Vibin Lakshmanan asked: Why is 'polarity of power' thesis less relevant and meaningful than the 'balance of power' in the present international system?
S. Kalyanaraman replies: Polarity of Power and Balance of Power are not contrasting explanatory or theoretical perspectives.
Polarity of Power refers to the structure of international systems, whether they are dominated by a single Great (Super) Power [unipolar system] or two Great Powers [bipolar system] or multiple Great Powers [multipolar system].
Balance of Power is the attempt by each Great Power in an international system to ensure itself against rivals or adversaries through a combination of alliance formation (external balancing) and building up its own capabilities (internal balancing). The efforts made in this regard by the various countries inhabiting an international system are referred to as Balance of Power politics.
Theoretically, it can be argued that Balance of Power politics ceases to operate in a unipolar international system. A good recent example is America's 'unipolar moment' which dawned after the demise of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the expectations of many theorists of a realist persuasion, no other power or combination of powers (for instance, Western Europe) automatically rose to balance against American power or challenge American hegemony. And contrary to Paul Tsongas' cryptic judgement (The Cold War is over; Japan won.), and Paul Kennedy's prediction that Japan would supplant the United States as the new superpower, Japan in fact entered a period of stagnation from which it has still not completely recovered. However, since international politics is a human endeavour and not a mathematical equation, 'History' did not 'End' with the triumph of a liberal democratic United States and the international system did not freeze into unipolarity forever.
Over the last 25 years, China has steadily risen to Great Power status and a nascent bipolar international system can be discerned. Notwithstanding dire predictions of a terminal American decline, there are indications that the United States may actually spring back from the consequences of its recent imperial overstretch thanks to the shale gas revolution, the domestic backlash against globalisation and the shrinking of the cost differential between domestic and overseas manufacturing. The belief that the international system may actually become multipolar in character with the Rise of the Rest (including India) no longer appears to be a certainty and may well prove to be a distant mirage. Be that as it may, it is in the context of the return of bipolarity or multipolarity that the practice of Balance of Power has returned to the international system.
None of this means that Balance of Power as state practice fell into disuse in the context of relationships between regional powers. The 50-year old China-Pakistan entente cordiale is a good example in this regard.
Vibin Lakshmanan asked: Why is 'polarity of power' thesis less relevant and meaningful than the 'balance of power' in the present international system?
S. Kalyanaraman replies: Polarity of Power and Balance of Power are not contrasting explanatory or theoretical perspectives.
Polarity of Power refers to the structure of international systems, whether they are dominated by a single Great (Super) Power [unipolar system] or two Great Powers [bipolar system] or multiple Great Powers [multipolar system].
Balance of Power is the attempt by each Great Power in an international system to ensure itself against rivals or adversaries through a combination of alliance formation (external balancing) and building up its own capabilities (internal balancing). The efforts made in this regard by the various countries inhabiting an international system are referred to as Balance of Power politics.
Theoretically, it can be argued that Balance of Power politics ceases to operate in a unipolar international system. A good recent example is America's 'unipolar moment' which dawned after the demise of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the expectations of many theorists of a realist persuasion, no other power or combination of powers (for instance, Western Europe) automatically rose to balance against American power or challenge American hegemony. And contrary to Paul Tsongas' cryptic judgement (The Cold War is over; Japan won.), and Paul Kennedy's prediction that Japan would supplant the United States as the new superpower, Japan in fact entered a period of stagnation from which it has still not completely recovered. However, since international politics is a human endeavour and not a mathematical equation, 'History' did not 'End' with the triumph of a liberal democratic United States and the international system did not freeze into unipolarity forever.
Over the last 25 years, China has steadily risen to Great Power status and a nascent bipolar international system can be discerned. Notwithstanding dire predictions of a terminal American decline, there are indications that the United States may actually spring back from the consequences of its recent imperial overstretch thanks to the shale gas revolution, the domestic backlash against globalisation and the shrinking of the cost differential between domestic and overseas manufacturing. The belief that the international system may actually become multipolar in character with the Rise of the Rest (including India) no longer appears to be a certainty and may well prove to be a distant mirage. Be that as it may, it is in the context of the return of bipolarity or multipolarity that the practice of Balance of Power has returned to the international system.
None of this means that Balance of Power as state practice fell into disuse in the context of relationships between regional powers. The 50-year old China-Pakistan entente cordiale is a good example in this regard.
Posted on February 11, 2014