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Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM, PhD (Retd) discusses his book “War is a True Chameleon: Strategising for Future Wars in Indian Context”

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a discussion on Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma’s latest book, War is a True Chameleon: Strategising for Future Wars in Indian Context (Sabre and Quill, 2026) on 30 July 2026. The discussion brought together MP-IDSA scholars to reflect on the modernisation transformation needed within India’s Armed Forces, capability development, and politico-military dialogue. The discussion was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA.
Executive Summary
The discussion explored the evolving, multispectral nature of modern global conflict and the necessity of strategising for future wars within the Indian context. Emphasising an administrative and capabilities-driven perspective, the discussion highlighted that the traditional grammar of war is highly contested. With warfare now expanding to encompass non-military and non-violent domains, the concept of victory has shifted from a zero-sum military outcome to one that is largely perceptional. Sustaining national security in this environment requires India to move beyond platform-centric approaches, develop distinct asymmetric capabilities and ensure that military modernisation is tightly aligned with clear politico-military objectives.
Detailed Report
The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy delivered the Opening Remarks. Welcoming the Author, Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd), former MP-IDSA Executive Council Member and Distinguished Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation. Amb. Chinoy highlighted Lt. Gen. Sharma’s extensive operational experience, including his command of the Indian Army’s 14 Corps (Fire and Fury Corps), and noted that his role brought a vital administrative and force-modernisation perspective to the analysis of future wars. Introducing the theme, Amb. Chinoy observed that warfare today is changing kaleidoscopically, driven by multi-domain operations, the increasing role of the private sector and the critical importance of narrative warfare.
Lt. Gen, (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) noted the increasing frequency of global conflicts, citing ongoing crises in Ukraine, Gaza, the South Caucasus and tensions around Taiwan. He explained that his book seeks to challenge prevailing orthodoxies regarding how wars are fought and won. He structured his presentation around the three core themes of his book: the blurring lines between war and peace, the evolution from old to new wars and strategic recommendations for India.
The author explained that the only point of agreement between his book and classical military theorist Carl von Clausewitz is the concept of war as a ‘chameleon’: an entity that constantly changes its nature. He argued that the traditional grammar of war requires expansion as modern conflicts span a full spectrum of military and non-military, as well as violent and non-violent actions. Discussing the concept of victory, the author noted that while traditionally viewed as a zero-sum game, modern outcomes tell a different story. He cited Russia’s inability to achieve rapid regime change in Ukraine and the United States’ protracted challenges with Iran as examples of how traditional metrics of victory no longer apply. Today, victory is largely perceptional and fought in the information domain. This perceptional shift explains why adversaries leverage third-party channels – such as Pakistan broadcasting via Chinese networks during Operation Sindoor – to shape narratives.
On Deterrence, the author argued that the traditional concept is effectively dead, questioning what actually deters India’s adversaries today. While conventional deterrence has gained focus in recent decades, he pointed out its complete inadequacy in countering sub-conventional threats like terrorism. Regarding India’s developmental vision of a ‘Viksit Bharat’ (developed India) with a US$30 trillion economy, he cautioned that these economic ambitions rest on fragile security foundations. He warned against assuming a near-term resolution of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). He noted that Pakistan is unlikely to collapse without an internal revolution and China will continue to deepen its footprint in South Asia. Given these factors, the author questioned whether escalation control can truly be guaranteed in the region.
Transitioning to the nature of current conflicts, the author observed that ‘old wars’ and border conflicts – characterised by narrow frontages like the early phases of the Russia-Ukraine War – remain a persistent reality. However, he urged a shift away from platform-centric warfare towards outcome-oriented capability development. Noting India’s budget constraints, he emphasised that military capabilities must be strictly tailored to politico-military objectives. Among the critical capabilities needed, he highlighted battlefield transparency, institutional resilience, integrated air defence systems and asymmetric warfare. Using Iran’s extensive subterranean military infrastructure as an example of resilience, the author pointed out a vulnerability in India’s borderlands which lack comparable underground bunkers and fuel depots. To gain a strategic advantage, he argued that India must develop its own ‘kill webs’ and ‘asymmetric structures’.
Focusing on strategic planning for India, the author lamented the absence of a dedicated cognitive institution for long-term strategic thought. He recalled the erstwhile Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff, which served as a vital bridge between political and military establishments, noting that a disconnect often exists today between political objectives and military preparedness. Stressing the need for continuous politico-military dialogue to shape future war scenarios and fighting doctrines, he asked whether India is currently ‘arming without aiming’. He advocated for an outcome-oriented approach to military transformation, where modernisation plans clearly outline the specific methods required to achieve defined strategic goals.
Q & A Session
The interactive session that followed witnessed an exchange of views on the boundary question, wargaming, the expanding nature of war, an Indian definition of war, asymmetric warfare, and strategic communications.
The Director General, Amb. Chinoy, summarised the discussion by stating that while India is modernising, it is not yet fully transforming. He echoed the need for annual transformation goals driven by constant dialogue between political and military leaderships. He agreed that subterranean warfare allows a state to conserve its capabilities, and while it worked for Iran, India must find its own tailored solutions. Amb. Chinoy also noted that India requires directed focus on improving its communications and satellite surveillance capabilities.
On the boundary question, the author surmised that a comprehensive resolution is unlikely in the near term due to broader geopolitical factors, though localised resolutions might be possible. Noting India’s position of strength in Doklam over the past two years, it was suggested by Gen. Sharma that this could be an opportune time to engage China in dialogue.
The discussion also addressed the lack of formal politico-military wargaming mechanisms in India, highlighting that wargaming has the potential to serve as a highly effective dialogue tool. The author debated whether structures, technology, or strategy should come first, ultimately concluding that a clear strategy must lead the way. The need for a dedicated government department for grey-zone warfare and cognitive operations, separate from the Armed Forces, was also underlined.
Addressing a question on whether the author’s strategic assumptions had been adequately stress-tested against historical experiences like the 1962 War or the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, it was noted that India possesses five decades of military stress-testing. However, questions remained regarding India’s preparedness to fight adversaries other than China or Pakistan. Amb. Chinoy noted the cardinal rule of warfare: one must never underestimate the enemy, but rather, consistently overestimate them to ensure adequate preparedness.
Finally, regarding an Indian definition of war, the room agreed that with victory now based on perception, strategic communication must be strengthened and wielded as a primary tool of deterrence.
Amb. Chinoy thanked the author and the audience before concluding the session.
The report has been prepared by Mr. Siddhant Hira, Research Analyst, Military Affairs Centre, MP-IDSA.



