Dr. R. Vignesh, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Security in the Strait of Hormuz: Assessing the Limits of Military Options” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 18 May 2026. Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.), Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA moderated the meeting. Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The Session highlighted the operational significance of anti-access and area-denial capabilities including missiles, drones, naval mines, fast attack craft, and midget submarines. It argued that even overwhelming conventional superiority faces severe constraints in narrow maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. The discussion further emphasised that contemporary maritime conflict increasingly reflects broader transformations in warfare characterised by non-contact operations, autonomous systems, dispersed infrastructure, and asymmetric escalation. The Speaker concluded that sustainable stability in the Strait cannot be ensured through military means alone and requires sustained diplomatic engagement and negotiated security arrangements. 

Detailed Discussion

In his Opening Remarks, the moderator, Col. Chadha observed that the recent Strait of Hormuz crisis had exposed important limits of conventional military superiority. Despite the overwhelming disparity in economic and military power between the United States and Iran, the United States had not been able to decisively impose its will in the maritime theatre. He argued that the crisis demonstrated how geography, operational circumstances, and the changing character of warfare could enable a relatively weaker actor to neutralise the advantages of a technologically superior military. Referring to the difficulties involved in securing maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, he noted that even extensive naval and air capabilities could not guarantee freedom of navigation when confronted with layered asymmetric threats such as missile batteries, naval mines, drones, and dispersed coastal systems. He emphasised that the issue carried broader lessons regarding the future utility and limitations of military force.

Dr. Vignesh structured his presentation around five themes: the strategic geography of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, the historical legacy of the tanker wars, the evolution of Iran’s asymmetric naval doctrine, the operational challenges involved in securing the Strait militarily, and the broader strategic implications emerging from the current conflict.

The Speaker began by outlining the geographical and economic significance of the Persian Gulf. The Gulf, bordered by eight littoral states including Iran, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE, contains a substantial proportion of global crude oil and natural gas reserves. Iran possesses the longest coastline in the Gulf, stretching across the northern rim and providing it with significant geographical leverage. Prior to the present disruption, the maritime routes in the region carried around 20 percent of global LNG trade. The Strait of Hormuz, at its narrowest point approximately 33 Km wide, remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, through which a substantial portion of global seaborne oil trade and petroleum consumption passes daily. Therefore, any instability in the Strait has immediate implications for global energy security, maritime commerce, and international economic stability.

Tracing the historical origins of the current crisis, Dr. Vignesh revisited the tanker war phase of the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s. After the war reached military stalemate in 1982, both Iran and Iraq increasingly targeted commercial shipping and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Between 1981 and 1987, hundreds of vessels were attacked and significant losses were inflicted on maritime traffic. In response to growing threats to shipping, the United States launched Operation Earnest Will in 1987 to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers. However, the mission gradually evolved into direct confrontation with Iran, culminating in Operation Praying Mantis after the American frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian naval mine in 1988. The succeeding American retaliation destroyed several Iranian naval assets and offshore platforms. As a result, Iran shifted rapidly toward asymmetric and hybrid naval warfare strategies.

Further, Dr. Vignesh pointed out Iran’s dual naval structure comprising the conventional Islamic Republic of Iran Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN). While the conventional navy focuses on blue-water operations, the IRGCN was specifically organised for asymmetric and irregular maritime warfare. Its doctrine emphasises hit-and-run tactics, swarm tactics, ambushes, and shoot and scoot. The purpose of this strategy, he argued, was not to achieve conventional naval superiority but to impose costs, create uncertainty, and complicate operations for a technologically superior adversary.

Dr. Vignesh explained that since the 1990s, Iran has increasingly viewed the Strait of Hormuz as a critical strategic asset. Iranian leaders repeatedly signalled that disruption or closure of the Strait could be used in response to external pressure or sanctions. Statements by Iranian political leaders during the 2011–12 sanctions period, following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, and after the reported U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025, reflected continuity in Iran’s strategic signalling. He argued that the Strait had evolved beyond a geographical chokepoint into a coercive diplomatic tool central to Iran’s deterrence posture.

The presentation then assessed Iran’s principal asymmetric maritime capabilities. Dr. Vignesh highlighted Iran’s extensive network of land-based anti-ship missile systems, including both ballistic and cruise missiles deployed along the southern coastline. Iran’s geography, particularly its mountainous terrain, underground tunnel networks, and mobile launchers, significantly enhances the survivability of these systems. He discussed systems such as the Khalij Fars and Hormuz-2 anti-ship ballistic missiles, as well as anti-ship cruise missiles (Abu Mahdi) reportedly capable of striking targets at distances exceeding 1,000 kilometers.

