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Monday Morning Webinar on “The Ukraine Crisis” February 28, 2022 1000 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Mr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will speak on “The Ukraine Crisis” at the Monday Morning Webinar which will be held on 28 February 2022 .

Col. Deepak Kumar, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will moderate the Webinar.

Dr. Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, will be the rapporteur for this Webinar.

Talk by Rear Admiral Jacques Fayard, Joint Commander of the French Forces in the Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN) on French Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region February 23, 2022 Talk

Rear Admiral Jacques Fayard, the Joint Commander of the French Forces in the Indian Ocean (ALIDIEN) spoke on the topic “French Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region” on 23 February 2022 at 1700h in the MP-IDSA Auditorium. The talk was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General, MP-IDSA. The event was attended by Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd), the Deputy Director General, Scholars of MP-IDSA and delegates from France. The talk was also live-streamed on YouTube.

Executive Summary

France’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are driven by its status as a resident power of the region with its overseas territories of Mayotte, Réunion, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Clipperton, Wallis and Futuna and French Antarctic stretched across the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. These territories constitute the majority of France’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which is the second largest in the World and home to 1.57 million French citizens. Apart from having its sovereign territories and population, France has enormous economic stakes in the Indo-Pacific with one-third of exports and 40% of imports from non-EU countries transiting through the region. As a result of this France has a substantial military presence of seven thousand personnel deployed permanently in the region based across its overseas territories and host nations such as UAE and Djibouti. The evolving strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific are shaped by the strategic competition between China and the U.S, which has resulted in the proliferation of military capabilities and is bound to affect the security balance of the region. France’s regional priorities in the Indo-Pacific include preserving Freedom of Navigation (FoN), protecting Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), preventing environmental degradation, combating terrorism, narcotics trafficking and piracy in the Indo-Pacific.

These priorities have been underscored by the Macron led French Government’s commitment to support the peaceful resolution of conflict, contribute to regional peace, protect regional state sovereignty and take action against climate change. France intends to actively contribute to multilateral efforts in the Indo-Pacific for protecting the global commons, promoting a rules-based international order, preserving strategic balance, combating transnational terrorism and addressing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  France aims to strengthen its military capabilities in the region by increasing vigilance through the regular deployment of naval assets, greater sharing of intelligence with partner nations and providing a multi-dimensional response to any threat to its interests in the region. France already has been playing a major role in combating piracy in the region through its participation in the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) and Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150) deployed near the Gulf of Aden. France aims to maintain a privileged defence relationship with India by supporting its ‘Make in India’ Initiative and enhancing cooperation to improve interoperability between the respective naval assets. The EU’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific is complementary to France’s own strategy for the region. The bilateral strategic relationship with India is a key element of France’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific.

Detailed Report 

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed the forum by extending his warm wishes to Rear Admiral Jacques Fayard for addressing the scholars of MP-IDSA. He stated that France has shown a renewed interest in the Indo-Pacific as a resident power of the region. Its overseas territories in the region give France the World’s second largest EEZ. The Director General pointed out that France’s presence in Abu Dhabi and Djibouti gives it critical access to major chokepoints such as Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb. He also brought out that France is a member of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and CTF-150. The Director General highlighted the fact that the Indian and the Pacific Oceans are increasingly becoming intertwined not only in terms of energy and trade flows but also in terms of a wider technological, ideological and territorial contestation that has emerged in recent times. He underscored the growing concerns regarding telecommunications, 5G, environmental degradation and safety of critical supply chains in the region. The Director General stated that from an Indian perspective, France’s presence and participation in the emerging geoeconomic and geostrategic architecture of the Indo-Pacific is regarded as a positive factor. Attributing to India’s unique geographic location in the Indo-Pacific, he stated that India has growing trade, economic and strategic interests in the region.

The Director General reiterated the fact that India like other like-minded nations including France supports Freedom of Navigation (FoN) and overflights for unimpeded commerce on the high seas. Citing Hon’ble Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation in the One Ocean Summit organised by France and India’s support to the French Initiative for an ambitious international coalition for protecting bio-diversity on high seas beyond national jurisdiction, the Director General remarked that these developments indicate the growing strategic convergences between India and France.  He stated that the cooperation between the two nations has deepened across the board.  Referring to the recent visit of Hon’ble Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s visit to Paris where the Indo-French Roadmap on the Blue Economy and Ocean Governance was concluded, the Director General stated it is a reflection of the shared interest in climate change, health of the oceans, sustainable development, international law and infrastructure development. He brought out that as a major economic power, France has played a key role in the evolution of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy which has been reflected through France’s participation in the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) situated in Gurugram, India. He remarked that there is greater scope for collaboration between India and France in the areas of countering radicalisation, terrorism and piracy. He highlighted the prospects of emerging opportunities for Indo-French defense cooperation in the regions like the Gulf of Guinea and Francophone Africa. With these opening remarks, Ambassador Chinoy welcomed Rear Admiral Jacques Fayard to deliver his talk on “French Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region”.

Rear Admiral Jacques Fayard, began his talk by focusing on the fact that seven of the thirteen French overseas territories are situated across the Indo-Pacific and 1.57 million French citizens live in these territories. He stated that due to this fact France’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are dictated by the presence of its own sovereign territories and population in the region. He underscored that these geographic factors make France a coastal state and a resident maritime power of the Indo-Pacific. Pointing out the French Islands of Mayotte, Réunion, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, Clipperton Island, French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Admiral Fayard stated that the expanse of its overseas territories spanning across the region represent nine million square kilometres of the total eleven million square kilometres of French EEZ. He informed that that seven thousand French Military personnel have been permanently deployed throughout the Indo-Pacific region including the French bases in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Djibouti. Taking into account that the Indo-Pacific has become the world’s demographic and economic centre of gravity with 60% of the global population, 17 of the world’s 20 largest harbours and 75% of global maritime trade, Admiral Fayard stated that the region has acquired enormous geostrategic significance. He brought out that the vital maritime routes that connect Indonesia to Madagascar, Oman to Singapore, Japan to Australia and China to Polynesia are situated in the Indo-Pacific which makes the protection of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) a vital component of the security of this region.

Admiral Fayard stated that France as an Indo-Pacific nation is a direct stakeholder in the economic interconnectivity of the region. Taking into account that more than one-third of France’s exports and more than 40% of imports from non-EU countries transit through the Indo-Pacific, he stated France has enormous economic stakes in the region due to which the French Government has assumed its responsibility to contribute to the region’s maritime security. Explaining the strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, Admiral Fayard said that despite financial and economic interdependence, the U.S and China are engaging in global strategic competition and its effects are now manifesting in the region. The evolution of the strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific induced new alignments and has spurred the need to rethink defence policy. In this context, Admiral Fayard stated that the majority of the Indo-Pacific countries have increased investments in procurement of advanced military assets to improve their coastal defence capabilities and implement long-range area denial. The proliferation of such military capabilities will significantly affect the security balance of the Indo-Pacific. Explaining the French Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Admiral Fayard cited the French President Emmanuel Macron’s Garden Island Speech of 2018, where he underlined France’s four key commitments in the Indo-Pacific Region which are:

  • To support the peaceful resolution of conflict.
  • To contribute to regional peace and security.
  • The responsibility to protect regional stated sovereignty.
  • The need to take action against Climate Change.

Citing the evolving security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, Admiral Fayard stated that France needs to cope with new risks and threats facing its interests and of its partners in the region. He informed that France intends to carry out an autonomous and sovereign action from its overseas territories for actively contributing to the multilateral efforts in the Indo-Pacific focused on:

  • Protecting the global commons.
  • Promoting a rules-based international order.
  • Rejecting unilateral ambitions that may threaten FoN.
  • Preserving strategic balances.
  • Combating transnational terrorism.
  • Addressing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD).
  • Countering interference operations aimed at eroding the legitimacy of a democratic regime.

Admiral Fayard highlighted that France’s key priorities in the Indo-Pacific are the protection of its overseas territories, citizens and EEZs. He stated that France resolves to address this priority by entering into military and security cooperation with its partners in the Indo-Pacific that will provide France with greater strategic depth to operate in the region. Underscoring the need to enhance its military capabilities in the region, Admiral Fayard emphasised the need to strengthen the three key domains which are as follows:

  • Knowledge and Anticipation: this domain implies the exercise of increased vigilance with regard to regional security development that may have a direct or indirect impact on France’s sovereign spaces. He stated this requires the regular deployment of air and naval assets which will reinstate France’s commitment to the region and support the efforts of its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
  • Protection: This is ensured through a more assertive presence and better sharing of maritime information in France’s sovereign spaces. This would involve anticipating the developments of new threats and sending strong messages to deter strategies of coercion.
  • Prevention: This domain involves closer cooperation with the French Department of the State to provide the necessary multi-dimensional responses to any risk and threat to France’s interests in the region.

