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Monday Morning Webinar on Understanding China’s Growing Military Footprints in Central Asia January 17, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Col. Deepak Kumar, Research Fellow and Coordinator, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA, spoke on the topic “Understanding China’s Growing Military Footprints in Central Asia” at the Monday Morning Webinar held on 17 January 2022. The webinar was moderated by Mr. Vishal Chandra, Research Fellow, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA; Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA; the panellists and scholars and members of the Institute participated in the webinar.

Executive Summary

China in recent years has increased its military presence in the Central Asian region by conducting joint military exercises, arms trade and building military infrastructure. Chinese military footprint is expanding in the so-called weaker Central Asian nations. Those with a relatively stronger economy and security structures have resisted Chinese overtures in their own manner. China’s increased military presence has an impact not only on the Central Asian region but also on the neighbouring regions. Russia is observant of the steps taken by China and India too is aware of the increased military presence.

Detailed Report

The Monday Morning Webinar began with Mr. Vishal Chandra, the moderator, referring to reports about the Chinese military presence in eastern Tajikistan, close to the Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan. The Corridor is strategically located between Tajikistan to the north, China to the east, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) to the south. The reports though denied by the Tajik Government, but assuming the Chinese have some military presence there, it has to be seen either as a part of the Sino-Russian collaboration or the Sino-Russian competition. Referring to the diversity of Central Asia, he observed that there is a Turkic Central Asia, a Persian Central Asia, and then there is a Russian Central Asia. Historically, it included parts of southern Russia, the Xinjiang Region (western China), and northern Afghanistan.

Col. Deepak Kumar, the speaker, began his presentation by referring to China establishing its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 and Chinese troops’ presence in Tajikistan. He pointed to the popular narrative of Russia being the security provider and China the economic provider in Central Asia. When it comes to Central Asia, China sees two main threats: possible spill-over of radical Islam into its restive Xinjiang Region and threat to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure. According to the speaker, Chinese military footprints are visible in four areas: arms assistance, military training and exercise, military bases and private security companies.

While focusing on arms assistance, data was shared by the speaker from the year 1991–2018 on arms imports by the Central Asian Republics from Russia and China. Overall Russia leads in arms supplies, however, there is a gradual increase in arms imports from China in the last five years particularly by Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In Turkmenistan, China has overtaken Russia as the second largest arms supplier after Turkey. According to data sourced from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China has supplied more than $60 billion to Central Asia since 1991. 97 per cent of Chinese sales and assistance happened after 2014. From 2010–2014, Chinese arms to Central Asia comprised about 0.5 per cent of Central Asian arms imports, whereas from 2015–2019 China provided 18 per cent of the region’s arms. Russian arms supply in the last 10 years has been consistently about 60 per cent. Imports from China are increasing particularly in the field of technology such as drones and missiles.

As far as military exercises are concerned the speaker stated that from 2014 to 2019, China held 10 bilateral exercises with Central Asia. In 2016, China and Tajikistan held an exercise in the Gorno-Badakhshan region that borders Afghanistan, in which 10,000 personnel were involved. China in the same year formed a Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan for counter terrorism, mainly because China felt that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was not aligning to its agenda. China has conducted nearly same numbers of bilateral and multilateral exercises as Russia, with 60 per cent of the exercises involving the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and not the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 2019, for Cooperation Series Exercises, Chinese PAP interoperated with the armies of the Central Asian countries. Essentially, China wants the PAP to be its military front in Central Asia.

Speaking about military bases and infrastructure, the speaker brought out that until 2016, only Russia had its military presence in Central Asia, however in October 2016, China constructed 11 border outposts and a training centre for border guards in Tajikistan. A separate border outpost in the Shamyak village in Murgab District was also constructed in 2016. Another military base financed by China will be constructed in Tajikistan as per a recent agreement for about $10 million but no Chinese personnel will be stationed in that base. There is also a Chinese electronic warfare facility in Tajikistan, which was used to monitor the Western forces in Afghanistan. Lately, Chinese Institutes have begun training courses for Central Asian officers including language classes and offer a higher stipend than Russia.

The speaker further spoke about Private Security Companies and mentioned that Chinese state-owned organisations like the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps are remodelling their scope to include security services for the BRI. The future role of training Central Asian paramilitaries and officers is also under consideration. Many Chinese private security companies are present in Central Asia.

The speaker elaborated on the consequences of the Chinese military presence in the region. Chinese security outreach is linked to its expanding national interest and PLA and PAP are being used for protecting Chinese interests. China, according to the speaker, will use the military for its national interest but in the short term would not be directly involved in any confrontations in Central Asia. China is trying to establish a strategic foothold in areas where Russian technology is lacking and is ready to supply the needed technologies. Chinese military education will have a significant impact on the composition of the military leadership in Central Asia.

The presence of troops near Wakhan, which is situated close to Gilgit-Baltistan, has implications for India. Chinese electronic warfare facilities could be used to monitor Indian military activity in the neighbourhood. 

In the short-term, the Russia–China bonhomie can be expected to continue. Rather than Russia’s arms exports, China presently is slicing from the arms exports share of other countries like Ukraine, Turkey, Spain and France. In the long run, it may eat up Russian space for arms trade which could cause friction between the two. 

India has strong connections with Central Asia including military exercises and visits from senior military leaders to India. India has increased its outreach in the region including visits by the Indian Foreign Minister to Central Asia and hosting of Third India–Central Dialogue.

The speaker concluded by stating that there is evidence of growing Chinese influence in Central Asian security and at present it is calibrated to keep Russian sensitivities in mind. In future, China might not defer to Russia and perhaps even develop its own initiatives and ignore Russia.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA stated that historically, China used to be strictly against foreign bases. Exports were generally part of the Chinese matrix. Even in the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese did send a large number of arms and ammunition to the Afro-Asian countries. Chinese views have changed and can be predicated on their realisation of the enormous economic stakes as the world’s biggest trading power. It would like some security for its investments like the BRI.

He also brought to the fore that the PAP is a part of the PLA so two features should be kept in mind. Firstly, as the PLA was demobilised in the past, many joined the PAP. Secondly, there is no distinction between the operational training, military craft, etc., and weapons allocated to the PAP and the PLA.

 He made the point that China in Wakhan is extremely worried about any malicious insidious outpours coming out of Afghanistan into their soft underbelly. There is also an increase in the role and importance of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) after the recent Kazakhstan protests. It is certainly back in the reckoning.

He also mentioned that Chinese Policy in Xinjiang has always been predicated on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which is also the group sanctioned by the United States.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA said that the route from Tajikistan to Xinjiang is the only route from where anything can come into China. China is trying to stabilise and prevent the entry of terror organisations into Xinjiang. Chinese military’s entry into this narrow zone with a narrow purpose may not constitute a major military development. It is doubtful whether electronic warfare elements deployed in eastern Tajikistan  have the capabilities to cross the Pamir Knot and track Indian military movement. He also asked if there is space for Indian private security companies to enter into this zone of the CARs.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA made the point that though Chinese military expansion is visible, Russia is still the ‘go-to’ country when it comes to the SOS for regime stability. Russia is the actor the countries could rely on and CSTO is a Russian-led organisation. There exists a convergence of interests between Russia and China when it comes to the West. There is competition but also cooperation. There is a plan to strike a balance between each actor to maximise economic gains and maintain their scope for strategic autonomy.

He said that the potential of trilateral India, Russia and Central Asia defence cooperation has been talked about and asked what could be the contours of this trilateral partnership?

Dr.Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA said that Europe is working on gas supplies with Turkmenistan and vice-versa. She asked about the ways for these countries to diversify energy security and their link to Europe.

