divided response was evident at various stages: the African Union (AU) statement, voting on the resolution at the UNSC and the vote at the emergency session of the UNGA. The first response from the continent came from the AU, wherein the President of Senegal, the current AU Chair called for respecting international law by all parties.

Stating that the African countries in the UNSC “A3”, voted in favour of the US sponsored resolution against aggression by Russia, Ms. Beri reflected on the speech by the Kenyan UN Ambassador. The speech which focused on Kenya’s opposition to Russian action, against unilateral changing of colonial boundaries and highlighted that African countries have sought to integrate their colonial borders has been hailed as one of the best speeches in recent times. With regard to the voting pattern in the UNGA, she mentioned that 28 African countries voted for the resolution supporting Ukraine, while 17 abstained, one country, Eritrea, voted in support of Russia and the remaining eight African countries were absent from the session.

Shedding light on the factors that shaped this divided African response, Ms. Beri stated that the countries which voted in support of Ukraine share close political and military ties with Western countries as some of them have their bases in Africa. On the other hand, the countries that abstained from the vote share historically close ties with the former Soviet Union. She mentioned another factor could be that Russia has over the last few years invested in improving ties with African countries, increased its military support and is the largest weapons exporter to the continent. Additionally, racial discrimination against African students in Ukraine by not permitting them to board trains or cross the border during the evacuation process led to an outcry against Ukraine.

Ms. Beri analysed another issue, that was the faulty portrayal of African migrants by European media. Elucidating on the African narrative towards the Ukraine crisis, she remarked on the double standards of the western countries evident in the speed of their response towards conflicts in Africa vis-à-vis conflict in their region. Ms. Beri assessed that the ‘A3’ countries in UNSC – Gabon, Ghana and Kenya voted based on their own national interest and did not coordinate with the AU.

The speaker explained that the Ukraine crisis poses challenges and opportunities for the African countries. The opportunity was the likely increase in investment in natural gas and oil producing countries which could increase exports to the European markets. Ms. Beri stated that the challenges include rising prices of oil, increase in Africa’s population in urban areas whose needs are unmet by the existing agricultural produce, Africa’s dependence on import of food which is being affected and would lead to a food security crisis. On a concluding note, Ms. Beri reiterated that the position of the African countries on the Russia-Ukraine crisis was nuanced and complex. She analysed that the Ukrainian crisis could result in further marginalisation of Africa in the future.

Complimenting the speaker on her presentation, the Chair shared a few key takeaways. Col. Kumar remarked on the lack of unity in voting considering Africa is not a monolith but rather different countries with their own interests and challenges, the clear divide between African countries supporting the West and Russia, division in the western response towards African citizens vis-à-vis European citizens, opportunities for the oil producing African countries and the serious challenge of food security. He enquired about the future of Russia’s military agreements with the African countries and about military imports from Russia, and if the void in market would be filled by western countries.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) complimented the speaker for an enlightening presentation on the impact of the crisis on Africa and shared his thoughts on the repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis on the international order, commercial systems and energy supply chains. He reflected that across the world there was a divided reaction to the Ukrainian crisis and substantiated it with the remarks shared by the German Chief of Naval Staff and French Admiral during their visit to MP-IDSA. Regarding fragmentation and integration of colonial boundaries, he stated that countries in Asia too were facing reverberations of the colonial borders. Mentioning the treatment towards African students, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bakshi suggested that perhaps they could have also been allowed to enter from the Russian side and opined that Ukraine deliberately blocked the possibility in order to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.

During the Panel discussion, Dr. Rajorshi Roy observed that the geopolitical environment for Russia is currently far more hostile than it has been since 1991. He shared that considering Africa is a priority for Russia and the country is becoming an international pariah, Russia would seek support from countries with which it shares its equities including African countries. Dr. Swasti Rao shared her observations and raised queries on the reasons for not exploring the possibility of the sea-route for evacuation of Indians; and on Russia’s increased arms supply to Africa as well as its increased presence on the Southern flank of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in order to balance US dominance in the region. Ms. Sindhu Dinesh requested the speaker to share her thoughts on the role of South Africa as a mediator since President Cyril Ramaphosa had stated South Africa had been approached to mediate on the issue and US had expressed support for the same.

Ms. Beri responded to the comments and queries. With regard to Russia’s military presence and agreements with African countries she stated that Russia has a presence in Mali, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic and has emerged as an important security partner for Africa. However, there are concerns as to whether Russia would continue the same level of military presence or arms exports in the coming days. She also explained that Europe is involved in funding AU’s military operations and due to the relative lack of interest by major powers, perhaps conflicts in Africa would fester for a longer time. Ms. Beri emphasised that colonial borders have been dealt with differently in Africa from the South Asian context. She observed that since the priority for India was quick evacuation of its citizens, a sea-route was not explored due to feasibility issues of time and arrangement of a humanitarian corridor at the coast. Ms. Beri remarked that owing to South Africa’s previous experience as a successful mediator within the continent and its close ties with Russia and Ukraine, the country may be able to influence the leadership on both sides. However, the successfulness cannot be ascertained.

