Events

The paper presenter’s aim was to create a new discourse that treats Tibet as a regional, if not a global, commons that has wide-ranging implications for all of South Asia from being a source of many important rivers to controlling the Monsoons. Such a discourse that highlights Tibet as being crucial for a wider humanity will put pressure on China to review its activities in Tibet which is resulting in severe ecological degradation. The most pressing problem seems to be the impact on the rivers that flow downwards into the Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia which will all face a considerable reduction in runoff with the receding of glaciers.

The speaker looked at the following 3 aspects through the course of his paper:

1. The impact of human activity in Tibet and the changing climate on the countries dependent on this ecosystem.
2. The diversion of rivers originating in Tibet by China.
3. Policies for co-operation and peaceful resolution of conflict.

While elaborating on the first point, it was pointed out how the urbanization of Tibet with infrastructure building, extension of railways and roads, and conversion of grasslands will result in demographic changes that will impact the local ways of living. All these factors will, in turn, change the nature of the local ecosystem. For example, the nomads’ lifestyle ensured that the delicate balance of the fragile ecosystem was not disturbed.

Glaciers are an important aspect of this ecosystem. However, there is much contention over whether or not they are melting at a rapid rate (or melting at all). This is due to a dearth of information or facts regarding them. India has around 9,575 glaciers but research has been done on only 25-30 of them. Thus, the difficulty of drawing any definite conclusions. However, the presenter insisted that the people of the Himalayas have noticed the change and he quoted Chewang Norphel who said “I am the scientific data”, i.e. one doesn’t need a scientific authority to certify what is obvious to the people living there.”

Diversion of rivers and construction of dams by the Chinese on rivers like Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) or the tributaries of Indus and Sutlej will adversely affect the lower riparian states. China’s increased control of river water will mean an increased security threat for the others.

The speaker asserted that a major obstacle to studying the impact of the diversion of rivers is posed by the lack of scientific data that is available in the public domain. The lack of transparency in terms of information results in analysts having to make intelligent guesses.

Incorporating China in the Indus Water Treaty is one of the solutions proposed for peaceful co-operation as well as a consolidated effort by all the countries of the region to conduct scientific studies on the environmental degradation of the ecosystem caused due to man-made activity and climate change.

Ultimately, the crux of the presenter’s argument was that a discourse that regards Tibet as a regional (or global) common should be created in order to prevent any adverse effects on other lower riparian countries that would result from unilateral Chinese diversion of rivers in Tibet.

Shri M.S. Menon made some pertinent observations on the issues brought up in this paper. Most importantly he highlighted the confusion regarding global warming, climate change, and glacier melts since the causes and effects are “not very clear”. Not to mention, scientific data can be manipulated to suit particular agendas. He also pointed out that studies regarding the role vegetation cover (including that in Tibet) plays on monsoons are incomplete.

The presenter’s fear of Chinese diversion of rivers and its security implications were reinforced by Shri Menon. Unlike B.G. Verghese who claims that it is near impossible for China to divert water from these rivers due to the terrain, Menon asserted that China was more than capable of accomplishing such a feat. His remedy for this problem is that India should build a dam in Arunachal Pradesh in order to control the flow of the Brahmaputra.

The lack of data on the water flow of rivers should also be addressed. In border areas where civilians are not allowed, the army should step in to take measurements. In terms of exchange of data between India and China, the best area to bring up this issue would be in forums concerning biodiversity since they are signatories of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and project an image of concern for the environment in this regard. He also supported the idea of a reworked IWT that included China.

Dr. A.P. Dimri discussed the technical aspects of climate change and how the Himalayas play a major role in controlling the monsoons, which is why the topography of Tibet should be looked at in more detail. He also talked about the need to look at regional dynamics of climate change. Cycles of heating and cooling have always existed, however, what we should be worried about is the anthropogenic forces that are contributing to climate change.

The discussant explained how the debate around the melting of glaciers is extremely complicated and cannot have a simple answer. Glaciers are viscoplastic in nature. So what might be considered as glaciers melting might actually be a geological phenomenon of glaciers just breaking up. A lot more work needs to be done in this area before anything concrete can be ascertained. He also mentioned that satellite imagery is not entirely reliable data since it does not cover the area throughout the season so one cannot make accurate interpretations.