Ms. Anandita Bhada, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA asked whether India offers any defence courses for the Central Asian defence personnel? If yes, can it help in further improving the India–Central Asia relations?  

Mr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA stated that the short-term bonhomie between Russia and China is evident. He asked the speaker to elucidate on the possible situation in the long run, particularly since China is heavily investing in its military presence in Tajikistan, which is also a CSTO member.

He also said that QCCM was established in pre-Taliban Afghanistan but the current crisis in Afghanistan has led to a Taliban-led Afghanistan. He asked as to how this impacts the QCCM?

Col Deepak Kumar, the speaker, gave detailed and insightful replies in response to comments and questions received from the panellists and participants.

Report prepared by Mr Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.  

Europe and Eurasia
Monday Morning Webinar on 25 years of the Ganga Treaty: What Lies Ahead? January 10, 2022 1030 to 1300 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Centre Coordinator, Non-Traditional Security Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses spoke on the topic "25 Years of the Ganga Treaty: What Lies Ahead?” at MP-IDSA’s regular Monday Morning Webinar held on 10 January 2022. Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik, Research Fellow, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, chaired the webinar. Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, scholars and members of the Institute attended the webinar.

Executive Summary

The Ganga Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh has come a long way since its signing in 1996. The treaty is for a period of 30 years and is due for renewal in 2026. With the impact of climate change on water resources and the emerging inter and intra-state water sharing challenges, it would be important for both countries to work towards the future contours of the Ganga Treaty. The next five years, therefore, will be crucial.

Detailed Report

Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik introduced the topic and highlighted the importance of the Ganga Treaty that was signed on 12 December 1996. She mentioned that on both sides there exist several concerns pertaining to the availability and flow of the Ganga water and when the Treaty comes up for renewal, several challenges will have to be overcome given the fact that water sharing is highly political, emotive and divisive.

Dr. Sinha highlighted 1996 as a landmark year, which he described as a ‘Hydrological Moment’.  1996 not only saw the signing of the Ganga Treaty but also the Mahakali Treaty with Nepal which was signed in February 1996. Further touching upon the political developments that led to the signing of the Ganga Treaty, Dr. Sinha, mentioned that Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, who came to power in June 1996 played an important leadership role. He recalled that in a joint statement, soon after signing the treaty in New Delhi, Hasina very wisely and carefully called it “The Ganga Treaty” rather than the anglicised Ganges, or the Padma, as the river is known in Bangladesh. The 1996 Ganga Treaty he explained was a culmination of several water sharing developments that took place since the Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971.  These include the 1977-1982 agreement and several other one year MOU’s on water-sharing between the two countries. Dr. Sinha informed that soon after Bangladesh’s independence, the Joint River Commission was established in 1972 to map and survey the ‘common rivers’ between India and Bangladesh.

With this brief historical narration, Dr. Sinha then discussed the transboundary river dynamics. First, he mentioned that transboundary rivers establish a complex network of environmental, social, economic and security interdependencies. Second, rivers crisscrossing boundaries in South Asia brings in an interesting politico-diplomatic framework. Rivers can act as a catalyst for cooperation between states as well as become a source of competition and rivalry. What, therefore, emerges, is a hydro-politico-security complex, in which a distinct hydro-behaviour of states can be determined along with upstream-downstream contestations. He observed that South Asia is a ‘riverine neighborhood’ where predictability and availability of water in the rivers will be challenged by demands and pressures and also by the knowns and unknowns of climate change.

On the specifics of the Ganga Treaty, Dr. Sinha mentioned that the Farakka Barrage has always created fear and apprehension in the minds of the people of Bangladesh, because of the water that has been diverted to Hooghly in the maintenance of Calcutta port. He asserted that the entire debate on Farakka in the 1960’s between India and East Pakistan was based on strong opposition from Islamabad on ‘not’ having the Farakka Barrage. But India’s hydrocracy prevailed and the Farakka Barrage was commissioned in 1975. Interestingly, Dr. Sinha captured the Lok Sabha debate soon after the Treaty was signed and highlighted some of the statements from Members of Parliament present during the discussion in particular, Uma Bharti, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi. Even Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh, as Dr. Sinha explained, had to face strong criticism on the water sharing mechanism.

Briefly commenting on the political setup in India during the signing of the Ganga Treaty, Dr. Sinha mentioned that the year 1996 saw an uneasy coalition government which wanted to leave a legacy especially in neighbourhood diplomacy. The Ganga Treaty like the 1977 agreement was signed by a non-Congress government. Dr. Sinha highlighted the role of India’s ‘Left Parties’ and the important role played by Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister of West Bengal. Sheikh Hasina built good personal rapport with Jyoti Basu keeping in mind the importance of West Bengal. She also, unlike the previous regimes in Bangladesh, did not internationalise the issue of Ganga waters despite domestic pressures.

Looking ahead, Dr. Sinha mentioned that the Indian states of U.P. and Bihar will have to be factored in the effective utilization of Ganga water. He mentioned that India has done its ‘utmost’ to maintain the flow of water. He highlighted the basic principles of the Ganga Water Treaty, which has been adhered to the best possible extent despite several contrary noises in Bangladesh. These include: 1. Equitable; 2. Fairness and 3. No Harm. He mentioned that for the future course of this treaty ‘dialogue and negotiations’ would remain crucial and critical. Further, the mechanisms and institutions that exist between India and Bangladesh on water sharing require updating. Transparency, trust and accountability remains important in terms of data exchange and information sharing on available water resources. Dr. Sinha suggested that Indian diplomats posted in the neighbourhood need to be trained in hydro-diplomacy and be familiarised with technical knowledge on hydrology. Finally, the speaker concluded by highlighting that Bangladesh needs ‘the Ganga Barrage’ that could be optimised to operate with the ‘Farakka Barrage’. This will not only restore the environment in the southern part of Bangladesh but would also provide water in dry season for irrigation in eastern India and central Bangladesh.

Questions and Comments

Following this extensive talk, Dr. Pattanaik made her remarks and invited Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy to make his comments. The floor was later opened for the panelists and participants for their comments and questions.

Ambassador Chinoy thanked the speaker and pointed out that water is not only the root cause of many disputes between states, but also similar disputes are witnessed domestically as well. Citing the example of the Krishna water dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, Ambassador Chinoy mentioned that such complex water-related issues are equally difficult to deal with internally. Second, he mentioned that water-related issues between states become even more complex when rivers enter and re-enter the territories of states. Third, he mentioned that the water disputes are largely related to its sharing. He also pointed out that water can be used as a weapon and cited the 2004 Parechu incident. He took the opportunity to state China’s reluctance on sharing hydrological data with India that led to downstream dangers on the Sutlej river when the huge water accumulated in the lake Parechu suddenly burst through.  

Capt. Anurag Bisen mentioned that China does not have any water treaty with lower riparian countries as compared to India and asked the speaker as to why India did not sign the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. He also asked Dr. Sinha to comment on India’s so-called generosity in signing water-sharing agreements with lower riparian countries.

Col. (Dr) Divakaran Padma Kumar Pillay (Retd.) in his remarks also commented on India’s generous approach in water-sharing agreements with lower riparian states. Col. Pillay asked the Speaker to comment on such an approach. 

Dr. Nihar K Nayak in his remarks mentioned that 47 per cent of water to the Ganges comes from Nepal during the non-lean period and simultaneously during the lean period (i.e. during dry season) 75 per cent of the water flow in the Ganges comes from Nepal. He asked the speaker, "Should India involve Nepal in the future Ganga Water Treaty that is going to be renewed in 2026”? 

