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Events
| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
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| India's Nuclear Policy | February 17, 2010 | 1500 to 1700 h | Book Discussion Forum |
Venue: Seminar Hall No 1, IDSA |
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| State of International Studies in India | February 16, 2010 | 0930 to 1300 hrs | Other |
Venue: Seminar Hall 1, IDSA Dr. Muthiah Alagappa will present the report of a seminar jointly organised by the East West Centre and the Lew Kwan Yew Institute of Public Policy, Singapore
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| Eminent Persons' Lecture Series - Left-Wing Extremism in India | March 05, 2010 | Gopal K. Pillai | Speeches and Lectures |
Venue: Seminar Hall 1, IDSA  On March 5, 2010, as part of its Eminent Persons’ Lecture Series, IDSA organized a lecture by Home Secretary Gopal K. Pillai on “Left Wing Extremism in India”. Pillai shared with the distinguished audience his own perspective on the Naxal movement, which is considered to be one of the most serious internal security threats faced by India today. The origins of the Naxal movement can be traced back to the 1960s when Naxalites started operating from various parts of the country. However, Naxalism emerged as a real security threat when armed groups like the Peoples’ War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre joined hands in 2004 and formed the Communist Party of India (Maoists) -- CPI (M) -- to fight against the Indian state. In fact, one of the basic objectives of the Naxal movement, as identified by Pillai during the course of the lecture, is the overthrow of the state in India. Naxals do not believe in parliamentary democracy and in fact consider parliament a pigsty. While projecting the state as well as its armed forces as the ‘enemy’, the Naxal movement calls upon its members to take up arms and defeat the enemy decisively. The movement believes that the state is merely an agent of the elitist class and does not really cater to the interests of the lower stratas of society. While discussing the methodology of the CPI-Maoists, Pillai argued that the members of the Naxal movement initially try to infiltrate and develop their bases in underdeveloped areas where there exist some sort of an administrative vacuum. Once these bases become strong enough, the Naxalites start expanding their influence in the surrounding areas as well. While taking advantage of the feeling of neglect among the people, the Naxalites start educating them about their exploitation by the Indian state and how to bring an end to such exploitation through an armed struggle. According to Pillai, many youths get inspired by the radical ideas advocated by the Naxal movement and try to achieve these goals. However, once they realize that the movement is not as ideal as they had initially expected, they try to come out of it. Pillai also stated that the violence profile of extremism in India is going up every year. In fact the year 2009 was the bloodiest of all. He warns that the coming years will see more and more violence. This is so because the Indian state has decided not to give in to extremists’ demands and instead tackle them head on. During his lecture, Pillai asserted that the armed cadres and weapons of the Naxalites have been slowly built up by the CPI-Maoists. Such cadres have three basic modules. Among these, the real armed cadre is the back bone of Naxal armed forces. At the same time, it is also the most sophisticated one. However, this cadre base is still used as a reserve cadre. Unfortunately, the Indian government has not been able to catch hold of even five per cent of the real armed cadres of the Naxalite movement. While emphasizing that all the three cadres of the movement are highly modernized and well trained, Pillai stated that the CPI-Maoists carry out excellent post mortem of their operations with military like precision, which helps them improve their future armed operations. According to Pillai, since the Naxal movement does not believe in peaceful discussion and emphasizes on armed struggle, the Indian government has not been able to bring about much results through dialogue. However, he hopes that the Naxalites will feel the pressure within one or two years once the Indian government starts putting its act together. The desired results have not been achieved so far particularly because the police force, which should have been in the forefront of the fight against Naxalism, has been highly neglected and it is particularly ineffective in the Naxal affected areas. Pillai also threw light on certain aspects of police reforms in India. According to him, although a huge amount has been allocated by the Finance Commission recently for the purpose of police training, the police force is still in a pretty bad shape. In many areas, the actual number of police personnel is much lower than the posts sanctioned. Thus, a huge number of police posts lie vacant. According to Pillai, at a time when unemployment is still a big issue in India, many youths can take up the police profession. He also mentioned that if enough youths from Naxal affected areas can be recruited into the police, law and order can be improved in those areas to some extent. Pillai also stated that in recent years the intelligence gathering system in Naxal affected areas has improved and that is why the government has been able to catch hold of a few CPI-Maoists politburo members in the last few months. While explaining the reasons behind the origin of the Naxal movement in India, Pillai talked about the loopholes in the Indian forest conservation act, the mining act, land acquisition law, power plant law, etc. He personally believes that until and unless necessary measures are adopted by the government in reforming these acts, it will not be possible to uproot the Naxal movement or any other extremist movement from India. While concluding his speech, Pillai offered the audience a hopeful picture by stating that with the police reforms being undertaken at present, the Indian government will be able to take control of the civil administration within 7 to 10 years and minimize the influence of the Naxal movement to a large extent. This report has been prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant, IDSA. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | Left-Wing Extremism | |||