Admiral Fayard brought out that in order to strengthen these domains, the French overseas military forces are engaging in training exercises with regional partners for enhancement of strategic intelligence capacities and projection of naval capabilities for demonstrating France’s credibility and assurance towards its partners. Pointing to France’s binding defence agreements with UAE and Djibouti he said that they enabled France to deploy its drone capabilities to secure the SLOC and combat piracy in Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Admiral Fayard also referred to France’s prominent role in the EU NAVFOR which has been successfully countering piracy in the sea off  the coast of the Horn of Africa and protecting 25% of the global maritime traffic that transits through the region. He also cited France’s leading role in anti-narcotic operations, the protection of strategic chokepoints and increasing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Gulf region.  He categorically stated that France rejects any maritime claim that is not compliant with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He brought out that France shares common concerns with India, the U.S., Japan and Australia regarding the emerging challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. Admiral Fayard stated that the strategic partnership that France has established with these four nations is crucial to preserve stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Referring to France’s bilateral relations with India, Admiral Fayard said that France aims at maintaining a privileged defence relationship with India guaranteeing the strategic autonomy of both countries. He said that France fully supports India’s ‘Make in India’ initiative and aims to contribute jointly to Indian Ocean security through developing bilateral cooperation both at the strategic and operational levels. He highlighted France’s regular naval exercises with India to mutually enhance both nations’ naval capabilities in the areas of carrier-borne operations, Anti-Submarine Operations (ASW), submarine warfare and HADR operations. He said France as a leading maritime power will play an important role in combating terrorism, narcotics, climate change and Illegal Unreported Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the region. He stated that EU policies in the Indo-Pacific are complimentary to France’s interests in the region. He also gave his view that the EU needs to have a greater presence in the Indo-Pacific and ensure better coordination among its naval deployments. Admiral Fayard concluded his talk by stating that the bilateral strategic relationship with India is key for the success of France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.

During the Q&A session, responding to a question posed by Cmde. Abhay K. Singh on the probable change in the structure and composition of the French Deployment in the Indo-Pacific, Admiral Fayard said due to geostrategic and geoeconomic significance of the region France is looking forward towards dynamic force employment to secure its interests in the region. Answering a question posed by Col. Vivek Chadha on how does France view partnership with India to address common concerns in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), he stated that the dynamics of defence cooperation with India are very vivid and France is focused on developing interoperability between the two nations by engaging in joint military exercises. Responding to a question posed by Capt. Anurag Bisen on the other nations that France would like to engage in littoral cooperation in the IOR, he stated that apart from India, nations like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka offer prospects in capacity building in the maritime domain.

Answering a question posed by Ms. Ruchita Beri on the prospects of Indo-French defence cooperation in the Western Indian Ocean and Africa, Admiral Fayard stated that currently, the French and Indian Frigates are carrying out coordinated patrol in the region. Responding to a question by Col. D.P.K Pillay on France’s independent stance on security apart from the NATO and EU’s influence, he said that France as a P5 member and a nuclear power has an autonomous and independent perspective on global security issues. To Col. R.P. Singh’s question on the scope of France cooperating with Australia on maritime security issues in the Pacific, Admiral Fayard stated that France works on a regular basis and has long-standing security agreements with Australia and New Zealand for the security of the Pacific Region. Responding to the final question posed by Dr. Anand Kumar on whether France is concerned about the growing Chinese presence in the IOR, Admiral Fayard stated as a P5 member China must ensure FoN in the region for all nations to have unimpeded access to the global commons in the region.

The Vote of Thanks was given by Dr. Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA.

Key Takeaways –

  • France’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are driven by its status as a resident power of the region.
  • France has enormous economic stakes in the region due to which the French Government has assumed the responsibility to contribute to the region’s maritime security.
  • Already France has a substantial military presence of seven thousand personnel deployed permanently in the region who are based across its overseas territories and host nations such as UAE and Djibouti.
  • France aims to fulfil its strategic commitments in the Indo-Pacific by entering into military and security cooperation with its partners in the region.
  • The EU’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific is complimentary to the French strategy in the region.
  • The bilateral strategic relationship with India is a key aspect of the French strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.

Report Prepared by Dr. R.Vignesh, Research Analyst, Military Affairs Centre, MP-IDSA


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Europe and Eurasia Indo-Pacific, France
MP-IDSA and JISS Third Annual Bilateral Dialogue January 13, 2022 Bilateral

Executive Summary

The US-China relationship is simply not just trade rivalry, but it is a discourse in itself. It is based on preserving respected status in global affairs, engaging in economic cooperation and cohesion, military partnership and adventurism. To challenge China’s growing influence in the South China Sea and beyond, the Biden administration has given a lot of importance to multi-alliance politics. From Chinese view, President Xi Jinping’s major foreign policy is to build and prepare China to challenge US national security interests in the longer run.

The regional security situation in West Asia remains volatile with Syria, Yemen and Lebanon undergoing prolonged crises. However, West Asia has also registered some positive developments. The Abraham Accords have provided a strong foundation to Israel-UAE and Israel-Bahrain relations. Other significant developments include the formation of the new Quad between India, Israel, UAE and the US, Qatar-GCC reconciliation, Saudi Arabia-Iran reconciliation talks. Iran is providing UAVs to its proxies such as Houthis in Yemen, militias in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. 

Since the historic visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in July 2017, India-Israel ties have transformed with political ballast adding robustness to the strength of the relationship. While cooperation in other sectors like homeland security and agriculture is coming on apace, an important arena of future growth in India-Israel bilateral ties could be cooperation in the science and technology and innovation sphere.

Detailed Report

The third Bilateral Dialogue between MP-IDSA and the JISS was held virtually on January 13, 2022. Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General MP-IDSA, and Prof. Efraim Inbar, President JISS, led the Dialogue on both sides. The Dialogue deliberated on the three central themes: US-China Rivalry, Regional Developments in West Asia and India-Israel Bilateral Relations. Scholars from both sides frankly put forward their views on these issues and discussed the possibilities of further cooperation between the two Institutes in the future.

In his opening remarks Amb. Sujan Chinoy, stated that the US-China rivalry is affecting current global geopolitics. He said that the global order is in a state of flux. Multilateralism is becoming weaker and multi-alliance is increasingly becoming stronger. This shift is threatening China as it is suspicious of anything that does not include them. Comparing China policies of Joe Biden and Donald Trump, Amb. Chinoy stated that though Biden cites China as its major rival, the modus operandi is different from that of Trump. Unlike Trump, Biden’s decision-making involves other partners, parties and people. As a result, Biden’s efforts to strengthen Trans-Atlantic, Trans-Pacific partnerships and his three-prompt policy – cooperation, extreme competition and rivalry is viewed as more insidious by China.

Amb. Chinoy stated that China welcomes cooperation with US and seeks to expand its bilateral ties. China asserts that it can live with competition provided it is positive in nature. However, it is determined to oppose the US, if they regard China as its adversary. In this context, China views AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific, which adds to the existence of the Quad, skeptically. Moreover, AUKUS is a military pact, and unlike the Quad, it deals with broader cooperation themes such as critical supply chain, vaccine development, technology, capacity building, freedom of navigation etc.

Speaking on the concept of decoupling with China, Amb. Chinoy stated that it is hard to decouple in this globalised world of interconnectedness. But, in the semi-conductor space, the US appears to have succeeded in slowing China’s advance in artificial intelligence, telecommunication etc., so far. Amb. Chinoy giving an example of India, stated that when India faced harsh sanctions by the international community, including the US after India’s 1974 nuclear tests, the effective result was India progressed rapidly in terms of missile development programmes. So, the denial regime also creates greater determination and clarity of thought and purpose. Amb. Chinoy further highlighted the growing misconceived yet popular rhetoric of the US’ decline and China’s ascendance. China had a spectacular rise, but as compared to the US, Beijing has a long way to go – politically, socially and economically.

Lastly, speaking on India-Israel ties, Amb. Chinoy stated that the relationship is being drastically transformed today. India and Israel are the most natural of partners, and India welcomes Israel doing more in Asia, including the Indo-Pacific. Highlighting the existing cooperation, he stated that India and Israel share strong ties in the agriculture and defence sector. Health and technology can also be huge pillars in India-Israel bilateral ties. The recent formation of the second Quad involving India, Israel, US and the UAE marks another milestone in India-Israel bilateral relations. However, there is need to give a shape and balance to take this pact forward. India has excellent relations with US and UAE, so there is optimism about the new Quad. These countries have the potential to collectively tackle many common challenges emerging in the region.

Session 1: The US-China Rivalry

The theme of the first session was the US-China Rivalry and it was chaired by Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy. The session had three panelists, namely, Prof. Eitan Gilboa (JISS), Prof. Gabi Siboni (JISS) and Dr. Jagannath Panda (Research Fellow and Coordinator, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA). 

In his presentation, Prof. Eitan Gilboa evaluated Joe Biden’s presidency during the first year of his tenure. He stated that Biden was more focused on domestic issues like price rise, economy, the pandemic, deep polarisation etc. Biden’s announcement of US withdrawal from Afghanistan created a negative impression. Besides, the US is withdrawing from world issues such as China, Russia, Climate Change, Human rights etc. For, Prof. Gilboa, Biden is attempting to restore good relations with the European Union. He intends to work much closer with the UN and other agencies. Biden prefers multilateral diplomacy as compared to unilateral diplomacy that Trump practised.

