Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
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Training for Senior BSF Commandant Course: Defence and Security Module Level-1 | February 27, 2012 to March 09, 2012 | Training Capsules | |||||||
DIG Course | January 23, 2012 to January 27, 2012 | Training Capsules | |||||||
Training for Senior BSF Commandant Course | October 24, 2011 to November 04, 2011 | Training Capsules | |||||||
Training Programme for BSF DIGs: Defence Security Module Level 11 | September 19, 2011 to September 23, 2011 | Training Capsules | |||||||
The APPA Course | September 07, 2011 | Training Capsules |
1045-1130 Global Security Environment by Brig (Retd)Rumel Dahiya |
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Lectures at IDSA as part of the Defence and Security Module were held for IFS Probationers | May 02, 2011 to May 11, 2011 | Training Capsules | |||||||
Defence and Security Module Level-II for the rank of BSF DIGs | December 17, 2012 to December 21, 2012 | Training Capsules | |||||||
Equipping UN Forces: Challenges & Remedies | February 08, 2013 | Venu Gopal | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Shri Amit Cowshish External Discussant: Col P Chandok and Col S Bhatia |
Military Affairs | |||
The Evolution of Chinese Military Doctrine | February 01, 2013 | Prashant Kumar Singh | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) This paper discusses the factors responsible for the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine and attempts to chalk out its nuances. Its core premise is that a military doctrine is a component of a nation’s grand strategy for security and, at times, it may not be stating actual military conditions but is simply a declaration of its strategic intent. The paper finds that Chinese have learned from their and others’ experience. China’s threat perception and relations with the nations of the world has changed with time influencing their military doctrine. Over the years, the Chinese have evolved four broad military doctrines:
The paper also refers to two other doctrines which are disputed to be independent military doctrines: Infomatised War (RMA): The discourse on revolution in military affairs (RMA) adds another dimension of “infomatised war” to the “limited war under high tech conditions”. Ideally, RMA is a holistic concept comprising social, economic, political and technological components. The Chinese discourse on infomatised warfare is based on the Chinese belief that information determines international relations and the outcome of wars. Chinese believe that digitized governance is the Achilles’ heel of the militarily advanced countries and this is where China can score in their depth. The Chinese assume that gathering precise and complete information in a literal sense is possible; and once there is correct information, one can bring the enemy to its knees even without fighting. In fact, information deterrence can prove more effective than nuclear deterrence. Information relating to cyberspace has the highest prominence in the Chinese discourse on infomatised war as well as RMA. The doctrine is quite offensive and the preferred tactics in this warfare are “surgical removal”, “selective attacks” and “precision raids” by missiles or other superior electronic weapons or computer science. Anti-Access-Area Denial (A2/AD): This is essentially an American term. The perceived Chinese A2/AD has a limited objective of holding back American forces in Taiwan contingency till the PLA troops land in Taiwan and build defences. The battle objectives are mainly to harass American troops to delay their access to the centre of action. However, as of now, these capabilities have defensive purpose and are still in nascent stage with questionable quality. The author concludes that over the last two decades, Chinese military doctrine has changed from being inward looking to looking-beyond-its-borders and more importantly seaward doctrine. Chinese military capabilities have persistently moved towards matching doctrinal expositions. However, the possession of asymmetric warfare capabilities as visualised under infomatised war doctrine by China and its ability to deploy them in conflict is a subject of speculation. Major points of discussion and suggestions to the author:
Some western scholars argue that the Chinese military is overstretched. (report prepared by Saurabh Mishra, Research Assistant IDSA) |
East Asia | ||||
Equipment and Force Structure Requirements to Meet External Threats 2032 | January 18, 2013 | Vivek Kapur | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), AVSM Major Highlights of the PaperThis paper addresses the equipment and force structure required to meet external challenges 2032. The current paper is second in the series of four papers that Gp Capt Kapur intends to do on a project “IAF Deep Multidimensional Change 2032: Imperatives and a Roadmap.” The previous paper was “Challenges for IAF 2032.” The next two papers in the series are “Organisational Structure Optimisation,” and “Organisation and Technology Issues Related to the 2032 IAF.” The critical role of Air Power post World War-II has been well established. Indian Air Force is no exception and hence its battle readiness is of utmost interest to our military planners. The paper therefore discusses a very important element of combat readiness, i.e. equipment support and force structure. While equipment support and force structure is only one out of many aspects of combat readiness it is perhaps the most important one. The paper makes a comparative study of the Indian Air Force (IAF), the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF). Since PAF and PLAAF have posed serious security challenges before the country in the past and are likely to pose the same in the future, the study makes a comparative assessment of their strength and weaknesses in order to put the IAF’s requirements in perspective. The author’s projection takes into account the likely scenario of a two-front war, involving both China and Pakistan. The paper forcefully argues that numbers (Squadrons and aircrafts) even in this hi-tech age matter for engaging the enemy. This projection of requirements is also based on the estimated sortie generation capability of the three forces. Significantly, the paper shows that the Indian Air Force has an edge over the Chinese Air Force in this regard. Since the North Eastern border is the most likely theater of war with China, the paper gives a detailed assessment of the requirements of the IAF to ensure its combat readiness. After taking into account geography, infrastructure & reach factor, the combat efficiency comparison of IAF: PLAAF comes to 1.4:1.0. Another important finding of the paper is that the IAF needs 724 (40 Sqn)/ 929(52Sqn) fighter aircrafts in North East and North to counter Chinese threat for a clear victory. Given India’s rising power status, engaging in Out of Area Contingency Operation (OOAC) is likely and India may be asked to play an increasingly important role in such Ops. The paper therefore looks into this aspect and suggests the need for Special Forces and heavy lift capability. It projects the need for deployment of one Division size force of the army requiring IAF’s provision of airlift through 1 Sqn C-17+1 Sqn C-130J/ MTA for OOAC. Further, the need for an expeditionary air base capability has been highlighted. The paper ends with a set of specific recommendations. Some of the important recommendations in the paper are:
Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:
Report prepared by Amit Kumar RA IDSA |
Military Affairs |