Samir Ahmed Asked: Why India is hesitant to adopt a pro-active approach in its international affairs?

S. Kalyanaraman replies: A state’s foreign policy is a function of two inter-related factors: (1) the economic, political and security objectives it seeks to achieve; and (2) the power capabilities (economic, military, technological, and [soft] cultural and ideational) and the resultant diplomatic influence it has to achieve them. The greater the power capabilities that a state has, the grander will be the objectives it can set for itself and the more diplomatic influence it will be able to wield to realise these objectives. And the lesser the power capabilities that a state has, the more restrained will be the objectives it sets for itself and the weaker will be the diplomatic influence it will be able to exercise to attain its objectives. Thus, the distribution of power capabilities among states in an international system is a key determinant of the foreign policy adopted by each state. While this reality does not constrain a relatively weaker state’s ability to adopt a proactive approach to international affairs, its ability to achieve objectives will be limited. In other words, being proactive does not necessarily mean being successful. Further, diplomacy also tends to be reactive, in terms of responding to domestic developments in other countries and new policies they may initiate.

Locating India’s foreign policy within these broad parameters indicates that India has indeed adopted a proactive approach to international affairs during the course of the last 66 years. During the years of the Cold War, it was at the vanguard of the non aligned movement and the efforts to ameliorate superpower tensions, the diplomatic campaigns against apartheid, colonialism, and nuclear disarmament, and attempts to forge a new international economic order that takes into consideration the interests of developing countries. And in the last 20 plus years, India has been at the forefront of diplomatic negotiations on climate change and international trade issues as part of the Doha Round.

Where India has been reluctant is on issues relating to humanitarian intervention, which, in some cases, has involved the promotion of democracy at the point of a bayonet or regime change. Even on subcontinental issues, India has been proactive diplomatically: it has been one of Afghanistan’s top economic partners since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001; it has sought to push forward trade relations with Pakistan and thus foster normalisation of bilateral ties; it continues to play a critical role in the democratic transitions of Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal; and it has consistently engaged with the regime in Myanmar. At the same time, India has had to necessarily respond or react to unfolding events in other countries, both within the subcontinent and in other parts of the world; instances include the crisis generated by the arrest of former Maldivian President Nasheed and the onset of the Arab Spring and the manner in which it has unfolded differently in various countries of West Asia and North Africa.

A final thought: being proactive diplomatically must necessarily be tempered by the axiom ‘look before you leap’. Caution must be the watchword in diplomacy and the act of looking before leaping must necessarily include comprehending the ground on the other side.