Speaking on China, US and Israel, Prof. Gilboa said that there is a continuity in American foreign policy from Obama to the Biden era. Obama spoke about Asia focusing on China, India and the wider Asian continent. Obama could not do so as the US was occupied with the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, Biden heavily criticised China on several issues, many of which China perceives as its internal matter such as the issues of Hong Kong, Taiwan and oppression against the Uyghur Muslims. The US is also concerned about the building of military bases in the artificial island in the South China Sea.

China wants to become a superpower peacefully. But looking at today’s scenarios, Chinese actions do not seem peaceful rather they are aggressive. China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI) is a clever strategy in this context. China has a large number of resources and it invests these resources in many parts of the world-building roads, bridges, ports, infrastructure etc. By acquiring Chinese loans other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America give China some degree of control. Prof Gilboa also explained US concern about China’s progress in artificial intelligence, big data, cyber-security, 5G telecommunication etc.

BRI initiative is becoming a trend in the Middle East as well. China’s economic investment and projects, particularly the construction of Haifa port in Israel has angered the US. The China-Iran 25 year strategic partnership with an estimated US$ 400 billion investment in Iran is likely to provide a lifeline for Iran’s return in the region. Israel has a major battle with Iran and this deal seems to change the equation in the region and also for the US bloc.

According to Prof. Gabi Siboni, cyberspace must be understood and consumed in a more globalised way. China is very heavily involved in developing its cyberspace in terms of both offensive and defensive capabilities. China uses offensive capabilities in an aggressive way towards anyone who is a potential challenge. He said that China that is threatening US critical infrastructure and assets. Not only the US, even the EU issued few alerts to its member states on Chinese cyber activity. While the West cannot control every criminal or cybercrime that is taking place, the use of criminal proceedings against the criminal groups supported by the states like Russia and China for political purposes can be limited. He said that it is a common practice for China to be involved with many malicious groups directly or indirectly to act outside of China. Beijing has decided to replace the Western economy and technology, and it is using every means to achieve it. China is also seeking to expand its industry and company espionage.  Nevertheless, America, the EU and Canada are trying their best to contain China, its industry and private companies are committed to investing a lot of money in cybersecurity and technology. He also stated that Israel also faces similar threats in the region and it is working towards enhancing its cyber potential even further.

Dr. Jagannath Panda stated that US-China relations is simply not just rivalry, but it is deeper and bigger than that. It is a discourse in itself that is significantly setting international relations in the arena of political, military, economic and ideological components. Perhaps, the rivalry is at the elementary stage. There is a strategic competition between them, though not an outright confrontation. From a holistic point of view, US-China rivalry is based on preserving respected status in global affairs, engaging in influential cooperation such as economic cooperation and cohesion, military partnership and adventurism.

He said that the US-China rivalry is based on trade, economic, international financing policy, technology and clash of leadership in global governance. China is making more grounds and the US is pushing for alignment and alliance politics which is widening the rift between the democratic and authoritarian principles. He said that from the US point of view, China’s rise has arrived as a threat to US dominance in global affairs. Since Trump’s presidency, the US officials, strategic community and the policy makers have continuously made China a long term strategic threat. Not the US alone, but there are growing anti-China narratives across the globe. President Biden’s similar anti-China path gives a lot of importance to multi-alliance politics. The US focus on Quad, Quad plus, AUKUS, B3W initiatives etc. is based on anti-China narratives to pose a challenge to BRI and try to create a global narrative in promoting resilient and quality infrastructure.

From a Chinese perspective, President Xi Jinping’s major foreign policy is to build and prepare China to challenge US national security interests in the longer run. Xi’s gradual consolidation of political power has put the communist party in the global spotlight. A central feature of power consolidation is the transformation of the Chinese government’s decision-making process. A decade back it was a collective practice, but today, China’s decision-making process has become more authoritarian and singular which is dictated and directed by Xi Jinping.

He concluded by saying that from a broader perspective, US-China rivalry is not in the interest of the region. Their rivalry is seriously undermining the multilateral institutions and global governance architectures. It is also significantly affecting peace and stability in the international arena. India would like to escape this bipolar mode of power politics. However, it does not have much choice apart from aligning with the US and other democratic countries in the world. 

Session 2: Regional Developments and Bilateral relations

The second session of the dialogue focused on the important developments taking place in the region and India-Israel bilateral relations; and was chaired by Prof. Efraim Inbar. Speakers in this session were Dr. P K Pradhan (Associate Fellow and Coordinator, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA), Dr. S Samuel C Rajiv (Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA) and Prof. Uzi Rubin (JISS).

Dr. Pradhan said that the Abraham Accords have provided a strong foundation to Israel-UAE and Israel-Bahrain relations, which is reflected in the rapid improvement in the ties between these countries. According to him this has been an extraordinary step in a volatile region like West Asia. These efforts have also been welcomed by India which supports peace and stability in the region and favours cooperation among the regional countries in this regard. The agreement between India, Israel, UAE and the US known as the new Quad is another significant step. From India’s point of view this development is important since India is serious about engaging with these countries, reflected in its high-level official meeting with them held in November 2021. In his view, the new Quad countries must make serious efforts to achieving something meaningful in future. 

With regard to the Gulf region, he said that the unity in GCC has been restored during the Al Ula summit. However, the Iranian issue still continues to trouble them. During the GCC summit held in December 2021, they discussed Iran’s destabilising activities in the region by its proxies. They deliberated on the Iranian nuclear issue and stated that GCC countries’ relations with Iran will be determined by the nuclear talks going on in Vienna. Dr. Pradhan highlighted that revival of talks on the Iranian nuclear deal is also a crucial development and stated that the Iranian insistence on removal of sanctions and American pressure on Iran to abide by JCPOA has led to the current stalemate.

The talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia with the mediation by Iraq’s Prime Minister, Mustafa Al Kadhimi, is another major development and it has the potential to change the geopolitics of the region. Though the talks are in the early stage, the reconciliatory approach shown by both the parties will help in de-escalating tension within the region in the short and long term. With regard to Yemen, Dr. Pradhan stated that with the increasing power of Houthis, the threat to international shipping lines particularly in the Red Sea and Strait of Bab El Mandab has become a cause of concern. The condition in Yemen has provided a conducive environment for the terror groups as the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has consolidated its position in the southern parts and the ISIS has also been trying to gain a foothold in the country. He concluded by saying that despite some constructive efforts by the countries to establish peace and stability, the situation in the region remains fragile.

Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv in his presentation on India-Israel relations drew attention to the transformation of ties in the past few years, with political ballast adding robustness to the strength of the relationship. This has specifically been so after the historic visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in July 2017. In 2021, both the countries shared high level visits including that of Air Chief Marshal, RKS Bhadauria (August 2021), External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar, Defence Secretary Ajay Kumar (October 2021) and Army Chief General Mukund Naravane (November 2021). This has translated into greater synergies between the two countries. According to Dr. Rajiv, political interactions have continued and defence interactions have strengthened.  During the 15th JWG on defence cooperation in October 2021 in Tel Aviv, both sides agreed to set up a Sub Working Group (SWG) on Defence Industry Cooperation. 

He also highlighted the significant policy decisions taken by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to increase defence indigenisation and noted that, going forward, India is aiming to reduce the volume of defence imports as well as increase its defence exports. As per SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIV), India imported US$ 36 billion during 2010-2020, 8 percent of which was from Israel, while the country’s defence exports in 2020 stood at over US$ 1 billion. India aims to reach a target of US$ 5 billion of defence exports in the next five years. In order to add a fillip to domestic defence production, two defence industrial corridors are being set up and exclusive budgets have been earmarked for domestic capital expenditure. Along with this, a defence indigenisation portal (Srijan Portal) has been started. Changes in the FDI policy, among others, is an important opportunity for the Israeli industry to more fully participate in fulfilling the requirements of the Indian armed forces. 

While cooperation in other sectors like homeland security and agriculture is coming on apace, Dr. Rajiv noted that an important arena of future growth in bilateral ties could occur from cooperation in the science and technology and innovation sphere. While Israel is acknowledged as a world leader in innovation, the Indian innovation ecosystem is also growing by leaps and bounds. During 2021 itself, over 40 Indian Start-Ups reached the unicorn status (valuation of US$ 1 billion). He concluded by saying that India and Israel can explore bilateral, trilateral (with the UAE) and quadrilateral (with the US and UAE) projects in this sphere. 

Prof. Uzi Rubinstated that until recently it was believed that the Missile is the decisive strategic disrupter in the region and the UAVs have been used as supportive weapons. But this understanding has changed over time with UAVs being considered at par with strategic disruptors such as missiles. He gave a broader classification of UAVs wherein, he divided it in three categories, namely reconnaissance UAVs used for intelligence gathering (Hermes 900), Combat UAVs (Reaper) and Suicide (Kamikaze) UAVs. He also elaborated on how these different kinds of UAVs were previously used in the region as secondary options in comparison to missiles by Turkey and other countries. He further said that Iran providing UAVs to its proxies in the region such as Houthis in Yemen, militias in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, has challenged the regional security situation. In the past few months, Iran has threatened the international maritime routes through UAV strikes and has targeted Israeli ships in the Gulf multiple times.   