The internal discussants, Jaganath Panda and Avinash Godbole, also raised important points. The former talked about the Chinese strategy that includes the restructuring of the industrialization process and a new focus on local industries in order to show that Tibetan industries are not being destroyed. He also discussed the reasons behind why China wanted to divert water in terms of geography, social and national tension particularly with the drying up of the Yellow river. He proposed SAARC and the UN as good forums in which India can engage with China. Godbole put forward two critical questions. First, if Chinese activity in Tibet affects rivers’ flow to India, it should also affect rivers flowing into China; so, why would China want to harm their own water resources? Secondly, can science and politics be separated? Even scientific data can be manipulated for particular ends.

The Chair, Arvind Gupta, summed up the discussions by claiming that we should “learn to live with uncertainty” and evolve precautionary principles rather than keep waiting for concrete data to act. He asserted that China feels secure with its Tibet policies and the diversions of the rivers. It becomes an important strategic tool to engage India in larger Sino-Indian relations.

The report has been prepared by Shubha Kamala Prasad, an intern at IDSA.

Chairperson: Ramesh V Phadke
Discussants: Kalim Bahadur and Alok Bansal

Chairperson: Dr. Arvind Gupta
Discussants: Alok Bansal and General Barmer

Dr. Sreeradha Datta, notes that Bangladesh’s maritime boundary dispute with India and Myanmar is becoming increasingly salient in their bilateral relations. It is only in recent years that the issue has gained prominence fraying relations. The un-demarcated nature of the maritime boundary line is the source of dispute between Bangladesh and its two neighbours. Both India and Myanmar have overlapping maritime boundary claims with Bangladesh. Bangladesh is the only country among littoral states not to have reached a maritime agreement. Maritime boundary delimitation implies not only the setting of limits of the state’s outer limit of maritime zones including its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf, but also its maritime boundary limits vis-à-vis its opposite or adjacent state. Under the dispute settlement provisions of the UNCLOS of 1982 each littoral state is entitled to claim 200 nautical miles (nm) of sea area as its EEZ with all living and non-living resources within these areas are that state’s exclusive property; out of this, the first 12 nm are the Territorial Sea and the next 188 nm are its EEZ. The resolution of Indo-Bangladesh maritime boundary dispute entails addressing two contentious issues – that of the baselines to demarcate maritime and delimitation boundaries including the outer limit of the overlapping extended continental shelf. Following revision, the UNCLOS III stipulated that the ‘median’ or the ‘equidistance’ be the principle for maritime boundary demarcation which India supports. Bangladesh strongly opposes the ‘equidistance’ principle given the nature of its coast. With India, Bangladesh’s dispute specifically surrounds the contrasting claims over what is known as New Moore in India and South Talpatty in Bangladesh. Myanmar’s position is fairly similar to that of India. Rangoon also insists that the equidistance principle be maintained. However as Dr. Datta maintains despite the contentious issues at stake between Bangladesh and its two neighbours and given the geographical condition of Bangladesh there is ample scope in the UNCLOS III to treat Bangladesh’s case with greater flexibility and beyond the strict guidelines of equidistance. India and Bangladesh could agree on a joint survey, but for now the dispute is being mediated by an independent arbitrator. Finding a modus vivendi is possible according Dr. Datta. While Bangladesh in recent negotiations has agreed to a joint hydrological survey on Teesta River with India allowing the extreme positions over the baseline may thus be bridged.

Points of Discussion

1. Europe’s context is different from the history that bedevils the India-Bangladesh maritime dispute. History is important in Europe’s case, but this is not the case between India and Bangladesh.
2. The paper is informative.
3. Equity cannot be defined clearly and Bangladesh has its own conception.
4. Delineation of the maritime boundary must follow the equidistance principle. Even the ICJ maintains that equidistance is the rule.
5. Joint management is the best option as the author has proposed. Sea bed resources can be equally shared.
6. India is in a scientifically and technically stronger position than Bangladesh, which lacks technical resource capacities.
7. India must be magnanimous, because it will strengthen the Hasina government.
8. China’s role is increasingly worrisome.
9. The author seems to be pleading only Bangladesh’s case. The onus also lies on Bangladesh to demonstrate that it is really in need of the resources.
10. The author must highlight the strategic importance of the dispute and China’s role in trying to exploit the problem, particularly between India and Bangladesh.