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma asked the speaker to comment on the IPCC sixth assessment report that highlights the impact of climate change on the flow of the water in the Ganges River in the near future. He also asked the speaker to comment on the issue of ‘Climate Refugees’ that may emerge for Bangladesh as a result of drought and flooding (according to the IPCC 6th Assessment Report).

Dr. Sinha gave a detailed explanation to the comments and questions raised by the panelists and the participants.

Report prepared by Bipandeep Sharma, Research Analyst, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

Non-Traditional Security
Webinar Discussion on India-Australia Bilateral Relations February 10, 2022 Other

Centre for Southeast Asia and Oceania organised a webinar discussion on India-Australia bilateral relations, where Col. Ravinder Pal Singh, Research Fellow at MP-IDSA, delivered a presentation on “Australia’s Strategic Posturing in Indo-Pacific: Imperatives for India”, on 10 February 2022 at 1500 hours (IST). Mr. Mahadevan Shankar, National Convenor for Defence and Security Working Group in the Australia-India Chamber of Commerce, joined as an external discussant while Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow at MP-IDSA, joined as an internal discussant. Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh, Cluster Coordinator for Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre and Senior Research Associate at MP-IDSA, moderated the session. Ms. Shruti Pandalai, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA, and Mr. Akash Sahu, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA, were also part of the discussion.  

Executive Summary

India and Australia have improved their bilateral relations in the past decades to reach an alignment of their foreign policies. Even though Canberra’s loyalties may be more firmly rooted in treaty alliances such as ANZUS, than the QUAD, there is an acute realisation that China’s aggressive actions can pose a threat to its national security. New Delhi and Canberra may work together to eliminate mutual suspicions, and boost bilateral ties for greater synergy on foreign policy issues.

Detailed Report

Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh began the session with an introduction on India-Australia relations, and traced major points of their engagement in the past few decades. He noted that the history of their relationship has been an important determinant of bilateral trust and political will to deepen relations. India and Australia may be at a point in time that changing global order could bring them closer in bilateral as well as multilateral forums like the Quad. It may be important in that case to address issues that can prevent a stronger and more comprehensive strategic partnership.

In his presentation, Col. R.P. Singh began with an overview of the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. He highlighted the great power rivalry between the US and China which can potentially shape diplomatic alliances among countries in the region. The rivalry is evident from policy documents coming out of Washington on defence as well as trade. The global influence of the US seems to be declining and the Biden administration has chosen to go along with Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The rise of minilaterals in the region characterise fast-changing security dynamics. Increased focus on non-traditional security and ASEAN centrality have also been crucial areas of the regional security discourse. Col. Singh traced Australia’s deteriorating relations with China since after Canberra publicly supported calls for investigation on COVID-19. As a reaction, China ceased imports from Australia which has adversely impacted their bilateral equation. Australia shares India’s vision for freedom and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. It has also been part of a new trilateral AUKUS, under which it will receive critical technological support from the US for nuclear-powered submarines. The 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Defence Strategic Update coming out of Australia underlined its perspective on deterrence and response with a credible minimum force. Canberra’s strategy could be seen as recognising the threat, building a response, and developing capabilities accordingly.

On India’s engagement with Australia, Col. Singh highlighted the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries, participation in the QUAD, Joint exercises like Malabar and AUSINDEX, and ASEAN forums like ADMM Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum, and East Asia Summit. Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Indian Ocean Rim Association, and the MILAN exercise have also strengthened bilateral relations. India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and Forum for India- Pacific Islands Cooperation indicate New Delhi’s focus on the Indo-Pacific. Col. Singh recommended joint defence manufacturing, joint training for interoperability of forces, and long-term reciprocal arrangements.

Mr. Mahadevan Shankar observed that Australia’s relations with India have been long impacted by colonial perceptions, but relations have improved particularly as Indo-US ties have strengthened. With the election of Trump in the US, security guarantees to Australia came under question, and Australians began to contemplate how they can independently tackle threats to their national security in the Indo-Pacific region. This can be seen as the underpinning for a substantial change in Canberra’s national security approach, which also precipitated the formation of AUKUS. On the question of Taiwan, Canberra is so firmly tied to the US alliance and security commitments that it can be expected to back the US if things go south between China and Taiwan. Thus, Australia looks to India as a potential partner in a volatile security environment of the region.

Cmde. Abhay K. Singh in his remarks noted that while the US influence may be perceived as declining, the absolute American naval power in the Pacific is formidable. This allows the US to be a major player in the regional security equation to balance China. He also cautioned that Australian ‘fickleness’ is a big challenge and suggested that India-Australia ‘strategic convergence needed to transform into ‘strategic interdependence’.  Ms. Shruti Pandalai posed a question on the differing meanings of interoperability of forces among like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. It was unanimously agreed that different military hardware may induce challenges for more streamlined joint training, but that may be overcome through regular exercises. Mr. Akash Sahu raised a question on Australia’s trade in the region, and how that may impact its diplomatic alliances. Mr. Shankar responded that even though China had been Australia’s prime destination for exports; a large portion of those have found alternative markets. For New Delhi, this is a sign of Canberra’s autonomy in pursuing its security and foreign policy. Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh summed up the discussion and expressed that greater dialogue between India and Australia may help them reach a deeper level of strategic partnership.

The report was prepared by Mr. Akash Sahu, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning Meeting on Indian Foreign Secretary’s Visit to Myanmar: Prospects for India-Myanmar Relations January 03, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

The Monday morning meeting on “Indian Foreign Secretary’s Visit to Myanmar: Prospects for India-Myanmar Relations” was conducted on 3 January, 2022. Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh, Coordinator, Southeast Asia & Oceania Centre, delivered a presentation on the topic and the session was chaired by Dr. Priyanka Singh. The panelists included Director-General Ambassador Sujan Chinoy, Deputy-Director General Maj. Gen (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha and Research Analyst Mr. Akash Sahu.

Executive Summary

The discussion brought forward sensitive strategic issues of India’s stance in the Myanmar crisis, and sought to weigh different options to find a path for cooperation. India may engage with Myanmar on different levels and seek to strengthen its position vis-à-vis economic and strategic bilateral relations. The Bay of Bengal may emerge as a new frontier for power rivalry, and India must be vigilant about naval activities taking place in the region.

Detailed Report

The session was commenced by the chair highlighting Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla’s visit to Myanmar. The visit could be seen as India’s outreach to Myanmar as the foreign secretary arrived there with one million doses of COVID vaccines. The chair posed some questions central to the discussion for the day, such as-

  • Why does India engage with the regime in Myanmar? Is the China factor a determinant in India’s actions regarding Myanmar?
  • How long can India keep engaging the regime, especially as most western nations have cut off ties with Myanmar and even imposed economic sanctions?

Dr. Singh began his presentation by observing that the democratisation process in Myanmar has been derailed. He provided a background on the events that led to the military coup in Myanmar by the Armed forces or ‘Tatmadaw’ in early 2021. The election results, where popular leader Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory, were disputed by the Tatmadaw even though no substantial evidence of any electoral fraud could be found. The Tatmadaw under Min Aung Hlaing refused to accept the election outcomes and seized political power in the country. The regime has set August 2023 as a tentative time for upcoming elections, but, that has not stopped a popular outrage against the regime. The movement has been crushed by the military and hundreds of citizens have been put behind bars. Dr. Singh spoke about external relations of Myanmar and pointed out the regime’s closeness with Russia and China. China transferred a submarine to Myanmar, and China continues to supply arms to the regime. Japan has retained its close ties with the military administration in Naypyidaw. China developed close ties with the Myanmar regime during years of its boycott by the west. It has carefully cultivated strategic and economic dependencies for Myanmar which it may not be able to easily shrug off.