He elaborated on the challenges in combating UAVs. Firstly, due to their small size they are hard to detect by radar. Also, suicide UAVs fly close to the ground and 'pop up' only when close to the target. Secondly, they are highly stealthy due to the composite materials used in making them. Thirdly, the powering of UAVs by small piston engines imparts them a negligible heat signature. Lastly, they can be programmed to follow a roundabout trajectory and attack unexpectedly.

He shared the Saudi experience of dealing with the UAV threat and said that Saudi Arabia is targeted by UAVs from Yemen. It receives 40-50 UAV strikes per month and is combating them through ground-based air defence (Patriot Missile) and F-15s launched air to air missiles. Thereafter, he shared Russian experiences in dealing with UAV threats. The two permanent Russian bases (Hmeimim Air Base and Tartus Naval Base) in Syria have regularly been targeted by the rebels through UAVs. To deal with these strikes, Russia has re-tuned its Radars. It has deployed "soft" defence belt of GPS and Glonass jammers along with EW Radio communication jammer system. It has also deployed SA 22 Panzir systems to provide "hard" defence. 

In his view, to deal with the danger of UAV threats, one needs to deploy a 360 degree early warning fence against very low flying targets. There is also a need to integrate soft and hard defence systems. To deal with UAV threats Israel has unveiled Sky Dew Early warning system and Scorpius advance ECM. He concluded his presentation by saying that "any future military action in the region will be a missile and UAV war". 

In the Closing session, Maj. Gen. Dr. Bipin Bakshi, Deputy Director General MP-IDSA, apprised the participants about the various initiatives which include a start-up challenge where local industries are being roped in, especially in the last five years, to produce flight as well as land based robotic devices capable of carrying cameras and diffuse bombs. These industries are also being provided seed funding. He emphasised that India and Israel have been natural allies and enjoy mutual friendship with the US, Bahrain and UAE. The two countries have shared concerns of terrorism and issues of regional security. He mentioned that the US is making attempts to counter China and stressing on the ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy since a long time, in the light of China posing a hybrid threat using criminal groups as a front by the government. He drew attention to the collaboration between India and Israel in this complex environment. Furthermore, he highlighted that no regional security construct could be envisioned without contemplating on the US and China strategic competition particularly in the South and West Asian region.

Col. Dr. Eran Lerman summed up by pointing out three major developments. Firstly, the changes in Afghanistan and implications for the US, that shall affect the Middle East and the region surrounding India. Secondly, the idea of western Quad to complement the eastern Quad is another crucial geopolitical development.  Dr. Lerman stated this will bring together India, the US, Israel and the UAE, covering the spectrum of religious identity within the scope of like-mindedness. Thirdly, he mentioned that Iran is an ultimate challenge for Israel in maintaining stability in the region.

Eurasia & West Asia
Monday Morning Webinar on “Economic Crisis in Sri Lanka: An Assessment” February 14, 2022 1030 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Gulbin Sultana, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will speak on “Economic Crisis in Sri Lanka: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Webinar which will be held on 14 February 2022 at 10.00 AM.

Dr. Anand Kumar, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will moderate the Webinar.

Dr. Zainab Akhter, Research Assistant, will be the rapporteur for this Webinar.

South Asia
Monday Morning Webinar on Key Takeaways from the U.S. State Department Report Limits in the Seas: China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea January 24, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Event Report

Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.) spoke on the topic Key Takeaways from the U.S. State Department Report “Limits in the Seas: China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea” at the Monday Morning Webinar held on 24 January 2022. The session was chaired by Capt. (IN) Anurag Bisen and was attended by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, senior scholars & research analysts of MP-IDSA.

Executive Summary

The US State Department since 1970 has been carrying out a series of studies that aims to examine coastal states’ maritime claims and boundaries to assess their consistency with the International Maritime Law. The latest report in this series that has been released in January 2022 focuses on the legality of China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (SCS). Although the UNCLOS has laid down the parameters for the coastal states to demarcate their respective maritime jurisdiction, there have been differing opinions between nations on the interpretation of Straight Baselines. The previous US assessments have dismissed the Chinese maritime claims in the SCS based on invalid basepoints. The latest in the series of these assessments has focused on the inconsistencies in Chinese maritime claims over Island territories like Pratas, Paracel, Scarborough Shoal and Spratly promulgated based on Straight Based lines.

Earlier reports have suggested that the geographical features along China’s coastlines do not meet the conditions for Straight Baselines as laid out by the UNCLOS and China has been inappropriately using its low-tide elevation as basepoints to stake their maritime claims in the SCS. The latest report by the US State Department interprets China’s claim over the SCS on the basis of historical rights lacking any legal basis. In the absence of an alternative customary international law for providing a legal basis for non-archipelagic states to establish straight baselines, the Chinese maritime claims stand in violation of the provisions of UNCLOS. Hence the Chinese claims gravely undermine the international rules based order as a result of which the US along with other nations have rejected the Chinese claims over the SCS as illegal. The report reflects that the American Position regarding the SCS Maritime Dispute is similar to the 2016 tribunal verdict given by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  

Detailed Report

Capt. (IN) Anurag Bisen, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA commenced the session by a giving brief overview on the topic, where he stated that the limits in the sea series issued since 1970’s by the Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs (OES) of the US State Department aims to examine the maritime claims of coastal states and assess their compatibility with International Law. Capt. Bisen pointed out to the fact that although the US has accepted the UNCLOS as international customary law but it has not yet ratified it. Describing the South China Sea (SCS) as the geostrategic core of Southeast Asia and the basis of Sino-US confrontation,     Capt. Bisen stated that the territorial disputes of SCS and Taiwan have become high potential theatres of conflict between US and China. With these opening remarks Capt. Bisen welcomed Cmde. Abhay K Singh to make his presentation.

Cmde. Abhay K. Singh, began his presentation by stating that the UNCLOS provides the basis for coastal states to claim their territorial jurisdiction at seas by laying down the parameters for demarcation of their maritime jurisdiction. He stated that UNCLOS recognises certain states as archipelagic states which are governed by a distinct set of rules, where these states are allowed to draw straight baselines to demarcate their territorial seas. Focusing on China’s maritime claims at SCS, Cmde. Singh quoted Report no.43 titled “Straight Baselines: People’s Republic of China”. This report published on 4 September 1958 provided the US’s perspective on the PRC declaration of territorial seas where China claimed 12 nautical miles based on Straight Baselines without any geographical coordinates and prohibited foreign vessels from entering these areas. China also on this basis laid claim to islands in the region like Taiwan, Paracel, Spratly and Pratas which were not under Chinese control at that time.

Cmde. Singh stated that the US assessment of the Chinese claims declared them invalid as the basepoints of these claims are without any geographical coordinates and described the language of these claims as vague and subject to interpretations. Also, these assessments pointed out that the Islands that were claimed by the PRC were not under their jurisdiction as they were either controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) or other countries. Subsequent US assessments stated that China is imposing large areas of the high seas and claiming them as internal water which contradicted the UNCLOS. Further, it states that much of China’s coastline does not meet the conditions of the Straight Baselines and China has used low-tide elevation inappropriately to use them as a basepoint. Cmde. Singh recalled that many of the Freedom of Navigation (FON) exercises carried out by the US were focused around the Hainan Province, where US objected to China’s excessive maritime claims in the region.  Report no. 143 titled “China’s Maritime Claims in the SCS” released in December 2014 declares China’s Nine Dash Line as having no historic basis and hence cannot be considered as a valid national boundary.  

Cmde. Singh stated that the most recent report in this series which is Report no. 150 builds upon the previous Report no. 143 of 2014. This report states that since the tribunal ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2016, China has revised its articulation of maritime claims. China’s revised claims states that its island group includes Pratas, Paracel, Scarborough Shoal and Spratly all of which have been promulgated by the Straight Baselines. Essentially the report argues that China’s maritime claim over these maritime features is inconsistent with the International Law, as more than a hundred features are low-tide elevation and beyond the lawful territorial sea.  Cmde. Singh bought out the fact that China justifies these claims on the basis that much before the existence of UNCLOS, states have been using Straight Baselines for demarcating their maritime territory. He stated one of the key issues in state practice or customary law is Opinio Juris which refers to the acceptance of the law when the state practices are universally recognised by features. Cmde. Singh stated that Article 7 of UNLCOS does provide the use of Straight Baselines wherever it is applicable. Nations like Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Netherlands, Russia, France, Spain and UK among others have clarified that their Straight Baselines are based on the rules reflected in UNCLOS and they do not recognise the baselines of other states not confirmed by the Convention. The report has shown that only baseline practices of PRC and Ecuador predate the convention. It says wherever a state claims a large maritime area consisting of Island groups this practice is extremely limited with the exception of PRC with the Paracel Islands, Ecuador with the Galápagosand and India with respect to the Lakshadweep.