The Q/A session drew inputs on the reasons underlying Eritrea’s vote in support of Russia and on the options for Africa to deal with its impending food crisis especially since Russia would utilise its food supply for its own consumption during wartime. The speaker shared that Africa would seek UN Aid and made a mention of India-Africa agricultural trade, wherein African countries through export of pulses to India have helped the country enhance its food security. Ms. Beri assessed that Africa could focus on diversifying its sources of agricultural imports in the future. The Chair concluded the session by drawing attention towards three domains in Africa majorly affected by the Ukrainian crisis – security, energy opportunity and challenge and the food security crisis.

The report was prepared by Ms. Sindhu Dinesh, Research Analyst, ALACUN Centre.

Eurasia & West Asia Russia-Ukraine Relations, Ukraine
Report of Monday Morning Meeting on “Political Instability in Sri Lanka” April 11, 2022 1000 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

The Monday morning meeting on “Political Instability in Sri Lanka” was held on 11 April 2022 at 10 AM in Seminar Hall I, Second Floor. Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), Dr. Gulbin Sultana spoke on the subject and elaborated on the causes and implications of the crisis in Sri Lanka. The session was chaired by Dr. Anand Kumar, Associate Fellow South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA. Director-General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and Deputy Director-General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi shared their views. Coordinator South Asia Centre, Dr. Ashok K. Behuria also shared his views on the topic.

Executive Summary

Sri Lanka has been passing through a serious economic crisis that has also led to political uncertainty in the island nation. There have been peaceful protests for days and the protestors blame President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his government for the economic crisis and want him to go. Though the crisis continues and some countries have offered help, that doesn’t seem enough. Assessing the gravity of the situation, India has offered timely help of US$ 2.4 billion, although it has avoided commenting on the political crisis as it is Sri Lanka’s internal matter. The overall situation remains volatile and uncertain.  

Detailed Report

Dr. Gulbin Sultana started her presentation by saying that political instability in Sri Lanka has been caused by the economic crisis in the country. In the latest major political development, the whole Cabinet except the Prime Minister resigned with immediate effect late on Sunday night (3 April). Most of the Ministries since then are being run by Secretaries. The country has had no Finance Secretary for some time.

Dr. Sultana said that the people of Sri Lanka believe that the economic crisis was caused by incompetence of the Gotabaya Rajapaksa Government. Sri Lanka was mired in various crises like health crisis, farmers’ protests, amongst others for a long time. However, the major breaking point was an 8-9 hour long power cut on 30 March, after which people from a wide spectrum of society hit the roads. They started protesting against the government in various parts of the country. In the last week of March there were protests outside the President’s House which were condemned by the President saying that extremists were behind these protests. He, in fact, declared an emergency. However, people defied the emergency and curfew and came in large numbers on the streets from 2 April onward, demanding the resignation of the President. They also demanded a change in the political system in the country.

Apparently, it was the scale and nature of the protests across the country that forced the Ministers to resign on 3 April. Once the Cabinet resigned, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa appointed four new Cabinet Ministers on 4 April. The President then proposed the formation of an interim government with the opposition, which was an earlier demand of the 11 coalition partners of the ruling party. The opposition refused the offer.

Dr. Sultana said that the protests were widespread and not led by any political parties; the protesters came from all walks of life and appeared united. They included every ethnicity, class and professionals and therefore such protests were unprecedented.  

The opposition and the coalition partners (41 in number) who have decided to sit as independents in the parliament, are neither united nor consistent in their demands. The opposition agreed to the formation of an interim government but on certain conditions, which include: one, that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa would have to resign and two, no more than two of the Rajapaksas would be there in the interim government.  

Meanwhile, while debating the issues in parliament on 5 and 6 April, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) led ruling alliance asked that if the President resigns, what plan does the opposition have to deal with the situation. At the same time, the opposition seems to have realised that if it was unable to deal with the situation, it may also be blamed for the crisis. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the other 11 coalition partners of the government have proposed the formation of the national executive council.

The main opposition is also saying that if the President decided not to resign, it would bring a no-confidence motion against the President. Several political parties have said that they would support a no-confidence motion against the government. There are a total of 225 members in parliament out of which the government had the support of 156 members. Out of that, 41 have withdrawn their support and are sitting as independent members. At the moment, the government has only 114 seats. However, though the government enjoys a simple majority at the moment, the opposition is not sure how many would vote in its support. What happens next will be known only on 19 April when parliament meets. The overall situation, according to Dr. Sultana, is dynamic and unfolding with new developments taking place.