But it does not end there. There have been reports of mistrust between China and the Tatmadaw as well. Even if this may have put strain on their relationship, China still maintains strong clout in Myanmar. That is particularly in context to its infrastructure projects such as oil and gas pipelines and highways. On Myanmar’s economy, Dr. Singh underlined its poor and declining state. He also said that influx of refugees to India may increasingly become a problem. In such matters, the centre and state governments in India have not always found agreement, but it may be useful to take the states into confidence as they are an important agency in negotiating with local insurgencies. India supports the ASEAN process and its five-point resolution. It may act in concert with other ASEAN partners like Vietnam to preserve its relationship with the regime, and even compel it to bring reformative changes in the polity of Myanmar.

The Director-General shared his comments on the developing situation and observed that India’s Act East policy is contingent on good relations with Myanmar. India has had to tackle multiple fronts such as incoming refugees and the Rohingya situation. For India to join the bandwagon of countries demanding the regime to bring back democracy may not be very prudent. Given that it shares a long border with Myanmar and naturally has a much larger stake than western nations, India may weigh its options carefully before deciding to sanction the regime or break ties. The Indian government has dealt with monarchies on its periphery before, such as Nepal and Bhutan, and has established successful diplomacy in those cases. Acting in haste in case of Myanmar may only push the country deeper into the axis with China, which can be counterproductive for India. He also pointed out that the Tatmadaw is a structured and powerful organisation, therefore, it may be expected to remain in power for the foreseeable future. More importantly, the citizens of Myanmar must influence their own politics rather than an external power. The Deputy Director-General reiterated the view and added that Indian armed forces have had a cordial relationship with the Tatmadaw. Their involvement with the regime can be fruitful for India to maintain a presence in Myanmar.

Vice Admiral Sinha supported the views expressed and spoke about Bay of Bengal as a new frontier for growing power rivalry. Given Myanmar’s island territories in the region and Beijing’s intention to use the waterways of Bay of Bengal, India must be cautious of China’s growing influence. India has trained Myanmar’s Navy for several years and this cooperation among the two armed forces may be utilised as an asset in diplomacy. Mr. Sahu asked a question on India’s economic policy regarding Myanmar, which may help to build confidence among Indian investors to continue operating in Myanmar and even expand their operations. In response to that, Dr. Singh noted that a detailed analysis of the working of different ministries in Myanmar may be of help in assessing where India must focus its outreach to safeguard its investors and business interests in Myanmar. Dr. Singh summed up the discussion and highlighted that China’s interaction with Myanmar may be closely monitored by India.

Report prepared by Mr. Akash Sahu, Research Analyst at Centre for Southeast Asia and Oceania.

South East Asia and Oceania
Report of Monday Morning Webinar on An Assessment of the Security Situation in Jammu & Kashmir February 07, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Manzoor Ahmad BhatResearch Analyst, Internal Security Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, spoke on “An Assessment of the Security Situation in Jammu & Kashmir”, at the Monday Morning Webinar held on 7 February 2022. The webinar was chaired by Dr. Pushpita Das, Centre Coordinator, Internal Security Centre. Director General, Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy, Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. Bipin Bakshi, Col. Vivek Chadha and other scholars of the institute participated in the webinar.

Executive Summary

With an overall decline in terrorist-related violence statistics, the security situation in Jammu and Kashmir has relatively improved over the last two years. More importantly, the security forces have succeeded in tapping the external influences in the Kashmir Valley. Although it is a positive indication, but this alone, cannot ensure long-term peace and stability in Jammu and Kashmir. To bring Jammu and Kashmir back on the path of normalcy, the decline in violence should pave the way for strengthening of democratic institutions at the grassroots level. The dominant counter-terrorism paradigms advocate promotion of democracy as the best method to decrease the political utility of terrorist violence.

Detailed Report

Dr. Pushpita Das initiated the webinar by recalling the apparent security apprehensions which were associated with the abrogation of Article 370 from the state of J&K on 5 August 2019. She underscored that the security situation in J&K, on the other hand, had remained largely under control as several militants were neutralised in the past two and a half years. She attributed the success to the intelligence-backed security operations, wherein, intelligence was provided by the locals. Dr. Das, however, expressed her concerns over the challenges due to the creation of new militant groups, the emergence of ‘hybrid militancy’, cross-border infiltration of terrorists; and, smuggling of narcotics & small arms etc.

Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Bhat began his presentation by giving an update on the security situation in J&K. Comparing the violence statistics (terrorist incidents, fatalities, cross-border infiltration, encounters between terrorists and SFs) for the two periods i.e. prior to and after the abrogation of Article 370; Dr. Bhat assessed that the militancy in J&K has registered a declining trend in the period following the abrogation of Article 370. 

Description

16 April 2017 to 4 August 2019 (841 Days)

5 August 2019 to 30 Nov 2021 (841 Days)

Terrorist Incidents

843

496

Civilians Killed

86

79

Security Forces Killed

78

45

With respect to cross-border infiltration, a similar declining trend was evident suggesting that the security forces in J&K have been relatively successful in controlling the external influences in Kashmir in the period following the abrogation of Article 370.

Description

2018

2019

2020

2021

Net Infiltration

143

141

51

28 (till Oct 31)

Dr. Bhat discussed the important developments which were relevant to the changed security situation in the post-abrogation period. The three districts- Baramula, Kupwara and Bandipora- which were the hot bed of militancy earlier, have largely remained peaceful for some time. Listing the region-wise contribution to the militant violence, Dr. Bhat stated that the four southern districts of Kashmir-Shopian, Pulwama, Kulgam and Anantnag-together accounted for 65 per cent of the total militant violence in 2021; followed by Central Kashmir (18 %); and North Kashmir (17 %). With respect to the district-wise percentage of the encounters between the militants and SFs, Shopian tops the list with 20 per cent of the total encounters, followed by Kulgam (19 per cent), Pulwama (16 per cent) and Srinagar (14 per cent). Rajouri and Poonch have remained relatively at peace and most of the encounters reported in these two districts were related to infiltration.

Dr. Bhat also expressed his views on the changing dynamics of militancy in the Kashmir Valley. The militant outfit- Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), which had come into prominence during Burhan Wani’s leadership and after his death, has contributed relatively less as compared to the Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. According to him, the elimination of HM’s top leadership and its policy of giving room to freshly minted groups like The Resistance Front (TRF), Peoples Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) etc. – were the possible explanations. He opined that the emergence of new ‘terrorist brands’ like TRF, the Ghaznavi Force, the Geelani Force, Kashmir Tigers etc., was mainly to ensure that the links of any big terrorist attack in J&K could not be traced back to Pakistan.

Another perceptible change/trend was the dip in the killing of Pakistani terrorists compared to local militants in J&K. Dr. Bhat attributed it to the killing of Burhan Wani, as during his time and after his killing, lot of Kashmiri youth had joined militancy in the state. He also added that the same could also be a reflection of the changed approach of Pakistan to militancy in Kashmir, driven by the pressure from FATF and its preoccupation with Afghanistan. In the wake of  the recent developments in J&K, Dr. Bhat argued that there was an increased attempt to “secularise the Jihad” in Kashmir as all the new organisations had consciously avoided religious symbolism in their titles. The intention, according to him, was to project it as a resistance movement, which is somewhat acceptable to the international community.

In order to explain the above-mentioned developments in the security situation in J&K, Dr. Bhat cited the ‘Strategic Model’ of terrorism that assumes terrorists as ‘rational actors’ and most importantly talks about ‘Political Utility’. Based on this model, reducing the political utility of terrorism is considered as the best counter-terrorism strategy. Dr. Bhat said that the recent changes in the Government’s policy with respect to J&K, and especially on terrorism in the Valley, have largely contributed to the improved security situation over the last two and a half years. The Government’s policy of non-appeasement and the resolve to directly deal with the sustaining factors of militancy etc., were a clear departure from the earlier period.