Summarising the key highlights of the Report, Cmde. Singh stated that PRC’s territorial claim based on historic rights claims has no legal basis. Also, he bought out that there is no customary international law that provides an alternative legal basis for non-archipelagic states to establish straight baselines around outlying island groups. Labelling PRC’s claim of territorial jurisdiction over SCS as unlawful, Cmde. Singh empahsied the fact that such claims gravely undermine the international law on maritime jurisdiction.

During the panel discussion Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA remarked that the debate on International Law has been continuing for a long time which is reflected through early works on International Law like Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum. He bought out that during the Seventeenth Century even Hugo Grotius was tasked by the Dutch with a mandate of finding a legal basis to contest Spanish Claims in the maritime region around the present day Malacca Strait. However, the conception of a globally accepted legal basis for maritime jurisdiction has remained elusive even in the Twentieth Century. Ambassador Chinoy pointed out that even the globally accepted UNCLOS has certain contentious parts as a result of which certain nations including the US have not yet ratified. This has resulted in creating complexities in the UNCLOS including the interpretation of Straight Baselines. He stated the series of reports published by the US State Department since the 1970’s reveal how US’s interpretation of the maritime cartography and the blatant nature of Chinese claims have evolved over time. Also Ambassador Chinoy mentioned the differing interpretations of Rights of Passage in Laksahdweep between India and the US and encouraged scholars of MP-IDSA to undertake a study on how India’s perspective on archipelagic claims converge and differ from that of China and US.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA bought out that SCS is a region that offers China an access to break out of the Island Chains as a result of which China is making such aggressive claims due to which the region has the potential to become a flashpoint for maritime conflict. He stated that the presentation made by Cmde. Singh has made it clear that the maritime claim line is not an exact mirror of the geometry of the coastline of a nation.

During the Q&A Session, responding to the Director General’s question on US position on China’s sovereign claim in SCS, Cmde. Singh stated that the American position is closer to the 2016 tribunal verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Responding to another question posed by the Director General regarding the reason for India not considering Straight Baselines in Andaman & Nicobar Islands excepting the Western side, Cmde. Singh stated given the features on the Western coast of islands the provisions of UNCLOS allows for the application of Straight Baselines, but on the Eastern Side it would not be permissible. In response to the Deputy Director General’s question on ascertaining the low-tide line as its measurement will differ due to spring tides and neap tides, Cmde. Singh explained that it is measured on the basis of Chart Datum which is the line from the coast beyond which a large amount of low tide will not go below and there are technical formulas to calculate these Chart Datum based on hydrographical observations.  Responding to a question on the discussion between China and the ASEAN nations on the code of conduct on SCS and its legality, Cmde. Singh stated that if the code of conduct is framed in a manner where the members ascribe themselves to legal compliance and mutually agree that any deviation would be subjected to prosecution, then it can be legally binding.

Key Takeaways:

  • Interpretation of the US State Department’s recent Report makes it clear that PRC’s maritime claim on the SCS on the basis of historic claims has no legal basis.
  • There is no customary international law that provides an alternative to non-archipelagic states to establish straight baselines around outlying island groups.
  • China’s claim on territorial sovereignty over the SCS is unlawful.
  • Chinese maritime claims in the SCS undermine the UNCLOS and International Rules Based order.

Report prepared by Dr. R.Vignesh, Research Analyst, Military Affairs Centre, MP-IDSA

Military Affairs
Monday Morning Webinar on Understanding China’s Growing Military Footprints in Central Asia January 17, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Col. Deepak Kumar, Research Fellow and Coordinator, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA, spoke on the topic “Understanding China’s Growing Military Footprints in Central Asia” at the Monday Morning Webinar held on 17 January 2022. The webinar was moderated by Mr. Vishal Chandra, Research Fellow, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA; Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA; the panellists and scholars and members of the Institute participated in the webinar.

Executive Summary

China in recent years has increased its military presence in the Central Asian region by conducting joint military exercises, arms trade and building military infrastructure. Chinese military footprint is expanding in the so-called weaker Central Asian nations. Those with a relatively stronger economy and security structures have resisted Chinese overtures in their own manner. China’s increased military presence has an impact not only on the Central Asian region but also on the neighbouring regions. Russia is observant of the steps taken by China and India too is aware of the increased military presence.

Detailed Report

The Monday Morning Webinar began with Mr. Vishal Chandra, the moderator, referring to reports about the Chinese military presence in eastern Tajikistan, close to the Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan. The Corridor is strategically located between Tajikistan to the north, China to the east, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) to the south. The reports though denied by the Tajik Government, but assuming the Chinese have some military presence there, it has to be seen either as a part of the Sino-Russian collaboration or the Sino-Russian competition. Referring to the diversity of Central Asia, he observed that there is a Turkic Central Asia, a Persian Central Asia, and then there is a Russian Central Asia. Historically, it included parts of southern Russia, the Xinjiang Region (western China), and northern Afghanistan.

Col. Deepak Kumar, the speaker, began his presentation by referring to China establishing its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 and Chinese troops’ presence in Tajikistan. He pointed to the popular narrative of Russia being the security provider and China the economic provider in Central Asia. When it comes to Central Asia, China sees two main threats: possible spill-over of radical Islam into its restive Xinjiang Region and threat to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure. According to the speaker, Chinese military footprints are visible in four areas: arms assistance, military training and exercise, military bases and private security companies.

While focusing on arms assistance, data was shared by the speaker from the year 1991–2018 on arms imports by the Central Asian Republics from Russia and China. Overall Russia leads in arms supplies, however, there is a gradual increase in arms imports from China in the last five years particularly by Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In Turkmenistan, China has overtaken Russia as the second largest arms supplier after Turkey. According to data sourced from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China has supplied more than $60 billion to Central Asia since 1991. 97 per cent of Chinese sales and assistance happened after 2014. From 2010–2014, Chinese arms to Central Asia comprised about 0.5 per cent of Central Asian arms imports, whereas from 2015–2019 China provided 18 per cent of the region’s arms. Russian arms supply in the last 10 years has been consistently about 60 per cent. Imports from China are increasing particularly in the field of technology such as drones and missiles.

As far as military exercises are concerned the speaker stated that from 2014 to 2019, China held 10 bilateral exercises with Central Asia. In 2016, China and Tajikistan held an exercise in the Gorno-Badakhshan region that borders Afghanistan, in which 10,000 personnel were involved. China in the same year formed a Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan for counter terrorism, mainly because China felt that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was not aligning to its agenda. China has conducted nearly same numbers of bilateral and multilateral exercises as Russia, with 60 per cent of the exercises involving the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and not the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 2019, for Cooperation Series Exercises, Chinese PAP interoperated with the armies of the Central Asian countries. Essentially, China wants the PAP to be its military front in Central Asia.

Speaking about military bases and infrastructure, the speaker brought out that until 2016, only Russia had its military presence in Central Asia, however in October 2016, China constructed 11 border outposts and a training centre for border guards in Tajikistan. A separate border outpost in the Shamyak village in Murgab District was also constructed in 2016. Another military base financed by China will be constructed in Tajikistan as per a recent agreement for about $10 million but no Chinese personnel will be stationed in that base. There is also a Chinese electronic warfare facility in Tajikistan, which was used to monitor the Western forces in Afghanistan. Lately, Chinese Institutes have begun training courses for Central Asian officers including language classes and offer a higher stipend than Russia.

The speaker further spoke about Private Security Companies and mentioned that Chinese state-owned organisations like the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps are remodelling their scope to include security services for the BRI. The future role of training Central Asian paramilitaries and officers is also under consideration. Many Chinese private security companies are present in Central Asia.

The speaker elaborated on the consequences of the Chinese military presence in the region. Chinese security outreach is linked to its expanding national interest and PLA and PAP are being used for protecting Chinese interests. China, according to the speaker, will use the military for its national interest but in the short term would not be directly involved in any confrontations in Central Asia. China is trying to establish a strategic foothold in areas where Russian technology is lacking and is ready to supply the needed technologies. Chinese military education will have a significant impact on the composition of the military leadership in Central Asia.

The presence of troops near Wakhan, which is situated close to Gilgit-Baltistan, has implications for India. Chinese electronic warfare facilities could be used to monitor Indian military activity in the neighbourhood. 

In the short-term, the Russia–China bonhomie can be expected to continue. Rather than Russia’s arms exports, China presently is slicing from the arms exports share of other countries like Ukraine, Turkey, Spain and France. In the long run, it may eat up Russian space for arms trade which could cause friction between the two. 

India has strong connections with Central Asia including military exercises and visits from senior military leaders to India. India has increased its outreach in the region including visits by the Indian Foreign Minister to Central Asia and hosting of Third India–Central Dialogue.