Dr. Sultana stated that a few factors that need to be taken note of include: First, with regard to the protests, despite them being widespread, united and peaceful so far, it is not clear how sustainable they are going to be. Especially when the President has made it clear that he is not going to resign. Second, the role of SLFP is going to be important. Will the party support the government or will it decide to join the opposition needs to be seen. Third, the issue of legitimacy is important. Some people in Sri Lanka say that the problem is with the Presidential form of government in the country, not only with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Therefore, perhaps the political system needs to be changed in order to address the issues. However, the change needs to be constitutional.

There are some issues with these demands. Even if the President resigns, any interim government cannot continue for too long. That is a problem especially because new elections will cost money and it is a difficult proposition at a time when the economy is doing badly and even foreign reserves of the country have come down to $1.9 billion in the month of March. The newly appointed Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has said that he has already tightened the country’s monetary policy. The country is also mulling over whether to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for bail out packages. The Governor has said that it would take 8- months to bring about some kind of stability in the economy.

Given all these factors, Dr. Sultana concluded that it is difficult to predict how the political and economic crises in Sri Lanka are going to unfold in the coming days. 

Discussion

The Director General, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy in his remarks started by pointing out that it is not a good sign for India to have two of its neighbouring countries, Sri Lanka and Pakistan facing political crises. Ambassador Chinoy said that any kind of turmoil in our neighbourhood essentially spells trouble for India. India must pose broad questions- whether such turmoil pushes Sri Lanka closer to China? Will they now rethink and open up to other possibilities other than China? Other than India? Will they also welcome the Millennium Challenge Corporation of the US? Or will it be viewed with the same kind of suspicion as it was seen as a zero-sum game or something that is a tactic against China or in more neutral terms, Ambassador Chinoy added.

Ambassador Chinoy said that to focus merely on political structure, like a change in the presidential system is like jumping out of a frying pan into the fire because in case of Sri Lanka no matter who is brought in, it is going to be an acolyte of the Rajapaksa family. That doesn’t address their fundamental issue which remains the economy.

Ambassador Chinoy said that there are three main prongs in the Sri Lankan economy. One, tourism which has dried up because of the COVID Pandemic. Instead of earning money, Colombo is spending money on stranded tourists in the country, especially from Russia and Ukraine. Second, because of the pandemic, remittances have dried up. This is important because Sri Lanka relies on remittances a lot. Third is the agriculture sector in which the country seems to have made some fundamental mistakes by putting bans on some fertilizers and is trying to form some half-baked notion of organic farming because agriculture has spiralled into a non-performing sector. The country can’t grow food for the country’s population, let alone for exports. Fourth is the undue reliance on external commercial borrowings to fuel the infrastructure spree. In this case borrowing from China and then unable to service the usurious rates of interest which puts Sri Lanka in debt, to the extent that the country has interest payments to the tune of $7.28 billion/year, an amount impossible for the country to pay. The only option here, Ambassador Chinoy pointed out, seems to be to turn to a country like India. India is doing what it can. India also has to make sure that it can’t open up too much just because the neighbouring country is in trouble. There have to be some conditionalities that India will also attach. There were some issues that troubled India. Some decisions taken by Sri Lanka were unfair in India’s view. There must be a review on all those matters.

But more broadly speaking Sri Lanka is turning to the IMF which raises some questions, Amb. Chinoy pointed out. Sri Lanka has been under scrutiny from the West on account of alleged war crimes and so-called human rights violations. Pressure on these matters is likely to increase if the country goes to the IMF because conditionalities that they attach for lending loans, like democracy, transparency, good governance, human rights, etc. will reflect those very same interests that had earlier tried to put Sri Lanka on the mat.   

Dr. Gulbin Sultana agreed with the issues raised by the Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy. She said that the option of the interim government that was being discussed, if it comes about, would only be for a short period of time. What happens after that? The main problem is how to deal with the economic crisis? The Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has said that it would take 6-9 months to achieve some kind of economic stability. That means even if the new government is formed, it would have very little time to address various issues. But people are demanding change in the political system because they think the system has failed to address the issues.  On remittances, Dr. Sultana said that Sri Lankan expatriates are also protesting in many countries and they have said that they would not remit dollars to Sri Lanka until and unless the current government resigns. As far as undue commercial borrowing is concerned, it is a major problem but it seems that Sri Lanka doesn’t have much of an option but to go for loans. Though India is helping, how much assistance can it provide? Given the amount that Sri Lanka needs, one or two countries can’t help. Dr. Sultana said that some people say China was not as proactive as expected. But it would be wrong to say that Sri Lanka would move away from China. Finally, Sri Lanka is going to the IMF for help which is criticised by some sections in the country, as it would come with many conditionalities.  

Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi said that one needs to follow the crises in the two neighbouring countries carefully. Some observers are raising a question that there is a possibility of interference from the US. Both the countries are facing economic crises and have huge foreign debts because of mismanagement of the economy. Has the situation been engineered in a manner so as to create political instability is a question that needs to be looked into? Both countries have seen some unprecedented political developments. In this backdrop, how should India respond? Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bakshi said that if Beijing was to play an active role by helping Sri Lanka that would push it further into a debt-trap. One needs to find ways so that India can establish long term economic relations with Sri Lanka while keeping China at bay. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bakshi said that the idea of imposing organic farming without proper data and any trial is a function of a centralised decision making system. Power in Sri Lanka is centralised in one individual which may not be good for the nation.

Dr. Ashok K Behuria said that the issue of the executive presidency has been there for a long time in Sri Lanka. They have been trying to remove it, though that necessarily may not address the situation on the ground. The concentration of power in one person is proving detrimental for the country. As far as India's role is concerned, Dr. Behuria said that India has its limitations. India cannot pump in millions of dollars every year into the Sri Lankan economy to bring it out of crisis. At the same time, over the last 10 years, India’s influence in Sri Lanka has decreased. Other countries are securing their interests in Sri Lanka. India needs to look after its interests and act accordingly in the current situation. On the ethnic issue, Dr. Behuria said that India can join the international community and persuade the Government in Sri Lanka to go soft on the Tamil minority. But at the same time, it shouldn’t come at the cost of India’s reputation and influence. Some in Sri Lanka are mulling over bringing about a no-confidence motion against the present government. That would not remove the President, as according to the constitution, that would require 2/3rd majority in the parliament, Dr. Behuria added.  

Ms. Mayuri Banerjee asked that given the political instability in Sri Lanka, is it going to create a refugee crisis. If that is directed at India, how would India resist its interference?

Dr. Gulbin Sultana responded by saying that some people have come to India but only a few. Due to the conflict in Sri Lanka, people from Sri Lanka have come to India in the past as well. But it may not be like the situation in the 1980s when thousands came to India. But in any case if it happens, that would be a major crisis.

Ms. Saman Ayesah Kidwai asked whether the political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka is going to create a political vacuum that can be over taken by non-state actors. Is there a possibility of an armed conflict? 

Dr. Gulbin Sultana in response stated that Sri Lanka has been caught in armed conflicts for a long time. However, the current protests are unprecedented as they include every ethnicity and class. In fact the protests and the government response have united them. However, the ethnic problem remains unresolved. It can crop up again anytime.      

The report was prepared by Dr. Nazir Ahmad Mir, Research Assistant, MP-IDSA.

South Asia Sri Lanka, Financial Crisis
Report of Monday Morning Webinar on “The Ukraine Crisis” February 28, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia CentreMP-IDSA spoke on the topic “The Ukraine Crisis” at the Monday Morning Webinar held on 28 February 2022. The webinar was moderated by Col. Deepak Kumar, Research Fellow, Centre Coordinator, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA. 

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) Deputy Director General MP-IDSA, the panellists, scholars and members of the Institute participated in the webinar.

Executive Summary

The recent crisis unfolding in Ukraine has shaken the international arena, with Russian military might being displayed across the border with Ukraine. There has been strong and quick reactions from the West and Europe against Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO). Though the conflict continues, the Russian incursion into Kyiv and the Western responses through sanctions and military aid will have major impact on the global world order. The debates regarding the Russian game plan and the Ukrainian resistance to preserve their national sovereignty have been reverberating across the globe. The discussion of a probable peace plan does provide hope for a solution to the conflict.

Detailed Report

The Monday morning Webinar began with Col. Deepak Kumar, the moderator referring to troops’ amassment by Russia across the Ukrainian border since 2021. After months of military build-up, Russia invaded its Soviet neighbor from various fronts. The military operation signifies the failure of diplomatic efforts like the Normandy Format and has trigged the greatest security crisis in Europe since the Cold War. It has led to a dangerous escalation between NATO and Russia. Various questions were highlighted by the moderator ranging from sanctions on Russia, regime change to deliberating upon the Chinese game plan and the delicate balancing act of India.

Dr. Swasti Rao, the speaker, began her presentation with a detailed description of the two heads of states involved in the crisis. The speaker provided the background information of the conflict, including amassment of troops and Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions just before the Special Military Operation (SMO) was announced by Russia on 24 February 2022. She provided an update on the current crisis including the situation in Kharkov and Kyiv. Peace talks proposed by Vladimir Putin were supposed to be held in Minsk but were rejected by Volodymyr Zelensky. However, an agreement was reached by both heads of states to have peace talks on the Belarus border.

