Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.), Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA, made a presentation for his Fellow Seminar on “Atmanirbharta in Naval Fighter Aircraft” on 24 October 2025. The Seminar was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA. It was attended by serving and retired naval officers, scientists, and scholars of MP-IDSA. The External Discussants were Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd.), Member, Governing Council, Indian Council for World Affairs, Professor Hari Babu Srivastava, former DG DRDO, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi & Distinguished Fellow at Vivekananda International Foundation, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.), Executive Vice President for Technology Development (Aerospace & Defence), Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd.

Executive Summary

The session evaluated India’s naval aviation trajectory and indigenous fighter development. Key concerns included inconsistent programme continuity and loss of hard-won technological expertise. Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised that NLCA Mk-I must be inducted in limited numbers for data generation and naval technology validation, assessed Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) as obsolete, and recommended prioritising Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) for long-term capability. He cautioned that shutting Naval Light Combat Aircraft (NLCA) would erode institutional knowledge and that India must choose an “India variant” aligned with national requirements. The discussion underscored the need for continuity, coordinated development and decisive high-level direction.

 

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy opened the Session by framing the pressures on India’s military aviation to match global standards in both scale and capability, noting that the pace of technological development and absorption ultimately depends on funding. He traced the Navy’s trajectory in carrier aviation: after committing to the naval LCA Mk-I in 2003, the service took a step back in 2016, leaving the aircraft at the stage of a technology demonstrator rather than advancing it toward induction. The Navy has also not committed to the LCA Mk-II or the developing AMCA, while exploring options such as import of the Rafale Marine and the development of TEDBF. Amb. Chinoy emphasised that TEDBF and AMCA are interlinked, as their designs and engine requirements cannot be treated separately, and future progress will hinge on co-development of ~120 kN-class engines with France as well as indigenous development of Kaveri engine. Another point to consider regarding the LCA is that production capacity comprises 8×2 in Bengaluru; 8×1 in Pune, totalling 24  aircraft per year, which is constrained by dependence on US G-404/G-414 engines. Given the 30–50 year lifespan of fighter aircraft and India’s challenges in the development of Kaveri engine, such long-term reliance on external suppliers remains a concern.

 

Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.), Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA

Gp. Capt. Narang began by stating that his paper is built upon three hypotheses: First, limited induction of Naval LCA Mk-1 (fighter) is essential for data generation, development & validation of navy specific technologies, and it will be useful for developing advanced indigenous naval fighters since there is a difference between naval and land based LCA performance. Second, TEDBF has become obsolete. Third, the Indian Navy joining AMCA will be better for meeting future threats and self-reliance. With these hypotheses as his organising frame, Gp. Capt. Narang proceeded to set out the technical lineage, programme milestones, platform specifications and the programmatic choices that inform India’s carrier-borne aviation options.

He began with the LCA family and the NLCA programme. The LCA Mk-I is a single-engine aircraft with a weight of 13,500 and up to 3 tons in payload capacity. Gp. Capt. Narang traced the programme chronology precisely as recorded in the transcript. The Indian Air Force issued its requirement in 1983; the Navy submitted requirements in 1985. In 1986 the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was asked to conduct a feasibility study on NLCA; that study was carried out between 1989 and 1992, and the resultant report was approved in 1985. The IAF recorded the type’s first flight in 2001; NLCA Mk-1 approval came in 2003; and the naval prototype’s first flight occurred in 2012, a development Gp. Capt. Narang noted occurred within a relatively short eight-year to nine-year window from formal approval. He recorded the Navy’s withdrawal of consent from the naval LCA programme in 2016, and yet underlined subsequent operational milestones: NLCA completed landings on INS Vikramaditya (2020) and on INS Vikrant (2023). He stated the sanctioned cost of LCA Mk-1 at INR1,714 Cr and noted the comparative per-aircraft figure for a single Rafale as roughly INR 2,000 Cr.+ to illustrate the fiscal implications of import.