Dr. Bhat concluded his presentation by outlining the security threats and issues associated with the relatively new "hybrid" militants/militancy in J&K. He anticipated that the new militancy-framework could appeal to a large number of militants, particularly locals, due to the greater impunity and fewer risks it entails.

The following important points came up during the discussion.

The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy expressed his disagreement on ‘secularisation of the Jihad’ in J&K. He said that militancy in J&K has been largely Kashmir-centric, and that the state as a whole is not participating in militancy. Even communities such as Buddhists, Bakarwals, Gujjars and Kashmiri Pandits, among others, are never involved in terrorism. He advised the speaker to revisit his opinion/ theory on the ‘secularisation of the Jihad’ in J&K. Ambassador Chinoy also sought the speaker’s thoughts on anticipated changes in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy if FATF pressure and its preoccupation with Afghanistan change. In response to the Director General’s comment, Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Bhat, clarified that his reference to “secularisation of the Jihad” was to mainly emphasise that the intention is to make it more of a resistance movement that can garner more international solidarity. He clarified that this is not meant to widen the net to include recruits from other communities.

Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. Bipin Bakshi spoke on the efficacy of the robust counter-infiltration grid as an important factor responsible for the improved security situation in J&K. He opined that this is a manifestation of robust border management. Another important factor, according to Maj. Gen. Bakshi, has been the reduced influence of separatist leaders.

Key Takeaways

  1. Security forces in Jammu and Kashmir have managed to control external influence.
  2. The Government has reduced the political utility of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.
  3. New terrorist outfits have propped up which avoid religious symbolism to garner international support.
  4. Hybrid militancy can challenge the security forces for some time, but in the long run, it cannot be sustained without any organizational support.

The Report has been prepared by Ms. Rajbala Rana, Research Analyst, Internal Security Centre, MP-IDSA.

South Asia Jammu and Kashmir
Online Session on Writing Skills and Development January 28, 2022 1500 hrs Other

Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator, Non-Traditional Security will speak on the theme. Dr. Sinha is also the Managing Editor of Strategic Analysis, MP-IDSA’s flagship journal published by Routledge.

Ms. Sumita Kumar, Academic & HR Coordinator, MP-IDSA will moderate the session.

Non-Traditional Security
Monday Morning Webinar on Pakistan’s National Security Policy 2022-2026: An Assessment January 31, 2022 Monday Morning Meeting

Event Report

Col. Guriqbal Singh Gill, spoke on the topic “Pakistan’s National Security Policy 2022-2026: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Webinar held on 31 January 2022 at 10 AM. The session was chaired by Dr. Ashok K. Behuria and was attended by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, senior scholars & research analysts of MP-IDSA.

Executive Summary

On 14 January 2022 the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Imran Khan launched his nation’s first ever National Security Policy (NSP). The launch of this NSP comes at a time when Pakistan’s image in the international community has been deteriorating due to its support for terrorism and the economic crisis that it has been facing internally. This document however indicates a shift in Pakistan’s perception about national security as it focuses more on the non-traditional aspects of security like economic and human security than the traditional aspects of security like external aggression. Recent developments in the Af-Pak region including the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the internal security threats posed by Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) and Baloch separatists have influenced the drafting of the NSP. The document also focuses on aspects like improving national cohesion through the promotion of inclusive economic growth in the underdeveloped regions within Pakistan. The document reflects Pakistan’s insecurities with India’s superior military capabilities and India seeking the role of a Net Security Provider for South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The document classifies enhancing economic security as Pakistan’s medium term objective and ensuring comprehensive security as its long term objective. The document puts Pakistan’s relationship with China on a high pedestal and indicates Pakistan’s estrangement from its strategic partnership with the US.

The document despite adopting a comprehensive outlook towards national security ignores the practical realities and challenges that confront Pakistan. Although the document lays down certain policy objectives it fails to provide any mechanism for the implementation or execution of these objectives. As a result of this, the document appears to be more of a perception management exercise by Pakistan as it faces a negative image externally and economic uncertainties internally. The document does not adequately address the issue of terrorism due to which bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have been suffering for a long time. As a result, the document is unlikely to bring any significant change in Pakistan’s attitude towards India nor does it indicate Pakistan abandoning the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

Detailed Report

Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA commenced the session by giving a brief overview of the recently released “Pakistan’s National Security Policy 2022-2026.” He stated that the document puts a lot of emphasis on the economic and human security aspects of national security. Dr. Behuria described the document as containing a blend of realism and neo-liberalism oriented aspects like economic interdependence and hard security issues. He stated that although the document claims to focus on improving economic connectivity in the region it does not present any clear road map to achieve the same. He further commented that the anodyne pronouncements given in the document reveal the biases and disillusionment of Pakistan’s deep state. With these opening remarks, Dr. Behuria invited Col. Guriqbal Singh Gill to give his presentation on the Assessment of Pakistan’s NSP.

Col. Guriqbal Singh Gill began his presentation by defining the concept of National Security as a multifaceted concept that encompasses all aspects of security for a nation-state, its citizens, economic interests and institutions. He stated that an NSP document provides guidelines for the government to address the security needs of the people and the state. He stated such documents essentially reflect the views of the respective Government and its institutions.       Col. Gill pointed out the fact that the common traits of such documents comprise of three key elements that include a state’s vision of the international system, threat assessment and delegation of functional responsibilities of each implementing authority.

Col. Gill then gave a brief background of the various factors that prompted the Pakistani Government to release the draft of the NSP. He stated the most important factor was the developments in the Af-Pak region including the fall of the Western-backed Afghan government and Pakistan’s open support to the Taliban that has resulted in generating a negative image of Pakistan by the Western media. The second factor is the deteriorating relations with the US post its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Col. Gill mentioned the security issues threatening the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the struggling Pakistani economy that requires International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout as other contributing factors. Apart from this security factors like the external threat from India, internal threats from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) & Baloch separatist movements and issues on the domestic political front are other aspects that have influenced the NSP.

Analysing the contents of the document Col. Gill stated the eight sections of the document focused on aspects like policy formulation, national security framework, national cohesion, economic issues, territorial integrity, internal security, foreign policy and human security. He pointed out that the second section on the national security framework is one of the most important sections as it reflects the challenges and changes in the strategic thinking of Pakistan. Col. Gill brought out the fact that economic security has been made the cornerstone of the national security framework and the document indicates a possible psychological shift in Pakistan’s national consciousness. The second section dwells upon the emerging non-traditional threats like terrorism and economic vulnerabilities. The document reveals that Pakistan views the enhancement of economic security as its medium-term objective and ensuring comprehensive security as its long-term objective. Col. Gill brought out that the third section on national cohesion is unique as it provides certain policy guidelines which the other sections lack. These policy guidelines focus on the need to achieve national cohesion through inclusive economic growth in the underdeveloped areas within Pakistan. He also stated that the details for execution of these policy guidelines have not been mentioned. Col. Gill explained that the fourth section deals with charting a roadmap towards securing the economic future of Pakistan. This section points out external imbalances, vertical and horizontal inequalities as the key challenges that threaten Pakistan’s economic future.