The speaker concluded by stating that there is evidence of growing Chinese influence in Central Asian security and at present it is calibrated to keep Russian sensitivities in mind. In future, China might not defer to Russia and perhaps even develop its own initiatives and ignore Russia.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA stated that historically, China used to be strictly against foreign bases. Exports were generally part of the Chinese matrix. Even in the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese did send a large number of arms and ammunition to the Afro-Asian countries. Chinese views have changed and can be predicated on their realisation of the enormous economic stakes as the world’s biggest trading power. It would like some security for its investments like the BRI.

He also brought to the fore that the PAP is a part of the PLA so two features should be kept in mind. Firstly, as the PLA was demobilised in the past, many joined the PAP. Secondly, there is no distinction between the operational training, military craft, etc., and weapons allocated to the PAP and the PLA.

 He made the point that China in Wakhan is extremely worried about any malicious insidious outpours coming out of Afghanistan into their soft underbelly. There is also an increase in the role and importance of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) after the recent Kazakhstan protests. It is certainly back in the reckoning.

He also mentioned that Chinese Policy in Xinjiang has always been predicated on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which is also the group sanctioned by the United States.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA said that the route from Tajikistan to Xinjiang is the only route from where anything can come into China. China is trying to stabilise and prevent the entry of terror organisations into Xinjiang. Chinese military’s entry into this narrow zone with a narrow purpose may not constitute a major military development. It is doubtful whether electronic warfare elements deployed in eastern Tajikistan  have the capabilities to cross the Pamir Knot and track Indian military movement. He also asked if there is space for Indian private security companies to enter into this zone of the CARs.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA made the point that though Chinese military expansion is visible, Russia is still the ‘go-to’ country when it comes to the SOS for regime stability. Russia is the actor the countries could rely on and CSTO is a Russian-led organisation. There exists a convergence of interests between Russia and China when it comes to the West. There is competition but also cooperation. There is a plan to strike a balance between each actor to maximise economic gains and maintain their scope for strategic autonomy.

He said that the potential of trilateral India, Russia and Central Asia defence cooperation has been talked about and asked what could be the contours of this trilateral partnership?

Dr.Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA said that Europe is working on gas supplies with Turkmenistan and vice-versa. She asked about the ways for these countries to diversify energy security and their link to Europe.

Ms. Anandita Bhada, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA asked whether India offers any defence courses for the Central Asian defence personnel? If yes, can it help in further improving the India–Central Asia relations?  

Mr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA stated that the short-term bonhomie between Russia and China is evident. He asked the speaker to elucidate on the possible situation in the long run, particularly since China is heavily investing in its military presence in Tajikistan, which is also a CSTO member.

He also said that QCCM was established in pre-Taliban Afghanistan but the current crisis in Afghanistan has led to a Taliban-led Afghanistan. He asked as to how this impacts the QCCM?

Col Deepak Kumar, the speaker, gave detailed and insightful replies in response to comments and questions received from the panellists and participants.

Report prepared by Mr Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.  

Europe and Eurasia
Monday Morning Webinar on 25 years of the Ganga Treaty: What Lies Ahead? January 10, 2022 1030 to 1300 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Centre Coordinator, Non-Traditional Security Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses spoke on the topic "25 Years of the Ganga Treaty: What Lies Ahead?” at MP-IDSA’s regular Monday Morning Webinar held on 10 January 2022. Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik, Research Fellow, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, chaired the webinar. Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, scholars and members of the Institute attended the webinar.

Executive Summary

The Ganga Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh has come a long way since its signing in 1996. The treaty is for a period of 30 years and is due for renewal in 2026. With the impact of climate change on water resources and the emerging inter and intra-state water sharing challenges, it would be important for both countries to work towards the future contours of the Ganga Treaty. The next five years, therefore, will be crucial.

Detailed Report

Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik introduced the topic and highlighted the importance of the Ganga Treaty that was signed on 12 December 1996. She mentioned that on both sides there exist several concerns pertaining to the availability and flow of the Ganga water and when the Treaty comes up for renewal, several challenges will have to be overcome given the fact that water sharing is highly political, emotive and divisive.

Dr. Sinha highlighted 1996 as a landmark year, which he described as a ‘Hydrological Moment’.  1996 not only saw the signing of the Ganga Treaty but also the Mahakali Treaty with Nepal which was signed in February 1996. Further touching upon the political developments that led to the signing of the Ganga Treaty, Dr. Sinha, mentioned that Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, who came to power in June 1996 played an important leadership role. He recalled that in a joint statement, soon after signing the treaty in New Delhi, Hasina very wisely and carefully called it “The Ganga Treaty” rather than the anglicised Ganges, or the Padma, as the river is known in Bangladesh. The 1996 Ganga Treaty he explained was a culmination of several water sharing developments that took place since the Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971.  These include the 1977-1982 agreement and several other one year MOU’s on water-sharing between the two countries. Dr. Sinha informed that soon after Bangladesh’s independence, the Joint River Commission was established in 1972 to map and survey the ‘common rivers’ between India and Bangladesh.

With this brief historical narration, Dr. Sinha then discussed the transboundary river dynamics. First, he mentioned that transboundary rivers establish a complex network of environmental, social, economic and security interdependencies. Second, rivers crisscrossing boundaries in South Asia brings in an interesting politico-diplomatic framework. Rivers can act as a catalyst for cooperation between states as well as become a source of competition and rivalry. What, therefore, emerges, is a hydro-politico-security complex, in which a distinct hydro-behaviour of states can be determined along with upstream-downstream contestations. He observed that South Asia is a ‘riverine neighborhood’ where predictability and availability of water in the rivers will be challenged by demands and pressures and also by the knowns and unknowns of climate change.

On the specifics of the Ganga Treaty, Dr. Sinha mentioned that the Farakka Barrage has always created fear and apprehension in the minds of the people of Bangladesh, because of the water that has been diverted to Hooghly in the maintenance of Calcutta port. He asserted that the entire debate on Farakka in the 1960’s between India and East Pakistan was based on strong opposition from Islamabad on ‘not’ having the Farakka Barrage. But India’s hydrocracy prevailed and the Farakka Barrage was commissioned in 1975. Interestingly, Dr. Sinha captured the Lok Sabha debate soon after the Treaty was signed and highlighted some of the statements from Members of Parliament present during the discussion in particular, Uma Bharti, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi. Even Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh, as Dr. Sinha explained, had to face strong criticism on the water sharing mechanism.

Briefly commenting on the political setup in India during the signing of the Ganga Treaty, Dr. Sinha mentioned that the year 1996 saw an uneasy coalition government which wanted to leave a legacy especially in neighbourhood diplomacy. The Ganga Treaty like the 1977 agreement was signed by a non-Congress government. Dr. Sinha highlighted the role of India’s ‘Left Parties’ and the important role played by Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister of West Bengal. Sheikh Hasina built good personal rapport with Jyoti Basu keeping in mind the importance of West Bengal. She also, unlike the previous regimes in Bangladesh, did not internationalise the issue of Ganga waters despite domestic pressures.

Looking ahead, Dr. Sinha mentioned that the Indian states of U.P. and Bihar will have to be factored in the effective utilization of Ganga water. He mentioned that India has done its ‘utmost’ to maintain the flow of water. He highlighted the basic principles of the Ganga Water Treaty, which has been adhered to the best possible extent despite several contrary noises in Bangladesh. These include: 1. Equitable; 2. Fairness and 3. No Harm. He mentioned that for the future course of this treaty ‘dialogue and negotiations’ would remain crucial and critical. Further, the mechanisms and institutions that exist between India and Bangladesh on water sharing require updating. Transparency, trust and accountability remains important in terms of data exchange and information sharing on available water resources. Dr. Sinha suggested that Indian diplomats posted in the neighbourhood need to be trained in hydro-diplomacy and be familiarised with technical knowledge on hydrology. Finally, the speaker concluded by highlighting that Bangladesh needs ‘the Ganga Barrage’ that could be optimised to operate with the ‘Farakka Barrage’. This will not only restore the environment in the southern part of Bangladesh but would also provide water in dry season for irrigation in eastern India and central Bangladesh.

Questions and Comments

Following this extensive talk, Dr. Pattanaik made her remarks and invited Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy to make his comments. The floor was later opened for the panelists and participants for their comments and questions.

Ambassador Chinoy thanked the speaker and pointed out that water is not only the root cause of many disputes between states, but also similar disputes are witnessed domestically as well. Citing the example of the Krishna water dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, Ambassador Chinoy mentioned that such complex water-related issues are equally difficult to deal with internally. Second, he mentioned that water-related issues between states become even more complex when rivers enter and re-enter the territories of states. Third, he mentioned that the water disputes are largely related to its sharing. He also pointed out that water can be used as a weapon and cited the 2004 Parechu incident. He took the opportunity to state China’s reluctance on sharing hydrological data with India that led to downstream dangers on the Sutlej river when the huge water accumulated in the lake Parechu suddenly burst through.  

Capt. Anurag Bisen mentioned that China does not have any water treaty with lower riparian countries as compared to India and asked the speaker as to why India did not sign the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. He also asked Dr. Sinha to comment on India’s so-called generosity in signing water-sharing agreements with lower riparian countries.