Report prepared by Kartik Bommakanti, Research Assistant at the IDSA

Chair: Dr. Rajaram Panda
External Discussants: Dr. P.K. Ghosh Senior Fellow, CAPS and Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra, JNU

Presentation

• The paper’s core question “What factors influence why states make the decision to import advanced weapon systems or to develop them indigenously?”
• Both India and Japan had similar threat perceptions owing to similar kind of neighbourhood situation.
• The paper discusses the political processes behind BMD acquisition and not its scientific effectiveness or military utility.
• There is research on suppliers’ perception of arms transfer but litter research on recipients’ perspectives.
• In the case of Japan, discussion on BMD began with Reagan’s “Star Wars” address. In the late 1980s and through the 1990s Japanese defence industry conducted research in this area. There was some joint research with the United States as well.
• North Korea’s 1998 Taepo Dong I test convinced Japan of BMD’s usefulness and formal joint research with United States began.
• After the United States withdrew from ABM treaty, the Japanese Cabinet decided to introduce BMD systems. As of December 2009 4 SM-3s and 12 PAC-3s are deployed.
• Japan’s Foreign Policy concerns influenced the timing of the BMD deployment. Its perception about threats from the neighbours mattered in the decision about BMD. The Taiwan strait crisis of 1995-96 and earlier Chinese nuclear tests caused the difference. North Korean tests became an incentive to introduce BMD system, but was not a decisive factor that made Japan decide to join the American system.
• Japan did not consider self reliance because there are restrictions due to import controls and limited R&D budgets.
• In the case of India, Pakistan’s acquisition of M-11s caused it to think of BMD. Chinese and Pakistani co-operation was looked at seriously. The political decisions behind it have not been fully analysed.
• India has been aiming for self-reliance in its defence procurements.
• India’s desire for independent policy also caused it to focus on self reliance. In the cold war period, the United States and USSR had tied their arms sales to alliance partnerships and there still exist political hurdles to delivery of weapons. Thus indigenisation and diversification have been two pillars of the Indian arms policy.
• DRDO has conducted tests successfully and India should be able to deploy its BMD system by 2011.
• Even if it was economically difficult, India decided on indigenous development of BMD for political and strategic reasons.
• Thus, foreign policy and threat perceptions matter equally in decisions over BMD policies.

Comments and Discussion:

• Need to go deeper into the use of the Defence Industry perspective. 1998 alone cannot be the reason for Japanese policy on BMD. Japan favours two layered system and not two staged system.
• MTCR has been critical in decisions about BMD by different countries.
• India decided against co-development because it was turning out to be more expensive.
• Japan’s R&D numbers are impressive; in fact the United States wanted to collaborate with Japan for its own advantage.
• That Japan became more independent in its foreign policy with the end of Cold War is a very tall claim.
• Impact of the Japanese BMD is going to be same regardless of its origin.
• Economic benefit of the Japanese BMD programme is an outcome and not a cause. This has happened because the United States has subsidised Japanese BMD programme.
• There is need to elaborate on the reasons why Japan decided not to develop indigenous capacity when it could and why India decided to do so when it did not have the knowledge.
• Even while the nature of arms transfer has changed and even as marketisation has taken place, co-operation on BMD still remains a political decision.
• The author could compare the different nature of relationship that India and Japan have with the United States and its impact on their BMD policy.
• In Japan, public opinion has played an important role.
• Credibility of the Indian BMD can be questioned. One should not look at statements but the results of the tests.
• BMD is a work in progress. It is useful for its psychological and political utility. No one would share it if it was perfect.
• In India this has not been a strategic political decision but a military technical decision.

Report Prepared by Avinash Godbole, Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.