She highlighted that Putin stated that the objectives of the SMO are Demilitarization and Denazification of Ukraine. This might also include a regime change and establishing a pro-Russian leader in power similar to Belarusian leadership. She suggested that there could be a division of Ukraine into two parts separating the East and the West along the River Dnieper. According to the speaker, the objective of Russia tightening the noose around Kyiv is not to capture the city but to pressurize Zelensky to either flee or surrender or to give in to Russian demands.

Putin’s plan for Ukraine could be summarised as the three ‘D’s-Division, Demilitarisation and Denazification. While division of Ukraine may or may not be on the cards, but Putin definitely wants to demilitarise Ukraine as the West has been pumping defence aid and weaponry into the country since 2014. The speaker explained that Putin uses Denazification, both as a euphemism for any Pro-West forces within Ukraine and to designate an array of neo- Nazi groups in Ukraine that have been at the forefront of receiving military training from the West after the Annexation of Crimea in 2014 and have also been instrumental in fighting the Russian backed separatists in the Donbass region.

The speaker then highlighted the apparent loopholes in Putin's plan. Even in the initial days of the SMO, there seems to be a sense of frustration concerning Russia’s military advancement in Ukraine, mainly due to the rapid rise in costs owing to delays caused by strong Ukrainian resistance. There also seems to be a failure on the part of the Russians to gain air dominance. The pro-Russian sentiment seems to be misjudged by Putin because present-day Ukraine seems different from the Ukraine of 2014.

The delays are providing leverage to the West and Ukraine. New weaponry is coming from the West through Poland. The United States has approved an extra $350 million in aid and the European Union has announced funding the Ukraine military including purchases and delivery of weapons worth 500 million euros. Germany has made a historic change in its post-war weapons policy. The West, in a coordinated manner, has imposed hard-hitting sanctions on Russia including cutting targeted Russian banks off the SWIFT transaction system.

Putin, on the other hand seems to be upping the ante of tough posturing against NATO and its allies. He recently gave directions to Russia’s Defence Minister to keep Russia’s nuclear weapons on alert. Belarus, a key Russian ally, has revoked its non-nuclear status and has allowed Russia to keep nuclear weapons within Belarusian territory.

The speaker then highlighted that Putin does not regard Ukraine as a separate sovereign country. He sees Kyiv as the cradle of Russian civilization and asserts the close cultural proximity that the two countries share.  Putin has time and again stated that the breakup of USSR was an unfortunate accident of history. His recent speeches have invoked the past glory of the Russian Empire. He dismisses the post-war and cold war map of Europe. He does not believe in the sovereignty of most of the East European states, particularly the erstwhile Soviet states and specially Ukraine. While Putin’s official stand remains seeking guarantees for Ukraine’s neutrality and against NATO’s eastward expansion, his misgivings about Ukraine’s sovereignty hinges from a different narrative of the glory of the Russian empire.  However, Putin’s rationale for launching the SMO is a pushback against NATO’s eastward expansion that he saw threatening to Russian security.

The speaker then focused on NATO’s eastward expansion that started in the 1990s.  She stated that the problem began from Czech Republic (an erstwhile Warsaw Pact member) joining NATO in 1999. This was followed by other erstwhile members of the Warsaw pact like Hungary and Poland joining the NATO.  The major jolt came in 2004 when the three Baltic States (that were erstwhile Soviet states) joined NATO. This eastward expansion continued until 2020 with North Macedonia in the Balkans being the last country in East Europe to join the NATO.

The speaker then discussed the inconsistencies within the argument that Russia’s SMO is a reaction against NATO's further Eastward Expansion with Ukraine becoming a likely member. Ukraine had applied to join NATO in 2008 in the backdrop of Russia’s operations in Georgia. However, its request was rejected by the NATO then. Ukraine would not have been able to join the NATO after 2014 as the NATO does not accept members with disputed borders.

In the 1990s, NATO- Russia relations seemed to be in the positive space and Russia had joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme. In 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed.  In 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was set up. In 2002, the NATO- Russia Council was set up which held its last meeting just a few days before the SMO was launched on 24 February 2022.

The speaker mentioned the Visegrad group formed in the 1990s comprising Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungry which pushed for greater cooperation with Europe and later, after the division within Czechoslovakia, both Czechia and Slovakia became part of the Visegrad group that pushed for NATO’s membership, eventually joining the NATO in 1997.

The speaker also deconstructed the big jolt that came with the Baltic States joining NATO in 2004. She highlighted that Russia and Lithuania had an unstable border in 1998 which was settled with Russian assistance. Russia formed the Commonwealth of Independent States in order to lure the East European countries to remain under the Russian influence, which the Baltic States refused to join. She also mentioned the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) group which was formed by smaller East European countries to have more bargaining power against Russia. The bottom line, according to the speaker, is that it is the East European countries themselves which have been trying to join the NATO worried for their security concerns at the hands of Russia and not the other way round as Russia would like to project it.

