Rise of Terrorism and Extremism

The second session of the Second India-Africa Strategic Dialogue, focused on the theme ‘Rise of Terrorism and Extremism’. It was highlighted that a number of new issues have emerged in the security discourse such as piracy, narco-terrorism, etc.

Terrorism/extremism has taken centre-stage in Africa after the Kenya and Tanzania US Embassy bombings in 1998 and especially after 9/11. While many interventions have been made at the national and regional and continental levels to combat terrorism/extremism, the main weakness of the approach has been a singular focus on the security/military aspects alone. This approach does not address the root causes of the rise of terrorism/extremism. It was emphasised that this is not merely a security problem – it has socio-economic, legal, political, ideological, technical and doctrinal aspects. There is increasing visibility of issues such as trans-national organized crime, like piracy, drug trafficking, etc. Most terrorist groups indulge in these to finance their terror activities and this needs to be factored in to the discourse.

In the Sahel region, in North and West Africa, the most active groups are the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine and Boko Haram, which target government buildings, security posts, schools, and foreign diplomatic missions and employ conventional terrorist tactics, including guerilla style raids, kidnappings, hostage taking, bombing and murder of western tourists, aid workers and suicide bombings. An increasingly worrying trend is that apart from the kidnappings and killings, AQIM and its affiliates are working with drug cartels and other criminal networks in the region to smuggle drugs, arms and other contraband goods to augment their resources and financing for continuous operation.

It was pointed out that terrorism and Extremism in West Africa can be attributed to a combination of three factors: structural weakness of the state; porous borders and the socio-economic discontent of the population; and poor governance, underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment and conflicts.

East Africa remains Africa’s underbelly for global terrorism. Countries such as Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have all served at various times as terrorist safe havens, staging areas or transit points. The region’s porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, pervasive corruption, and, in some cases, state complicity in terrorist activities, combined with over two decades of instability in Somalia, have provided an enabling environment for Al Qaeda and other violent groups to operate in this region. He specifically pointed to the fact that Sudan had, in the 1990s, been a safe haven for terrorists, including Osama Bin Laden, and terror groups that operated in the Horn of Africa. More recently, Al Shabaab – a locally focused Islamist insurgent group and a transnational terrorist affiliate of Al Qaeda – is most active in the region.

The following are the possible implications of terrorism and extremism on regional security:

1. Victims of these attacks are suffering from and grappling with political, economic and social impact of terrorism ad extremism.
2. West and North Africa – Sahel region risks becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups and a springboard for further attacks. It this needs sustained international attention.
3. Possible increase in transnational organized crimes in Sahel region and maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
4. Increased reprisal attacks and kidnapping of foreign nationals in the Sahel region and East Africa.
5. Co-existence of different religious communities may be negatively affected in some parts of Nigeria.

The efforts taken to combat terrorism and extremism include efforts at the national, sub-regional, continental and global levels. At the national level, these include adoption of anti-terrorism legislative frameworks together with the establishment of counter-terrorist units, especially in East Africa. In West Africa, most of the country-level counter terrorism efforts are being undertaken in collaboration with other states and organizations like the US, European Union, etc. In East Africa, the US is also cooperating with countries in the Horn of Africa through the East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative and the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa. At the sub-regional level, most counter-terrorism initiatives are being undertaken in partnerships with the US and its G8 allies. At the continental level, the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) provides the basis for combating and preventing terrorism in Africa. Counter-terrorism initiatives have focused on detecting, disrupting and defeating transnational terrorist groups, countering resurgence of international terrorism and building capacity of security agencies and terrorism. India’s multi-pronged approach to dealing with terrorism over the past six decades can be useful for Africa. There is scope for increased India-Africa cooperation in areas of intelligence, investigation, prosecution and counter-insurgency operations as well.

The session also discussed both Indian and African examples by bringing out the complexity of the issue of terrorism and extremism, and underscored the correlation between the two. India, a country, has faced a number of problems that Africa is facing as a continent, and a number of these problems predate independence. These problems range from proxy war to indigenous threats. There are also lessons to be learnt from both the successes and failures of counter-terrorism efforts and the failures are important since they can become the catalyst for change.

In India, there are four main kinds of terrorism: in the North-East, in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), Left Wing Extremism (LWE), and Terrorism in the Hinterland, which have resonance with uprisings in Africa. In the North-East, the insurgencies highlighted were the Naga insurgency (1955-56 till date) and the Mizo insurgency (1966-86); latter is a success of sorts since it was effectively resolved. In J&K, there was local dissatisfaction; the issue was hijacked by Pakistan and turned into a proxy war, aimed at achieving Pakistan’s strategic gains. LWE, on the other hand, is an ideological conflict and one of the rare conflicts still based on the hardline Communist ideology. Terrorism in the Hinterland includes outfits like the Indian Mujahiddin (IM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT ).