Col. (Dr) Divakaran Padma Kumar Pillay (Retd.) in his remarks also commented on India’s generous approach in water-sharing agreements with lower riparian states. Col. Pillay asked the Speaker to comment on such an approach. 

Dr. Nihar K Nayak in his remarks mentioned that 47 per cent of water to the Ganges comes from Nepal during the non-lean period and simultaneously during the lean period (i.e. during dry season) 75 per cent of the water flow in the Ganges comes from Nepal. He asked the speaker, "Should India involve Nepal in the future Ganga Water Treaty that is going to be renewed in 2026”? 

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma asked the speaker to comment on the IPCC sixth assessment report that highlights the impact of climate change on the flow of the water in the Ganges River in the near future. He also asked the speaker to comment on the issue of ‘Climate Refugees’ that may emerge for Bangladesh as a result of drought and flooding (according to the IPCC 6th Assessment Report).

Dr. Sinha gave a detailed explanation to the comments and questions raised by the panelists and the participants.

Report prepared by Bipandeep Sharma, Research Analyst, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

Non-Traditional Security
Webinar Discussion on India-Australia Bilateral Relations February 10, 2022 Other

Centre for Southeast Asia and Oceania organised a webinar discussion on India-Australia bilateral relations, where Col. Ravinder Pal Singh, Research Fellow at MP-IDSA, delivered a presentation on “Australia’s Strategic Posturing in Indo-Pacific: Imperatives for India”, on 10 February 2022 at 1500 hours (IST). Mr. Mahadevan Shankar, National Convenor for Defence and Security Working Group in the Australia-India Chamber of Commerce, joined as an external discussant while Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow at MP-IDSA, joined as an internal discussant. Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh, Cluster Coordinator for Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre and Senior Research Associate at MP-IDSA, moderated the session. Ms. Shruti Pandalai, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA, and Mr. Akash Sahu, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA, were also part of the discussion.  

Executive Summary

India and Australia have improved their bilateral relations in the past decades to reach an alignment of their foreign policies. Even though Canberra’s loyalties may be more firmly rooted in treaty alliances such as ANZUS, than the QUAD, there is an acute realisation that China’s aggressive actions can pose a threat to its national security. New Delhi and Canberra may work together to eliminate mutual suspicions, and boost bilateral ties for greater synergy on foreign policy issues.

Detailed Report

Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh began the session with an introduction on India-Australia relations, and traced major points of their engagement in the past few decades. He noted that the history of their relationship has been an important determinant of bilateral trust and political will to deepen relations. India and Australia may be at a point in time that changing global order could bring them closer in bilateral as well as multilateral forums like the Quad. It may be important in that case to address issues that can prevent a stronger and more comprehensive strategic partnership.

In his presentation, Col. R.P. Singh began with an overview of the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. He highlighted the great power rivalry between the US and China which can potentially shape diplomatic alliances among countries in the region. The rivalry is evident from policy documents coming out of Washington on defence as well as trade. The global influence of the US seems to be declining and the Biden administration has chosen to go along with Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The rise of minilaterals in the region characterise fast-changing security dynamics. Increased focus on non-traditional security and ASEAN centrality have also been crucial areas of the regional security discourse. Col. Singh traced Australia’s deteriorating relations with China since after Canberra publicly supported calls for investigation on COVID-19. As a reaction, China ceased imports from Australia which has adversely impacted their bilateral equation. Australia shares India’s vision for freedom and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. It has also been part of a new trilateral AUKUS, under which it will receive critical technological support from the US for nuclear-powered submarines. The 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Defence Strategic Update coming out of Australia underlined its perspective on deterrence and response with a credible minimum force. Canberra’s strategy could be seen as recognising the threat, building a response, and developing capabilities accordingly.

On India’s engagement with Australia, Col. Singh highlighted the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries, participation in the QUAD, Joint exercises like Malabar and AUSINDEX, and ASEAN forums like ADMM Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum, and East Asia Summit. Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Indian Ocean Rim Association, and the MILAN exercise have also strengthened bilateral relations. India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and Forum for India- Pacific Islands Cooperation indicate New Delhi’s focus on the Indo-Pacific. Col. Singh recommended joint defence manufacturing, joint training for interoperability of forces, and long-term reciprocal arrangements.

Mr. Mahadevan Shankar observed that Australia’s relations with India have been long impacted by colonial perceptions, but relations have improved particularly as Indo-US ties have strengthened. With the election of Trump in the US, security guarantees to Australia came under question, and Australians began to contemplate how they can independently tackle threats to their national security in the Indo-Pacific region. This can be seen as the underpinning for a substantial change in Canberra’s national security approach, which also precipitated the formation of AUKUS. On the question of Taiwan, Canberra is so firmly tied to the US alliance and security commitments that it can be expected to back the US if things go south between China and Taiwan. Thus, Australia looks to India as a potential partner in a volatile security environment of the region.

Cmde. Abhay K. Singh in his remarks noted that while the US influence may be perceived as declining, the absolute American naval power in the Pacific is formidable. This allows the US to be a major player in the regional security equation to balance China. He also cautioned that Australian ‘fickleness’ is a big challenge and suggested that India-Australia ‘strategic convergence needed to transform into ‘strategic interdependence’.  Ms. Shruti Pandalai posed a question on the differing meanings of interoperability of forces among like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. It was unanimously agreed that different military hardware may induce challenges for more streamlined joint training, but that may be overcome through regular exercises. Mr. Akash Sahu raised a question on Australia’s trade in the region, and how that may impact its diplomatic alliances. Mr. Shankar responded that even though China had been Australia’s prime destination for exports; a large portion of those have found alternative markets. For New Delhi, this is a sign of Canberra’s autonomy in pursuing its security and foreign policy. Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh summed up the discussion and expressed that greater dialogue between India and Australia may help them reach a deeper level of strategic partnership.

The report was prepared by Mr. Akash Sahu, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning Meeting on Indian Foreign Secretary’s Visit to Myanmar: Prospects for India-Myanmar Relations January 03, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

The Monday morning meeting on “Indian Foreign Secretary’s Visit to Myanmar: Prospects for India-Myanmar Relations” was conducted on 3 January, 2022. Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh, Coordinator, Southeast Asia & Oceania Centre, delivered a presentation on the topic and the session was chaired by Dr. Priyanka Singh. The panelists included Director-General Ambassador Sujan Chinoy, Deputy-Director General Maj. Gen (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha and Research Analyst Mr. Akash Sahu.

Executive Summary

The discussion brought forward sensitive strategic issues of India’s stance in the Myanmar crisis, and sought to weigh different options to find a path for cooperation. India may engage with Myanmar on different levels and seek to strengthen its position vis-à-vis economic and strategic bilateral relations. The Bay of Bengal may emerge as a new frontier for power rivalry, and India must be vigilant about naval activities taking place in the region.

Detailed Report

The session was commenced by the chair highlighting Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla’s visit to Myanmar. The visit could be seen as India’s outreach to Myanmar as the foreign secretary arrived there with one million doses of COVID vaccines. The chair posed some questions central to the discussion for the day, such as-

  • Why does India engage with the regime in Myanmar? Is the China factor a determinant in India’s actions regarding Myanmar?
  • How long can India keep engaging the regime, especially as most western nations have cut off ties with Myanmar and even imposed economic sanctions?

Dr. Singh began his presentation by observing that the democratisation process in Myanmar has been derailed. He provided a background on the events that led to the military coup in Myanmar by the Armed forces or ‘Tatmadaw’ in early 2021. The election results, where popular leader Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory, were disputed by the Tatmadaw even though no substantial evidence of any electoral fraud could be found. The Tatmadaw under Min Aung Hlaing refused to accept the election outcomes and seized political power in the country. The regime has set August 2023 as a tentative time for upcoming elections, but, that has not stopped a popular outrage against the regime. The movement has been crushed by the military and hundreds of citizens have been put behind bars. Dr. Singh spoke about external relations of Myanmar and pointed out the regime’s closeness with Russia and China. China transferred a submarine to Myanmar, and China continues to supply arms to the regime. Japan has retained its close ties with the military administration in Naypyidaw. China developed close ties with the Myanmar regime during years of its boycott by the west. It has carefully cultivated strategic and economic dependencies for Myanmar which it may not be able to easily shrug off.

But it does not end there. There have been reports of mistrust between China and the Tatmadaw as well. Even if this may have put strain on their relationship, China still maintains strong clout in Myanmar. That is particularly in context to its infrastructure projects such as oil and gas pipelines and highways. On Myanmar’s economy, Dr. Singh underlined its poor and declining state. He also said that influx of refugees to India may increasingly become a problem. In such matters, the centre and state governments in India have not always found agreement, but it may be useful to take the states into confidence as they are an important agency in negotiating with local insurgencies. India supports the ASEAN process and its five-point resolution. It may act in concert with other ASEAN partners like Vietnam to preserve its relationship with the regime, and even compel it to bring reformative changes in the polity of Myanmar.