The speaker then elaborated on sanctions especially the unprecedented SWIFT sanctions imposed on Russia’s Central Bank that is likely to offset the safety valve effect of Russia’s large foreign reserves.  Russia has the fourth largest foreign reserves in the world but cutting off the Central bank from Swift transaction system would mean Russia will not be able to access almost half of the foreign reserves that are held overseas.  As a result, the Central Bank of Russia would not be able to intervene with required capital and financial controls to stabilise the devaluation of ruble and control inflation. The sanctions are not likely to deter Putin but are aimed at bleeding the Russian economy in the long run.

The speaker also highlighted the limitation of China’s ability to support Russia. While China will buy more gas from Russia but even that will come with riders. The current pipelines from Siberia that are taking gas into China are already working at their optimum capacity and sending more gas to China would mean readying more pipelines that will at take at least three years. The Chinese are also known to demand cheaper prices from Russia which would not be to Russia’s advantage. Two major Chinese banks have also put restrictions on Russian transactions for the fear of secondary sanctions by the West. What this means is that while China would like to help Russia against the West but at the same time China is not willing to jeopardize its own embedded supply chains in the world and specially its large trade with the US and the EU.

The speaker concluded by highlighting the responses from Europe. She described that the Russian SMO against Ukraine has made non- NATO European states worry for their safety. Kosovo has requested a permanent US military base and a NATO membership. Germany is not only supporting sanctions and has halted the certification of the Nord Steam-2 but it also announced a special defence budget and it has been stated that its defence budget will be raised by 2 percent every year. Sweden and Finland are worried and arming their islands in the Baltic Sea and the public opinion in these two is swinging in the favour of joining NATO for the first time after the end of the Cold War.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA commended the speaker for a detailed presentation. He stated that the resistance from the Ukrainian forces is not unexpected. Minsk II Agreement also failed partly because there was no consensus on the two breakaway provinces and the role of the parties involved. Regarding Zelensky’s decision to not flee, he drew parallels with Ashraf Ghani fleeing Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover. He said that Regime changes do not work and that they are doomed to failure. Changes have to be organic and a generic product from the contending forces. He further said that neutrality is a fig leaf and hypocritical in the context of Sweden and Finland.  In Germany’s case, one has to take note of the increased defence budget and flip over in providing some hard core defence hardware. Sanctions do not work beyond a point as evident in the case of Iran. He concluded his remarks by stating that the Chinese would try to seek advantages from both parties.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA said that this is one of the most significant events of the century so far. We are moving through a rapidly changing geostrategic landscape. There is an emergence of EU powers moving away from the US and United Kingdom’s way of thinking. There is a re-emergence of World War II allies (AUKUS) and the US and UK are always apprehensive of seeing any other power dominating Europe. The continued relevance of hard power emerges as a key element of state power. The importance of nuclear deterrence emerges and deterrence of conventional forces has also come up.

The question, he said, is about India's stand. Can we sustain this position which we have taken by abstaining from the vote and not condemning Russia, if the war continues and civilian causalities mount including Indian civilians?

Dr. Swasti Rao, the speaker, gave detailed and insightful replies in response to comments and questions received from the panellists and participants.

Report prepared by Mr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Europe and Eurasia Russia-Ukraine Relations, Ukraine
Report of Monday Morning Webinar on “India’s Recently Enunciated Arctic Policy: An Assessment” April 04, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Capt. Anurag Bisen (Indian Navy) spoke on “India’s Recently Enunciated Arctic Policy: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Webinar held on April 4, 2022. The webinar was chaired by Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Centre Coordinator, Non-Traditional Security Centre. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, Deputy Director General, Centre members and scholars attended the webinar.

Executive Summary

India released its official Arctic Policy Document which highlights that India’s interests in the region are scientific, environmental, commercial and strategic. It is for this reason that India’s engagement with the Arctic region over the decades has been consistent and multi-dimensional. This policy document sets a clear roadmap for India’s holistic engagement in the region.

Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha gave a brief overview of India’s Arctic Policy that was released by the Ministry of Earth Sciences on March 17, 2022. He highlighted that the process of policymaking in India is witnessing a new and enlightened trend that includes having public discussion and taking inputs. Making a reference to Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech in 1987 in which the Soviet leader called the Arctic as a ‘Zone of Peace’, Dr. Sinha raised issues over the emerging power rivalry and geopolitics of the region.

Capt. Anurag Bisen (Indian Navy) highlighted the long-standing need for India’s Arctic Policy. He mentioned that the Arctic region is warming three-times faster than the rest of the world, which is leading to accelerated melting of the Arctic sea-ice and consequently increased availability of mineral and hydrocarbon resources. He summarised the six pillars of India’s Arctic: 1. Science and Research 2. Economic and Human Development Cooperation 3. Climate and Environmental Protection 4. Transportation and Connectivity 5. Governance and International Cooperation 6. National Capacity Building.