Dr. Vignesh further examined the role of the IRGCN’s fast attack craft, which are designed for swarm attacks and high-speed manoeuvres. Their low radar signatures and heavy armament make them effective for asymmetric maritime warfare. Iran’s growing use of aerial drones, unmanned surface vessels (USVs), and unmanned undersea vessels (UUVs) was also highlighted.

Naval mines were identified as another critical element of Iran’s anti-access strategy. Even limited mine deployment, he argued, could significantly disrupt maritime traffic, delay naval operations, and increase insurance and transit costs. He also discussed Iran’s fleet of midget submarines, particularly the Ghadir-class submarines designed for shallow-water operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Their small size, low acoustic signature, and ability to conduct ambush-style attacks and mine-laying operations make them difficult to detect in congested maritime environments.

A recurring theme throughout the presentation was the strategic role of geography. Dr. Vignesh argued that Iran’s terrain, dispersed deployment patterns, underground infrastructure, and mobility created a “whack-a-mole” operational problem for the United States and Israel, wherein destroyed launch sites could rapidly be replaced or relocated, thereby complicating efforts to fully neutralise Iran’s strike capabilities.

Turning to the operational challenges of securing the Strait militarily, Dr. Vignesh argued that both offensive and defensive approaches faced severe limitations. Offensive operations aimed at neutralising Iranian capabilities would likely require sustained ground deployments to physically secure coastal areas and islands around the Strait. While such operations could theoretically be undertaken by U.S. Marine Corps and airborne units already deployed in the region, maintaining long-term control would involve high casualties, logistical strain, and sustained resource commitments.

The Speaker also assessed the limitations of defensive naval escort operations. Modern convoy operations would require layered protection against missiles, drones, submarines, mines, and fast attack craft simultaneously. Large commercial convoys stretching across several kilometers would remain vulnerable to coordinated multi-domain attacks despite substantial naval protection. He therefore argued that such operations would be resource-intensive, operationally complex, and potentially unsustainable over prolonged periods.

Dr. Vignesh referred to the short-lived U.S. maritime security initiative termed “Project Freedom,” announced in May 2026, as evidence of these operational difficulties. Although intended to establish maritime security zones and offensive interdiction capabilities, the operation was suspended shortly after its announcement following coordinated Iranian missile and drone strikes against shipping targets. According to Dr. Vignesh, the episode illustrated the practical limitations of rapid maritime security constructs in the Strait of Hormuz.

On the legal dimension, Dr. Vignesh argued that Iran’s attempts to impose transit fees or exercise unilateral control over the Strait would face significant international resistance. Since the Strait constitutes an international waterway governed by principles of transit passage and freedom of navigation, major maritime and energy-importing powers would be unlikely to accept unilateral restrictions. He suggested that negotiated arrangements involving sanctions relief and security concessions would likely prove more sustainable than attempts to impose coercive transit regimes.

In his concluding observations, Dr. Vignesh argued that the crisis reflected an increasingly unstable escalatory dynamic in the maritime domain with direct implications for global energy markets. He stressed that Iran did not need to sink large numbers of vessels to generate strategic effects; even limited disruption or the perception of insecurity was sufficient to alter shipping behaviour and increase insurance and transportation costs. Despite overwhelming conventional superiority, the United States remained constrained by geography, operational complexity, political limitations, and Iran’s long-developed asymmetric capabilities. He concluded that military means alone were insufficient to ensure stable maritime transit and that sustained diplomatic engagement remained the only viable long-term solution.

During the discussion, participants raised questions regarding Iran’s defence-industrial adaptation, reverse engineering practices, societal resilience, the limitations of conventional military power, the role of intelligence assessments, the Houthis and Red Sea operations, the use of satellite navigation systems, and the broader transformation of warfare.

Dr. Vignesh, in response to questions regarding reverse engineering and asymmetric innovation, noted that Iran had extensively reverse engineered foreign technologies, including fast attack boats originally developed for recreational purposes. He also emphasised the importance of geography in military operations, citing historical examples such as the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest to illustrate how terrain can negate numerical and technological superiority.

The Session concluded with broader reflections on the transformation of warfare in an era increasingly characterised by non-contact operations, multi-domain conflict, drones, autonomous systems, and asymmetric escalation.

The Report has been prepared by Mr. Vinayak Rajpurohit, Intern, Military Affairs Centre, MP-IDSA.