Jagannath Panda replies: It is unwise to use the term “unrest” with regard to Tibet and the situation in Xinjiang. Both are different types of conflicts and could be termed probably as ethnic crisis-driven areas of China. The Tibet issue has special importance for Indian security as almost 120,000 Tibetan exiles live in India; and also because the Tibetan factor is inextricably linked with the Sino-Indian border dispute. At the same time, the Xinjiang issue also came to the fore when violence broke out between Uyghurs and Hans and the consequent crackdown on Uyghurs by the Chinese government. India of course is naturally more concerned about the situation in Tibet because of the large Tibetan exile community living in India and how their activities might evolve in the post-Dalai Lama period. As for Xinjiang, Indian worries centre on the connections between Uyghur militants and transnational jihadist groups. Above all, the most important implication for India is in terms of the geographical proximity of both Xinjiang and Tibet. Xinjiang borders Ladakh region of India. The eastern part of Ladakh became a disputed area between China and India in the wake of the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in 1962.

Udai Bhanu Singh replies: The Indian Navy (IN) has both security and economic interests in seeking out port facilities in countries like Vietnam and Cambodia. IN regularly holds naval exercises (Milan) with other navies (including from Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand). IN ships frequent Vietnamese ports like Ho Chi Minh City and Haiphong; recently, between May 30 and June 2, 2010, INS Ranjit and INS Kulish docked in these ports. India has an arrangement with Vietnam for this purpose. Usually, advance information is sought for berthing facility and logistic supplies. It forms part of IN’s diplomatic exercise in peace time. (Interactions such as these at their basic level may be viewed as a CBM and at their most intense as an alliance partnership). It is assumed that the commitments that nations make for war time eventuality would be of a different order.

K. Subrahmanyam replies: The minimum deterrent should spread over three media, air, land and sea (under the sea). It should be sufficient to absorb a first strike by the adversary and then retaliate. It should be sufficient to deter two adversaries who have a nuclear proliferation relationship of over 34 years. This cannot be less than hundred but the optimum figure is a matter of strategic judgement.

Jagannath P. Panda replies: Though China’s military build-up in Tibet is primarily to take control of the region and make it one of China’s most powerful province; some of its new reach in terms of strategic bombers and long-range missiles would easily enable it to overcome India’s existing detection capabilities. The current plan of missile deployment is attached to the Chinese strategy of its rail linkages offering advantages to the Chinese troops to deploy the rail-car missiles along the border. The PLA’s capacity to move these missiles on wheels and aircraft easily in the Tibetan region indicates the logistical and mechanical revolution that is undergoing in PLA. The completion and execution of the Qinghai–Tibet railway and the expanded railway network up to the Nepal border poses some concerns too. On the Tibetan plateau, a number of new major airbases along with the innumerable newly developed satellite airstrips provide the Chinese Air Force capability to execute offensive operations over the Himalayas. In the west, the Chinese military has invested in logistical build-ups like a metallic highway capable of carrying battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and other technological equipment in Lhasa.