Capt. Bisen further observed that the policy document sets a broad-base and holistic roadmap for India’s engagement in the Arctic region. He outlined the scientific interconnectivities between the Arctic and the Himalayas (also known as the Third Pole), especially the crucial link between the Arctic sea-ice melt and the Indian monsoons. Speaking on the mineral and energy resources potential, Capt. Bisen mentioned that the Arctic accounts for 30 per cent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil. He asserted that India’s future engagement with the Arctic region can potentially address its energy security and rare earth minerals resource needs.

In the final part of his presentation, Capt. Bisen mentioned that India’s Arctic Policy calls for a dedicated polar research vessel, a need to develop indigenous capabilities in polar ship construction and to establish institutional funding for Arctic research at the national level. He suggested that India should also increase scientific participation in the working groups of the Arctic Council. On the issues related to economic and human development, the speaker mentioned that India is keen to explore opportunities for responsible exploration of natural resources and as per the sustainable development goals. On transport and connectivity, the document articulates India’s interest in seeking partnerships for shipbuilding and promoting opportunities for Indian seafarers. Referring to governance and international cooperation, he noted that the policy document focuses on understanding the Arctic related mechanisms at the national and sub-national legislation levels. On national capacity building, Capt. Bisen mentioned that India’s Artic Policy articulates developing Indian scholarship on the Polar Regions. Finally, he suggested that MP-IDSA could become a knowledge centre in this.

Questions and Comments

Following the presentation, Dr. Sinha invited the Director General, Deputy Director General and all the panel members to give comments and ask questions.

Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy thanked the chair and complimented Capt. Bisen for his presentation. Acknowledging the reference made by Dr. Sinha to a paper authored by the Director General himself in 2012, Ambassador Chinoy highlighted that the write-up served as an important base paper for the preparation of India’s Arctic Policy. He further highlighted the importance of India developing infrastructure capabilities in the Polar Regions in terms of shipbuilding, deep seabed research and other related domains to fulfil its interests in the Arctic. Highlighting the military importance of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), Ambassador Chinoy asked the speaker to share his views on the same.

Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, complimented Capt. Bisen for his presentation and highlighted the importance of linking the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with the Northern Sea Route as it will have long-term economic and connectivity benefits.

Answering a question by Dr. Nihar R. Nayak on the Arctic interconnections with the Himalayas, Capt. Bisen mentioned that climate change in the region has direct implications on the Indian monsoons, which have a cataclysmic impact on Indian agriculture. It is therefore, extremely important for Indian scientists to understand these interlinkages.

Responding to a question by Mr. Bipandeep Sharma on the current suspension of the Arctic Council and its implication on ‘Observer States’, Capt. Bisen responded by saying that the observer states have no influence in the Council. All decisions in the Council are taken by its member states.

Dr. Uttam K. Sinha in his concluding remarks recommended that the participants should read India’s recently released Arctic Policy.

Report prepared by Mr. Bipandeep Sharma, Research Analyst, NTS Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

Report of Monday Morning Webinar on “India-Australia Relations: Recent Virtual Summit and the Way Ahead” March 28, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

The Monday morning meeting on “India-Australia Relations: Recent Virtual Summit and the Way Forward” was held on 28 March, 2022. Research Fellow at MP-IDSA Col. Ravinder Pal Singh spoke on the subject and elaborated on the outcomes of the summit. The session was chaired by Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh, Centre Coordinator and Senior Research Associate at MP-IDSA. The Director-General Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and Deputy Director-General Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi shared their views. Associate Fellow Ms. Shruti Pandalai and Research Analyst Mr. Akash Sahu were panelists for the session.

Executive Summary

The discussion outlined evolving India-Australia relations, particularly in the fast changing global security environment. Both countries have come closer with bilateral initiatives on a number of areas including defence, technology, and people-to-people ties. Their relations can be further strengthened by addressing elements of distrust, and by aligning more with each other’s worldview. India-Australia relationship is critical for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

Detailed Report

Col. Singh began his presentation by providing a background on India-Australia relations, which have broadened after 2014 culminating into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries in June 2021, as compared to very limited economic cooperation and people-to-people exchange before 2000. At the virtual summit, the two leaders reiterated their commitment to shared values of democracy and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Col. Singh highlighted the leaders’ discussion on the current Ukraine crisis, Afghanistan, Myanmar and also the South China Sea. They also reaffirmed ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific. Many new developments were announced at the summit like opening up of Australia’s new Consulate-General in Bengaluru, and setting up of a A$ 17.2 million Australia-India Strategic Fund, Australia India Infrastructure Forum, India Australia Centre of Excellence for Critical and Emerging Technology Policy, and Centre for Australia-India Relations. Additionally, General Rawat India-Australia Young Defence Officers’ Exchange Program will be helpful in strengthening military relations between the two nations. Australia has committed A$ 25.2 million for the Australian Space Agency to deepen space cooperation with India, and will support India’s manned mission to space Gaganyaan. A full Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) is expected to be realised by end of the year between the two nations. They have also collaborated in the area of critical minerals with Australia’s Critical Minerals Facilitation Office and India’s Khanij Bidesh Ltd. signing a Memorandum of Understanding.