The Director-General shared his comments on the developing situation and observed that India’s Act East policy is contingent on good relations with Myanmar. India has had to tackle multiple fronts such as incoming refugees and the Rohingya situation. For India to join the bandwagon of countries demanding the regime to bring back democracy may not be very prudent. Given that it shares a long border with Myanmar and naturally has a much larger stake than western nations, India may weigh its options carefully before deciding to sanction the regime or break ties. The Indian government has dealt with monarchies on its periphery before, such as Nepal and Bhutan, and has established successful diplomacy in those cases. Acting in haste in case of Myanmar may only push the country deeper into the axis with China, which can be counterproductive for India. He also pointed out that the Tatmadaw is a structured and powerful organisation, therefore, it may be expected to remain in power for the foreseeable future. More importantly, the citizens of Myanmar must influence their own politics rather than an external power. The Deputy Director-General reiterated the view and added that Indian armed forces have had a cordial relationship with the Tatmadaw. Their involvement with the regime can be fruitful for India to maintain a presence in Myanmar.

Vice Admiral Sinha supported the views expressed and spoke about Bay of Bengal as a new frontier for growing power rivalry. Given Myanmar’s island territories in the region and Beijing’s intention to use the waterways of Bay of Bengal, India must be cautious of China’s growing influence. India has trained Myanmar’s Navy for several years and this cooperation among the two armed forces may be utilised as an asset in diplomacy. Mr. Sahu asked a question on India’s economic policy regarding Myanmar, which may help to build confidence among Indian investors to continue operating in Myanmar and even expand their operations. In response to that, Dr. Singh noted that a detailed analysis of the working of different ministries in Myanmar may be of help in assessing where India must focus its outreach to safeguard its investors and business interests in Myanmar. Dr. Singh summed up the discussion and highlighted that China’s interaction with Myanmar may be closely monitored by India.

Report prepared by Mr. Akash Sahu, Research Analyst at Centre for Southeast Asia and Oceania.

South East Asia and Oceania
Report of Monday Morning Webinar on An Assessment of the Security Situation in Jammu & Kashmir February 07, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Manzoor Ahmad BhatResearch Analyst, Internal Security Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, spoke on “An Assessment of the Security Situation in Jammu & Kashmir”, at the Monday Morning Webinar held on 7 February 2022. The webinar was chaired by Dr. Pushpita Das, Centre Coordinator, Internal Security Centre. Director General, Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy, Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. Bipin Bakshi, Col. Vivek Chadha and other scholars of the institute participated in the webinar.

Executive Summary

With an overall decline in terrorist-related violence statistics, the security situation in Jammu and Kashmir has relatively improved over the last two years. More importantly, the security forces have succeeded in tapping the external influences in the Kashmir Valley. Although it is a positive indication, but this alone, cannot ensure long-term peace and stability in Jammu and Kashmir. To bring Jammu and Kashmir back on the path of normalcy, the decline in violence should pave the way for strengthening of democratic institutions at the grassroots level. The dominant counter-terrorism paradigms advocate promotion of democracy as the best method to decrease the political utility of terrorist violence.

Detailed Report

Dr. Pushpita Das initiated the webinar by recalling the apparent security apprehensions which were associated with the abrogation of Article 370 from the state of J&K on 5 August 2019. She underscored that the security situation in J&K, on the other hand, had remained largely under control as several militants were neutralised in the past two and a half years. She attributed the success to the intelligence-backed security operations, wherein, intelligence was provided by the locals. Dr. Das, however, expressed her concerns over the challenges due to the creation of new militant groups, the emergence of ‘hybrid militancy’, cross-border infiltration of terrorists; and, smuggling of narcotics & small arms etc.

Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Bhat began his presentation by giving an update on the security situation in J&K. Comparing the violence statistics (terrorist incidents, fatalities, cross-border infiltration, encounters between terrorists and SFs) for the two periods i.e. prior to and after the abrogation of Article 370; Dr. Bhat assessed that the militancy in J&K has registered a declining trend in the period following the abrogation of Article 370. 

Description

16 April 2017 to 4 August 2019 (841 Days)

5 August 2019 to 30 Nov 2021 (841 Days)

Terrorist Incidents

843

496

Civilians Killed

86

79

Security Forces Killed

78

45

With respect to cross-border infiltration, a similar declining trend was evident suggesting that the security forces in J&K have been relatively successful in controlling the external influences in Kashmir in the period following the abrogation of Article 370.

Description

2018

2019

2020

2021

Net Infiltration

143

141

51

28 (till Oct 31)

Dr. Bhat discussed the important developments which were relevant to the changed security situation in the post-abrogation period. The three districts- Baramula, Kupwara and Bandipora- which were the hot bed of militancy earlier, have largely remained peaceful for some time. Listing the region-wise contribution to the militant violence, Dr. Bhat stated that the four southern districts of Kashmir-Shopian, Pulwama, Kulgam and Anantnag-together accounted for 65 per cent of the total militant violence in 2021; followed by Central Kashmir (18 %); and North Kashmir (17 %). With respect to the district-wise percentage of the encounters between the militants and SFs, Shopian tops the list with 20 per cent of the total encounters, followed by Kulgam (19 per cent), Pulwama (16 per cent) and Srinagar (14 per cent). Rajouri and Poonch have remained relatively at peace and most of the encounters reported in these two districts were related to infiltration.

Dr. Bhat also expressed his views on the changing dynamics of militancy in the Kashmir Valley. The militant outfit- Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), which had come into prominence during Burhan Wani’s leadership and after his death, has contributed relatively less as compared to the Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. According to him, the elimination of HM’s top leadership and its policy of giving room to freshly minted groups like The Resistance Front (TRF), Peoples Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) etc. – were the possible explanations. He opined that the emergence of new ‘terrorist brands’ like TRF, the Ghaznavi Force, the Geelani Force, Kashmir Tigers etc., was mainly to ensure that the links of any big terrorist attack in J&K could not be traced back to Pakistan.

Another perceptible change/trend was the dip in the killing of Pakistani terrorists compared to local militants in J&K. Dr. Bhat attributed it to the killing of Burhan Wani, as during his time and after his killing, lot of Kashmiri youth had joined militancy in the state. He also added that the same could also be a reflection of the changed approach of Pakistan to militancy in Kashmir, driven by the pressure from FATF and its preoccupation with Afghanistan. In the wake of  the recent developments in J&K, Dr. Bhat argued that there was an increased attempt to “secularise the Jihad” in Kashmir as all the new organisations had consciously avoided religious symbolism in their titles. The intention, according to him, was to project it as a resistance movement, which is somewhat acceptable to the international community.

In order to explain the above-mentioned developments in the security situation in J&K, Dr. Bhat cited the ‘Strategic Model’ of terrorism that assumes terrorists as ‘rational actors’ and most importantly talks about ‘Political Utility’. Based on this model, reducing the political utility of terrorism is considered as the best counter-terrorism strategy. Dr. Bhat said that the recent changes in the Government’s policy with respect to J&K, and especially on terrorism in the Valley, have largely contributed to the improved security situation over the last two and a half years. The Government’s policy of non-appeasement and the resolve to directly deal with the sustaining factors of militancy etc., were a clear departure from the earlier period.

Dr. Bhat concluded his presentation by outlining the security threats and issues associated with the relatively new "hybrid" militants/militancy in J&K. He anticipated that the new militancy-framework could appeal to a large number of militants, particularly locals, due to the greater impunity and fewer risks it entails.

The following important points came up during the discussion.

The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy expressed his disagreement on ‘secularisation of the Jihad’ in J&K. He said that militancy in J&K has been largely Kashmir-centric, and that the state as a whole is not participating in militancy. Even communities such as Buddhists, Bakarwals, Gujjars and Kashmiri Pandits, among others, are never involved in terrorism. He advised the speaker to revisit his opinion/ theory on the ‘secularisation of the Jihad’ in J&K. Ambassador Chinoy also sought the speaker’s thoughts on anticipated changes in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy if FATF pressure and its preoccupation with Afghanistan change. In response to the Director General’s comment, Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Bhat, clarified that his reference to “secularisation of the Jihad” was to mainly emphasise that the intention is to make it more of a resistance movement that can garner more international solidarity. He clarified that this is not meant to widen the net to include recruits from other communities.

Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. Bipin Bakshi spoke on the efficacy of the robust counter-infiltration grid as an important factor responsible for the improved security situation in J&K. He opined that this is a manifestation of robust border management. Another important factor, according to Maj. Gen. Bakshi, has been the reduced influence of separatist leaders.

Key Takeaways

  1. Security forces in Jammu and Kashmir have managed to control external influence.
  2. The Government has reduced the political utility of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.
  3. New terrorist outfits have propped up which avoid religious symbolism to garner international support.
  4. Hybrid militancy can challenge the security forces for some time, but in the long run, it cannot be sustained without any organizational support.

The Report has been prepared by Ms. Rajbala Rana, Research Analyst, Internal Security Centre, MP-IDSA.

South Asia Jammu and Kashmir

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