Dr. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, delivered a presentation on “Iran: Overlapping Internal and External Crises” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 02 March 2026. The meeting was moderated by Dr. P. K. Pradhan, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA. MP – IDSA scholars participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The presentation examined the present phase of crisis in Iran not as an isolated military exchange, but as the culmination of overlapping internal and external pressures on Iran. Domestic unrest, economic fragility and political contestation have intersected with external coercive diplomacy, military signalling and direct strikes, thereby pushing Tehran toward a more escalatory and risk-acceptant posture. In this interpretation, Iran no longer sees the confrontation as limited to Israel alone; rather, it views itself as being in direct conflict with the United States and considers US bases in the region to be legitimate targets if Washington is militarily involved. The Speaker traced the present crisis to a convergence of internal instability in Iran and renewed external pressure, especially under a framework of coercive diplomacy and military escalation. The implication is that one cannot understand the current confrontation purely through nuclear diplomacy or military moves alone; rather, it reflects a wider crisis of regional order.

Detailed Report

Dr. P. K. Pradhan opened the Session by providing a concise background to the ongoing crisis. He traced the disruption of peace negotiations mediated by Oman and argued that the subsequent killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader precipitated a phase of military confrontation, marked by retaliatory actions by Iran against the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Dr. Saraswat commenced her presentation by underscoring the dual pressures confronting Iran: the intensification of internal unrest on the one hand, and the mounting external threats on the other. The protests and economic pressures within Iran overlapped with renewed US and Israeli threats, thereby producing what the Speaker described as the worst-case strategic scenario for the Islamic Republic. Negotiations, reportedly mediated by Oman, were presented as having unfolded under highly coercive conditions. The Speaker argued that from Tehran’s perspective, diplomacy under such terms came to resemble strategic surrender rather than meaningful compromise. This framing is essential to understanding why Iranian responses became earlier, sharper and more regionally expansive.

Slow strategic strangulation or sharp confrontation, two options were left for Iran to respond in existential terms. Iran’s retaliatory logic, as described by the Speaker is both strategic and asymmetric. Unable to match its adversaries symmetrically across all domains, it has sought to target US bases, symbolic infrastructure and economically sensitive sites in the Gulf. The purpose is not merely retaliation in a narrow military sense, but the creation of a new deterrence equation in which insecurity is regionalised. In effect, Tehran appears to be signalling that if Iran cannot be secure, then no state closely aligned with US military operations should assume immunity from the consequences.

Dr. Saraswat argued that there is a direct U.S. – Iran escalation dynamics from brinkmanship. A key argument advanced by the Speaker is that Iran’s earlier strategy of calibrated response and “strategic patience” failed to arrest the lowering of escalation thresholds by Israel and the United States. The Speaker noted that what began as shadow conflict and indirect contestation has progressively moved toward direct strikes, leadership decapitation attempts, attacks on military infrastructure and threats to regime survival. In this context, Tehran is said to have concluded that the only remaining option is to impose wider costs on its adversaries and on the regional system supporting them.

Dr. Saraswat also placed emphasis on the gradual lowering of escalation thresholds since 2024. What had once been shadow war and proxy competition is described as having evolved into direct missile exchanges, sustained attacks on strategic facilities, and even attempts to target top leadership. This historical sequencing matters, because it supports the argument that Iran’s current posture is a response to the perceived failure of “strategic patience” and restrained retaliation.

The Speaker strongly suggested that Iran now sees the conflict through the lens of survival. Regime change remains a political objective for some actors, but not an assured outcome.  If diplomacy under pressure is equated with strategic surrender, then escalation becomes, from Tehran’s perspective, a means to restore deterrence and improve bargaining leverage. This includes attacks on US bases, symbolic sites, and vulnerable economic targets across the Gulf. Such a strategy is asymmetric: Iran cannot mirror the full technological reach of the US-Israel side, so it seeks to distribute insecurity across the region instead.

The US-Israel strategy may have expanded beyond rollback of Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities toward weakening the regime’s coercive institutions and encouraging internal political rupture. However, the Speaker is cautious: air power and decapitation efforts alone are unlikely to guarantee regime collapse. Iran’s governance system is described as operating through multiple councils and distributed institutions, which may allow continuity even after severe shocks. Thus, while the regime is under strain, its breakdown should not be assumed.

The discussion repeatedly underscored that the Gulf monarchies did not want this war. Their position is structurally vulnerable because US military infrastructure on their soil makes them potential targets, while their economies remain deeply exposed to even limited instability. If oil flows, investor sentiment, aviation routes, or urban security are disrupted, the political and financial fallout could be severe. The mention of attacks or spill over into civilian areas reinforces the point that Gulf vulnerability is not merely theoretical. This condition is described as “reverse entrapment,” whereby weaker allies are drawn into conflict by the decisions of a stronger security partner.

Another escalation is on the Strait of Hormuz where the Speaker suggests that Iran’s objective is not necessarily full closure, but calibrated disruption sufficient to raise freight costs, unsettle energy markets and globalise the effects of the war. In such a scenario, the conflict ceases to be geographically localised and becomes economically international, with Asian economies—especially energy importers earing substantial costs.

Question and Answer

One of the scholars asked how deeply entrenched the ideology of Iran’s Supreme Leader is in Iranian society as nation. The Speaker highlighted an important socio-political tension. On the one hand, there are deep grievances against the Supreme Leader and against the State’s repressive apparatus. Some segments of society may indeed welcome visible setbacks to the regime. On the other hand, external pressure may strengthen siege nationalism and reinforce cohesion among regime loyalists, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Dr. Saraswat added that many Iranians may fear not only regime survival, but the possibility of “Syrianisation” or “Libyanisation”—that is, State collapse followed by prolonged civil conflict and fragmentation.

One participant asked whether Iran had done the right thing by escalating the war and whether it had the capacity to sustain such a campaign. The response was that, from Tehran’s perspective, escalation may have become unavoidable once the conflict was framed as existential and once external actors signalled willingness to widen objectives beyond nuclear rollback.

Another important line of questioning concerned whether Iran had missed the opportunity to acquire a nuclear weapon and thereby secure stronger deterrence. The Speaker argued that Iran may have deliberately avoided becoming a “North Korea,” preferring threshold capability and ambiguity as tools of bargaining. Full weaponisation, in this view, would have imposed heavy isolation costs without necessarily solving Iran’s long-term security dilemma.

Questions on China, Russia and wider global implications produced a broader geopolitical reading. The Speaker appeared skeptical of claims that the crisis should be seen primarily through a China-centred lens, but acknowledged that Beijing would interpret it as evidence of continuing US willingness to maintain regional hegemony by force. Similarly, the issue of Russian links to Shahed drone production was raised as a factor that could shape the conflict’s duration and operational character.

Report prepared by Ms. Warisha Wasi, Intern, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.