| China’s expanding relations with Africa | February 15, 2010 | 1500 hrs | Round Table |
Dr. Chris Alden, Reader, International Relations Department, London School of Economics and Political Science |
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| 12th Asian Security Conference: Asian Strategic Futures 2030 : Trends, Scenarios and Alternatives | February 11, 2010 to February 13, 2010 | Conference | Asian Security Conference | ||||||
| Prospects for India-US Cyber-Security Cooperation | March 26, 2010 | Cherian Samuel | Fellows' Seminar |
Dr. Cherian Samuel notes that cyber security is a significant domain for policy makers in India to formulate a hands-on approach, as there is clear evidence over the past decade of an increase of cyber threats worldwide. In his paper, he searches for scope for cooperation between India and the United States in the area of cyber security, continuing from the 2002 efforts of the India-US Cyber Security Forum aimed at strengthening cooperation on national security issues between the two countries. The structure of the paper encompasses the approaches to cyber security in both countries and studies the sectoral approaches to cyber security i.e., the IT security perspective, the economic perspective, the law enforcement perspective and a national security perspective. Dr. Samuel argues that understanding sectoral approaches is essential since harmonizing these perspectives to create a holistic policy on cyber security is required through the inclusion of all these sectors. In the United States, one finds that policy on cyber security is dominated by the national security perspective, which has been encouraged under President Obama as well. While there are practical problems relating to harmonizing aspects of privacy and security, the United States, unlike India, has formulated a clear policy towards cyber security as seen in its various declassified goals as well. In India, while there has been a boom of cyberspace in the past decade, the focus of policy makers has been economic rather than national security oriented, as seen in the Information Technology Act of 2000 which concentrates mainly on e-commerce. Following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, there have been efforts to introduce amendments in this bill, which, however, continues to lack a clear focus in its goal and is often noted to be an ‘Omnibus Bill’ covering too many issues. In the context of cyber security cooperation between the India and the United States, Dr. Samuel notes that the interests of both countries can be fulfilled. For India, capacity building and research development has been cited as a clear objective through this cooperation, while the United States may feel the need to safeguard its interests given the large number of US companies engaged in outsourcing in India. An asymmetry in the technical capacities of the two countries may have been a reason for the India-US Cyber Security Forum of 2002 not being successful, along with the lack of a multilateral treaty or body like the United Nations to coordinate and oversee activities and cooperation. The working groups established under the aegis of this Forum - Legal Cooperation and Law enforcement, Research and development, Critical Information Infrastructure, Defence Cooperation and Standards and Software assurance - have been used by Dr. Samuel as a template for his analysis in searching for areas for cooperation and road-blocks on cyber security between the two countries in the future. In the area of Legal Cooperation and Law Enforcement, the lack of an international legal framework has undoubtedly impacted the avenues for Indo-US bilateral cooperation on this issue. The UN’s Internet Governing Forum (IGF) has proved to be an inadequate mechanism for generating such a framework. On issues relating to Research and Development, cooperation remains limited since US agencies like the highly secretive National Security Agency (NSA) remains disinterested in sharing technologies that remain its strategic assets. Defence Cooperation in cyberspace encompasses unique issues, which need to addressed by both countries individually before agreeing on cooperation, wherein the policy of the state towards cyber crime or cyber terrorism are to be formulated. The US military has only recently begun to conceive cyberspace as a war-fighting domain and India is still far behind on this issue. NATO, of which the United States is a member, however has presented an advanced cyberspace cooperation mechanism and may even become a “hub” of coordinating responses to global threats to cyber security. The scope for cooperation between India and the United States, according to Dr. Samuel, lies mainly in the field of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection. This forms the focus of the US interest in cyber security partnership with India and this objective resulted in the setting up of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and the National Skills Registry in 2005 to authenticate individuals working in the IT industry. However, to increase Indo-US cooperation in this field there are gaps that need to plugged in by India, which has been found to have the highest cyber security regulation but the lowest security adoption rates. Therefore cooperation between the United States and India in this sphere is conceivable only when they are both equal in their understanding and responses to threats in cyber space. There is a pressing urge in India to approach this issue holistically, while taking into account the interests of the various sectors with stakes in cyberspace. The inability of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum to take off points to the need for a multilateral cooperation framework along with the presence of a legislation covering legal, technical and national security objectives to regulate India’s policies on cyber security to pave the way for bilateral and international cooperation on this issue. Points of Discussion