Col. Singh underscored that the convergence between New Delhi and Canberra is reflected by frequent Quad summits, pushback against China, 2+2 ministerial dialogue in September 2021, cooperation in ASEAN-led forums like East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum etc. and engagement with emerging minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific such as with Japan, Indonesia and France. Australia has supported India’s membership into the Nuclear Suppliers Group and both countries have robust cooperation on counterterrorism, apart from a number of military exercises like Malabar and AUSINDEX. India will be participating in Australia’s Indo-Pacific Endeavour exercise later this year. India’s Security and Growth for All (SAGAR), Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and Forum for India-Pacific Island Cooperation (FIPIC) underline New Delhi’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific, while Australia’s Pacific Step-Up and Indo-Pacific Approach in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update reflect Canberra’s similar outlook.

There are some divergences in the India-Australia relationship as well. Concerns over duty-free import of coal, increasing trade deficit, and delay in the conclusion of CECA are some current problems. Also, India is not a part of any free trade blocs in the region such as Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This may affect their trade relationship negatively. However, on the crisis in Ukraine New Delhi and Canberra seem to have a good understanding. Despite India abstaining to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the UN, Australia has expressed that it acknowledges India’s historic relationship with Russia. Col. Singh recommended that Track-2 dialogues may strengthen bilateral relations and MP-IDSA can possibly take a lead on that. Close cooperation in emerging technologies, counterterrorism, and space will be fruitful. The issues with regard to CECA must be resolved with a priority to ensure that both sides are on the same page regarding trade.

Ambassador Chinoy complimented the speaker for a comprehensive presentation and observed that India-Australia relations have grown tremendously. Earlier the bilateral relations would be ascribed to three Cs namely, Cricket, Curry and Commonwealth, but lately relations have expanded to include much more areas of cooperation, so to say involving more Cs like Connectivity, Communication, Coal and China.  While there has been substantial upgrade in relations from the pre India-US nuclear deal period, when Canberra seemed particularly hostile to India; bilateral relations even today may be seen as a function of India-US relations and India-UK relations. Australia’s unique relationship with China, especially in the context of large bilateral trade in essential minerals, further complicates the equation. Additionally, Australia’s historically close relations with Pakistan from the time that it helped set up Pakistani intelligence apparatus must also not be forgotten completely. Ambassador Chinoy cautioned that Canberra’s involvement with Pakistan in the past does not mean that it shares a worldview with Islamabad. Concluding his comments, he stressed that India and Australia collaboration has immense opportunity in the field of innovation and technology. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bakshi opined that the pandemic seems to have unified the divergent views on China within Australia. After the pandemic, Canberra has retaliated to China’s economic coercion in a more explicit way, most notably as it constituted the AUKUS with the US and the UK. It may be helpful to examine India’s stakes in the evolving transatlantic relations.

Ms. Pandalai observed that Australia’s positive reaction to India’s posture on the Ukraine crisis is of significant value to bilateral relations. She asked the speaker about the possibilities of a reciprocal access agreement between India and Australia. Some questions from the audience also focused on whether India and Australia can reach an intelligence sharing arrangement, especially since India has close relations with Russia. Mr. Sahu observed that the presentation has advanced the conversation on India-Australia relations, and asked the speaker for his opinion on whether India and Australia, in their engagement with ASEAN nations, may emerge as collaborators or rivals. He noted that Australia may view itself as closer to the ASEAN nations due to proximity and strategic utility. Col. Singh responded that both countries will pursue their independent policy of engagement with Southeast Asia, and while India’s outreach will have significant elements of cultural and historical linkages, Australia’s approach will be more related to economic and strategic cooperation. He added that India and Australia need not be averse to deeper cooperation on intelligence especially since India has foundational agreements of intelligence sharing and logistics with the US. India’s military relationship with Russia is limited to hardware and shall not discourage Australia from pursuing stronger logistics and intelligence cooperation with India.

Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh underscored the importance of the India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral given Indonesia’s strategic landscape and leadership within the ASEAN. He also pointed out that India’s cooperation with the pacific islands will help engage them for an inclusive Indo-Pacific agenda of development. He concluded the session by expressing hope for betterment of India-Australia relations that may help regional stability.   

Prepared by Mr. Akash Sahu, Research Analyst, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre.

South East Asia and Oceania India-Australia Relations

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