Turning to navalisation features, Gp. Capt. Narang drew on Cmde Jaideep Maolankar’s assessments to set out what distinguishes NLCA Mk-I for carrier use. Leading Edge Vortex Control (LEVCON) enhances controllability at low speeds; an arrestor hook enables carrier recovery; landing gear has been strengthened to withstand high axle loads during deck landings; and components and Line Replaceable Units have been re-certified from IAF to naval specifications. He acknowledged the known challenges the programme encountered — delays, technology denial, structural complexity and component supply delays — but emphasised that indigenous innovation and pragmatic engineering at multiple stages mitigated many of these hurdles. He warned that closure of the NLCA programme would set industry capability back by decades because the scientists and engineers holding project knowledge would eventually retire, compelling a return to the drawing board rather than building on accumulated experience.

To reinforce the operational dimension, Gp. Capt. Narang screened a demonstration video of NLCA to anchor discussion in flight-test experience and the incremental accumulation of naval-aviation know-how.

Gp. Capt. Narang then introduced LCA Mk-II. LCA Mk-II is a single-engine aircraft of 17.5 tons Maximum All up Weight (AUW) and was developed to meet naval requirements by increasing payload and range. In practice, the Indian Air Force found the Mk-II particularly useful because reduced drag and increased payload capacity made it effective for replacing Mirage-2000 class aircraft and for boosting squadron strength. Two naval prototypes (NP-3 and NP-4) were approved, but the Navy redirected sanctioned funds toward the Twin-Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF). Gp. Capt. Narang recorded that, notwithstanding earlier setbacks, the LCA Mk-II project received approval for a prototype in 2023.

TEDBF is a 4.5-generation twin-engine aircraft weighing around 26 tons. Its higher payload and extended range were conceived to meet carrier requirements and to counter regional threats. Proponents argued TEDBF would require less development time than AMCA. The initial requirement for TEDBF had been forecasted for three carriers; which was not approved. The Navy subsequently acquired the Rafale  through a global RFP for the  Multi Role Carrier Based Fighter (MRCBF). Gp. Capt. Narang stressed that the Navy withdrew consent for N-LCA and for naval LCA Mk-II in 2016 and that in 2017 it issued an RFI for 57 MRCBF, reflecting a change in procurement preference away from the indigenous naval LCA path.

On AMCA, Gp. Capt. Narang stated that AMCA is twin-engine, 25-ton weight and incorporates a stealth airframe. He emphasised the Navy’s operational question about whether stealth modules can be reliably maintained in a saline environment, and he noted that experience with other similar stealth platforms indicates viability, though the issue remains operationally salient for naval adoption. He compared AMCA’s ambitions with contemporary foreign designs, observing that China has inducted fifth generation such as the J-35 carrier based fighter and fielded the J-20  land variants, and has demonstrated J-36 and J-50, which he characterised as 5+ generation designs with potential to evolve further. Against this regional context, Gp. Capt. Narang highlighted resource constraints — funding, manpower and institutional capacity — that affect LCA Mk-II, TEDBF and AMCA alike.

One of the bottlenecks in his account is institutional constraints due to limited design and test resources. ADA is responsible for designing LCA Mk-II, TEDBF and AMCA; the programmes share test pilots, production facilities, certification agencies and supply chains. This commonality, combined with a limited pool of skilled personnel for design and development, creates competition for resources and contributes to significant schedule delays.

Gp. Capt. Narang characterised India’s indigenous Kaveri engine experience as ambiguous and mixed, and he set out unit costs to illustrate procurement pressures: LCA Mk-II costs INR 643 Cr. per aircraft, while the Rafale-M figure he cited is INR 2,453 Cr. per aircraft. These numbers, he argued, directly condition choices when budgets are constrained and timelines are tight.

Gp. Capt. Narang summarised practitioner inputs to emphasise operational imperatives. He relayed the perspective  of Adm Arun Prakash (Retd.) that a carrier-borne Tejas flight or squadron could perform fleet air-defence duties while generating valuable operational data for follow-on indigenous designs, tempered by concerns about HAL’s ability to ramp production. He also summarised counsel by Cmde. CD Balaji (Retd.) that maintaining a couple of NLCA squadrons would prudently preserve lessons learned from deck-based fighter development pending a successor design, thereby avoiding loss of institutional memory.

In his concluding assessment, Gp. Capt. Narang called for systemic reforms: an honest audit and analytical culture to diagnose delays and cancellations; stronger operator-developer feedback loops to generate mission data and validate naval technologies; explicit attention to saline-environment certification for sensitive modules; clearer ownership, leadership in decision-making and accountability to prevent inaction; adoption of spiral development to permit incremental capability growth; and a higher decision body to ensure roadmaps, reliable timelines and funding for course corrections. His specific prescription for the Navy aligned with his opening hypotheses: limited induction of LCA Mk-I to generate operational data; rejection of TEDBF as the principal path; and a concentrated effort to modify and operationalise AMCA for naval purposes. He closed by invoking Dr. Abdul Kalam’s words about the broader national imperative that India moves from being a low-cost assembly base to original research, design and manufacture if true Atmanirbharta in defence is to be realised.

Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.)

Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar began by warning that naval carrier aviation does not have a bright future on its current trajectory. Drawing from his experience in the LCA programme as Chief Test Pilot of the LCA Mk-1 (Navy) Fighter, he said the project suffered deep neglect, particularly in allocation of resources. The programme functioned on a shoestring budget and was structurally dependent on Air Force designs and resources. Even so, he argued, the central lesson is that a naval aircraft can be built indigenously, since despite resource scarcity the programme delivered results. However, he cautioned that this success has created a degree of technical arrogance that is unwarranted.

Cmde. Maolankar then outlined his first major point: the Navy’s understanding of aviation fundamentals needs a review . The organisation simultaneously inducts STOBAR carriers and dismisses their relevance, asserting that naval aviation will benefit with induction of 65,000-ton plus  carriers for using catapults and EMALS. According to him, the belief that catapults are indispensable is a myth. There is a strong case for lighter carriers, and it is better to have two smaller carriers that the Navy is willing to risk than one large carrier considered too precious to expose. In this sense, he argued, the Navy must return to basics in its thinking on aircraft and carrier requirements.

Cmde. Maolankar’s second concern was the handling of technology and human resource. “Technology is HR,” he stated, noting that lessons from NLCA Mk-I are being lost as those who worked on the programme depart, due to absence of an indigenous program or retirement. These insights cannot be captured fully through documentation. For example, during NLCA Mk-I development, non-critical LRUs underwent recertification and shop testing while critical LRUs—in some instances—were not tested and were allowed to pass based on analysis and risk acceptance. Such judgement calls reflect expertise that cannot simply be recorded; they must be experienced and retained.

Cmde. Maolankar criticised the fact that while the Navy is proud of its ships, it lacks an indigenous aircraft and has opted instead for Rafale, which he observed that is likely to become as outdated as TEDBF. He recalled that certain design changes once deemed too risky for Navy LCA Mk-II were later accepted without objection for Rafale, raising questions about whether such decisions were based on engineering logic or institutional decisions

Cmde. Maolankar also noted that India currently retains only one sanctions-proof technology gained from the United States—carrier suitability design and testing—acquired through paid training of U.S. personnel. However, the experts who absorbed that knowledge are retiring, putting even that singular capability at risk.

Shifting to structural concerns, Cmde. Maolankar said the three pillars of carrier aviation—ship, aircraft and weapons—should be designed concurrently, whereas in India they are developed separately. According to him, the ship should accommodate compromises so that the aircraft remains least compromised, and weapons must be customised specifically for the aircraft. The lack of such integration is likely to face fundamental challenges.

Cmde. Maolankar pointed out that there is inadequate appreciation of nuances of naval aviation and highlighted inherent flaws in giving priority to land based aircraft at the expense of carrier aviation. Unless the Navy fielded a carrier-aircraft-weapon ecosystem that delivered demonstrable capability, support would not materialise, and naval aviation would continue to be undermined. He added that foreign aircraft are obsolete the moment they are inducted and carrier aviation has not attracted due attention, which contradicts the broader logic of national air power. He noted that TEDBF appears in DRDO posters and Aero India displays yet has no sanction.

Discussing the prospect of merging TEDBF and AMCA, he described the first lesson from Mk-I as the error of adapting a land-based aircraft for naval use, necessitating Mk-II. The second lesson from the IAF Mk-I programme is that India lacks proper understanding of specifications; certification agencies enforce specifications rigidly instead of using them as guidelines. For AMCA, the IAF prioritises precision bombing, whereas the Navy needs anti-ship missiles, which are heavier and longer. Whether these requirements will be integrated remains uncertain, and the Navy may end up carrying weapons externally in non-stealth mode as with TEDBF. A merger is only viable, if Navy takes the lead in developing navy specific fighter.

He reiterated the importance of comprehensive data generation, noting that data from Mk-I should be leveraged for naval aircraft development, which requires design intuition, human judgement and data across varied scenarios.

In conclusion, he asserted that both TEDBF and Rafale are likely to become obsolete, and that AMCA risks obsolescence by the time it is ready. India must take timely decisions if naval aviation is to survive.

Adm. Shekhar Sinha (Retd.)

Adm. Shekhar Sinha began by stating that delays in decisions on aircraft carriers stem from the fact that such decisions are taken at much higher levels. He stressed that ships, especially aircraft carriers, must not be developed independently of the aircraft intended to operate from them. According to him, the absence of concurrent development has directly led to problems of weight, lift and wing fold in naval aircraft, and the same applies to weapons integration, which must also occur alongside aircraft development.

Reflecting on past practices, Adm. Sinha recalled that in the case of the Harrier, the engine was designed first and the airframe afterwards. Though considered the best approach at the time, this contributed to the Harrier’s limitations. He contrasted this with the F-35, whose configuration does not rely on a lift engine. While Harriers use maximum power during take-off and landing, the F-35 uses maximum power during cruise.

Adm. Sinha argued that adapting an Indian Air Force platform into a naval aircraft is a fundamentally flawed starting point. Naval fighters should not be derivative variants of Air Force platforms because their operational environments and mechanisms are different. As an example, he referred to the MiG-29K, which originated from the MiG-29B airframe and was not suited to naval demands, resulting in failures during testing. He described this as a continuation of the “jugaad” mentality—forcing a platform into a role for which it was not designed.

At this point, Amb. Chinoy briefly intervened to say that there are rare circumstances in which “jugaad” may be justified, citing the case of the Mirage-2000 in Kargil, but agreed that such logic cannot guide complex, high-end systems. Returning to his point, Adm. Sinha stressed that while the Navy can propose requirements based on threat perception, delays occur because decisions pass through several forums and ultimately rest with higher authorities who may not be technical experts. Even so, he expressed cautious optimism that good decisions will eventually be made. He noted India’s longstanding dependence on imported aircraft and emphasised the need for self-reliance .

Adm, Sinha added that future capability will depend on compatibility with emerging weapons. Electrically driven components may be explored, but each must be certified to withstand landing-induced shocks on carriers. This reinforces the need for trials and data generation. He mentioned that the United States had earlier approached India and that France remains a friend, suggesting that collaboration could lead to carriers tailored to national requirements.

Adm. Sinha said that throughout India’s defence research and development history, the air element has not been taken seriously enough. Import dependence has been persistent, and only recently has some transfer of technology been insisted upon. Scientists will need to have a bigger role, since pure science is an intrinsic part of aviation development and engineers alone are insufficient.

On the possible merger of TEDBF and AMCA, he cautioned that there are technical complications. In his view, ship, aircraft and weapons development must run concurrently, and the priority must be futuristic capability. Systems development must take into account shifts in the Indian Ocean Region. He described how Chinese systems are being tested in Pakistan and, by extension, against India. He pointed to China’s Beidou satellite network with more than 600 satellites over the Indian Ocean, enabling tracking that no aircraft or ship can evade. Combined with ISR satellite launches and optical fibre linkage between China’s Western Theatre Command and Rawalpindi, he argued that India now faces a single front dominated by China rather than a two-front problem.

Adm. Sinha said that if India wants to reset aviation development without losing gains already made, programmes must be continued rather than terminated midway. LCA, he argued, can preserve and advance carrier-aircraft know-how, and even a small number of aircraft can serve as development demonstrators. He compared this logic to the Bofors case, where rather than discarding available technology, it should be used to support future developments.

Adm. Sinha concluded by stating that aircraft carriers, aircraft and weapons must be developed as a composite whole rather than separate efforts.

Continuing the discussion, Amb. Chinoy said that both Cmde. Maolankar and Adm. Sinha had highlighted an important point—that TEDBF and AMCA merger should take into consideration  specific naval requirements. Stealth requirements and naval weapon systems may not be compatible and integrating them could compromise stealth itself. If those compromises become unavoidable, the merger would defeat its purpose.

Adm. Sinha added that an aircraft carrier, the fighter designed to operate from it and the weapon systems cannot be developed in isolation. To ensure unified development, he proposed the establishment of an apex-level coordinating body—potentially a Defence Science and Technology Council—headed at the highest political level and including key national security stakeholders. Such a body would assign responsibility, set timelines and ensure accountability.

Amb. Chinoy cited private-sector participation in AMCA as an example of the structural gaps that require such oversight. He noted that the programme is focusing on engines but lacks clarity on scale of requirement and responsibility. He mentioned that the Prime Minister recently called for a fighter engine programme in mission mode. He also noted international trends, remarking that the J-10 has been viewed favourably in countries such as Indonesia, which appears to prefer it over Rafale based on perceptions of performance during Operation Sindoor.

Dr. Haribabu Shrivastava

Prof. Haribabu Shrivastava noted at the outset that India has witnessed more programme closures than inductions across the services, and regardless of the explanations, the outcome represents a failure for the country. He emphasised the need for a national-level debate on LCA, TEDBF and AMCA, with participation from all three services and senior authorities, and stressed that the decision emerging from such a process should be binding on every stakeholder involved.

Prof. Shrivastava observed that one structural problem in India’s defence ecosystem is the “problem of plenty,” in which organisations or individuals claim capabilities they cannot practically deliver. This, he said, consumes limited resources and time that the country cannot afford to lose. Constraints span funding, manpower, manufacturing capacity and available facilities. According to him, progress will not come from data-sharing alone; there must be reflection on why advancement has stalled. He proposed a comparative study between the IAF and the Navy, accompanied by an assessment of current assets, future needs and collaborative avenues.

While India often benchmarks itself against China, Prof. Shrivastava stated that the financial and manpower bases are not comparable. He pointed out that DRDO employs approximately 7,000 scientists and only a few thousand work on relevant technologies in the private sector, illustrating the scale difference with the United States, China and Russia. Until India reaches that level, he said, the country must manage its limitations strategically, by accepting shortcomings in some areas while securing gains in others.

Prof. Shrivastava also addressed persistent concerns regarding the treatment of engineers as scientists. DRDO, he explained, includes its own research corps, the extra-mural research corps and the DRDO–Industry–Academia Centres of Excellence (DIACoEs). Earlier, a single proposal would be sequentially forwarded from one DRDO department to another until one eventually granted clearance, creating prolonged ambiguity and delays within approval chain. However, national research culture remains risk-averse. Most defence-related academic projects are concentrated in IITs, where large numbers of schemes leave limited time for direct faculty oversight. M.Tech and PhD scholars develop technology during their studies, but once they graduate, the technology effectively disappears with them, and supervising professors may not know the detailed technical work. The absence of mechanisms to integrate such scholars into defence organisations results in the loss of specialised manpower. He illustrated this with the example of scholars who developed a bulletproof jacket but, lacking continuity in the system, later took employment in a pipe manufacturing company.

Prof. Shrivastava concluded that a national debate is essential and that the final decision must be taken at a level that cannot be bypassed—by development agencies, procurement agencies or any service.

Amb. Chinoy expanded the discussion by noting that the issue is not limited to the large number of DRDO projects with IITs. As with MTech and PhD research, when senior directors and professors retire or relocate, the technologies they worked on move with them, sometimes even abroad. There is no legacy system, corporate databank or shared platform to retain and provide access to this accumulated knowledge, and Amb. Chinoy stressed the need to address this gap, even by superimposing decisions if voluntary agreement is not achieved. He recalled the Prime Minister’s call for such reforms before the next DRDO Foundation Day and expressed optimism. Adm. Shekhar Sinha differed with Prof. Haribabu’s earlier suggestion of a national debate, arguing it would create a “too many cooks spoil the broth” scenario and amount to going back to basics.

Q/A session

The Q&A began with a comment noting that the 1986 feasibility study lacked ship motion data and relevant publications, relying solely on experience from INS Vikrant. Within the LCA programme, the airframe had not been marinised apart from the engine—already in service on the F-18 Hornet—and faced issues such as delayed thrust recovery after touchdown, wing loading, rollers and angle of attack. The comment detailed the structural modifications required for marinisation: strengthening to withstand catapult forces, increasing undercarriage and nosewheel weight to prevent slamming, redesigning the cockpit to improve visibility and protect against humidity and salt ingress, and removing magnesium alloy to reduce corrosion. Persistent procrastination was also highlighted and that outcomes depend on human decision-making rather than equipment alone, with a call for the Navy to lead naval aviation design and create a dedicated cell for it.

The discussion then turned to whether the LCA Navy Mk-I has any meaningful operational role, given its seventeen-minute endurance at thirty miles from the carrier. This was seen as potentially limiting for training and air defence. In response, Cmde. Maolankar argued that the question hinges on defining the intended role of the N-LCA. He emphasised that during its final trials it exceeded expectations and therefore warranted continued evaluation to improve performance. He said the N-LCA could be used for data generation and training, but if its primary purpose is data generation, then holding it to full operational standards would be counterproductive.

Supporting this view, Gp. Capt. Narang said that what is needed now is test data generated in realistic conditions, which can only be achieved if operational pilots—not test pilots—fly the aircraft. Requirements derived from operational scenarios, rather than idealised environments, are necessary for credible development.

The debate then moved to whether TEDBF and AMCA should be merged. One intervention argued that a naval fighter must be designed as such from the outset, as modifying a land-based aircraft later results in long delays and obsolescence. If a merger must happen, the suggestion was that it should produce an “AMCA Navy” variant, noting that a carrier-borne aircraft can operate from land, but a land-based aircraft cannot operate from a carrier. Responding to this, Gp. Capt. Narang clarified that if a merger produces a naval AMCA that meets national requirements, he would support it. He noted that the LCA Mk-II programme had benefited the Air Force, demonstrating that cross-service adaptation is possible, and that AMCA can also be adapted if required. Whatever platform India chooses now, he stressed, will serve the fleet for the next three to four decades, making the decision strategically decisive.

A question followed on whether march-in rights through bodies like the Anusandhan National Research Foundation could prevent technology loss. Prof. Shrivastava noted that, while such rights exist and documentation is thorough, the “art” of engineering judgment—held by the individuals who worked on the technology—is lost when they leave. While PhD papers and theses are available digitally under the “one nation, one subscription” framework, documentation alone cannot reproduce an aircraft.

Another participant argued that India is still “landlocked in thinking,” despite the fact that aircraft are the longest-reach weapon available to a fleet. With a limited number of aircraft and rising threat levels, platforms must be omni-role and uncompromised. While Rafale and TEDBF are described as outdated, their avionics are comparable to AMCA except for stealth, which is less relevant for naval strike roles, where payload capacity matters more. India, must be prepared for current contingencies rather than hypothetical future ones.

To this, Gp. Capt. Narang agreed that India must seek the best capability available within its limited manpower, resources and development capacity. He stated that India does not need a “land” or “naval” variant but an “India variant”—a platform designed to meet national rather than organisational demands, even if it requires designing from scratch. At the same time, he warned that China has already deployed the J-35 from carriers, and India must consider whether TEDBF can credibly compete with aircraft such as the J-35 or J-20. He added that developing technology follows a different trajectory from buying technology, and historically India has purchased the best available systems rather than developed them. He stressed that India must not fall behind technologically.

In closing, Gp. Capt. Narang said that the art and science of naval fighter development must not be allowed to disappear, or the larger vision of Viksit Bharat will suffer. Decisions must be taken in national interest, and now is the appropriate moment for a unified approach. He warned that the naval fighter programme must not face a “Marut moment” due to indecision. On TEDBF, Rafale and AMCA, he said that India must field capability that can counter the J-35 and take the most optimal step for the next two decades. He emphasised the importance of giving indigenous aircraft the same leeway that foreign platforms receive, cited past rotorcraft programmes to show how maturity results from accumulated experience, and reiterated that technology loss through delays and indecision must be prevented through higher-level intervention. He added that aircraft and carrier design must proceed concurrently and echoed the earlier call for a higher-level scientific decision-making body for the national interest.

The Report has been prepared by Ms. Meghna Pradhan, Research Analyst, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre, MP-IDSA.