The facets of the Indian response include:

1. Policy focus on enhancing security and development in the affected region.
2. Three-tiered security mechanism (capacity of security agencies): local police (tier 1), central police (tier 2) and the Army (tier 3)
3. Factor of time: Of the six solved insurgencies in India, the average time is 16 years and that for the unresolved insurgencies is 36 years. The global average is 10 years.
4. Adoption of principle of minimum force.
5. Dealing with the External factor: This aspect is evident both in India (for example, Pakistan’s support to the Kashmir insurgency) but also in Africa. It is more deep-rooted than it appears, for example, and has many aspects to it, such as counterfeit currency from Pak; trafficking of drugs and weapons through porous borders; the IM might seem indigenous but its top leadership is in Pakistan.

In correlating issues with Africa, what becomes apparent is that religious terrorism is trans-national and that crime is both a component and a by-product of terrorism.

It was reiterated that Africa is not monolithic or homogenous and thus terrorism in Africa can be divided into four categories:

1. Ideology-based terrorism and extremism, based on appeal to radical Wahhabi Islam.
2. Economic-based terrorism, rooted in a sense of alienation, deprivation and structural issues like underdevelopment, poverty and lack of adequate economic opportunities.
3. Mercenary terrorism, used by terror entrepreneurs who exploit the sense of popular discontent/grievances to construct profitable enterprises by blending narcotics, smuggling, kidnappings and arms trade.
4. Political terrorism, which is used by groups such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram to challenge the ruling dispensation and present itself as a potential alternative.

There are other outfits in the region that are of importance: various militias in eastern Congo, insurgents in the Niger Delta, Janjaweed in Sudan, the Lord’s Resistance Army, Army for the Liberation of Rwanda and the Afrikaner Boeremag in South Africa along with a host of Islamic groups.

What makes the Islamic groups significant is the use of radical Islam as a binding ideology, which makes them part of the global jihadi network. The AQIM is a case study in the cynical use of radical, Islam, and significantly, is a hybrid amalgam of the four abovementioned types of terror outfits. The Nigeria-based Boko Haram is another outfit that uses Wahhabi Islam as its ideological inspiration and its activists are taking advantage of the porous borders in the region and crossing over into Niger, Cameroon and Mali. Al Shabaab is the prime example of this; while primarily confined to Somalia, it has increasingly used Wahhabism to rally disaffected youth, luring them with a vision of a purist Islamic society.

Terrorism in Africa has to be situated in the context of the ‘African Resurgence’. Terrorism in Africa is marked by the narrative of the ‘other’ as the enemy. India can be viewed as being part of the Western camp, hence it becomes the enemy. Also, there is a resemblance between Westgate mall attack in Kenya and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. These attacks were against cosmopolitan societies, and cities and were sending a similar message. Thus, India needs to be concerned as it increasingly moves towards and into Africa. It is more and more possible in future that terrorism in India would have its origins in Sahel and Saharan Africa. American officials worry that a successful terror attack in the US or Europe, planned in Africa and executed by African extremists is only a matter of time. In other words, the new face of militant Islam would be an African one.

The following recommendations were made about what India could do in its approach to Africa.

1. India should scale up its intelligence and counter-terrorism linkages with African countries as well as at the continental level.
2. India’s policy makers need to scale up development cooperation with Africa.
3. In the near term, forge comprehensive counter-terror cooperation with the AU and bolster counter-insurgency capacity of individual countries.
4. There needs to be a greater emphasis on research on Africa while at the same time expanding our reach in Africa.
5. The French and US initiatives against terror in Africa should be taken note of and India needs to have a separate Africa focus. It could also consider cooperating with countries like US and France.
6. An only security-centric approach has serious limitations, demonstrated best by the US example. India needs to have a multi-pronged approach from to forge partnerships to deal with terrorism in Africa, which would include a parallel focus on soft power, development, etc.

The question and answer session included a discussion on identification of particular local issues vis-à-vis terrorism and questions were raised as to whether there is a generalized definition or root to explain different kinds of terrorism. The progression of terror attacks in terms of tactics; financial linkages, chain of money transfer of AQIM, MUJAO, Boko Haram; linkage in what is called the Arc of Terror from Nigeria to Somalia; AU’s counter-terrorism initiatives; links between piracy and terror finance were also discussed. Discussion also focused on whether categories such as ‘failed’ or a ‘failing’ state legitimate or are they used as excuses for foreign intervention; role of media in Africa; and whether terrorist groups using certain natural resources to fund their activities.

Report prepared by Neha Kohli, Associate Editor, Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA.

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