Report prepared by Saba Joshi, Intern, IDSA. |
North American | ||||
| India's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era | April 30, 2010 | S. Kalyanaraman | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Dr. Thomas Mathew At the very outset of his presentation, Dr. Kalyanaraman argued that like any other nation state, the primary task of India’s security policy has been the structuring of an international environment conducive for development within and the pursuit of autonomy without. It is in this context that he identified, as the backdrop to his paper, the three phases of India’s approach to structuring such an environment:
Points of Discussion:
Report prepared by Rahul Mishra, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | |||
| The Obama Doctrine: Deciphering Obama’s Nuclear Policy and What it bodes for India | March 19, 2010 | A. Vinod Kumar | Fellows' Seminar |
In his paper “The Obama Doctrine: Deciphering Obama’s Nuclear Policy and What it bodes for India,” A. Vinod Kumar examined President Obama’s nuclear policies and critically assessed its implications for India. By addressing Obama’s “nuclear policy” as Obama’s “nuclear doctrine”, the paper attempted to show how America’s nuclear policies achieve a consistent doctrinal character even when successive Presidents promise paradigmatic change. In this light, the paper was divided into four main sections. First, the evolution of Obama’s thinking on nuclear weapons was elucidated. Secondly, the paper detailed how Obama’s nuclear policy was in fact a doctrine in the making. In the next section the paper critically probed where the doctrine could fall apart. And in the final section, the implications of Obama’s nuclear policy for India were examined. From the beginning the paper showed how the purported nuclear policies of Obama were a continuation of Bush’s doctrine. While analysing the genesis of Obama’s thinking about nuclear weapons, the paper showed how Obama was buffeted between forces of pragmatism in national security issues and those favouring elimination of nuclear weapons. The four statesmen – Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn – emphasized nuclear disarmament but paradoxically they also encouraged nuclear modernization. In this context, the paper argued that though Obama’s nuclear policy favours traditional non-proliferation goals he was also forced to consider aspects of Bush’s dogmatic policies as well. Article IV of the NPT was reemphasized by Obama in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887; but even here issues like the need for a credible nuclear deterrent; the absence of prioritization of punitive action on NPT defectors and the absence of practical steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons, according to the paper, has not created anything new beyond the Bush doctrine. But the need for a credible nuclear deterrent, the absence of prioritization of punitive actions on NPT defectors and the absence of practical steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons all meant that the Obama nuclear doctrine could not go beyond the Bush doctrine. The author also showed how the revival of traditional instruments of the non-proliferation regime, central to Obama’s vision, could not escape his predecessor’s doctrinal style. For example, on the NPT, the paper asserted that the problems of non-compliance, constraints on nuclear commerce, threats from non-state actors, nuclear test ban, FMCT, strengthening safeguards and restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing technologies are all issues that need immediate redressal for the treaty to be strengthened; and these were the issues on which Bush was not decisive. Between merely setting an agenda for the 2010 Review Conference and formulating a grand 21st century version of the NPT, the paper argued that reviving the NPT could be a long haul. Similarly, on CTBT, the paper showed that securing support within the Senate for its ratification would be a difficult task. Most importantly, it stressed that Obama’s strategies to combat nuclear security and terrorism were a copy from the Bush administration. The paper however suggested that a new framework could be derived through the UNSCR 1540 to ensure that non-state actors do not access sensitive nuclear technology. Alongside, it also suggested that “the summit could also formalize counter-proliferation instruments like PSI within the non-proliferation edifice so as to generate global templates for prevention and responses.” Therefore, even in counter-proliferation, Obama might not devalue Bush’s initiatives. Finally on Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD) and promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the paper showed that Obama’s nuclear policies were inadequately grounded. While Obama voted for major cuts in BMD programmes and was non-committal on Bush’s deployment plans, upon assuming office Obama favoured limited deployment plans to provide minimum protection to the United States and its allies. He cancelled the Kinetic Kill Vehicle programme but remains apprehensive of Iranian, North Korean, Chinese and Russian missile modernization. The paper predicts that this could “force Obama to open funding for both missile defence as well as space weapons.” The same ambiguity was reflected in promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; while Obama favoured international nuclear fuel-cycle centres he also felt that over-emphasis on nuclear energy is unwarranted. To conclude, the paper asserted the continuities of doctrines regardless of the paradigmatic change promised. In the next section, the paper laid out two important issue areas where Obama’s doctrine might fail. First, it questioned whether Obama’s nuclear disarmament is at best a utopian dream. The reason for such scepticism according to the author is that (a) total elimination cannot happen at one stroke as this will not be a consensual or sequential movement among the nuclear weapon states; (b) incremental steps towards elimination, involving test-ban and fissile material cut-off, would be a long haul; and, (c) new weapon states that might emerge could reverse the reduction process. The failure to move from non-proliferation to disarmament, and ever lingering security dilemmas have created more questions about prospective nuclear disarmament ambitions of the President. Second, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and maintaining a robust deterrent is a problem. Maintaining extended nuclear deterrence, sentiments of the armed forces on modernizing the ageing nuclear forces along with demands for RRW and Stockpile stewardship program has created disagreements over Obama’s policies. Therefore, the paper, while arguing how Obama’s doctrine could fall apart, also stressed that reductions and total elimination of nuclear weapons would also imperil CTBT and FMCT operationalisation. Finally, the paper assessed the implication of Obama’s nuclear policy for India. On a broader platform of integrating India into the non-proliferation regime, NPT, CTBT and FMCT options were discussed. On NPT, notwithstanding India’s apprehensions to join the club as a NNWS, the paper stated that Obama might not initiate sweeping reforms by opening up the NWS club. Therefore India’s call for a new non-proliferation bargain transcending the NPT centric regime might not fructify. Similarly, on CTBT, the paper stated that India cannot accept the treaty without a disarmament roadmap; the possibility of offering sophisticated weapons design data and simulation capabilities by United States to woo India was discussed with a caveat that Obama would not offer such capabilities as it would undermine his larger disarmament objectives. Finally on FMCT, the paper stated that since India has committed itself to the treaty’s early conclusion without resolving all its contentions, it might hope for a third party spoilsport if Obama couldn’t rectify the problem areas including verification and the EIF clause. Secondly, discussing the divergent perceptions on disarmament for understanding the implications of Obama’s nuclear policy on India, the paper drew attention to three factors. One, the paper stated that India disowns the NPT and believes it could only retain a non-proliferation edifice without conditioning disarmament and therefore India has reservations on the traditional NPT route of Obama to achieve total elimination; two, the paper argued that Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan of June 1988 could be a solution to Obama’s scepticism of not achieving disarmament in his lifetime; and finally, the paper stated that de-legitimisation of nuclear weapons could be a right step towards total elimination with a universal agreement on no-first use and reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. The paper was sceptical of the Obama administration taking such paradigmatic steps in the near future to achieve total elimination. Last but not the least, the paper discussed counter-proliferation policy and its implications for India. It noted that the main stumbling block in India’s participation in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the reference to IAEA comprehensive safeguards in the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention (Suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea). India’s apprehension is that PSI is being targeted at non-NPT states. On missile defence the paper reiterated that with Obama’s own reservations India might have fewer worries of his policies impinging on Indian interests. Finally, however, the paper noted that Obama is likely to push for India’s participation in counter-proliferation initiatives which is in consonance with the Hyde Act but such pressures would also require India’s commitment to support US action against Iran which could prove problematic. Discussion
Report prepared by Shanmugasundaram Sasikumar, Research Assistant. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | ||||
| Energy Related Border Adjustment Measures: Will it Lead to Trade War? | March 12, 2010 | Shebonti Ray Dadwal | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal, Research Fellow, presented her paper titled “Energy Related Border Trade Measures: Can it lead to trade war?” on 12 March 2010. Dr. Arvind Gupta chaired the session. Dr. Nityananda and Prof. V.G. Hegde were external discussants. Col. P.K. Gautam and Dr. Uttam Sinha were internal discussants. Shebonti Ray Dadwal highlighted the key aspects of the topic under consideration:
Discussion:
Report prepared by Avinash Godbole, Research Assistant, IDSA. |
Non-Traditional Security | |||
| War and Peace in Modern India | January 25, 2010 | 1000 to 1200 hrs | Book Discussion Forum |
Dr Srinath Ragavan |