The fifth section on defence and territorial integrity focuses on aspects like border management and conventional military threats. Col. Gill stated that managing Pakistan’s border issues across the Line of Control (LOC) with India and the Durand Line with Afghanistan are the key issues of this section. He pointed out that although this section deals with important security aspects for Pakistan such as contestation in the Indian Ocean, India’s nuclear triad, space, information and cyber security threats, but it lacks a detailed assessment as it is covered within ninety words. Section six on internal security focuses on threats from terrorism to the development initiatives denoting threats to CPEC, hostile intelligence agencies, the role of extremism and sectarianism. He stated that although Pakistan has described internal security threats as its biggest challenge but those aspects have been already dealt in the 2016 national action plan published after the attack on the Peshawar Army School. Explaining the seventh section on foreign policy Col.Gill stated that Pakistan labels China, Iran and Afghanistan as friendly countries. Regarding India, there is a brief reference to Jammu & Kashmir and the revocation of article 370 in 2019.  He described the entire section as a PR exercise to project a positive image of Pakistan internationally. The final section dealing with human security aspects like population, healthcare, climate, water, food and gender security has been described by             Col. Gill as an attempt by the Pakistan government to give the document a comprehensive outlook.

Summarising his presentation Col.Gill described the NSP document as a perception management exercise as Pakistan’s image has taken a beating over the last couple of years. He stated that there has been some signalling towards India in terms of one step forward and one step back. Also, China has been put on a higher pedestal and US has been put along with the rest of the World citing cooperation beyond combating terrorism. He pointed out that the emphasis on the economy and internal issues indicate that Pakistan is looking inwards due to the extensive economic crisis it faces. Col.Gill stated that India should not lose sight of the fact that the Pakistan Military had sought a ceasefire last year and is reaping its benefits. He brought out the fact that the Indian Army Chief has spoken positively about the resolution of the Siachen Issue during his Army Day press conference and India has also recently asked for the scope to expand religious tourism in its communication to the Pakistani Government.

During the panel discussion Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy described the release of Pakistan’s NSP document as a window-dressing exercise due to the imprimatur of the academic styled document lacking any practitioner’s inputs on the practical realities and challenges. He stated when India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, there was a positive view that both nations would share a harmonious future but this view was short-lived with Pakistan’s invasion into Kashmir months after Independence. Recalling Ayub Khan’s offer for a no-war pact with India that had the conditionality for resolution of the Kashmir dispute and Indus Water sharing issue, the Director General pointed out that any attempt to establish enduring peace with Pakistan had been impeded by the Kashmir issue. He further stated that the policy document does not adequately address the issue of terrorism that India constantly faces in its relationship with Pakistan. The Director General brought out that the document reflects Pakistan’s drifting away from its strategic relations with the US and its increasing affinity with China. He also noted that the document did not sufficiently cover Afghanistan beyond referring to it as a gateway to Central Asia for Pakistan and did not dwell upon the strategic significance of the greater Af-Pak region in connecting South Asia with Central Asia. He stated that the document is more of an internal perception building effort taking into context the upcoming Pakistani General Elections in 2023.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, stated that despite the criticism of the document for being more theoretical and lacking policy guidelines, the attempt to articulate Pakistan’s wider security interests and threat perception can be commended. He stated that Pakistan’s shift from focusing on traditional security issues to human security issues which has been reflected in the NSP is a positive development. The document’s mention of India’s nuclear triad and the technological advances is a reflection of Pakistan’s fear of India’s superior military capabilities. The Deputy Director General stated that the existing ceasefire benefits Pakistan as it has been able to facilitate infiltrations without the fear of Indian retaliation. Col. Vivek Chadha, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA stated that the document does not reflect the reality and is unlikely to bring about any major changes in Pakistan’s attitude towards India.

During the Q&A session responding to a question posed by the Deputy Director General on Pakistan gaining from the ceasefire along the LOC, Col. Gill said due to the overwhelming firepower of the Indian Army the Pakistani Military had been under severe stress. He agreed with the DDG that the ceasefire is detrimental to India as it has provided Pakistan with the impunity and freedom to push in infiltrators across the LOC without any counteractions from the Indian side. To a question on reactions of nations like the US, China, Turkey and Malaysia to Pakistan’s NSP, Col. Gill responded by saying that there has been no reaction from either the US or China and any other Islamic States including Malaysia and Turkey. Responding to a question on the necessity for India to draft an NSP, Col. Gill stated that it is necessary to have political consensus to identify a nation’s security challenges on paper and to have clarity on the military policy which will ensure the right allocation of resources towards national security.

Key Takeaways –

  • The document reflects a shift in Pakistan’s focus from traditional security issues to non-traditional security issues like Economic and Human Security.
  • Although the document provides some policy guidelines to achieve its stated objectives but it does not lay down any clear mechanism for its implementation or execution.
  • The document reveals Pakistan’s insecurities against India’s superior military capability and at the same time lays emphasis on aspects of non-traditional security.
  • The Document puts China on a higher pedestal and indicates Pakistan’s drifting away from its strategic partnership with the US.
  • The release of the document can be considered as a perception management exercise due to the negative image of Pakistan in the International community.

Report prepared by Dr. R.Vignesh, Research Analyst, Military Affairs Centre, MP-IDSA

South Asia Pakistan
The K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture By Dr. Edward N. Luttwak on "Applying the Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam Method Today" February 03, 2022 Speeches and Lectures

The Second Annual K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture was hosted by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), India on 03 February 2022 at 1100hrs (IST) in a virtual format. The keynote speaker Dr.  Edward N. Luttwak, Contractual Advisor US Government and a Treaty ally, spoke about ‘Applying the Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam Method Today’, in the presence of the Hon’ble Minister of External Affairs of India Dr. S. Jaishankar and Shri Dhruva Jaishankar. Both joined the virtual discussion in their capacity as family members of Late K. Subrahmanyam. Director General (DG), MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, chaired the session and delivered the welcome addreess.

Executive Summary

Reminiscing about the memory of Late K. Subrahmanyam, Dr. Luttwak said that he foresaw the economic rise of China in the late 1970s. He anticipated that China would economically outmatch the US and argued for the India-US partnership. Dr. Luttwak opined that in the changed circumstances, the US needed allies. He maintained that Chinese belligerent behaviour had compelled the regional states to come together and form an organic coalition which was supplemented by the overlapping bilateral arrangements between the constituent states.

Dr. Luttwak suggested that China was comparatively focusing less on its land borders. Thus, it was an opportunity for the alliance to make its presence felt on the Chinese borders. Comparing China’s current political environment with Mussolini’s Italy, Dr. Luttwak contended that China under President Xi Jinping was in the Mussolini phase. He argued for an agile and downsized Indian army ready to take on future challenges. Concluding his address, Dr. Luttwak strongly proclaimed that blockade in the oceanic space remained the best way to deal with China during adverse times.

Detailed Report

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy began his introduction by remembering Late K. Subrahmanyam on his 11th death anniversary. He said that the world had changed since the 2008 economic crisis and even more so, after the COVID-19 pandemic. He referred to China’s economic rise accompanied by its coercive military tactics to state that China’s actions might prove counter to its long-term interests. However, he observed that the United States (US) was late in recognising China’s hegemonic behaviour in the region. Ambassador Chinoy pointed to the contrast in US’s relations with Europe. On the one hand, President Biden’s recommitment to the transatlantic alliance helped evolve a consensus on China; on the other hand, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the crisis over Ukraine exposed fissures between the US and its European allies. Highlighting the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion against Russian sensitivities and Russian deployment of the troops to Kazakhstan under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework, Ambassador Chinoy argued that the world was neither unipolar nor bipolar nor was it multipolar. He expressed concern that these events might take the US attention away from China which was the systemic challenger in the Indo-Pacific.

