The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting featuring a presentation by Mr. Niranjan Oak, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA on “The Unravelling of the Global Nuclear Order.” The Session was moderated by Dr. Abhishek Verma, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The Session examined the erosion of the global nuclear order and the key pillars that have supported nuclear governance since the Second World War. The Speaker argued that the current nuclear landscape shows institutional decline, growing multipolarity, weakening of the norms against nuclear weapon use, and the disruptive impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Mr. Oak assessed four main pillars of the existing Global Nuclear Order: the international nuclear regime, bipolar nuclear hegemony, extended nuclear deterrence, and the nuclear taboo, and found that each is under serious stress. He also spoke about the impact of AI on Strategic Stability. Finally, he discussed how India has harmonised its nuclear policies in accordance with the global nuclear regime, despite being a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Detailed Discussion

In his Opening Remarks, Dr. Abhishek Verma, introduced the topic by highlighting the renewed salience of nuclear weapons in current geopolitics. Referring to recent developments such as nuclear signalling during the Russia–Ukraine War, France’s proposal of forward deterrence, Germany’s interest in nuclear-sharing arrangements, and Finland’s proposed legal changes to allow nuclear weapons on its territory, he showed how the foundations of the existing nuclear order are being challenged.

Mr. Niranjan Oak began by noting that there is no fixed definition of the global nuclear order. He described it as a mix of international regimes, institutions, norms, and practices that aim to maintain balance in the governance of nuclear technology. He defined it as a practical compromise between complete nuclear anarchy and disarmament. He argued that the current nuclear order can be assessed by four factors: the international nuclear regime, bipolar nuclear hegemony, extended nuclear deterrence, and the nuclear taboo.

Mr. Oak described the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of global nuclear governance, but despite being ratified by 191 States, it is widely seen as structurally unfair. The Treaty’s commitment to disarmament prescribed by Article VI—which mandates an end to the arms race and meaningful movement toward total disarmament—remains unfulfilled. This failure has essentially permitted the five acknowledged Nuclear-Weapon States to maintain their stockpiles, with global counts projected to increase. Furthermore, Mr. Oak believes the Treaty’s credibility has been gravely compromised by U.S. and Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, particularly as Iran is an NPT signatory asserting its rights under Article IV.

On the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Speaker noted that although it has not entered into force, it has largely been followed since 1996 except by North Korea, but its future is uncertain after indications in October 2025 of a possible U.S. return to testing. The U.S. accusations of low-yield tests by Russia and China remain unconfirmed, while Vladimir Putin has warned of a matching response.

On bilateral arms control, he stated that New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired on 5 February 2026, marking the end of the arms control era that began eroding with the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Key barriers to a new agreement include disputes over participation, weapons categories, and defence capabilities, compounded by the Ukraine War, leaving no limits on deployed strategic weapons between the two main nuclear powers.

According to Mr. Oak, China’s accelerated nuclear growth—marked by the construction of new missile silos, development of MIRV-capable intercontinental missiles, and rising plutonium output—represents a significant geopolitical shift. He projected that China could achieve parity with the nuclear stockpiles of the U.S. and Russia by approximately 2030, a development that risks triggering a three-way arms race through reactive military expansions. China’s rise is also generating pressure for nuclear growth in the Indo-Pacific, with debates in Japan and South Korea alongside concerns about China’s non-proliferation record and territorial ambitions.

The Speaker observed that increasing skepticism regarding U.S. extended deterrence has led European nations to investigate autonomous alternatives. This shift is evidenced by the July 2025 Northwood Declaration, which facilitates coordination between British and French forces, alongside broadened “forward deterrence” frameworks. Concurrently, comparable concerns have surfaced in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically within South Korea and Japan, amid changing security dynamics such as the Russia–North Korea Partnership and other nascent defence agreements.

Referring to Dr. Nina Tannenwald, he explained that the nuclear taboo reflects a belief in the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons, which is now under pressure, due to explicit threats by leaders, risking erosion of long-standing restraint since 1945. He warned that increasing reliance on AI in military systems may heighten uncertainty, as its limitations, vulnerability to cyber-attacks, and impact on secrecy and decision time could weaken second-strike capability and raise the risk of miscalculation, despite human control formally remaining in place.

Mr. Oak concluded by reviewing India’s position on the matter. India has long supported a fair global system for non-proliferation and disarmament but did not accept the NPT, calling it “nuclear apartheid” because it limits some States but not others. India has also not signed the CTBT but follows a voluntary testing pause, and its non-proliferation record is clean, with no proven cases of sharing nuclear technology. India has been formally integrated into global nuclear control systems through its 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver and participation in export control regimes. Its nuclear deterrent has been effective, as shown by its ability to carry out conventional military actions under nuclear pressure in the India–Pakistan context, exposing Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.

Q&A Session

The presentation was followed by a lively discussion.  Dr. Abhishek Verma, Dr. Hina. Pandey, Dr. M. S. Prathibha, Ms. Deepika Saraswat, and Mr. Arnab Dasgupta made observations and raised questions, which were addressed by Mr. Niranjan Oak.

The weakening U.S. extended deterrence in Europe and Asia was raised as a factor that could speed up nuclear proliferation in both regions, alongside the possible role of the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan mutual defence pact in future India–Pakistan tensions. It was questioned whether the size of China’s nuclear arsenal matters in practical terms, since even one nuclear weapon can deter. The situation was described as a “nuclear disorder” rather than a true order, noting that no NPT Review Conference has produced a consensus document since 2015, followed by major decline in the regime. Article 4 of the NPT was highlighted as long disputed, with many States seeing it as an unconditional right to nuclear energy, while the United States applies a narrower view and restricts some technologies even for allies. On New START, the absence of inspections since 2017 was noted, weakening its verification function well before its expiry. It was asked how India should respond if Japan and South Korea develop nuclear weapons, given their importance as partners. The value of nuclear arsenals, especially tactical versus strategic weapons, was questioned.

It was argued that the nuclear order began weakening after the Cold War, and that China’s nuclear rise should not be overstated given its focus on conventional missiles and minimal second-strike capability.

Additionally, it was stated that India should avoid multilateral arms control arrangements involving China and Pakistan.

It was stated that U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea remain strong and are unlikely to change without a major decline in U.S. power.

Mr. Niranjan Oak replied that Japan and South Korea have the technical ability to quickly develop nuclear weapons. While their reliance on U.S. security has supported economic growth, President Trump’s posture and the North Korean threat have increased domestic nuclear debates, making regional proliferation possible. However, a major shift in U.S. power would still be required before independent nuclear choices are made. On the Saudi–Pakistan pact, he said Saudi Arabia is unlikely to give direct military support to Pakistan due to strong ties with India, but Pakistan may use the pact to gain financial support from the Gulf. On arsenal size, he noted that while equal numbers are not required for deterrence, China’s expansion shows a desire for parity with the United States and Russia, as noted in The Science of Military Strategy, adding that China’s stated no-first-use and minimum deterrence policies do not match its actions, including adopting a launch-on-warning posture.

On New START, the Speaker noted that the U.S. compliance report found no suspicious activity in Russia’s arsenal. He said India would likely express concern but avoid active diplomatic steps if Japan and South Korea develop nuclear weapons. He added that nuclear deterrence works, citing North Korea, which has not been attacked, unlike Iran. On China, he said evidence suggests expansion of its nuclear capabilities, though reliable information is limited, noting that nuclear developments are largely opaque, with most public data coming from the West, while satellite images showing China building nuclear silos and its large-scale plutonium production raises further questions.

The Report has been prepared by Mr. Cyrus Ghosh, Intern, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.