Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “President Putin’s Visit to China: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 15 June 2026. Dr. Mayuri Banerjee, Associate Fellow, moderated the meeting. The scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The Speaker assessed the evolving Russia-China strategic partnership in the context of President Putin’s visit to Beijing in May 2026, coinciding with the thirtieth anniversary of bilateral

trategic coordination. He examined the historical trajectory of the relationship, the economic, defence, and diplomatic drivers for both countries, structural asymmetries and limitations, and the implications for India. He argued that while significant convergence of interests exists, a formal military alliance remains unlikely, and the partnership is best characterised by the formula: never against each other, but not always with each other.

Detailed Report

Dr. Mayuri Banerjee, the moderator, provided the contextual backdrop to the meeting, noting that President Putin’s two-day visit to China from 20-22 May 2026 coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of strategic coordination between Russia and China, and was widely celebrated in the Chinese media as marking their twenty-fifth bilateral summit. She further noted that the visit

was interpreted as a significant diplomatic achievement for Xi Jinping as China was seen courted by both US and Russia. Against this backdrop, she posed three questions to the Speaker: whether the relationship is evolving towards a “no-limits partnership”; how strategic trust between the two countries should be assessed; and what a closer Russia and China relationship implies for India, particularly in the context of the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy began by situating the visit within the longer arc of the Russia-China relationship, which has traversed the full spectrum from friendship and alliance to adversarial rivalry and back to what he described as a “historic high.” He traced the key inflection points in this trajectory, noting that it was from 1989 onwards that a deliberate effort was made to reset ties, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness in 2001. He identified Ukraine 1.0 in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, followed by the joint declaration of a “no-limits partnership”, as the critical accelerants that deepened the relationship to its present level. He also highlighted the qualitative and quantitative improvement in the partnership over the last decade, characterised by extensive cooperation across trade, energy, defence, and diplomacy, as well as a new pattern of interaction that has seen a growing Chinese footprint in areas traditionally considered Russia’s sphere of influence, including Central Asia, the Arctic, and the Russian Far East.

Dr. Roy then outlined the drivers behind the partnership for each side. For Russia, he argued that a strategic embrace of China has become a necessity to withstand Western geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure, particularly in the context of sanctions. China is now Russia’s largest trade partner, with bilateral trade having grown by fifty percent over the last four years and thirty-five percent of Russia’s exports directed towards China. He underlined the complementarity between the two economies, Russia as an exporter of natural resources and China as an exporter of finished commodities, while also noting the increasing use of national currencies, with the yuan functioning as a de facto reserve currency for Russia. Energy, he observed, remains the backbone of the economic relationship, with China absorbing Russian oil and gas previously destined for Europe through pipelines such as Power of Siberia and ESPO (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean), with ongoing negotiations over the proposed Power of Siberia II.

On the defence front, the Speaker noted the remarkable reversal in fortunes: Russia, which has traditionally prided itself as one of the world’s leading arms manufacturers, is now dependent on China for dual-use electronics, commercial drones, and microelectronic components. He also emphasised the political-diplomatic driver, whereby China has consistently supported Russia on core concerns, including opposition to NATO expansion, Western interference, and colour revolutions, while maintaining a studied neutrality on the territorial dimensions of the Ukraine conflict.

Turning to the drivers for China, Dr. Roy noted that while they mirror Russia’s in broad terms, there are important differences. On the economic front, Russia represents a captive market for Chinese manufactured goods and provides a reliable, discounted energy source at a time when China’s traditional energy suppliers in Venezuela and West Asia have faced instability. China also benefits from Russia’s importance as a node in the Belt and Road Initiative’s Silk Road Economic Belt connectivity project. He further pointed to the significance of bilateral trade in RMB as a step towards the internationalisation of the yuan. On the defence front, China has sought specific areas where Russia retains competitive edge, including missile defence and fighter jet engines, while drawing broader strategic lessons from the Ukraine War regarding Western-imposed geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure. The Speaker noted China’s interest in a US strategically distracted in Europe rather than focused on the Indo-Pacific, and highlighted Russia’s support for China’s maritime ambitions through joint patrols in the South China Sea, Sea of Japan, and Taiwan Strait. A key dimension underlined was China’s sustained investment in shifting Russian public perception, historically negative, through educational scholarships, cultural outreach, and tourist infrastructure, particularly targeting younger Russians.

Dr. Roy then addressed the question of whether a formal military alliance is in the offing. He argued that despite the rhetoric of a “no-limits partnership,” structural limitations persist. The relationship, he contended, reflects strategic compulsion on Russia’s part more than organic convergence, and the growing asymmetry, with Russia clearly the junior partner, represents a remarkable historical reversal from the Mao era that makes Russia deeply uncomfortable. He identified several sources of friction: the risk of hollowing out of Russian domestic manufacturing due to dependence on Chinese goods; fears of Chinese encroachment into Central Asia, the Arctic, and the Russian Far East; divergences in foreign policy strategy, including Russia’s arms exports to India and the Philippines, and its deepening engagement with North Korea; and the persistent Russian fear of a G2 arrangement between China and the United States that would leave Russia marginalised. The Speaker also noted unresolved historical fault lines, including Chinese territorial claims rooted in the nineteenth-century unequal treaties. Against this backdrop, he described Russia’s approach as one of “subtle balancing”, engaging countries that have frictions with China without overtly challenging Beijing, and maintaining Institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of which China is not a member. The formula that best captures the relationship, he argued, is: never against each other, but not always with each other.

On the implications for India, the Speaker maintained that the deepening Russia-China Partnership complicates India’s strategic environment, with Russia backing China on the Indo-Pacific and weapons exports resuming as a point of concern. He noted that a weakened Russia may find it increasingly difficult to resist Chinese pressure on issues of importance to India. Nevertheless, Dr. Roy argued that India should continue to invest in the bilateral relationship with Russia, as it gives Moscow strategic breathing space and provides India with leverage to prevent a Russia-China axis from acting against Indian interests. He recalled instances of Russia maintaining strategic autonomy, including during the Taiwan crisis, on Article 370, and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) amidst a China-Pakistan tandem, as evidence that Russian equities in India remain significant. The Speaker concluded by identifying four benchmarks that would shape the trajectory of the partnership: the terms on which the Ukraine War ends and whether Russia subsequently recalibrates towards the West; China’s actions in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea and Russia’s response; the outcome of Power of Siberia II negotiations as an indicator of Chinese leverage; and the question of leadership succession in Russia and whether a post-Putin leadership would seek accommodation with the West.

Q&A Session

Participants raised questions on a range of issues, including Russia’s position as the pivot in the US-Russia-China strategic triangle, China’s negotiating leverage over the Power of Siberia II pipeline, Russia’s tacit support for Chinese drone technology being supplied to both Russia and Ukraine, China’s growing security footprint in Central Asia and its treaty engagements with Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics, India’s potential to strategically cap China’s engagement in Russia, Russia’s perception of Xi Jinping’s centennial goals and the China Dream, and the implications of the Russia-North Korea military compact for the Russia-China relationship. Participants also raised observations on the evolution of the bilateral relationship, the role of transboundary river agreements in achieving border stability, and the centrality of personal ties between Putin and Xi in sustaining the partnership. The Speaker provided comprehensive responses to questions raised during the Session.

The Report has been prepared by Mr. Aquib Mohd. Khan, Intern, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.