Game theory can be helpful in understanding how India and Pakistan can get out of the low paying unhelpful situations, throw light on crisis escalation and crisis stability, and to understand their nuclear thresholds.

There is a need to conclusively revisit the issue of India’s response, and other pro-active measures, to deter and forestall terrorist attacks in future.

Pakistan’s conciliatory approach towards India is tactical and could change rapidly if the army decides that its interests are better served through a more offensive posture.

The success of high-level talks between India and Pakistan would depend on how the media shape popular opinion in the two countries and popular support to take the relationship forward.

The article fleshes out Pakistani first use options for an informed discussion on the implied nuclear threat that Pakistan sometimes resorts to.

The aversion in India to dealing directly with Pakistan's military establishment is entirely understandable, but is also unreal given the power dynamics of Pakistani politics.

In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing.