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Events
| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 49th Foundation Day Address by Montek Singh Ahluwalia | November 09, 2013 | 1130 hrs | Other |
1100 to 1130 hrs Tea and registration 1125 Shri Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission arrives and meets the guests 1130 Welcome remarks by Dr Arvind Gupta, DG, IDSA 1135 to 1140 Introduction by the Moderator (Amb. Ronen Sen) 1140 to 1210 Address by Shri Montek Singh Ahluwalia on "Indian Economy and National Security" 1210 to 1215 Award presentation ceremony: 1220 Vote of thanks by Brig Rumel Dahiya, DDG, IDSA |
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| IDSA-MISIS 1st Bilateral Dialogue on "Myanmar in Transition: Implications for India" | November 01, 2013 | Bilateral |
Programme9.30 – 10.00 am: Registration 10.00-10.15 am: Inaugural SessionWelcome address by Dr Arvind Gupta, DG, IDSA 10.15-11.30 am Session 1: Global and Regional GeopoliticsModerator: Amb. Rajiv Kumar Bhatia 11.30-12.45 pm Session 2: India-Myanmar RelationsModerator: Amb. Veena Sikri 12.45-1.00 pm Concluding Remarks 1.00- 2.00 pm Lunch Concept NoteMyanmar is undergoing a critical phase of transition, wherein important political, economic and social changes have taken place and will continue to occur. This has drawn in not only the domestic stakeholders but also the external players. Will the current reforms meet the expectations of its own people and the regional and global actors? After the initial euphoria about Myanmar, will the momentum be sustained? Without doubt, the changes expected of Myanmar would not happen overnight. To be durable and sustainable, the reform has to be indigenous and not imposed from outside. Domestic, and regional/international imperatives will impel Myanmar to draw a clearer picture of its future. Will the change come before Myanmar takes over as the ASEAN Chair in 2014, or when elections are held in 2015, or would it extend extend beyond 2015, to perhaps, 2020? How long drawn out this process turns out to be, would hinge on players both domestic and external. India has stakes in the future of Myanmar and seeks to be a partner in the progress and prosperity of Myanmar. Myanmar occupies a geo-strategic position in India’s neighbourhood and forms an important element in its ‘Look East’ policy. It is important for its security, for its energy security, and for its developmental priorities, including in its Northeast. India is conscious that the challenges that Myanmar faces could have spillover effects on its security. Perhaps the biggest challenge that Myanmar faces is the challenge of ethnic reconciliation. The reverberations of the Rohingya crisis were felt outside Myanmar and India was no exception. India was impacted when in July terrorists targeted the sacred Mahabodhi temple in Bodh Gaya with a series of bomb blasts. Some differences on the border are being ironed out as well. While challenges persist in Myanmar, there are opportunities to be harnessed both in the field of security and development. India’s own experience with democracy could be a guide to the reform process in Myanmar. Contact Conference Coordinator Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh email udaibhanusingh@hotmail.com |
South East Asia and Oceania | |||||
| Second India-Africa Strategic Dialogue: Common Security Challenges for the Next Decade: Perspectives from India and Africa | November 18, 2013 to November 19, 2013 | Conference |
The 2nd India- Africa Strategic Dialogue on ‘Common Security Challenges for the Next Decade: Perspectives from India and Africa’ was organised at the IDSA on November 18-19, 2013. The conference brought together prominent researchers and eminent persons from Africa and India to discuss and debate on issues of strategic relevance.
Rapporteurs' ReportInaugural Session Download Event Report [PDF] |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | |||||
| IDSA-APLN Round Table on 'Regional Nuclear Dynamics' | October 23, 2013 | 1030 hrs | Round Table |
Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor) Speakers: Prof. Ramesh Thakur,Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy,Prof. Gareth Evans Discussants: Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Prof. Swaran Singh |
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| Talk by Shri PS Raghavan, SS (DP) on Development Partnership Administration (DPA) | July 18, 2013 | P. S. Raghavan | Round Table |
India has had a long history as a provider of development assistance. However, our various initiatives have often been projected (unfairly in many cases) as lacking in co-ordination and focus. The DPA was established in January 2012 to address this issue by streamlining the delivery of assistance and improving the effectiveness of such efforts. When deciding upon the structure and functioning of the DPA, the MEA sought to learn from the experiences of various other prominent models, such as those of USAid and DFID. Unlike them, the DPA is an integral part of the MEA. It is a multi-division department within the MEA. It does not formulate development assistance policy, but deals with its implementation. India’s development assistance takes one of three forms: grant assistance, lines of credit (LOCs) and capacity-building. The DPA is implementing a number of major ongoing grant assistance projects, many of them in India’s neighbourhood. Perhaps the most impressive of these is the housing project for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka. Under this ambitious project, 50,000 houses are to be built, representing a significant percentage of the total housing requirement for IDPs. The project is following an owner-driven model, characterised by direct cash transfers to beneficiaries, who build their own houses with logistical and technical support from reputed NGOs. Launched in October 2012, the housing project has made remarkable progress. Moreover, it is complemented by a multitude of other rehabilitation projects in Sri Lanka, such as the distribution of family packs and bicycles, demining, the renovation of schools, etc. Indeed, the popular perception that India is not doing much to help IDPs in Sri Lanka is not borne out by the facts on the ground. There are several other notable grant assistance projects taking place in other neighbouring countries. In Afghanistan, India is constructing the Parliament building, two power sub-stations in Doshi and Charikar, and the Salma Dam near the Iranian border. India is also running a massive wheat donation programme. In Nepal, appreciable progress is being made in various connectivity projects, both along the Indo-Nepal border and across it. In Myanmar too, several connectivity projects are under way. This is of great strategic importance to the north-east of India as it gains an outlet into south-east Asia. In this regard, the Trilateral Highway, linking Imphal, Manipur to the Thai border, via Mandalay, is especially noteworthy. India is also engaged in the establishment of a Myanmar Institute of Information Technology (MIIT), modelled on the IIITs in India. In Bhutan, India is implementing a number of hydropower projects. India’s Small Development Projects, which are responsive to the requirements of local communities, are very popular among neighbouring countries. The other two strands of the DPA’s development assistance – LOCs and capacity-building – also have numerous achievements. Since 2003, almost $10 billion worth of LOCs has been extended, with Africa receiving the lion’s share (approximately 60%). Such LOCs are used to fund a wide range of projects in areas such as agriculture, irrigation, food processing, rural electrification, healthcare, IT and infrastructure. Examples of LOCs extended to African countries include an LOC of $640 million for the up-gradation of three sugar mills in Ethiopia and one of $178 million for a water supply project in Tanzania. Neighbouring countries have also been major recipients of LOCs from India – notable recent examples are Sri Lanka ($966 million), Bangladesh ($800 million) and Myanmar ($500 million). Turning to capacity-building, the Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation (ITEC) programme has long been a flagship programme of India’s development assistance. It has been very successful, continues to expand and generates a lot of goodwill towards India in other developing countries. India faces a number of challenges in the implementation of both grant projects and LOC projects. In implementing grant projects, India grapples with various host country challenges (many of which exist in our own country too): delays in statutory approvals and land acquisition, local protests (by environmentalists, vested interests and others), lack of necessary infrastructure and changes in the scope of the work are some of them. There are also internal challenges, such as ensuring the adequacy and predictability of budget allocations, fine-tuning approval/appraisal procedures and reducing the dependence on PSUs. As far as LOC projects are concerned, the main host country challenges are weak project conceptualisation, a lack of project synchronisation and the overly narrow pool of Indian companies involved in project proposals and implementation (which is an internal issue as well). Additionally, due to the political sensitivities of partner countries, India often cannot carry out rigorous project appraisal. LOC projects, like grant assistance ones, are also subject to the various political, economic, social and security risks posed by the partner country. The DPA has taken some steps to tackle the above challenges. A greater emphasis is being placed on project conceptualisation, appraisal and monitoring. Project Management Consultants are to be engaged for large projects. Indian corporates are briefed on LOC project opportunities in the hope that greater awareness will widen the pool of Indian companies involved in these projects. Borrowing governments are being sensitised on the need for transparent practices. The terms governing LOCs are being revised to meet IMF conditionalities on borrowing governments on the minimum grant element in concessional loans that they can access. This will make the loans more attractive for partner countries. This, in turn, will presumably make these countries more open to stringent guidelines, aimed at bringing about greater transparency and synchronisation in the implementation of projects. DPA is moving in a number of other directions. Public outreach, both at home and abroad, is required in order to spread awareness of DPA’s activities. The induction of technical, multi-sectoral expertise in DPA is important, given that it deals with areas as diverse as health, IT, power and roads, to name a few. This exercise has begun and will be intensified. DPA is in a unique position to benefit from cross-sectoral and cross-regional experience-sharing and must make full use of this. Though DPA is not a policy-making body, the experience it imbibes should feed back into the fine-tuning of India’s approaches to development partnerships. Measures are being explored for combining development partnership with India’s private sector investments as an effective way of expanding India’s development footprint abroad. A better utilisation of NGO expertise in socio-economic programmes would also help enormously. Finally, the philosophy underpinning India’s development partnership perspectives should also be considered. A fundamental point to keep in mind is that – unlike Western “traditional donors” – India is a developing country. Therefore, while our development assistance must be in line with our partners’ priorities, it must also be closely linked to our own commercial, foreign policy and strategic interests, energy requirements, food security and search for natural resources. India has often been described as an “emerging donor”. We dispute both words of that term. Our assistance is not “emerging”: it dates back to Nehruvian days. And we do not consider ourselves donors, but development partners. Unlike the aid of Western donors, which is often conditional on recipient government policies regarding governance, human rights, etc., India’s development assistance is demand-driven and does not constrain the sovereignty of its partners in any way. Indeed, India sees this as one of the defining features of South-South co-operation. The growing role played by India and other developing countries in the area of development assistance seems to be causing some anxiety in the West. Western countries, many of which are experiencing “donor fatigue”, are wary of losing influence in a sphere they traditionally dominated. In many ways, the much-touted Busan process is an attempt by the West to standardise the delivery of aid/assistance along the lines of the norms and principles that have typified Western aid. It is also a way for Western donors to hang onto the coattails of developing country donors to enter countries and regions where they have not been active. These observations explain India’s serious reservations about the Busan process. More generally, India is wary of some of the premises underlying the post-MDG development agenda. In particular, India is adamant that it should not become a means for the West to pass on a greater burden to developing countries. Whereas North-South aid is a historical responsibility, South-South co-operation is a voluntary undertaking. Developing countries’ development assistance should be distinct from North-South commitments, rather than a substitute for them or an excuse for developed countries to diminish their aid programmes. |
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| Framing of Nationalism in Nepal's Radical Communist Movement: The India Factor | November 29, 2013 | Post Bahadur Basnet | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya, SM (Retd) Mr Post Bhadur Basnet, SAARC Visiting Fellow from Nepal presented his paper titled “Framing of Nationalism in Nepal’s Radical Communist Movement: The Indian Factor” on 29 November 2013. The paper argues that the Maoists used “negative nationalism”, based on anti-Indian sentiments, as one of the key “revolutionary” strategies during the insurgency. The same band of nationalism continues to feature in the radical communist discourse, though it seems to have lost much of its appeal among the masses during the course of democratic politics in which the Maoists willingly participated since 2005. The genesis of anti-Indianism goes back to the days of the formation of Nepali state. The 1950 treaty, which aimed to bring Nepal under the security sphere of India that possibly checked the import of communism to Nepal from China, has been a major irritant for the communists. India’s security concern requires an India-friendly regime in Nepal and thus India is seen to be meddling in the internal affairs of the country and favouring some actors over the others, which is viewed as external interference in Nepal’s internal politics and leads to anti-India sentiments amongst the Nepalese people. Moreover, “not-to-be-an-Indian” is one of the key features in the identity formation process in Nepal. All these features collectively offered a fertile ground to the political actors to manufacture and exploit anti–India sentiments to their benefit over the years. During the monarchy period, the king was successful in sustaining his regime by instigating anti-Indianism and gathering the support of the communists. Once the relationship between the monarchy and the communists was broken, there was a regime change in Nepal. With the monarchy gone, the paper argues, the role of nationalism for political mobilisation is no longer effective. The Maoists after 2006 have realised that the anti-India card does not work in the changed global, regional and domestic political matirx. The mainstream faction of the Maoist party led by Prachanda has removed India from its hit-list, and started talking about the internal nationalism (ethnic federalism and development). However, the radical faction in the Maoist Party led by Kiran Baidya continues to talk about external intervention and take an anti-Indian line while framing its version of Nepalese nationalism. The presenter argued that while the line of “externalised nationalism” may have lost its glamour, the Maoist plan for consolidating ‘internal nationalism’ through emphasis on ethnic nationalism has pushed the Nepali state into a state of wilderness. The presenter provides the following recommendations which according to him can remove the prevailing anti-India sentiments in Nepal:
Comments of the discussantsThe discussants have made the following observations about the paper:
The paper gives an impression that China is interested to play its own political game in Nepal. However, it was argued by the discussants that it was the Nepalese who wanted to play the China card. China is quite pragmatic in its dealings with Nepal. The paper is detailed and timely. However to make it more up-to-date it should accommodate the analysis on the latest Constituent Assembly (CA) election results. |
South Asia | |||
| Overlapping Regional Security Governance Mechanisms: An Alternative Interpretation of the Difficulties of Regional Cooperation for Afghanistan | November 08, 2013 | Sandra Destradi | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar | South Asia | ||||
| 2nd India-Australia 1.5 Dialogue on 'Realizing the India-Australia Vision for Partnership and Prosperity' | October 17, 2013 | 0900 - 1800 hrs | Round Table |
Programme9.00 – 9.30 am: Registration 9.30-10.00 am: Inaugural Session
10.00-11.30 am: Session 1: Emerging Strategic Equations in The Asia-PacificThe session would cover the Security Architecture, Implications of the US ‘Rebalancing’ Policy and prospects for the IOR-ARC.
Discussion 11.30-1.00 pm: Session 2: Reimagining the Region: ‘Asia Pacific’ or ‘Indo-Pacific’?Is ‘Indo-Pacific’ a viable concept? How does it differ from ‘Asia-Pacific’?
Discussion 1.00-2.00 pm Lunch 2.00-3.30 pm: Session 3: Non-Traditional Security Challenges: (Environment, Food and Water)What is the salience of Non-Traditional Security challenges in the emerging security architecture in the Asia-Pacific? How can these issues be addressed?
Discussion 3.30-3.45 pm Tea 3.45-5.15 pm - Session 4: Emerging Regional Defence OutlookThe session will review the Developments in defence doctrine and Capabilities of major defence forces in the Region including the US and China.
Discussion 5.15-6.00 pm: Session 5: India-Australia Dialogue: The Way ForwardThis session will discuss the prospects of cooperation between the two institutions.
Concept NoteThe first round of India-Australia 1.5 Dialogue was conducted in Perth, Australia on July 19-20, 2012. The themes covered during that dialogue included Indian and Australian policies for the region; major powers (US and China) policies in the region; regional architecture; maritime security in the region and future challenges including food and water. With this and the then Australian PM’s visit to India forming an important backdrop, the 2nd India-Australia 1.5 Dialogue in New Delhi provides a suitable opportunity to carry forward the ideas set forth in the 1st Dialogue held in 2012. In the past year a series of developments have brought Asia-Pacific into prominence. The region has been marked by transformative economic and strategic changes. The rise of Asia (especially China and India) provides an opportunity, and the rapidly changing strategic landscape, equally throws a challenge. For instance, China is Australia’s largest trading partner and the economic transformation of China could have far reaching strategic implications too. In October 2012 then PM Julia Gillard paid a visit to India. Australia has lifted the export ban on uranium. The Nuclear Suppliers Group had waived a three decade ban on exports to India. Considering India’s growing economic and strategic interests in engaging its maritime neighbours, it is vital that India works with Australia. Nuclear trade between the two countries is equally important as Australia commands around 40 per cent of the world’s total uranium resources. Nuclear cooperation would certainly help India meet its energy requirements — 800,000 MW of energy is needed by 2032 and fossil fuel will not be sufficient. In the absence of assured supply of uranium, India’s energy generation will increasingly become carbon emitting. Australia could contribute to environment protection through uranium supply to India. Given Australia’s growing strategic and economic importance, India needs to create a more robust relationship. There is tremendous scope for cooperation in agriculture, ocean technology and other such areas. Likewise, Australia too could reap the benefits of engaging India in economic, strategic and diplomatic terms. India and Australia are well placed to play a role in the region. The Australian government released a series of papers- including the Defence White Paper, Australia in the Asian Century White Paper and a National Security Strategy- which lay out Australia’s engagement with Asia, with special reference to India. In the strategic realm, unprecedented rise of China has certainly posed numerous challenges to countries of the region, to which India and Australia are no exceptions. Uncertainties posed by China’s rise have played a role in India and Australia’s changing perceptions of the twenty-first century global politics. Though India and Australia are not keen, perhaps not equipped enough, in balancing China in the region, both have been trying to hedge against the challenges posed by China’s rise. India’s economic reforms and opening up to the East Asian and the Asia- Pacific region through its Look East policy in the 1990s opened up new vistas for India- Australia engagement. The Look East policy, particularly the Phase two, led to India’s greater engagement with Australia. In fact, in the last decade, India-Australia ties have improved significantly, which is evident from quantum jumps in bilateral trade volumes, military-to-military engagements, greater outflow of Indian students to Australia, and more importantly- the India- Australia nuclear commerce. The US has certainly played a key role in bringing the two democracies closer. India’s improved ties with the US have influenced Australia’s perception of India’s role in the regional and global politics. India’s economic growth and rise of its middle class have offered numerous business opportunities to Australia, which seems well equipped in seizing the opportunity of engaging India. Australia is actively working on devising better ways to engage Asia and its major stake-holders including India. The current round of Track 1.5 Dialogue intends to bring together Indian and Australian perspectives on the Emerging Strategic Equations in the Asia-Pacific (including the Security Architecture; Implications of US ‘Rebalancing’ Policy; and Prospects for the IOR-ARC); Re-imagining the Region: ‘Asia-Pacific’ or ‘Indo-Pacific’?; Non-Traditional Security Challenges (Environment, Food and Water); Emerging Regional Defence Outlook; and in conclusion, India-Australia Dialogue: The Way Forward. Contact Conference Coordinator Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh email udaibhanusingh@hotmail.com |
South East Asia and Oceania | ||||
| China's Tryst with IORA: What Does it Mean for India? | February 14, 2014 | Jagannath P. Panda | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: V Admiral Anup Singh (Retd) |
East Asia | |||
| 47th Annual General Body Meeting | November 09, 2013 | 1230 hrs | Other |
The 47th Annual General Body Meeting of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses will be held on 09th November 2013 at 1230 hours at the IDSA Auditorium. Individual invitations to the Life members and Members have already been mailed. However, any Life member and Member who may not have received the same due to change in address etc. may treat this as notice for the meeting or contact the undersigned for any clarification. Please note that only LIFE MEMBERS AND MEMBERS form the General Body of the Institute. Wg Cdr Hemlata Lohani (Retd)
Assistant Director Tele: 2671 7983, Extn. 7301 Fax: 26154192 (DG) 26154191 (DDG) 26146833 (AD) (Telefax) |