Referring to the 1990 essay of Dr. Luttwak titled “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce”, Ambassador Chinoy affirmed that there was a growing intersection between the political, military and economic factors, particularly their impact on peace and security.  The state and non-state actors had acquired asymmetrical means to bridge absolute gaps in economic and military heft. He argued that geoeconomics mattered but did not outweigh in importance the harsh reality of geopolitics. This was evident in US-China relations where mutual economic interdependence did not prevent aggravation of geostrategic contestation. Ambassador Chinoy underlined that the great irony was that China’s rise was facilitated in no small measure by the US. Further, he pointed to China’s debt-trap diplomacy, stranglehold over critical supply chains, unilateralism and military aggression over territorial differences to argue that there was consensus on ensuring rules-based order and a free and open maritime space in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the AUKUS were manifestations of new concerns. Furthermore, the Afghan situation remained fluid and there persisted a fear that Afghanistan might emerge as a hotbed of terrorism. He said that India would pursue strategic autonomy and issue-based alignment. Further, he emphasised that Kautilyan precepts had found a definite place in India’s strategic outlook whether it was India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy or its Indo-Pacific vision.

Ambassador Chinoy observed that nationalism, pragmatism and idealism permeated K. Subrahmanyam’s writings and pronouncements. His ability to synthesise political, economic and military issues was legendary. Even today, his imprimatur runs deep – from India’s nuclear posture to the country’s higher defence management. With this broad outline, Ambassador Chinoy handed over the floor to Dr. Luttwak to interpret the application of the K. Subrahmanyam method in today’s context.

Dr. Luttwak began his address by reminiscing about his interactions with Late K. Subrahmanyam, and described his voice as a “voice of inexorable logic”. He recalled how Late Subrahmanyam tried to explain the logic of nuclear India with a strict no-first-use policy. With nuclearisation, the aim was to create a nuclear threshold. His logic was irrefutable and his prediction about the future came out correct.

Late K. Subrahmanyam also foresaw the economic rise of China in the late 1970s. He anticipated that China would economically outmatch the US and argued a closer Indo-US relationship. Thus, he had recognised the necessity of an alliance not in a realm of strategy or war but in the realm of geoeconomics. Talking about China, Dr. Luttwak stated that today the world was dealing with the “New China”. Since the 2008 financial crisis, there was a feeling in China that “the East was up and the West was down”. The financial crisis was interpreted in China as the beginning of the general crisis of capitalism. During the same time, the US also weakened greatly. The social and cultural changes in the US and the accidental presidency of Mr. Trump contributed to this phenomenon. Dr. Luttwak argued that the US needed allies in the current circumstances as it was no more a unipolar moment of the 1990s.

Commenting on the regional scenario, the speaker observed that although neutrality between the US and China was the flavour of the season for regional states, the “logic of strategy” forced them to come together to contain China due to Chinese actions. Dr. Luttwak maintained that Chinese belligerent behaviour compelled the regional states to come together and form an organic coalition, unlike NATO. The organic coalition was supplemented by the overlapping bilateral arrangements between the constituent states. The Indo-Pacific command of the US was also the manifestation of the present-day reality. Although the Southeast Asian states did not take sides, their actions conveyed that the “logic of strategy” was working itself out, resulting in organic alliances.

Speaking further about the borders of China, Dr. Luttwak contended that China was acting like an island power. It was putting more efforts into building maritime, air and strategic forces and had an army of less than a million. He suggested that China was comparatively focusing less on its land borders. Thus, it was an opportunity for the alliance to make their presence felt on the borders. He asserted that when maritime powers are confronted by land powers, the former act on borders of the latter to remind them that they are a land power. India, being a maritime power, could take a leaf out of this strategy.

Reflecting on the internal dynamics of China, Dr. Luttwak argued that the world was dealing with only one person – President Xi Jinping – and not with China as a whole. Comparing China’s current political environment with Mussolini’s Italy, Dr. Luttwak contended that China under President Xi was in the Mussolini phase. Advising India about how it should deal with the challenge, he claimed that when a country faces a challenge, it is an opportunity to make drastic reforms. India needed an agile and downsized army ready to take on future challenges. He advocated against India having an aircraft carrier. Concluding his address, Dr. Luttwak strongly proclaimed that blockade in the oceanic space remained the best way to deal with China during adverse times.

Ambassador Chinoy steered the discussion through a question-and-answer session with a comment that Dr. Luttwak’s address brought together Mahan and Mackinder in suggesting response levels. While answering questions by the audience, Dr. Luttwak maintained that although President Biden changed his predecessor’s many policies, he continued with President Trump’s China policy. The Ukraine crisis had not diverted the US’s attention away from China. He maintained that US resources were mainly focused on the Indo-Pacific, although the Ukraine crisis was getting much more media traction. Commenting on the Russia-China relationship, the speaker drew the attention of the audience to the fact that despite close partnership, Russia was supplying arms to countries that were not friendly with China including Vietnam and India. Answering a question about the US-Pakistan equation, Dr. Luttwak said that the relationship had gone through many evolutions but there was a strong view that Pakistan was hostile to the US. So, he believed that the US-Pakistan relations should be conducted in the context of the de-facto Indo-US alliance. About Myanmar, he argued that allies should work closely and defer to the country within the alliance that had vantage position vis-à-vis Myanmar. On the Ukraine and Taiwan issue, Dr. Luttwak claimed that Russia cannot contribute anything out of Vladivostok to support Chinese action over Taiwan. Neither would China do anything in the Baltic. So, there won’t be a scenario where Russians and Chinese will cooperate. Russia and China were tactical allies as against strategic allies.

Joining the interaction, India’s Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar gave insights about his father. Dr. Jaishankar said that Late K. Subrahmanyam’s thinking was profoundly shaped by the conflicts of 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1999. His advocacy of policies was a product of a tough strategic environment where the US, China and Pakistan had come together. So, in the 1970s he championed India’s close relations with the Soviet Union. And then a decade later, in view of the US-China contradictions, he became a strong advocate of Indo-US partnership. The logic of both relationships was the same. Dr. S. Jaishankar believed that his father was an “insider-outsider”. He served in the government as well as in a think tank like IDSA. At times he held contrary views vis-à-vis the government positions. But he expressed his views very responsibly without making grand sweeping submissions. Late K. Subrahmanyam considered himself a grand strategist. His writings had geoeconomic underpinning. He focussed on non-traditional security issues such as connectivity, technology, and financing among others and explained as to how these could be leveraged to shape international relations. Thus, he was far ahead of his time.

Shri Dhruva Jaishankar delivered a vote of thanks. He remembered Late K. Subrahmanyam’s role in building IDSA, right from the 1960s as a note-taker in the defence ministry until the establishment of the institute. He also thanked Dr. Luttwak for his address on the occasion and described how Dr. Luttwak’s worldviews were shaped by his personal journey.

Report prepared by Mr. Niranjan Chandrashekhar Oak, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA


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Online Session on Enhancing Awareness on Gender Sensitive Conduct at Workplace January 27, 2022 1500 hrs Other

Ms. Ruchita Beri, Senior Research Associate and Coordinator, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean and United Nations Centre will speak on the theme.

Dr. Titli Basu, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA will moderate the session.

Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN
Online Discussion on the Global Health Security (GHS) Index January 12, 2022 1030 to 1300 hrs Other

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi organised a virtual discussion on the Global Health Security (GHS) Index, on 12 January 2022. The discussion was held with members from NITI Ayog headed by Dr. Rakesh Sarwal, Additional Secretary. The discussion was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, and was attended by Dr. Uttam Sinha, Col. (Dr.) DPK Pillay, Capt. Anurag Bisen (Indian Navy), Dr. Nihar R Nayak, Mr. Bipandeep Sharma along with the team from NITI Ayog and other faculty members of MP-IDSA.

Executive Summary

In October 2019, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security at the Bloomberg School of Public Health, in collaboration with Economist Impact, released the GHS Index. It evaluates and compares health security and associated measures and skills required to deal with it in 195 nations. Pandemics and healthcare are two of the most serious risks to security and well-being. It revealed the fragility of the global healthcare infrastructure. The COVID-19 pandemic has driven the world's overburdened healthcare system to cope and perform better. To fulfil the pressures of future health demands, India needs to invest more in its healthcare system. The GHS Index is a useful tool for detecting weaknesses in our healthcare system.

Detailed Report

Amb. Chinoy made the opening remarks and introduced to the audience the GHS Index report. While emphasizing the criticality of the healthcare system, he underlined that ‘no one is safe till everyone is safe.’ He emphatically observed that India has done remarkably well in not only vaccinating 70 per cent of the adult population but equally assisting a number of countries with medicines, vaccines and technical support, particularly in the neighbourhood. This follows India’s ‘first responder’ approach with its neighbouring countries. Amb. Chinoy further added that India must spend more on the healthcare system to meet future challenges of health. “We need to deepen our cooperation with countries like Japan, Australia and the US”, he remarked. Very candidly he stated that while the GHS Index is an interesting tool and possibly a guidepost in identifying gaps in the healthcare system but one needs to, at the same time, approach the methodology with a critical bent of mind especially when it comes to GHS Index performance evaluation of India’s capacity and response.

Col. (Dr.) DPK Pillay shared his views on the significance of health security. With historical evidences and timelines, Col. Pillay highlighted that more people were killed by the Spanish flu than those in World Wars I and II. He further stated that infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria have always tested the health system. Like the chair he also emphasized that India had responded to the recent pandemic fairly well given the inherent challenges. In the past too, India has performed exceptionally to prevented Smallpox and Polio. Quoting Mahatma Gandhi, “Health is the real wealth, not the pieces of gold and silver”. Col. Pillay highlighted constitutional provisions related to health particularly Article 39, Article 42, and Article 47. Explaining the significance of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), he stressed on the objective of Goal 3 (Good Health and Well-Being) and that India should put all its resources to achieve it by 2030.

He also mentioned three dimensions of an effective healthcare system, i.e., robust health services and infrastructure, preventive measures and timely monitoring; and financial allocations. Col. Pillay further commented on the role of the government in the healthcare system and described various measures including Mission Indradhanush that guaranteed access to healthcare and health services. The government’s focus on community-based disease prevention, health promotion, nutrition promotion and preparedness for pandemic, surveillance, water and sanitation, etc are commendable, he observed. India has taught the world a lot in terms of disease surveillance and control. One of the striking policy interventions has been the capping of prices of essential drugs and medical devices.

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma summarized the methodology of the GHS Index. He explained that the Index is meant to measure health security capacities of individual states depending on various parameters. The 2021 GHS Index includes a number of indicators that have been revised or added into the framework since the last report in 2019. The current GHS Index consists of 171 questions (compared with 140 in 2019) grouped into 37 indicators across six overarching categories. The Index includes research for 195 countries.

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma diligently explained the performances of each country, which is a weighted sum of the six categories such as Prevention, Detection and Reporting, Rapid Response, Health System, Compliance and International Norms and Risk. Each category is scored on a scale of 0 to 100, in which 100 represents the most favorable health security conditions and 0 represents the least favorable conditions. Based on the GHS Index criteria, a score of 100 does not indicate that a country has perfect national health security conditions, and a score of 0 does not mean that a country has no capacity. Instead, the scores of 100 and 0 represent the highest or lowest possible score respectively. He then elaborated how each category is normalized on the basis of the sums of its underlying indicators and sub-indicators. He concluded his presentation by giving insightful views on sub-classification of these broad six categories on which the score of each country is calculated. Interjecting, Amb. Chinoy raised doubts about the credibility of such reports and raised some important questions on the politicization of the pandemic and some of the underlying motives behind such studies.

The NITI Aayog team hereon joined the discussion. Dr. Rakesh Sarwal, Additional Secretary, NITI Aayog, complimented MP-IDSA for organising the virtual discussion on Global Health Security Index. Dr. Sarwal an MBBS and a doctorate in public health from Johns Hopkins University in response to the question raised by Amb. Chinoy stated that NITI Aayog does not subscribe to the GHS Index report but treats it as a case study evaluating the methodology that governs the report. He clearly emphasized that “we can adopt our own best practices in the healthcare arena.” He also mentioned that NITI Aayog recently produced a booklet on home care model and Covid-19 management at home. He further commented that health affects the economy and society of a nation and brought attention on two issues:

  1. How do the armed forces in India maintain public health in their cantonment and enclaves? What are the best practices that civilians should learn from the defence forces in maintaining the healthcare system?
  2. How is the security of a nation interlinked to global health? How are other countries managing in terms of isolating their armed forces from the larger pandemic and yet maintaining their vigilance on the border and preparedness for eventualities? And, the role of armed forces in helping civilian authorities in managing pandemics?

For a discussion on the methodology of the GHS Index, Ms. Prachi Goswami, an intern at NITI Aayog made her presentation. Ms. Goswami commented that the GHS Index is western oriented. Working in a privileged environment, western thinking is not exposed to the ground reality of emerging economies like India. She mentioned the historical aspect of the GHS Index and particularly emphasized the political and security risk part of the Index. It includes societal risk, risk of terrorism, armed conflicts, governmental territorial control and international tensions. One of the pitfalls, she observed, was that the methodology focused on tactical infrastructure without taking into consideration the political and social determinants of public health. Resultantly, those countries that are ranked ‘good’ on the GHS Index have performed ‘bad’ in the case of Covid-19, for instance the US. But those countries ranked relatively poor on the GHS Index performed well on Covid-19 performance, for instance India. She conclusively stated that the GHS Index in not a conclusive or a complete study.

Mr. Madan Gopal, senior consultant, NITI Aayog, commented on the accuracy of the GHS Index. There is a major concern, he stated, of not submitting data by various institutions. He also mentioned that there has been a UN Security Council Resolution 2532 which recognizes that Covid-19 “is likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security.” He also gave insights on how we can build indicators which can be measured and validated. He mentioned a Red Book of the military on public health and healthcare measures in armed forces cantonment areas.

Discussion, Comment and Question

Following this extensive discussion, Amb. Chinoy called upon Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Centre Head, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA, for his remarks.

Dr. Sinha stated that while such studies are instructive, the need is to develop our own framework, parameters and responses. He also observed that human well-being approach will be critical in future. In an interconnected world, the interface between human and infectious diseases are likely to increase in the future. MP-IDSA given its knowledge base and expertise can look at the non-medical attributes to the pandemic such as domestic political responses. He mentioned two important concerns that need to be studied. These are economic policies and aspirations; and social, political and cultural norms. He also added that the Army Medical Corps has a long history of preventive measures with the Station Health officers (SHOs) who engage with Preventive & Social Medicine (PSM). Responding to Dr. Sinha’s suggestion, Dr. Sarwal added that the Armed Forces Medical College (AFMC) Pune can be requested to give inputs.

Amb. Chinoy responding to the presentations suggested a need for training human resources to meet future healthcare requirements. He also raised an important question on Atma Nirbhar Bharat in manufacturing medical devices. Responding to it, Mr. Madan Gopal completely agreed and Dr. Sarwal added that the Atma Nirbhar Bharat in the health sector is a high priority area for the government.

Report prepared by Mr. Pintu Kumar Mahla, Research Intern, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA.

Non-Traditional Security

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